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Abstract
This thesis identifies a number of weaknesses and omissions in the literature on 
juridification and responds in four main ways. Firstly, it introduces and defends an 
empirical definition of juridification as the governance of political or regulatory 
relationships by law and legal considerations. Secondly, it proposes and utilises a method 
of testing juridification, through a qualitative approach to indicators, and explores the utility 
of these indicators. Thirdly, it seeks to understand, through an examination of two case 
studies (the Commission for Racial Equality and the Office of Fair Trading) why 
juridification sometimes occurs and sometimes fails to occur. Fourthly, it explores the 
implications of the findings for the literature dealing with regulatory strategy.
It is argued that the evidence of the case studies generally supports the regulatory strategy 
literature. Relationships between the regulatory agencies and their regulatees were 
generally characterised by informal contacts, with law remaining principally in the 
background. This general lack of juridification was, moreover, caused by the factors 
emphasised in the literature on regulatory strategies. However, this general support to the 
regulatory strategy literature is qualified by two exceptions -  both areas of regulation which 
have been substantially affected by EC law. The exceptions suggest firstly that there may 
be cases in which juridification can occur despite a persuasive regulatory strategy, and 
secondly that persuasive regulatory strategy is not always the predominant strategy. The 
literature on regulatory strategies may thus require some revision.______________________
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CHAPTER 1
Juridification
Introduction
In recent years, there has been a growing number of studies referring to the 
phenomenon of ‘juridification’, in such diverse areas as arbitration (Flood and Caiger 
1993, Langer 1998, Brooker 1999), employment relations (Browne 1994), financial 
services (Vogel 1996), central-local government relations (Loughlin 1996), housing 
policy (Stewart 1996), utilities regulation (Scott 1998), competition policy (Maher 
2000) and military law (Rubin 2002). These support previous studies arguing that 
processes of juridification were occurring in the areas of industrial relations (Simitis 
1987), social welfare (Partington 1987), corporate structures (Kubler 1987) and antitrust 
(Hopt 1987). The literature is an international one, with juridification ‘trends’ being 
claimed for Germany,1 Italy,2 Ireland,3 the US,4 and the UK.5
This PhD thesis arises from a critique of this burgeoning literature. In this 
chapter the nature of that critique is set out. It begins by noting the variety of definitions 
of juridification, and the failure to understand how these definitions relate to each other. 
It tries to address this shortcoming, not only by arguing in favour of one definition that 
is particularly suitable for empirical investigation (the governing o f a political or 
regulatory relationship by law or legal considerations), but by discussing some of the 
methodological issues that attaches to this definition. This also helps to address the fact 
that, in general terms, the juridification literature has been much stronger in the area of 
normative theory than in its treatment of how to measure and identify the phenomenon. 
Next, the analysis of the juridification literature turns to its treatment of causes, and it is
1 Indeed, this is where the literature stems from -  see Habermas (1986) and Teubner (1986,1987).
2 One example is Corsi (1987) who writes about the area of antitrust.
3 See, for instance, Browne (1994) on the area of industrial relations.
4 At least according to the definition that will be accepted: the legalisation of American politics has long 
been noted and discussed by academics -  e.g. Vogel (1986), Kagan (2001).
5 E.g. Loughlin (1996), Scott (1998), Rubin (2002). But not Latin America, according to Peruzotti (1995), 
who argues that low juridification has long been one cause of institutional weaknesses.
argued that there is a tendency either to provide very broad explanations of 
juridification or to examine juridification as part of a general theory, such that 
juridification is seen as an inexorable phenomenon rather than as a variable. Finally, it 
is noted that there is a failure to realise that the claims made in this literature have the 
potential to conflict with the predictions made in another body of literature that focuses 
on regulatory strategy.
The remainder of the PhD responds to the analysis in this chapter by aiming to 
fulfil three broad purposes, as follows:
a) Firstly, it aims to confront selected elements of the juridification literature with 
claims arising from work on regulatory strategies, focusing on the literature that is 
most relevant for regulatory agencies. It is argued that when the focus is on the 
conduct of regulatory agencies, and their relationships with regulatees, there are 
many reasons why we would expect law to be less important a driver than the 
juridification literature might suggest. The case studies are used to explore this 
question further, with the experiences of regulatory agencies used to explore the 
nature of any juridification trends or counter-trends.
b) Secondly, it aims to find a way of empirically examining juridification in the case of 
regulatory agencies. In this chapter, a definition of juridification is set out and 
defended. The chapter also proposes a method of testing juridification through a 
qualitative approach to indicators. These indicators are then used in the case studies 
before their utility is assessed in Chapter 7.
c) Thirdly, it seeks to examine in detail two selected cases and to use them inductively 
to add to our understanding of when and why juridification occurs (or does not 
occur) in regulatory relationships. The reason that an inductive approach is 
necessary is the lack of appropriate theoretical framework in the current literature on 
juridification.
Finally, it should be added that the findings of the case studies prompted this 
thesis to consider a fourth point: the impact of growing juridification on the regulatory 
strategy literature -  especially its central prediction that regulatory strategy tends to be 
predominately persuasive in nature. This issue is discussed in the course of Chapter 7.
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The juridification literature: in search o f an empirical approach
Given the dramatic growth of the literature on juridification within the past 
fifteen years, it may come of a surprise that it has done so without reaching a consensus 
as to the appropriate meaning of the word ‘juridification’. This section aims to address 
this difficulty, by settling on one definition that is particularly amenable to empirical 
investigation.
The section begins by looking at Teubner’s approach - largely because the 
subject of juridification is so associated with his work. It is argued, however, that 
Teubner’s analysis is not suitable for an empirical study of juridification for two main 
reasons: it does not allow for the treatment of juridification as a variable, and it focuses 
less on juridification itself than on the problems caused by juridification. Next, the 
section turns to the literature since Teubner, and picks out two main strands: one seeing 
juridification in terms of the reduction of autonomy caused by state intervention; the 
other defining juridification in terms of legalisation. It will be argued that the latter 
definition contains certain advantages as a focus of empirical analysis. The section then 
ends with a consideration of how this might work in practice, considering especially the 
empirical understanding of law that underpins the definition of juridification as 
legalisation.
Teubner and juridification
The term ‘juridification’ was first used in the context of labour relations in 
Weimar Germany - a polemical term, intending to point to the way in which the legal 
formalisation of labour relations served to neutralise genuine political class conflicts.6 It 
was later developed in particular by two theorists: Jurgen Habermas and Gunther 
Teubner. For Habermas (1986), juridification denoted what he called the 
“colonialisation of the life-world”, by which previously autonomous areas of social life 
became colonised by government through law. Habermas pointed to a series of 
juridification ‘thrusts’ with law used each time as the means of legitimating growing 
state intervention.
6 See Teubner (1987: 9)
Teubner basically accepted this analysis but focused more on its ramifications. 
He began by rejecting three prior usages of the term. The first was the notion of 
juridification as the proliferation of law -  the “flood of norms” definition. The second 
was juridification as the “expropriation of conflict”, whereby human conflicts were 
formalised and distorted by being subjected to legal processes. The third related 
specifically to the legal formalisation of labour relations so as to neutralise genuine
•  • • • 7political class conflict -  hence juridification as “depoliticisation through law”.
Instead of these, Teubner (1987) argued that juridification should be defined as 
the “materialisation of law”. The word ‘materialisation’ relates specifically to Weber’s 
distinction between two ‘ideal’ types of law: formal and material. The former implies 
the application of universal norms so that “in legal procedures, in both substantive and 
procedural matters, only unambiguously general characteristics of the facts of the case 
are taken into account”. The latter implies the introduction of substantive values into 
law so that sociological, economic or ethical argument takes the place of legal concepts 
(Teubner 1987: 17). For Teubner, regulation inherently implies the materialisation of 
law: as it implies the intervention into areas of social life in which law has previously 
had little role. Paradoxically though, law is used by the state in the first place precisely 
because of its formal qualities - its appearance of neutrality. The result, according to 
Teubner, is a kind of regulatory failure -  what he calls the ‘regulatory trilemma’.
It is worth briefly noting what this ‘regulatory trilemma’ consists of. Teubner 
begins by separating out three fields: law, politics and the social field subject to state 
intervention. He then theorises that, in practice, these three fields conflict in one of the 
following three ways:
■ They ignore each other in a kind of mutual indifference, such that the proposed 
intervention has no effect.
■ Law becomes politicised, or socialised.
■ Politics or the social field becomes legalised.
The rest of Teubner's article is then devoted to considering whether or not any solutions 
exist to this regulatory trilemma -  what he calls “the problem of juridification” 
(Teubner 1987: 5).
1 For the reasons why these definitions were rejected by Teubner, see Teubner (1987: 6-13).
Although it is not proposed here to discuss in detail the merits or otherwise of 
Teubner's analysis,8 it is at least necessary to consider the applicability of his analysis 
for empirical purposes - if only because so many subsequent writers base themselves 
upon it.9 In this regard though, his account is problematic on a number of levels.
One problem is the emphasis given to the effects of juridification on the law as 
opposed to political relationships. Partington, writing on the subject of social welfare, 
expresses what might be seen as the natural reaction of a political scientist (Partington 
1987: 435):
There is a danger that concentrating on law, the politics of welfare will be 
forgotten or, at least down-played... [S]ocial welfare must at base be a matter 
of politics, not of law. In so far as juridification suggests that there is a 
problem which is legal or jurisprudential in nature, it seems to me to be 
inappropriate.
A more fundamental difficulty with Teubner's analysis comes out of his 
proposed solutions to the problem of juridification. Take for instance, his treatment of 
the practice of ‘bargaining in the shadow of the law \ by which law essentially serves to 
regulate systems of negotiation (Teubner 1987: 34):
Events regularly take the following course. First, law is primarily used to 
bring about a certain kind of behaviour by the threat of negative sanctions.
However, enforcement deficits appear which oblige parties concerned to 
transform the enforcement systems into negotiation systems... Indeed, there 
are even interpretations of regulatory law which warn against taking the 
implementation of law too seriously. Strict enforcement of the book often 
appears unreasonable and endangers the precarious regulation situation 
(Bardach and Kagan 1982)... These strategies will not solve all the problems 
of juridification, nor will they reverse the process of juridification as such.
On the contrary, the legal regulation of self-regulation can itself be seen as a 
continuation of the juridification trend, but - and this would be the crucial 
step forward - it would help steer the process into more socially compatible 
channels.
The reason that the legal regulation of self-regulation is seen as a continuation 
of the juridification trend is because it is one prong of the regulatory trilemma - the 
prong that says that law will be ignored. It is important to appreciate the implications of
8 Which in any case is tied to his theory of ‘autopoeisis’ or self-reflexivity of law -  see Teubner (1988).
9 Aside from the works included in his edited volume (Teubner 1987), many subsequent works begin by 
quoting Teubner, even if they do not directly utilise his analysis (see e.g. Loughlin (1996) and Scott 
(1998)).
this argument. For Teubner, essentially all regulation is juridification as it implies the 
introduction of law into areas of social and political life previously untouched by it. 
Juridification does not, however, imply a particular role for law once it is introduced. 
Law could be heavily influential in governing these areas of social and political life, or 
it could sit in the background, gently shaping and structuring what goes on. Or, as 
Teubner writes above, it could be deliberately ignored. In any case, Teubner’s claim 
that there is an inexorable trend in juridification is easily indicated -  indeed, every new 
regulation provides a fresh confirmation. At the same time, however, this precludes the 
possibility of examining whether juridification has occurred within a regulatory regime, 
or the possibility of examining variations in juridification.10
There is another difficulty with Teubner's account in terms of its applicability 
for empirical investigation. This is that his analysis is fundamentally concerned with the 
normative aspects of juridification. It begins by referring to juridification as “an ugly 
word, as ugly as the reality as it represents”. The aim of most of the article is the 
“definition o f the problem of juridification” (his emphasis). The remainder looks at 
possible solutions to this ‘problem’. Partington's response in the same volume is to 
argue that “I think it is important that, at least in the first analysis, these value 
judgements about the phenomenon of juridification should not be accepted without 
question” (Partington 1987: 421). This would surely be right for an empirical analysis 
of the phenomenon of juridification, but this is not Teubner’s subject which is the 
problem of juridification.11 Teubner is less concerned with juridification as such than 
with its dysfunctional effects, and this should not come as too much of a surprise: the 
breadth of his definition of juridification lends itself to this focus.12
For these two reasons therefore - the breadth of definition used and the way in 
which value judgements about juridification are tied up with its definition - it is
10 Although it might be possible to test Teubner’s other empirical claims by looking at the effects of 
juridification within a regulatory regime -  to see, for instance, if regulation always leads to one of the 
three prongs of the regulatory trilemma.
11 This explains why Teubner’s four ‘definitions’ are distinguished solely by the normative grounds upon 
which they focus.
12 It is worth noting also that this is shared by other writers in the field -  see, for instance, Voigt’s 
assertion that “juridification is concerned with the conditions for, and limits of, the effectiveness of law as 
a steering mechanism” -  quoted approvingly (and translated) by Simitis (1987: 113). The same point can 
also be made about Habermas, with the term ‘colonialisation’ in itself pointing to the critical nature of his 
account.
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proposed to move away from Teubner and look at other approaches. In looking for a 
suitable empirical definition of juridification, it is proposed also to reject Teubner’s 
opening premise - that “notions of juridification always contain a theory of the 
conditions which it developed, an evaluation of its consequences and a strategy for 
dealing with it” (Teubner 1987: 6). It is submitted that, on the contrary, it is essential to 
separate all these things from its definition. Those approaches which define 
juridification in terms of its causes or its consequences will thus be rejected.
Two approaches to juridification
The following table gives some indication of the range of definitions attached 
to juridification in the context of empirical studies since Teubner (1987):
Simitis 1987 Industrial relations Changing concept o f state functions, with reformulation 
of legal framework
Clark & Wedderbum 
1987
Industrial relations A process by which the state intervenes in areas o f social 
life, through the use of law, in ways which limit the 
autonomy o f individuals or groups to determine their 
own affairs.
Flood & Caiger 1993 Arbitration A process by which lawyers seek to dominate a field
Browne 1994 Industrial relations Use of the law by the State to steer social and economic 
life in a particular direction, thus tied irrevocably to the 
concept of state intervention and limitation of autonomy 
to determine individual employment relationships.
Cooper 1995 Local government The increasing centring of law in structuring social, 
political, cultural and economic life.
Vogel 1996 Financial services and 
telecommunications 
regulation
Putting informal rules into legal form.
Loughlin 1996 Central-local 
government relations
Tendency towards greater legalisation -  the 
transformation from folk law to jurist law.
Stewart 1996 Housing law The increasing spread of law and legal constructions into 
social life.
Scott 1998 Utilities regulation A process by which relations hitherto governed by other 
values and expectations come to be subjected to legal 
values and rules -  ‘the tendency to formalise all social 
relations in juridical terms’.
Maher 2000 Competition policy The replacement o f discretionary political action with 
more juridical norms based on EU competition rules.
Rubin 2002 Military law Adopts definition o f Scott 1998.
What all these definitions have in common is the recognition of a changing role 
for law. Note also that none of them equate juridification with simply ‘more law’ or
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even ‘more complex law’, although some of the definitions do attach a significance to 
what might be called the ‘growing reach’ of law. The differences between the 
definitions, however, are more striking than the similarities. In particular, it is possible 
to separate two main strands. On one side, Clark and Wedderbum (1987), along with 
Browne (1994), equate juridification with the limitation of autonomy through state 
intervention,13 On the other side, writers such as Stewart (1996), Loughlin (1996) and 
Scott (1998) do not refer at all to a reduction in autonomy nor even to state intervention, 
but see juridification as a process of legalisation.14
The two definitions reflect the fact, already noted above, that there are different 
stages in the use of law. The first definition of juridification as the limitation of 
autonomy through state intervention suggests that law may now be used in an area 
which was previously unregulated.15 It is less clear though as to what the actual role of 
law will be within this area of social life. It will be seen shortly how Clark and 
Wedderbum attempt to resolve this issue. On the other hand, the definition of 
juridification as legalisation is one that focuses directly on the role of law within a 
regulatory field. Juridification is thus firmly understood as the phenomenon of law 
being in the foreground of relationships.
Aside from this, there are some obvious practical differences between the two 
definitions. It has just been noted that juridification as the limiting of autonomy does 
not necessarily imply the use of law, but can include non-legal measures such as 
changes in tax incentives. On the other hand, neither does legalisation necessarily imply 
a reduction of autonomy - law indeed could have the effect of increasing autonomy.16 It
13 A question worth considering is whether it is a coincidence that both these writers, as well as Simitis 
(1987) (who shares the basic definition, but focuses less on the reduction of autonomy aspect), are writing 
about the same policy area -  industrial relations -  or whether there is something inherent about this area 
of policy that makes a focus on government intervention particularly beneficial. If  the latter is the case, 
then this constitutes another argument for adopting the other definition of juridification as legalisation.
14 Of the others, Flood and Caiger (1993), by equating juridification with actions by lawyers, prejudice 
the discussion of what (and who) causes juridification, whilst the account of Simitis (1987) is 
fundamentally normative in nature, and thus neither are considered here.
15 Although this is not necessarily the case -  state intervention could also occur through means which do 
not require the use of law, such as the use of economic instruments. See Clark and Wedderbum (1987: 
168).
16 In fact, Clark and Wedderbum explicitly make this point, as follows: “All juridification involves state 
intervention, but not all state intervention necessarily involves juridification. It is thus possible to 
envisage state intervention which decreases the influence of the state and increases the autonomy of 
particular individuals and groups.”
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is clear then that there is a need to choose between these alternatives before moving 
forward.
For Clark and Wedderbum (1987:165), juridification is best defined as:
a process (or processes) by which the state intervenes in areas of social life 
(e.g. industrial relations, education, family, social welfare, commerce) in 
ways which limit the autonomy of individuals or groups to determine their 
own affairs. In the most general terms, it is about the relationship between 
state and society, and the balance between the relative influence on the way 
human beings conduct their lives.
According to this definition, the key test of whether or not juridification has 
occurred lies in whether there has been a reduction of autonomy within a particular 
social sphere. As such, Clark and Wedderbum set out a scheme whereby juridification 
is measured according to the effects of law on at least three levels: the level of public 
policy, the symbolic level and the level of day-to-day industrial relations. The first level 
includes government policy, the policy of political parties and pressure groups and 
debate in the mass media - what might also be called the general parameters of debate. 
It is possible however, for major change to occur on this level, and be expressed 
through legislation, without impacting on either of the other two levels: the symbolic 
level, reflecting changes in perceptions within the social field, and the level of day-to- 
day conduct of industrial relations, described as “probably the most crucial”. With 
respect to this third level, Clark and Wedderbum (1987:168) write:
In sociological terms, the question being addressed here is how far the social 
behaviour and values of the actors in industrial relations arc shaped by legal 
norms, and whether it is possible to discern a secular trend toward the 
juridification of the rules and processes governing the employment 
relationship.
This then is how Clark and Wedderbum try to resolve the issue above as to the 
actual role of law in relationships. They set up a scheme by which it becomes possible 
to talk about levels of juridification. Whilst juridification is indeed initially indicated by 
state intervention, the question is how far this has actually led the limitation of 
autonomy. It is thus possible for juridification to be implied by the initial intervention, 
but not actually experienced by actors within a social field.
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The idea that it is necessary to look beyond merely formal change to see 
whether change is occurring in the nature of actual relationships within a particular 
social sphere, is an important one, and will be revisited in the context of works which 
adopt the definition of juridification as legalisation. It parallels the socio-legal emphasis 
on Taw in action’ over the focus of mainstream legal scholarship on the content and 
style of laws. And the result is that Clark and Wedderbum (at 173) are able to argue that 
the Industrial Relations Act 1971 marked “a significant increase in the extent of 
juridification of collective bargaining at the level of public policy, but there was no 
significant increase in the juridification of collective bargaining at the level of day-to- 
day industrial relations.”17
In the final analysis, though, it is submitted that the approach of Clark and 
Wedderbum should be rejected, for three main reasons. The first relates to the guideline 
set out earlier. By equating juridification with state intervention, their account already 
prejudges discussion of where juridification comes from (i.e. government). It thus 
precludes the possibility of, for instance, juridification caused by the courts. The second 
is more heuristic in nature. Whilst a focus on autonomy may appear attractive, it is 
capable of obscuring more than it reveals. This is well illustrated by considering the 
arguments of Browne (1994) with respect to Irish employment law, that the Unfair 
Dismissals Act 1977 actually made it easier for employers to dismiss employees, at the 
same time as making relationships more formalised and legalised. On the one hand, the 
autonomy of individual employers and employees to negotiate specific settlements was 
limited by the legalisation and codification of this area. On the other hand, however, the 
new legislation gave employers more scope than previously to dismiss employees. In 
this sort of case, a focus on autonomy would seem to be inappropriate, serving only to 
hide changes of power structures. Finally, even if it is possible to focus on the limiting 
of autonomy through state intervention, there seems little distinctive about such an 
approach. Its main questions: ‘when and why does state intervention lead to a reduction
17 This distinction would have been useful for Cooper (1995) in focusing on “local government legal 
consciousness in the shadow of juridification”, where juridification is seen simply as structural legal 
change. Her account struggles with an ambivalence as to whether growing legal consciousness is better 
seen as part of the definition of juridification or as a result of juridification (consider, for instance, the 
sentence: “yet in identifying these changes, it is important not to overestimate the impact or extent of 
juridification...”). By adopting Clark and Wedderbum’s framework, she could have better dealt with the
of autonomy’, could easily be subsumed within the vast public policy and regulation 
literatures dealing with the more general questions of why governments choose to make 
policy in particular areas, and what the conditions are for successful regulation. There 
thus seems to be little obvious benefit in the use of a separate term, juridification, for 
this purpose.19
Juridification as legalisation
For all these reasons, it is proposed to concentrate on the second definition of 
juridification as legalisation. Here though, we have a different set of problems, 
beginning with the most immediate - what is understood by legalisation? In the first 
place, there is an ambiguity inherent in the word: ‘legal’ has not one but two core 
meanings highlighted by its two antonyms: illegal and non-legal. If an action changes 
from being illegal to legal, it was always within the realm of law, but the law has 
changed. Legalised in this instance thus simply means that the law now permits this 
activity.20 If the same action changes from being non-legal to legal, it simply was not
within the realm of law previously, but has become so - whether through government
21legislation, or a court case, or administrative rule-making and so on. Juridification 
relates to this latter meaning of legalised, but even from this basic starting point lie a 
host of difficult issues with which few writing on juridification have attempted to deal 
directly.
The issues become apparent when a work on the legalisation of international 
relations is considered - Goldstein et al (2001). They define legalisation as a particular
relationship between cause and effect”.
18 For usefhl introductions to the public policy literature, see John (1998) and Parsons (1995); for 
introductory texts on regulation, see Baldwin et al (1998) and Baldwin & Cave (1999). Note that this way 
of phrasing the question also points to the normative questions inherent in Clark and Wedderbum’s 
framework: essentially, the third level of juridification depends on the success of government in getting 
past the first level. Such questions of success and failure should not be mixed with the purely empirical 
questions of whether and why juridification is or is not occurring.
Unless the discussion is normative, in which case (as with Teubner), the word juridification is 
specifically being used to imply the changes in law that occur, the regulatory trilemma and so on. In this 
context, it makes sense to talk about the implications of growing state intervention through the concept of 
juridification.
20 As in discussions about the legalisation of cannabis or prostitution.
21 The Concise Oxford Dictionary (8th ed.) offers the following definitions: “1) of or based on law; 
concerned with law; falling within the province of law. 2) appointed or required by law. 3) permitted by 
law, lawful.” Here we emphasise the difference between the first and third meanings.
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form of institutionalisation characterised by three components: obligation, precision and 
delegation. In doing so, they emphasise that legalisation is defined in terms of key 
characteristics of rules and procedures, not in terms of effects. Hence, the degree to 
which rules are actually implemented or the degree of compliance is not included in the 
definition. “To do so,” they argue, “would be to conflate delegation with effective 
action by the agent and would make it impossible to inquire whether legalisation 
increases rule orientation or compliance” (Goldstein et al 2001: 18). The problem is that 
it could equally be argued that if rules are being ignored, then it makes more sense to 
conclude that relations have not been legalised in the first place. Indeed, the statement 
seems to conflict with their own definition of legalisation: what does obligation mean if 
the parties do not feel obligated, and why include precision if the researcher has no 
interest in the degree to which actions are actually governed by rules (as opposed to 
individual preferences and judgements)? Finally, as the authors note themselves, the 
degree of obligation, precision or delegation in formal institutions can be obscured in 
practice by political pressure, informal norms and other factors. If this is the case 
though, the danger of ignoring ‘effects’ seems fairly obvious: an empirical study that 
concentrates solely on the qualities of norms will fail to capture whether relationships 
are legalised in any real sense. In short then, without prejudice to the context of 
international law where it could be that the questions raised by Goldstein et al are of 
special importance, it seems undesirable to extend their definition to the context of 
political relationships generally.
Even so, their approach raises questions. Is it right to say that a decision is 
always more legalised if based on a precise rule rather than a general principle or 
standard? Is the complexity of law a relevant factor? To what extent does the concept of 
legalisation rest on court cases and judicial intervention?
In this regard, it is instructive to consider the arguments of Martin Loughlin. In 
concentrating on the nature of the political relationship between central and local 
government, he makes the following distinction (Loughlin 1996: 365):
Though the nineteenth-century reformation may be understood as a process 
of 'statutorification' of local government, this was not accompanied by a 
juridification of the central-local government relationship. That is, even 
though the central-local relationship was placed on a legal foundation, the
structure of positive law did not serve to define the character of the 
relationship. Statutorification did not, for example, result in the courts 
coming to play an active role in circumscribing the boundaries to local 
government's authority and in determining the character of the central-local 
relationship... These statutes should not be read as instituting a set of legal 
norms governing conduct: rather they should be viewed as establishing an 
interlocking administrative framework through which such understandings 
could evolve in the course of practice.
For Loughlin then, juridification, as legalisation, necessarily means something 
different than simply more law or more complex law. Instead, it implies a change in the 
nature of political relationships from one governed by non-legal considerations to one 
governed by legal considerations.22 At its most extreme, a wholly juridified relationship 
- an ‘ideal* type - would be one in which politics was replaced, with law supplanting 
power structures, decisions about competing resources, public opinion, pressure group 
lobbying and so on in determining the nature and content of that relationship.
Scott (1998: 20), in the course of listing some indicators for juridification, 
implicitly makes the same point:
Though the most visible indicators of juridification are instances of litigation, 
whether judicial review or other forms of action, they are just the tip of the 
iceberg. The seepage of law into the management of relationships... is also 
indicated by the more hidden but growing presence of lawyers at each stage 
of negotiating commercial and regulatory relationships, the increasing use of 
more formal processes of information gathering and enforcement, and the 
hidden growth of technical regulatory rules expressed in a variety of legal 
and sub-legal instruments.
Scott’s phrase, “the seepage of law into the management of relationships”,24 
puts him very close to Loughlin's approach. It is a definition of juridification that is 
neither based on any normative criteria, nor on any assumptions as to its causes or 
origins, and is thus well capable of empirical investigation. It is also a phenomenon that
22 For the definition of law that underpins this, see the below section entitled ‘Testing for juridification as 
legalisation: methodological issues’.
23 Actually, even in this extreme case, far more likely is that politics is displaced, so that in a completely 
juridified relationship, the arena of politics simply moves elsewhere. Examples of this would include 
when a regulated entity in the midst of a juridified relationship with a regulator lobbies MPs for a change 
in the law, or tries to exert pressure through the media. To suggest that politics could disappear is 
moreover hugely problematic from a jurisprudential standpoint, ignoring apart from anything else the 
political nature of law itself, and certainly it is not being suggested that Loughlin or Scott ever make this 
point. Rather, I put it this way simply to emphasise the logical implications and thus the power of their 
definition.
24 Harlow and Rawlings (1997: 313) define juridification very similarly as the “seeping of legal values
ought to be of immense interest to political scientists: not simply because it is a possible 
cause of regulatory failure, but more basically because it goes to the heart of the nature 
of regulation and political relationships.
The key to the definition is the emphasis on relationships being “governed” or 
“dominated” by law and legal considerations. Whilst every regulatory relationship is 
based on law to some extent, the extent to which a relationship can be described as 
juridified thus depends on the extent of the dominance of law in that relationship. It is 
perfectly possible under this definition for relationships to be characterised by partial 
juridification, by stronger juridification in some aspects of the relationships than in 
others, and by changing levels of juridification over time.
The definition of juridification used in this thesis
To sum up: juridification in this thesis is defined as the governing o f a political 
or regulatory relationship by law or legal considerations. As such it implies that law 
will govern or dominate -  that it will be explicitly in the foreground of that relationship. 
It is thus a variable capable of empirical investigation.
It is now possible to respond to the questions posed earlier. Firstly, the extent 
to which juridification may be caused by increasing number of laws, increased rule 
specificity or complexity, reduced administrative discretion or court cases and judicial 
intervention is a matter for empirical investigation - but certainly, on their own, none of 
these things should be equated to juridification per se. A political relationship in which 
the key issue is one of deciding the legal meaning or scope of a particular rule is no 
more or less legalised because that rule is general as opposed to specific. A large area of 
administrative discretion is still capable of leading to juridification if it is filled through 
reference to legal judgments.
Secondly, dealing more specifically with instances of litigation and judicial 
intervention, it is perhaps worth separating between two types of juridification. In Type 
I, the political or regulatory relationship is governed or dominated by litigation or the 
reliance on formal legal processes. In Type II, the relationship is governed by law in 
contexts outside litigation -  indeed, the parties to that relationship may even be in
and culture into regulatory relations”.
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complete agreement. The main point though is that juridification does not necessarily 
imply litigation, and throughout this thesis, this point will be emphasised by continuing
• 25to separate between the two types of juridification when looking at the case studies.
Testing for juridification as legalisation: methodological issues
Having now defined juridification, it is now necessary to turn to a more 
practical question: what evidence should be taken to indicate that juridification is 
occurring?
In order to address this question, it is first necessary to consider a preliminary 
issue: the empirical understanding of law that underlies the definition of juridification. 
The section then turns to the use of indicators. Whilst a number of indicators are 
suggested, it is suggested that the small number of case studies taken in this thesis 
allows for a more in-depth analysis. The question of the usefulness or otherwise of these 
indicators is still important, however, and it is addressed by using the indicators to sum 
up the findings of the case studies. Chapter 7 will then explicitly consider how 
accurately the indicators capture the evidence presented in the case studies.
The empirical understanding of law underlying the definition of juridification
When it is claimed that a political or regulatory relationship is being governed 
by law, what is meant by law? At the very least, it seems clear from those writers who 
have adopted this definition of juridification that law implies state law. Rubin (2002) is 
perhaps the most explicit. He emphasises that juridification (in the context of military 
relations) does not always replace a law-free zone, but that “it might replace informal 
arrangements or even systems of social control, reglementation, normative system of 
folkways which possess law-like characteristics”. Note that by identifying juridification 
with state law, Rubin gets out of having to commit to a jurisprudential definition of law: 
he is prepared to accept that law may be defined widely, but specifically relates
25 Indicators for each type of juridification are set out in the next section. At the end of each empirical 
chapter, these indicators are then used as a way of summing up the extent of each type of juridification in 
the case studies. See further in the below section.
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juridification to a specified type of law. In this instance, a wider definition of law would 
have covered up the trends that were taking place in the area of military relations. It also 
would have made it difficult for Rubin to separate himself from the large literature on 
rules and discretion.26
Whilst Rubin may be the most explicit, other writers similarly assume that 
juridification relates to state law. Loughlin (1996) defines juridification as the 
transformation from folk law to jurist law. Vogel (1996) defines juridification as the
putting of informal norms into legal form.27 Other writers do not refer to this issue
• ■ 28 directly, but implicitly assume that juridification as legalisation relates to state law.
Whilst there seems to be a consensus that law is to be understood as state law, 
this still leaves open another question: how widely the scope of state law should be 
defined. There are two possibilities here. One possibility is to define it narrowly as 
specifically primary and secondary legislation and case law. This is most commonly 
known as hard law -  a term originating in international law, but now widely used in the 
European Union context and also rapidly forming part of the currency of domestic law. 
The other possibility is to define state law much more widely such that it would include 
quasi-legislative instruments such as guidelines, circulars, directives and codes of 
practice, referred to here as soft law, again to reflect its growing international usage in 
legal terminology.
It can be argued that the answer to this dilemma lies in the actual definition of 
soft law, in its original context of international law. Snyder (1993), writing in the EC 
context, defined soft law as “rules of conduct which, in principle, have no legally 
binding force but which nevertheless may have practical effects.” He then provided 
some examples, as follows:
For instance, according to Article 189 EEC, recommendations have no 
binding force. However, the European Court of Justice has held that national 
courts are bound to take them into consideration in deciding disputes, in 
particular where the recommendations cast light on the interpretation of 
national measures adopted in order to implement them or when they are
26 For an introduction, see Hawkins (1992).
27 In terms of Hart (1964), this could be rephrased as the use of a rule of recognition so that the norms 
give rise to legal obligation.
8 See, for instance, Scott (1998) and Maher (2000).
29 Previous terminology has included ‘quasi-law’, ‘quasi-legislation’ and ‘tertiary rules’ - see e.g. Ganz 
(1987) and Baldwin (1995).
designed to supplement binding Community provisions. Similarly protocols 
annexed to the treaties by common accord of the Member States are an 
integral part of the treaties. In contrast, declarations annexed to the treaties are 
generally considered to be political statements, but they too may influence 
Community practice.
In the context of international law, Wellens and Borchardt (1989: 274)) argued that soft 
law “concerns rules of conduct that find themselves on the legally non-binding level (in 
the sense of enforceable and sanctionable through international responsibility) but 
which in accordance with the intention of its authors indeed do possess a legal scope, 
which has to be defined further in each case”.30
Both these definitions distinguish soft law from hard law in terms of legal 
bindingness. As such, they share a certain affinity with the definition of juridification 
that has been adopted: after all, if a relationship is being governed by law, it suggests 
that law is seen as having a binding quality (even if this is only in the sense of providing 
a binding framework within which to negotiate disagreement).
If the first reason for not accepting soft law as part of the understanding of 
juridification relates to the nature of its definition; the second reason lies in its 
uncertainty of its scope in practice. The problem lies with the difficulties of accurately 
delineating the boundaries of soft law as a category. At one end, soft law might be 
difficult to separate from mere political commitments; at the other end, it can achieve a 
binding status such that it becomes akin to hard law. And as Wellens and Borchardt 
(1989: 280) have argued in the field of international law, the legal status of any 
particular soft law cannot be known a priori from its legal form. This leaves the 
question of its status down to how it is interpreted in practice by primary actors.
Nor does it help to rely on the courts themselves to provide an authoritative 
solution to this dilemma. In the English context for instance, the courts have been 
notably inconsistent,31 as highlighted by Baldwin’s (1995) excellent study.32 For
30 They provide a number of examples: for instance, resolutions adopted by international organisations, 
codes of conduct and joint communiques.
31 The question of whether to give legal effect to soft law tends to arise in one of two contexts: firstly, 
where it is argued that the decision-maker is unlawfully fettering his or her discretion through the use of 
rules; secondly, where it is argued that the affected party had legitimate expectations that a particular 
decision would be made on the basis of rules. In both cases, the status of the rules is important, as if  they 
are deemed to be merely administrative guidelines without legal effect, they can neither give rise to 
legitimate expectations nor can they be adjudged to be fettering discretion.
32 See also Baldwin and Houghton (1986) and Ganz (1987).
example: in Bibi.33 Roskill LJ argued that the Immigration Rules were to be considered 
as delegated legislation, specifically authorised in the parent statute. However, a year 
later in Hosenball.34 Lord Denning MR and Geoffrey Lane LJ disagreed, arguing that 
the rules were “a practical guide for immigration officers... little more than explanatory 
notes in the Act itself.” Ultimately, Baldwin (1995: 90-1) is unable to reach any firm 
conclusions, as follows:
First, [tertiary] rules may have very different roles in relation to different 
legal issues and they may possess force only in limited aspects. Second, it 
could be argued (as by Allen) that courts tend to adopt an expedient approach 
to quasi-legislation, deeming it to be administrative where flexibility is 
required and tending to favour the administration. Challenges to the legality 
of such rules can accordingly be deflected with some ease by attributing 
informal status to them and thereby removing the obligation on the rule- 
maker to justify his/her action by statutory authority...
In the absence of any straightforward way of discovering the bindingness of 
soft law, it will be assumed in this thesis that this should be left open to empirical 
investigation.35 Thus only if it appears that soft law is treated as legally binding by the 
parties will it be assumed that this constitutes evidence of juridification. In general 
therefore, it is references to and reliance upon hard law that is seen as constituting the 
more reliable evidence. This whole issue will then be revisited in the concluding chapter 
(Chapter 7) where the implications of the growth or otherwise of soft law to a study of 
juridification will be reconsidered in light of the evidence of the case studies.
Finding evidence of juridification
This leads on to the general manner in which juridification will be inferred 
from the evidence presented in this thesis. Scott (1998) generally favours an indicator- 
based approach, and he lists four: instances of litigation, the growing presence of 
lawyers, the increasing use of more formal processes of information gathering and 
enforcement, and the hidden growth of technical regulatory rules. For the reasons just 
set out, the last of these will not, in itself, be taken as evidence of juridification in this 
thesis. On the other hand, several indicators could be added to his list: references to
33 R v Chief Immigration Officer Heathrow Airport, ex parte Bibi [1976] 1 WLR 979
34 R v Secretary of State of Home Affairs, ex parte Hosenball [1977] 1 WLR 766
35 This approach seems to be backed by Wellens and Borchardt who, for instance, describe the boundary
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(hard) law by regulators and regulatees, a coercive regulatory strategy36 and the 
adoption o f overtly legal values (such as precedent and the rules of natural justice) by 
regulators.37 The following two tables lists all the factors that are considered to be 
evidence and counter-evidence of Type I and Type II juridification respectively. In 
Chapter 7, the utility of these tables will be explicitly considered.
Type I  juridification -  relationship governed by litigation or legal processes
Frequent litigation Most regulatory contact outside the courts
Coercive, inflexible regulatory strategy Persuasive regulatory strategy
Reliance on formal, legal processes Reliance on informal contacts and strategies
Frequent prosecutions in response to breach of law Few prosecutions
High presence / involvement of lawyers Few lawyers
Type II juridification  -  relationship governed by law in contexts other than litigation
Explicit legal argument Explicit non-legal argument
Regulatory contact seen as setting legal precedent Contact not seen as legally significant
High presence / involvement of lawyers Few lawyers
References to law and legal cases No references to law and legal cases
Explicit adoption of overtly legal values Explicit adoption of non-legal values
The tables summarise the main empirical factors that are taken in this thesis as 
evidence of juridification or non-juridification. However, it is not proposed to use these 
indicators rigidly, as might be the case in a quantitative study. Whilst an indicator-based 
approach would clearly be a convenient way to compare a larger number of case 
studies, when only two case studies are taken it is possible to look at the evidence in 
more detail. And upon closer inspection, any one of these indicators might prove 
misleading. To take one example: an increase in lawyers working in a regulatory agency
between soft law and commitment as a “pure matter o f fact”.
36 For the reason why this will be taken as prima facie evidence of juridification, see the section further on 
in this chapter.
37 This last indicator would open up a minefield though if  take too far -  after all, what would determine 
whether a particular value was a legal value? Even the rules of natural justice -  a primary legal value -  is 
also an important administrative value. What might appear to be obeying rules o f precedence from one 
angle might well be described as path dependency from another. Thus the approach taken in this thesis is 
just to take the adoption of legal values as evidence where it has been articulated as such.
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would not be evidence of juridification if it turned out that these lawyers were chosen 
less for their legal knowledge than for their analytical minds,38 that they had a 
peripheral role in policy-making within the agency, and that overall the agency shied 
away from legalism. Thus the case studies themselves are not structured around these 
indicators, but focus, through a close qualitative look at the evidence, on the question of 
whether regulatory relationships really are being governed by law and legal 
considerations. Tables modelled on the above are then used as a way of summing up the 
evidence presented in each chapter. In Chapter 7, the question of the utility of these 
indicators is then considered in light of how well they capture the arguments made in 
the course of the case studies.
Having found an empirical concept of juridification and discussed the evidence 
that indicates its occurrence, it should be possible to test for the extent of juridification 
and to answer two simple questions: when does juridification occur and why does it 
occur. A normal method of answering these questions would begin with the existing 
literature, and use it to identify case studies that would provide a good test of its central 
predictions. It will be seen in the next section, however, that when it comes to the 
juridification literature, this is far from a straightforward task.
The causes o f  juridification
The current literature on juridification
The following table sums up the current state of the literature on the causes of 
juridification (as legalisation). Whilst several writers seem to agree that aspects of 
globalisation and liberalisation are important, it seems clear that there is little consensus 
as to why juridification is occurring.
38 As Wilks (1999) argues was the case in his study of the Monopolies and Mergers Commission.
Stewart (1996) Housing law Ideological intervention attempting to strengthen 
civil society
Loughlin (1996) Central-local government 
relationship
Ideological intervention from government, 
piecemeal and ill-thought out nature of imposed 
change.
Vogel (1996) Financial services regulation Pro-competitive policies, belief in proper 
procedure
Kagan (1997) General Increasing competition, intensified international 
competition brought about by globalisation.
Harlow and 
Rawlings (1997)
T elecommunications 
regulation
Liberalisation of market. Globalisation. Influence 
of international competition law.
Scott (1998) Utilities regulation Processes of liberalisation
Maher (2000) Competition law Incorporation of EC law
Rubin (2002) Military law Influence of European Convention o f Human 
Rights and EC Directives.
Before discussing where, in general terms, the juridification literature leads a 
researcher looking to explain the presence or absence of juridification, it is necessary to 
look at some o f the above explanations in a little more detail. In this section, we focus 
on four explanations: liberalisation, globalisation, the impact on European law and the 
rationalisation of politics.
a) Juridification caused by liberalisation
There are a number of writers who discuss the link between the liberalisation 
of markets and juridification, including Vogel (1996), Kagan (1997), Harlow and 
Rawlings (1997) and Scott (1998).
Stephen Vogel describes the British pattern of regulatory reform as “pro- 
competitive disengagement”, because it involves both the active promotion of 
competition and a further detachment of government from industry. One o f the main 
features of this pattern of reform is that the government “codifies and juridifies 
regulation”, as he writes (at 132-3):39
David Vogel and others have characterised the British regulatory style as 
particularly informal and consensual, but regulatory reform in the 1980s has 
moved it distinctly toward a more "U.S.-style" approach based on neutral 
criteria, fixed procedures, formal debate and openness to appeal... In part this
39 Later in this chapter, it will be seen how the central research question that this thesis seeks to answer 
relates precisely to the first part of this extract.
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trend follows naturally from the government's pro-competitive policy, which 
requires stronger and more sophisticated regulation to enforce competition.
In addition, however, the belief in proper procedure and fair competition 
have made the United Kingdom particularly susceptible to the American 
disease: more lawyers and ever more complex and detailed rules...
More generally, he argues that juridical reregulation is used to cope with the 
growing complexity of markets, with regulations typically made more codified and 
legalistic as the number and variety of market players increases.40 Kagan (1997) makes 
a similar link, quoting from Vogel in the process. But Scott (1998: 20), whilst also 
connecting the two, puts forward a different argument:
The main factor in increasing the importance of law in the utilities sectors has 
been the processes of liberalisation which have been developed some years 
after privatisation in most of the utilities sectors. Liberalisation has had the 
effect of multiplying the number of players participating in each sector (both 
regulatory and commercial) and tended to threaten the consensual, 
bureaucratic models of provision and regulation which carried over from the 
era of public ownership. Increasingly these more numerous players are 
seeking to test their rights and obligations against the legal frameworks of 
each sector.
Thus, the authors emphasise different mechanisms by which juridification 
comes about. For Vogel and Kagan, juridification is government-led, via a more 
legalistic style of regulation. For Scott, a greater stress is placed on legal challenges by 
market players. Harlow and Rawlings (1997: 361), in the context of their case study of 
UK telecommunications regulation, accept both views, as follows:
The recourse to such open, inclusive procedures can be seen to illustrate the 
process of juridification in the context of liberalisation. It is only natural that 
litigation should consequently grow, and recourse to lawyers increase, as 
interests in the industry diverge and the scope for consensus in the regulatory 
regime diminishes.
Finally, whilst all these writers suggest that liberalisation is a cause of 
juridification, it is worth noting that only Scott (1998: 56-7) tries to come up with a 
more general hypothesis of juridification. His suggested formula is that the more a 
market is liberalised, the more juridification there will be in the regulation of that 
market. He finds initial support for this hypothesis by noting that “the greatest incidence
40 Juridical reregulation is defined as the putting of informal rules into legal form, putting tacit rules into 
written form, and the formalising of procedures.
of litigation has been in the telecommunications sector, where liberalisation is most 
advanced, and that there has been virtually no litigation in water, the least liberalised 
sector”.
b) Juridification caused by globalisation
Another major explanation given for juridification is the phenomenon of 
globalisation. Such a claim is made by, amongst others, Kagan (1997) and Harlow and 
Rawlings (1997). In addition, the claims of other writers that juridification is caused by 
the influx of supra-national norms is linked to processes of globalisation, although they 
are treated separately.
Kagan argues that the key feature of globalisation is intensified international 
economic competition. This has led to falling trade barriers, improvements in 
international cargo transportation, increased mobility of capital, and sharper world-wide 
competition - all of which have tended to erode long-standing deterrents to litigation. In 
particular, Kagan draws attention to Donald Black's theorem that resort to law increases 
in accordance with the social distance between parties. Globalisation means not only 
that businesses are often dealing with strangers, but also that greater possibilities exist 
for alternative business partners. One further mechanism is mentioned: international 
competition between law firms generates pressures to be aggressive litigators, perhaps 
overcoming a predominant national legal culture of compromise. This argument is made 
especially in the field of international arbitration.41
In their case study of telecommunications regulation within the UK, 
meanwhile, Harlow and Rawlings (1997: 362) include elements of these arguments and 
make some further connections, as can be seen in the following extract:
Globalisation of an industry necessarily affects the scope, direction and style 
of national regulation. There will surely be further pressures here for 
deregulation. OFTEL has in the European context already had occasion to 
review national policy on matters such as interconnection in the light of new 
supra-national requirements... General competition law will play a central 
role, more especially at the European level, where the institutional 
arrangements and jurisprudence are highly developed. Later, we examine 
steps recently taken to revamp OFTEL as a competition authority applying 
broadly-based EC norms. Globalisation will also reinforce the trend away
41 Galanter (1992) is another who notes the spread of US litigation practices through multi-national 
companies, and see further Flood & Caiger (1993).
from informal regulatory relationships characterised by a high degree of 
mutuality or trust. Reference need only be made to market entrants like 
AT&T, well-versed in the legal strategies typical of American regulation.
Globalisation means juridification: in the shape of the corporate lawyer.
Thus overall, it is argued that globalisation has had a profound effect on 
regulatory relations, changing the style of regulation and making litigation more likely.
c) Juridification caused by the influx o f EC law
An argument that perhaps applies more specifically to the UK context is one 
that focuses on the impact of EC law. This connection is made, in particular, by two 
writers: Maher (2000) and Rubin (2002).
In the field of competition policy, Maher argues that juridification reflected the 
dominance of EC law.42 A key section of the Competition Act 1998 explicitly requires 
regulatory actors to act according to the requirements of EC competition law. Before 
this Act was passed, the conduct of competition regulation was largely administrative 
and discretionary. Since the Act, competition regulation has become juridified, with 
frequent reference to legal rules and judgments.
In the field of military law, Rubin points to the combined effect of the 
European Convention of Human Rights and EC directives, with judgments in UK courts 
revealing domestic inconsistencies with each. Previously, the structure of military law 
had been non-juridified, resting on informal arrangements or systems of social control 
and reglementation. The effect of EC law, however, was to open up these areas to civil 
law for the first time.
Taking both together, it emerges that conflicts of norms can be an important 
source of juridification in two ways: they provide increased opportunities for litigation, 
and give rise to pressures for legislative and administrative change. In the case of the 
latter, juridification is implied not directly, but indirectly. After all, it has already been 
argued that more legislation does not constitute juridification in itself, as the key is how 
relationships are affected by that legislation. It is implied indirectly though because if
42 Maher’s arguments are well-supported by policy arguments prior to the Act calling for a convergence 
between English law (which relied on largely discretionary and non-legalistic enforcement) and European 
law (based on a system of per se prohibition rules). See e.g. Wilks (1994), (1999), Whish (1993) and the 
relevant Green and White Papers on competition policy.
distinctive national approaches towards policymaking and implementation are being 
replaced, and if the country being examined is the UK (which, as will be seen, is widely 
claimed to have a distinctively informal and consensual style of regulation), then it 
seems likely that any such replacement would formalise and legalise regulatory 
relationships.43
d) The rationalisation o f politics
The argument that juridification is caused by the ‘rationalisation’ of politics is 
made, in particular, by Martin Loughlin (1996), although his claims are echoed, in 
slightly different terms, by Stewart (1996).
The concept of ‘rationalisation’ is borrowed by Loughlin from Oakeshott and 
described in detail in his concluding chapter. Essentially, it refers to the tendency in 
modem politics for traditions of behaviour to give way to political programmes.44 
Loughlin describes this as an “inexorable trend” that, in the context of central-local 
government relations, has led directly to juridification, as follows (at 380):
From the late 1970s then, the apparatus of government has been identified as 
being part of the problem of devising effective government policies and of 
maintaining innovation and responsiveness in government. The policies 
pursued since then have generally been founded on a set of individualistic 
values and, being based on the single-minding pursuit of efficiency, rooted in 
a means-end rationality. In short, the programme developed by the 
Government has been the epitome of Rationalist politics... [Tjhe 
implementation of this ideological programme has imposed severe strains on 
the traditional government arrangements based on the primacy of practical 
rather than scientific knowledge. As these self-regulatory frameworks have 
been undermined in the name of efficiency or consumer rights, the legal 
structures of government have increasingly been employed as normative 
frameworks. In Britain, rather than being identified as part of the problem of 
government effectiveness, the phenomenon of juridification has become a 
feature of the proposed solution.
In the course of this change, legislation has changed from being largely 
facilitative to instrumental in nature (at p381), there has been a tendency to legislate “on 
the hoof’ as the centre has tried to force through ideological change (p388), and the ill-
43 In Chapter 6, dealing with impact of the Competition Act 1998 which effectively incorporated EC 
competition jurisprudence into UK law, the nature of this transformation is shown clearly.
44 As such, it reflects a particular epistemological premise: that knowledge is best based on reason rather 
than experience -  hence the term “rationalisation”.
thought-out and piecemeal nature of the imposed change has created a normative gap 
which has encouraged subsequent legal challenges.
The theme of ideological intervention from government imposed onto a social 
sphere has also appeared in other works. Stewart (1996) argues that juridification of rent 
relations in the UK resulted from the attempt by government to strengthen civil society. 
This ideological intervention also implied, however, a greater regulatory invasion of 
civil society, and thus the increasing spread of law and legal constructions into social 
life. Moreover, the claim that juridification results from imposed ideological 
intervention might be another way of interpreting the link between liberalisation and 
juridification: after all, the break-up and liberalisation of utility markets was also a 
profoundly ideological act -  the same kind of Rationalist politics to which Loughlin 
refers.
Testing the claims of the juridification literature
In this brief survey, at least four different causes of juridification have been 
identified. In fact though, the number of potential causes of juridification could be seen 
as far greater than this. For Loughlin, juridification is caused by the rationalisation of 
politics. However, its more immediate cause was piecemeal change and a resulting 
normative gap. Kagan points to globalisation as a cause of juridification. But it could 
equally be said that he sees greater relational distances as a cause of juridification.
Moreover, when considering what causes juridification, it is not easy to 
compare different works -  or even different aspects of a single work - directly. 
Frequently they operate on different levels of abstraction. Some writers are simply 
trying to explain the juridification of one particular policy area, and advance localised 
causes. Other writers look to explain the general phenomenon of juridification in terms 
of very broad trends. In some works, it is argued that juridification came about because 
of a specific mix of circumstances; in others, juridification emerges as an inexorable 
trend. Even if we try to focus on the more specific causal mechanisms by which 
juridification is supposed to come about, it transpires that juridification is posited to 
come from just about every source imaginable: from the courts, to regulated companies, 
to legalistic regulation by government, to international sources of law. .
These difficulties pose a significant problem for researchers looking to test for 
the causes of juridification. On the one hand, some of the explanations seem too 
specific. The hypothesis, for instance, that juridification is linked to the degree of 
liberalisation in a market seems to have little to say about military relations or central- 
local government relations. On the other hand, other explanations seem too general to 
use. Indeed, taken to their logical conclusions, they imply that juridification is not only 
a general trend but an inevitable trend. Loughlin states that the rationalisation of politics 
is an inexorable trend and that juridification is one of its results. If this is true though, 
how can we explain variations in juridification? Similarly, given that globalisation is a 
grand historical trend, how could we explain the absence of juridification in a particular 
case?
In light of the many different possible causes of juridification as they emerge 
from the current literature, and the desire in this thesis to treat juridification as a 
variable rather than as a constant, it is proposed to concentrate on examining the causes 
of juridification through an inductive approach to the case studies. A hypothesis of 
when and why juridification occurs can then be developed in Chapter 7.
This leaves one final question: the question of how the case studies are going 
to be chosen. It seems clear that there is little scope to select case studies on the basis of 
a current empirical theory of juridification. Instead, it will be proposed that the most 
fruitful avenue of enquiry will lie in a separate but strongly related literature: the 
literature on regulatory strategies. In order to see why this is the case, we turn now to 
review the relevant features of this literature.
The regulatory strategy literature
Juridification and regulation
Before looking at the claims of the regulatory strategy literature, it is useful 
first to recall exactly what would be implied, in the area of regulatory relationships, by a 
claim that that relationship is characterised by juridification. Firstly, it implies that the 
style of regulation will change. From pursuing largely informal and consensual
regulatory styles, characterised by negotiation and bargaining and two-way education, 
regulatory agencies can be expected to move towards a focus on rules and process, a 
stricter, less flexible interpretation of these rules and processes, and a heavier use of 
prosecution when their regulatees are found to be in breach of those rules.
Then, it would be expected that regulatees, on their part, would respond to such 
a regulatory style either through legal challenges (Type I juridification) or else through 
another law-based response -  whatever this may be (Type II juridification). Either way, 
this claim of the inevitability of juridification means that there will be a joint 
understanding that it is a legal matter at stake which falls to be resolved through legal 
means, and thus that law and legal considerations are governing that relationship.
It is significant then that the literature on regulatory strategies makes almost 
the exact opposite claim.45 Its main predictions are that styles of regulation are most 
likely to be informal and persuasive in nature,46 that there are important reasons 
explaining why formalistic and legalistic regulatory strategies are relatively uncommon, 
and that regulatees, on their part, tend either to co-operate with regulators, or else at 
least to see regulation as a kind of ‘game* characterised more by bargaining than by 
legal obligation 47
In order to show that this is the case, it should be noted firstly that scholars of 
the enforcement strategies of regulators have frequently sought to distinguish between 
two ideal types of strategies: the persuasive and the coercive.48 The persuasive strategy 
is informal, with a large reliance on the giving of information and advice. In place of 
rules, the regulator focuses on general principles; rather than assuming that the regulatee 
is trying to deceive, the regulator begins with a degree of trust. The use of incentives, 
self-regulation and a proactive focus are thus all further characteristics of this strategy. 
The coercive strategy is far more formal, on the other hand, with a stricter emphasis on 
enforcement, a general rule-focus, the absence of any inclination to trust regulatees, and
45 For an introduction to this literature, see Chapter 6 of Baldwin and Cave (1999).
46 This includes the enforcement pyramid model introduced by Ayres and Braithwaite (1992).
47 See the special 1993 edition of Law and Policy 15(3), in which a series of articles use this metaphor of 
regulation as a game, and especially the article by Hawkins and Hutter.
48 See e.g. Reiss (1984), Shover et al (1986), Braithwaite (1985), Grabosky and Braithwaite (1986),
Hutter (1988). The two types of strategy are given varying names: the persuasive strategy is also called 
the ‘compliance’ strategy, the ‘negotiation’ strategy or sometimes the ‘informal’ strategy; whilst the 
coercive strategy is variably known as the ‘deterrence’, ‘legalistic’ or ‘enforcement’ strategy.
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the use of command regulation that is reactive in nature, with penalties for unlawful 
behaviour (used both for specific and general deterrence purposes). Shover et al (1986: 
10) put this distinction in terms which provides a direct link to the juridification 
literature:
In its ideal-typical form, the enforced compliance style of regulation 
encompasses an overriding drive towards the rationalisation of all aspects of 
the regulatory process. Its components include the reliance on formal, 
precise, and specific rules: the literal interpretation of rules: the reliance on 
the advice of legal technicians: the quest for uniformity: and the distrust of 
and an adversarial orientation towards the regulated. The negotiated 
compliance style of regulation reflects a dominant orientation toward 
obtaining compliance with the spirit of the law through the use of general, 
flexible guidelines the discretionary interpretation of rules: bargaining 
between agency and regulated industry conducted by technical experts: 
allowance for situational factors in rule application: and an accommodative 
stance toward the regulated.
There thus seems to be a clear affinity between a regulator’s choice of regulatory 
strategy and the subsequent presence or absence of juridification in the relationships 
with its regulatees. Put simply, the reliance on law and legal tools inherent in the 
deterrence strategy means that it is likely to both reflect and give rise to juridification -  
the dominance of law and legal considerations. On the other hand, if the persuasive 
strategy is used - with its reliance on bargaining and informal contacts - it is far less 
likely that juridification will be found to characterise that regulatory relationship.
It is this inherent link between regulatory strategy and juridification that 
explains why regulatory strategy was seen above as an indicator of juridification. It is 
also the reason why it is feasible for case studies to be selected according to criteria 
found within the regulatory strategy literature. But it is possible to go further than this. 
A final critique of the juridification literature is that it has failed to understand the 
tensions between its claims and those of the literature on regulatory strategy. Choosing 
case studies which explore these tensions is thus particularly desirable. We turn now to 
review the main claims of the regulatory strategy literature in order to show why this is 
the case.
The central predictions of the regulatory strategy literature
Despite the fact that researchers have identified two ideal types of enforcement 
strategy, and noted a number of variations in between, it soon becomes apparent that a 
more general trend has been observed. Indeed, researchers have become so confident of 
this trend that it is fair to describe it as the central claim of the regulatory strategy 
literature.
The basis of this claim is that whilst regulatory strategy can vary from agency 
to agency, there are very strong patterns within countries. In particular, whereas the 
style of regulation in the U.S. is close to a deterrence style, many countries outside the 
U.S. rely predominately on the persuasive strategy.
Many researchers have supported this conclusion. Bardach and Kagan (1982) 
argued that the dominant regulatory style in the U.S. is legalistic and ‘unreasonable*. 
Vogel (1986) also maintained that the U.S. regulatory style is distinctively legalistic 
when viewed in a comparative sense. Braithwaite and Braithwaite (1995), comparing 
Australian nursing home inspectors to those in the US, found that those in the US were 
far more likely to have a rule-focus, whilst the Australian inspectorate relied more on 
general principles and standards. And Kagan (1997 and 2000) attached the concept of 
adversarial legalism to the U.S.49
Outside the U.S., there is quite substantial agreement that whilst regulators 
tend to use a combination of persuasive and coercive strategies, the vast majority of 
action occurs at the persuasive end of the spectrum. Dickens (1970) reached this 
conclusion with respect to local authorities, Cranston (1979) in relation to local 
consumer protection bodies, Hawkins (1983) referring to health and safety inspectors, 
and Hutter (1988) in the context of environmental regulation. It is worth noting also 
Grabosky and Braithwaite's comparative study of 96 Australian regulatory agencies, 78 
of which said that education and persuasion were more important functions for them 
than law enforcement. “In short,” they argue, “the policy of most Australian regulatory 
agencies is all about getting companies to ‘do the right thing’ by as informal and non-
49 In light of these claims, it seems strange that Kagan (1994) suggests in his review article that regulatory 
strategy is difficult to predict and depends on a complex combination of variables. Whilst researchers 
have pointed to a number of variables that affect regulatory strategy (and these are taken up in this thesis 
in Chapter 2), they have also noted strong country-wide trends that make more general prediction 
possible.
confrontationalist a means as possible” (Grabosky and Braithwaite 1986: 190). And 
none of these conclusions are incompatible with Ayres and Braithwaite's well-known 
normative model of enforcement pyramids, by which regulatory action becomes 
increasingly severe when previously less severe measures are ignored by regulatees. 
The following example of an enforcement pyramid provides a good flavour of the 
nature of their argument (1992: 35-6):50
Most regulatory action occurs at the base of the pyramid where attempts are 
initially made to coax compliance by persuasion. The next phase of 
enforcement escalation is a warning letter; if this fails to secure compliance, 
imposition of civil monetary penalties: if this fails, criminal prosecution; if 
this fails, plant shutdown or temporary suspension of a licence to operate; if 
this fails, permanent revocation of licence. This particular kind of 
enforcement pyramid might be applicable to occupational health and safety, 
environment or nursing home regulation, but inapplicable to banking or 
affirmative action regulation... Different types of sanctioning are appropriate 
to different regulatory arenas.
It is easy to add to the list of researchers reaching the same conclusion. 
Hawkins (1984) perhaps made the point most succinctly by entitling one of the chapters 
of his book, “Law as last resort”. Meanwhile, Veljanovski (1984) argued that “it is a 
popular misconception that regulatory enforcement pursues such a penalty approach”, 
citing economic reasons why a flexible enforcement strategy is to be expected. By 1997, 
Rock was claiming that the persuasive strategy was so widespread that “it probably 
deserves to be taken as the major pattern or archetype of formal social control in 
western society” (cited in Hutter 1997: 242). And Clarke (2000), in his survey, 
summarises as follows:
Although it has been subject to extensive debate, the weight of the evidence 
confirms Reiss' (1984) view that the persuasive is likely to prevail over the 
coercive...
50 Ayres and Braithwaite (1992: 38) also argue that “there is a more fundamental enforcement pyramid 
pitched at the entire industry. This is the pyramid of regulatory strategies”. An example of such a pyramid 
begins with self-regulation, before moving up through enforced self-regulation to command regulation 
with discretionary punishment, before finally ending with the least common and most severe form of 
regulation -  command regulation with non-discretionary punishment. With all these pyramids, the point 
emphasised here is how the bulk of regulatory action -  represented by the bottom (wider section) of the 
pyramid -  is informal.
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The point can be made most strongly though by focusing on the country from 
which this thesis takes its case studies - the UK. In particular, consider the study of 
David Vogel, now some 15 years old. He argued that although the dominant style of 
regulation in the U.S. is generally considered to be distinctively legalistic and formal, 
researchers have often overlooked the fact that the dominant style of regulation in the 
UK is almost no less distinctive, as follows (Vogel 1986: 220):
In sum, each nation does exhibit a distinctive regulatory style, one that 
transcends any given policy area. The British government regulates the 
impact of business decisions on the environment in much the same way it 
attempts to control a variety of dimensions of corporate conduct. Regulation 
of industry tends to be more informal in Britain than in the United States, 
more flexible, and more private. Regulatory officials are able to exercise 
considerable discretion and tend to make policy on a case-by-case basis 
rather than through the application of general rules and standards. Little use 
is made of prosecution and much reliance is placed on securing compliance 
through informal mechanisms of social control, including in many instances, 
self-regulation. Regulatory officials tend to have close working relationships 
with the members of the industries whose conduct they are responsible for 
supervising: the latter are closely consulted before rules are issued and 
regulations enforced. In America, on the other hand, regulation tends to be 
highly formalised: it proceeds on the basis of the application of broad rules 
that are made and enforced in accordance with strictly defined procedures.
The entire regulatory process is subject to close scrutiny by the courts, the 
legislature, and the public as a whole. Fines are levied for violations 
relatively frequently and little reliance is placed on industry self-regulation.
In this passage, the tensions between the juridification and regulatory strategy 
literatures become clearly apparent. On the one hand, the central prediction of the 
regulatory strategy literature is that law is less important in the conduct of regulatory 
relationships than the juridification literature might suggest. On the other hand, if UK 
regulation really is experiencing a growth in juridification, this would pose a direct 
challenge to the previous consensus as to the nature of regulatory relationships in the 
UK. And more basically, it would pose a threat to the durability of the persuasive 
strategy itself. This is precisely why it is potentially so valuable to take case studies that 
can explore these issues further. We move now to the final section of this chapter, 
which sets out how these case studies are selected and how the thesis is structured.
Structure o f the thesis
Research questions, methodology and case studies
The analysis in this chapter has suggested that whilst a definition of 
juridification can be found that is amenable to empirical study, there is as yet no 
empirical theory of juridification and its causes that is capable of being tested. It has 
also been noted that the growth of juridification has implications for the current 
literature on regulatory strategy that ought to be explored further, even though it is not 
clear from the literature just how widespread juridification is as a trend.
In response to these points, this thesis seeks to address the following central 
questions:
• How prevalent is juridification?
• What are the causes of juridification or its absence?
• What does a growth of juridification imply for the regulatory strategy literature?
The approach taken to answer these questions is to use the comparative case 
study method, with the experiences of two regulatory agencies examined in depth. In 
light of the above argument that it is not presently feasible to extract an empirical theory 
of juridification (as legalisation) from the literature, these case studies cannot be chosen 
according to a theory of juridification. Instead, they are chosen in relation to theories of 
regulatory strategy, so that their findings can be as relevant as possible to a 
consideration of the relationship between juridification and regulatory strategy. The 
question of what causes juridification will then be answered, as far as can be possible, 
by using an inductive approach to these case studies.
The regulatory agencies chosen are the Office of Fair Trading (OFT) and the 
Commission for Racial Equality (CRE). The OFT was set up under the Fair Trading Act 
1973, and given regulatory duties and powers in two major areas: competition and 
consumer protection. The CRE was established shortly afterwards through the Race 
Relations Act 1976, with primary duties to eliminate racial discrimination and to 
promote racial equality. Both the OFT and the CRE are under-researched: there is no 
book-length study of the former at all and only one twelve-year-old partial study of the
latter.51
The two agencies are chosen according to a ‘most different1 design. It was 
argued earlier that juridification has a strong affinity with characteristics of the 
‘deterrence’ strategy of regulation and thus that the claims made in the juridification 
literature have implications for the literature on regulatory strategy. As such, it is 
especially useful to take two case studies which differ along lines considered significant 
under the regulatory strategy literature. The reasons why the OFT and CRE are ideal for 
this purpose are set out in Chapter 2.
Chapter structure of the thesis
It remains to set out how each chapter of this thesis relates to the central 
research questions.
In the next chapter, the basis of comparison between the two case studies is 
fully set out. The chapter also serves to introduce the two regulatory agencies: their 
powers, duties, procedures and accountability structures at the point at which they were 
first established.
This is followed in the next four chapters by the main body of the thesis. 
Chapter 3 deals with the relationship between the Commission for Racial Equality and 
its regulatees from its establishment in 1977 to 2002, and is thus able to briefly consider 
also the impact of the Race Relations (Amendment) Act 2000. This is then followed by 
three chapters on the Office of Fair Trading: Chapter 4 dealing with its consumer 
protection side, Chapter 5 with its competition side up to the Competition Act 1998, and 
Chapter 6 with the competition side since the Act. The amount of space devoted to the 
OFT reflects the size of its remit which has steadily grown since its establishment in 
1973, and the specific chapter on the impact of the Competition Act 1998 reflects the 
total change in the competition regulatory regime established by that Act. All of these 
chapters have a central question in common: the extent to which the relationship 
between the particular regulatory agency and its regulatees became juridified over a 
period of time.
51 McCradden et al (1991) which deals just with the work of the CRE’s Employment Division.
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Finally, in Chapter 7, the research questions will be revisited in light of the 
findings of the case studies. In the first section, the extent of juridification in the case 
studies will be discussed, with a particular look at the utility of the indicators in 
determining this question. This will be followed in the second section by looking at 
what caused juridification (or the lack of juridification) in the case studies, before 
finally the chapter concludes by considering the implications of the findings for the 
regulatory strategy literature.
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CHAPTER 2 
Mostly different: a comparison of the Commission for 
Racial Equality and the Office of Fair Trading
Introduction
In the last chapter, the basic framework for the selection of case studies was set 
out. It rested on two main arguments. Firstly, it was argued that it is not presently feasible 
to extract an empirical theory of juridification (using the definition that is adopted) from the 
juridification literature. The result of this is that the case studies cannot be selected 
according to a theory of juridification. Secondly, it was argued that the definition of 
juridification has a strong affinity with characteristics of the ‘deterrence’ strategy of 
regulation. This is important for two reasons: firstly, it implies that it is feasible to choose 
case studies on the grounds of predicted regulatory strategies whilst still using them to 
inductively derive causes of juridification; secondly, it implies that it is in any case 
desirable to choose the case studies on this basis, as it allows for a consideration of how the 
claims of the juridification literature might impact on the literature dealing with regulatory 
strategy (and vice versa).
Having established that the cases are to be chosen on the basis of theories of 
regulatory strategy, the main task of this chapter is to describe how this is done. The 
research design adopted is a ‘most different’ design: in other words, two case studies are 
chosen which are fundamentally different according to theories of regulatory strategies. We 
would thus expect variations in regulatory strategy between the case studies and, by 
extension, variations in the levels of juridification. One of the key functions of Chapter 7 
will then be to assess how closely the actual findings reflected this expected pattern.
This chapter thus sets out how the two cases of the Commission for Racial 
Equality (CRE) and Office of Fair Trading (OFT) are ‘most different’ according to the 
claims of the regulatory strategy literature. It will be argued that, at the time at which they 
were established, the CRE and OFT differed in terms of many of the variables considered
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important in the regulatory strategy literature. The Commission was given strong 
enforcement powers, with few controls; would face pressures from strong pro-regulation 
groups with which the staff in the Commission had close links; and had a task environment 
which was partially complaints-based, with a strong moral dimension. The Office on the 
other hand, was given relatively weak enforcement powers with strong political controls; 
was made up of civil service staff; faced a pro-business lobby that was substantially more 
powerful than the pro-consumer lobby; and was largely engaged in economic regulation 
without a significant moral dimension to it. As such, the literature would have predicted 
differing regulatory strategies for these agencies. They thus represent excellent case studies 
for the purposes mentioned above.
The chapter is divided into four main sections. In the first section, the two agencies 
are introduced, their main duties set out, and the background to their formation discussed. 
In the second and third sections, the main features of the CRE and the OFT respectively are 
described more fully, looking especially at their powers and relationships (both political 
and regulatory). In the course of examining these powers, there is a particular focus on the 
discretion left to each agency by the respective enabling statutes. This is an important step 
in subsequently determining the source of any juridification. If an enabling statute makes it 
mandatory for a regulatory agency to prosecute an offender in the courts every time an 
offence is committed, then that statute is the likely source of any subsequent juridification 
in the relationship between that agency and its regulatees. If on the other hand, the statute 
grants wide discretion to the regulatory agency, then the source of any subsequent 
juridification is likely to lie elsewhere. It is also important as it confirms that in neither case 
is the position of law predetermined -  thus the possibility of either juridification or the 
absence of juridification is left open. In the final section, the main features of the agencies 
are related directly to the regulatory strategy literature, and it is shown that the two agencies 
differ in ways considered significant by that literature.
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Background to the two agencies
• The Commission for Racial Equality
The UK has had a legal framework for dealing with racial discrimination since the 
first Race Relations Act in 1965. The first Act made incitement to racial hatred a criminal 
offence and established an administrative agency - the Race Relations Board - to 
investigate specified types of racial discrimination and secure compliance. But before the 
Board could refer the case to the Attorney-General who could then seek an injunction in 
court, there had to have been attempts to settle complaints with conciliation by local 
conciliation committees. McCrudden et al (1991: 9) noted the following about the Act:
Neither the Board nor the local committees, however, had the power to summon 
witnesses, subpoena documents, require answers to questions or issue orders.
Rather than being adopted as a more effective method of enforcement,
conciliation was included, according to a government spokesman, “to avoid 
bringing the flavour of criminality into the delicate question of race relations”. It 
was a continuing theme throughout the debate that the Government hoped that 
court litigation would not arise under the Act and actively wanted to prevent it.
This Act was followed three years later in 1968 by a second Race Relations Act, 
extending the scope of the anti-discrimination provisions to the fields of housing and
employment. For all areas apart from employment, the Act retained the two-tier
enforcement structure by which the Board had to try to resolve disputes before seeking 
court action. The Board was given an additional power to initiate investigations without a 
complaint where it was suspected that discrimination had occurred. In the area of 
employment, the Act required that industry dispute procedures should be used first, so that 
any complaints of discrimination in employment would be dealt with initially by the 
Department of Employment. Finally, the Act also established the Community Relations 
Commission with the main duty of promoting “harmonious community relations”.1
There were several problems with the workings of the 1968 Act: it only covered 
direct discrimination, its enforcement was almost exclusively reliant on complaints, the 
Board’s powers to obtain information were extremely limited, and the need for conciliation 
made proceedings cumbersome. All these and other problems led in 1976 to the passage of
1 For a more detailed account, see McCrudden et al (1991: 8-14).
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a third Race Relations Act in the space of eleven years, and the creation of a new body: the 
Commission for Racial Equality (CRE). Section 43(1) of the Act set out its main duties, as 
follows:
a) to work towards the elimination of discrimination;
b) to promote equality of opportunity, and good relations, between persons of
different racial groups generally
Thus its primary duties2 reflected those of the two bodies which the CRE replaced: 
the Race Relations Board and the Community Relations Commission. This reinforces the 
impression that these duties actually have quite different connotations. The elimination of 
racial discrimination is essentially backward-looking, dealing with an event that has already 
occurred. Promoting racial equality is forward-looking, however, and potentially more far- 
reaching. It includes, for instance, the possibility of positive or reverse discrimination. 
McCrudden et al (1991) suggest that there is a further distinction between them: the former 
clause suggests an individualistic focus (the “individual justice model”), whilst the latter 
suggests a group focus (the “group justice model”). Thus they maintain that the Act 
incorporates two fundamentally different philosophies of dealing with racial disadvantage.4 
It will be argued shortly that this ambivalence was likely to have the effect of increasing the 
Commission’s discretion to determine its style of enforcement.
The Race Relations Act 1976 fundamentally changed the structure of law 
enforcement in the field of race relations. For the first time, individuals subject to racial 
discrimination were able to bring their own cases to the relevant court or tribunal, without 
the need for prior conciliation. The Commission for Racial Equality was empowered to 
assist such individuals, but most of its other powers were not dependent on complaints. Its 
powers to initiate formal investigations, to launch codes of practice and, in some cases, to 
bring prosecutions could all be utilised to fulfil its primary duties irrespective of specific
2 Section 43 also required the Commission to keep under review the working of the Act and to draw up and 
submit to the Secretary of State proposals for amending it.
3 Defined as providing advantages to minority groups so as to offset institutional barriers.
4 This analysis is extended to other aspects of the Act. For instance, the individualistic nature of industrial 
tribunals, the concentration on the eradication of discrimination as the prime target of legal enforcement and 
the absence of group remedies or actions in the tribunals are all seen as suggesting individual justice strategies 
of dealing with discrimination. Suggestive of the group justice model is the prohibition of indirect 
discrimination, the powers of the CRE to launch strategic formal investigations, the recognition of the 
existence of social groups and the limited positive action permitted (McCrudden et al, 1991: 32).
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complaints received. Thus the CRE can be seen as the first really strategic law enforcement 
agency set up in the UK in the field of race relations.
• The Office of Fair Trading
The Office of Fair Trading was created in the Fair Trading Act 1973, with duties 
in the areas of competition and consumer protection policy. Both areas of policy had 
already been subject to a lengthy legislative history. In the area of competition policy, the 
Fair Trading Act was the sixth major piece of legislation since the Monopolies and 
Restrictive Practices (Inquiry and Control) Act 1948. In the area of consumer protection, 
enforcement had previously been carried out exclusively at local level by Trading 
Standards Departments under legislation largely relating to weights and measures offences, 
false descriptions and food safety standards.5
The joining together of the fields of competition and consumer protection was 
officially attributed to their functional similarity -  the improvement of the position of 
consumers within the marketplace. However, Ramsay (1987: 179) suggests that political 
factors were of more significance:
There were no plans for consumer legislation in the Conservative manifesto of 
1970. Indeed, one of the first actions of the new Government was the abolition of 
the Consumer Council. The public resentment over this surprised the Government 
and sensitised it to the electoral advantages of pro-consumer legislation. The 
Government was faced therefore with the necessity of developing a consumer 
policy.
In this context, the newly created Central Policy Review Staff, drawing on international 
examples, persuaded the relevant political players to attach consumer measures to the 
competition legislation that had already been time-tabled. Crucially this coincided with the 
creation of a new Cabinet post of Minister for Consumer Affairs, filled by Sir Geoffrey 
Howe who had several ideas for consumer-law reform. Thus the combining of competition 
and consumer protection measures within the Fair Trading Act 1973 can be seen almost as 
a historical accident. Wilks (1999: 173) comes to a similar conclusion:
5 For instance, the Trade Descriptions Act 1968, the Weights and Measures Act 1963 and the Food and Drugs 
Act 1955. See generally Cranston (1979).
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The Fair Trading Act could be portrayed as a gradual and almost inevitable 
policy development. Nothing could be further from the truth. It was the third of 
three radically different attempts at legislation and its genesis was marked by 
virtually every variety of political uncertainty, including elections, ministerial 
reshuffles, inter-departmental in-fighting, lobbying, expediency and accident. It 
constitutes a classic study in pragmatic policy making, of ‘muddling through’ in a 
process dominated and energised by officials in the DTI who responded, more or 
less ably, and more or less willingly, to the political pressures placed upon them.
Section 2 of the Fair Trading Act sets out the basic duties of the Director General 
of Fair Trading.6 In both the fields of consumer protection and competition, he is essentially 
given a “watchdog” role, as follows:
(1) Without prejudice to any other functions assigned or transferred to him by or 
under this Act, it shall be the duty of the Director, so far as appears to him to be 
practicable from time to time, -
(a) to keep under review the carrying on of commercial activities in the 
United Kingdom which relate to goods supplied to consumers in the United 
Kingdom or produced with a view to their being so supplied, or which relate 
to services supplied for consumers in the United Kingdom, and to collect 
information with respect to such activities, and the persons by whom they are 
carried on, with a view to his becoming aware of, and ascertaining the 
circumstances relating to, practices which may adversely affect the economic 
interests of consumers in the United Kingdom...
Section 2(2) of the Act gives the Director General the same duty in the area of monopolies 
and uncompetitive practices, and section 2(3) adds the duty to inform the Secretary of State 
as to developments in either field and to recommend appropriate reforms.
In addition to these general monitoring duties, the Director General was given 
powers in a number of specific areas relating to competition and consumer protection 
policy. In the field of consumer protection, he was given a lawmaking power under Part II 
of the Act by which consumer trade practices that were found to be damaging to consumers 
could be made into criminal offences. He was also given certain enforcement powers 
against rogue traders under Part III of the Act, and the duty to encourage trade associations 
to adopt codes of practice that would benefit consumers. In the field of competition policy, 
the Director General took over the duties of the Registrar of Restrictive Trading
6 Under statute (although the position has now been changed by the Enterprise Act 2002), officially the Office 
of Fair Trading does not exist. The legal creation was that of the Director General of Fair Trading, and all the 
powers and duties relating to the Office are legally vested in him. The legal source of the OFT is Schedule 1, 
section 7 of the Fair Trading Act stating that “anything authorised or required by or under this Act or any
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Agreements,7 and some of the powers of the Board of Trade to refer monopoly or suspected 
monopoly situations to the Monopolies and Mergers Commission. He was also obligated to 
advise the Secretary of State as to whether a reference should be made in the case of an 
actual or prospective merger.
At the time at which it was set up, it would have been misleading to see the Office 
primarily as a law enforcement agency. Ramsay (1989: 261) makes the following insightful 
observation about the Office’s array of powers:
The catalogue of the OFT’s powers indicates that, with the exception of the 
powers conferred under Part HI of the Fair Trading Act...8 it has no general 
enforcement powers. Thus, for example, it has no power to make an immediate 
response to actual or expected violations of consumer law through the use of 
interim injunctions, the freezing of assets and so on. This limitation reflected the 
judgment that initial enforcement ought to lie with the local authorities, the OFT 
acting primarily in a ‘back-up’ role and in a monitoring and general law-reform 
capacity. In addition, no formal powers were conferred on the Director General to 
secure private redress. He cannot, for example, bring a ‘substitute action’ in a 
representative capacity on behalf of aggrieved consumer litigants, and breach of 
the Fair Trading Act gives affected consumers no entitlement to damages.
The position would gradually change during the next two decades, with new 
primary and secondary legislation providing the Office with several new enforcement 
powers and areas of competence. Only a year after the establishment of the Office, for 
instance, the Consumer Credit Act 1974 would give the Office important ex ante powers in 
the field of consumer credit. But at the time it was set up, it would have been slightly 
misleading to present the Office as an enforcement agency as such. As will be seen, even 
for those areas of policy over which it was given enforcement responsibilities, the Office 
was given few coercive powers. The Office was thus primarily established as a dedicated 
monitoring agency, with some ability to initiate law reform.
Commission for Racial Equality: powers, discretion, relationships
other enactment to be done by the Director... may be done by any member of staff of the Director who is 
authorised generally or specially in that behalf in writing by the Director.
7 Section 94 of the Act.
8 The gap here is a reference to powers given to the Office under subsequent legislation.
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• Introduction
The Race Relations Act 1976 granted a number of powers to the CRE in pursuance 
of its main duties, as follows:
44-5 Assistance for relevant organisations or research
47 Codes of practice
48-52, 58-61 Formal investigations
62-3 Prosecutions
66 Assistance for individual claims in employment tribunals
Some of these powers are relatively straightforward. Section 44(1) empowers the 
Commission to give financial or other assistance to organisations “appearing to the 
Commission to be concerned with the promotion of equality of opportunity, and good 
relations, between persons of different racial groups”, and section 45 extends this to 
research for the same puipose. Meanwhile, section 62 empowers the Commission to seek 
an injunction in the case of persistent discrimination,9 and section 63 provides the same 
power in cases where there have been breaches of sections 29, 30 or 31 of the Act, 
outlawing discriminatory advertisements,10 instructions to discriminate11 and pressure to 
discriminate12 respectively.13
The remaining powers are more complex though. It will be shown how for each of 
the powers to launch formal investigations, to provide assistance to individual complainants 
under the Act and to issue codes of practice, there are significant gaps and ambiguities left
9 The power comes into operation when it appears to the Commission that an unlawful discriminatory act is 
likely to be committed by a person within 5 years of being subject either to a non-discrimination notice or to a 
finding of discrimination by a court or tribunal.
10 This is made unlawful by s29 of the Act. Section 29(1) states that “it is unlawful to publish or to cause to be 
published an advertisement which indicates, or might reasonably be understood as indicating, an intention by 
a person to do an act of discrimination...”.
11 Section 30 of the Act states that “it is unlawful for a person -  (a) who has authority over another person; or 
(b) in accordance with whose wishes that other person is accustomed to act, to instruct him to do any act 
which is unlawful [under the Act].
12 Section 31(1) states: “It is unlawful to induce, or attempt to induce, a person to do any act which 
contravenes [the Act].”
13 McCrudden et al (1991: 22) outline the rationale behind giving this power to the Commission as opposed to 
private plaintiffs, as follows: “The logic behind such restrictions on the role of individual plaintiffs flowed 
from traditional legal thinking and in turn reinforced it. On this traditional view, the private plaintiff is 
someone who makes a complaint about an individual wrong, not one who acts ‘in the public interest’. The 
intention of the legislators was that the Commission and only the Commission should perform that public 
interest function.”
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by statute. The result is not only that the Commission is left with a large degree of 
discretion as to the specifics of how these powers should operate in practice, but also more 
basic dilemmas as to how these powers should fit with its main duties of eliminating 
discrimination and promoting racial equality.
• The power of formal investigation
The introduction of a power to launch formal investigations was one of the most 
striking innovations of the 1976 Act. It was a power for which the Race Relations Board 
had campaigned, and is introduced in section 48(1) as follows:
Without prejudice to their general power to do anything requisite for the 
performance of their duties under section 43(1), the Commission may if they 
think fit, and shall if required by the Secretary of State, conduct a formal 
investigation for any purpose connected with the carrying out of those duties.
However, a significant ambiguity is introduced in section 49:
(3) It shall be the duty of the Commission to give general notice of the holding of 
the investigation unless the terms of reference confine it to activities of persons 
named in them, but in such a case the Commission shall in the prescribed manner 
give those persons notice of the holding of the investigation.
(4) Where the terms of reference of the investigation confine it to activities of 
persons named in them and the Commission in the course of it propose to 
investigate any act made unlawful by this Act which they believe that a person so 
named may have done, the Commission shall -
(a) inform that person of their belief and of their proposal to investigate the 
act in question
(b) offer him an opportunity of making oral or written representations with 
regard to it...
Whilst it is clear that the Act provides for at least two types of investigation: one 
non-accusatory type in which the investigation is not being launched against any particular 
named persons (the ‘general’ investigation) and one targeting named persons suspected to 
have infringed the Act (the ‘belief investigation), it is unclear as to whether it allows also 
for a third type of investigation where the investigatee is specified but the Commission is 
not alleging any unlawful acts. Does the ‘and’ in subsection 4 imply that a named person 
investigation is always to be preceded by a belief that discrimination has occurred, or is it 
simply there to distinguish this case from the one at the end of subsection 3? Is section 49 
in general meant to restrict the ambit of section 48, where it is stated that a formal
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investigation may be launched “for any purpose connected with the carrying out of those 
duties”, or simply to add requirements for certain types of investigation? The bottom line is 
that it is ambiguous.14
The two types of investigation that the Act definitely does provide for are very 
different from each other. In the case of a general investigation, no specific instances of 
discrimination are being alleged, and the Commission neither has the power to forcibly 
obtain information, nor the ability to issue a non-discrimination notice. As such, the 
investigation is not accompanied by the same safeguards. Investigatees do not need specific 
notice, nor do they have to be told of their rights to representation and counsel. In short, the 
general investigation is perhaps better seen as a research exercise than as an inquisitorial 
prosecution, even though the same term ‘formal investigation’ is used to describe it.
On the other hand, belief investigations (denoted for the rest of this chapter by the 
generic term, ‘formal investigation’) are far more coercive in nature. Under section 50(1),15 
the Commission can serve a notice on investigatees, requiring the provision of specified 
written information, at a particular time, in a particular manner and form. It can further 
require their attendance at an oral hearing, with the production of any documents relevant 
to the investigation.16 Wilful suppression, alteration, concealment or destruction of a 
relevant document, or the making of false statements, are offences under the Act, 
punishable by a fine of up to £400.17 In order to counter-balance the coercive nature of 
these powers, investigatees are specifically given rights of legal representation. 
Nonetheless, the late Lord Denning was not impressed, believing that this section of the Act 
effectively allowed the CRE to “interrogate employers and educational authorities up to the 
hilt and compel disclosure of documents on a massive scale... You might think that we 
were back in the days of the inquisition... You might think that we were back in the days of 
General Warrants... ”.18
14 It was also the cause of many subsequent problems for the Commission, as will be seen in the next chapter.
15 Section 50(2)(b) limits this power to ‘belief investigations.
16 Section 50(3)(a) excludes from the scope of this power any information or documents which the High Court 
could not compel to be produced in civil proceedings.
17 Section 50(6)
18 Science Research Council v Nasse [ 1979] QB 144,172. It was felt by judges in the House of Lords that this 
was somewhat of an exaggeration.
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At the end of a formal investigation, if the Commission finds that discrimination 
has occurred or is occurring, it is empowered to issue a non-discrimination notice. Section 
58(2) sets out what this notice requires of the investigated
(a) not to commit any such acts; and
(b) where compliance with paragraph (a) involves changes in any of his practices 
or other arrangements -
(i) to inform the Commission that he has effected those changes and what 
those changes are; and
(ii) to take such steps as may be reasonably required by the notice for the 
purpose of affording that information to other persons concerned.
A non-discrimination notice can also require the investigatee to furnish the 
Commission with information to enable it to verify that the notice has been complied with, 
and the requirements of a notice can remain in effect for up to five years.19 In the event of 
non-compliance, the Commission is empowered to seek a court order from the county 
court, a breach of which would be contempt of court.20
The Act includes several process requirements surrounding the issuing of a non­
discrimination notice. The Commission must first give notice to the investigatee that it is 
minded to do so, and offer an opportunity to make oral or written representations or both 
within a period specified (a minimum of 28 days). It must then take account of any 
representations that are made. On their part, investigatees subject to a non-discrimination 
notice are entitled to launch an appeal within six weeks of it being issued either in an 
industrial tribunal (if the investigation is in the field of employment) or a county court (if 
not). This is a significant right, both because there is no requirement for leave, and 
because the tribunal or court has a strong discretion to quash any requirement of the 
notice.23
At the time of the Act, the power of formal investigation could have been 
conceived in at least two ways. On the one hand, it could have been seen as a neutral 
investigation - a process to determine the existence of a set of facts. According to this
19 Section 58(4)
20 Section 50(1). This power is also available for investigatees who fail to comply with the terms of the 
original notice at the point at which the formal investigation is initiated.
21 Section 58(5)
22 Section 59(1)
23 r ,The court or tribunal has to quash any term of the notice that it believes is “unreasonable because it is based 
on an incorrect finding of fact or for any other reason” -  see section 59(2).
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model, the ‘punishment’ for discrimination would occur at the point at which the non­
discrimination notice was issued. Evidence in support of this view might have included the 
fact that an appeal could only occur once a notice has been issued, and that it was only non­
discrimination notices which had to be published in a register by the Commission. On the 
other hand, however, the power could have been viewed very differently: there is a sense in 
which the investigation itself serves as the more striking sanction. It is, after all, triggered 
by the belief that discrimination has occurred. On this model, the purpose of an 
investigation would be partially to satisfy the legal threshold so that a non-discrimination 
notice could be issued, partially to punish the investigatee and partially to deter potential 
discriminators through the negative publicity which surrounds an investigation. Although 
the Act is silent as to whether the Commission should make public the initial launch of an 
investigation, it does require that die report of an investigation be published or at least be 
made available for inspection.24 Thus even where the Commission does not issue a non­
discrimination notice, any criticisms it chooses to make of the practices of its investigatees 
within this report are necessarily made public.
The ambivalence within the Act as to the purpose of formal investigations is best 
shown though by the way in which the power is introduced in section 48(1). The 
Commission is granted discretion to launch an investigation “for any purpose connected 
with the carrying out of [its] duties”. As such, the Act leaves it to the Commission to decide 
whether formal investigations are better seen as a vehicle for eliminating racial 
discrimination or for promoting racial equality and good race relations or even for enabling 
it to keep under review the working of the Act.25 There are important practical 
ramifications to this dilemma. Its resolution affects the decision as to when formal
24 Section s51(4)
25 Section 43(l)(c)
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investigations should be launched,26 how often,27 against whom,28 how they are to be 
conducted29 and what type of follow up action should be taken.30
The Act thus leaves the most basic questions about the power totally to the 
discretion of the Commission. And in addition to this general lack of guidance, there is a 
lack of detail in the Act as to many more specific aspects of formal investigations. It is for 
the Commission to decide how widely the terms of reference are drawn up,31 and it also has 
the option of altering them at a later point in the investigation. It is for the Commission to 
decide whether and how to be influenced by the company’s representations during the 
course of the investigation.32 The actual conduct of the investigation itself is left completely 
open by the Act, subject to certain limited process requirements.33 The questions of which 
techniques should be used in an investigation, how long each one should be, how many 
people should be assigned,34 the style of any oral hearings, and any other logistical question 
imaginable are left untouched by the Act. Finally, the issuing of a non-discrimination 
notice, even if the Commission has become satisfied that discrimination has occurred, is 
also discretionary and although the Commission has to “take account” of any
26 Should they be responsive to complaints, or to more general evidence of discrimination in a particular 
field? Or should they be chosen to shed light on particular issues, such as what causes inequality even where 
there is no intent to discriminate on the part of the investigatee?
27 Should investigations be launched in response to every complaint of discrimination, or only some? If only 
some, what considerations should be used to decide what is an appropriate target?
28 Formal investigations could be used to highlight high profile cases and/or the main causes of 
discrimination. Or they could be used as a mechanism for ensuring that any firm -  big or small -  is at risk of 
being punished for unlawful discrimination.
29 If the investigation was chosen on the basis of a firm belief that unlawful discrimination has been 
committed by the investigatee, then it may be desirable to have highly formal proceedings, thus reinforcing 
the impression that the investigation is serving as a punishment. If, on the other hand, the investigation is seen 
as a vehicle for promoting more general change, then more informal proceedings might be more appropriate. 
Moreover, the model of formal investigations that is chosen would further affect the decision as to whether an 
investigation should be stopped in the event of the investigatee agreeing future compliance.
30 The options could include just ensuring that the investigatee is compliant with the non-discrimination 
notice, or concentrating on using the findings of the investigation to promote wider change.
31 The lack of guidance on this has caused the Commission particular problems in the courts, as will be seen 
in the next chapter.
32 The Act does not impose a duty to consider any representations made at this stage of the investigation, 
although it does do so with respect to the issuing of a non-discrimination notice.
33 These include the need to draw up terms of reference for the investigation, the requirement to offer the 
opportunity of oral or written representations (or both) before the investigation is launched, and the 
requirement to offer the same opportunity within 28 days of notifying the organisation that a non­
discrimination notice may be served.
34 Section 48(3) authorises the Commission to delegate the function to one or more Commissioners on its 
behalf, but this merely ensures that investigations do not need a quorum to utilise the powers connected with 
the investigation.
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representations made by the company,35 what exactly it should take into account is not 
specified.
• The power to provide assistance to individuals
The Race Relations Act 1976 introduced a new system for individual victims of 
discrimination. Whereas previously complainants had to go through the Race Relations 
Board and a system of conciliation, now they could take their claims straight to an 
industrial tribunal (if the complaint was employment-related) or a county court (if the 
complaint was in any other field). The Act still provided for the possibility of conciliation, 
but this could not be imposed on either party.36 It is in this context that the Commission 
was given the power to assist individual complainants under section 66 of the Act. 
Assistance could include the giving of advice, attempts to settle the dispute, the provision 
of legal assistance, or legal representation by a solicitor or counsel, although the 
Commission could also provide any other assistance which it considered appropriate. The 
Act also specified certain process requirements connected with the power, such as the need 
to respond to an application within two months,37 although the Commission was able to 
extend this to three months by giving notice to the applicant.
Section 66(1) of the Act gives the Commission a broad discretion to decide when 
to provide assistance as follows:
(a) on the ground that the case raises a question of principle; or
(b) on the ground that it is unreasonable, having regard to the complexity of the 
case, or to the applicant’s position in relation to the respondent or another person 
involved, or to any other matter, to expect the applicant to deal with the case 
unaided; or
(c) by reason of any other special consideration.
Whilst the subsection at least suggests that assistance should not be given for every single 
application, and provides examples of grounds which would be particularly appropriate, it 
still ultimately makes the decision a matter for the Commission’s judgement. Hence, as
35 Section 58(5)(c)
36 The conciliation officer has the duty to try to promote a settlement of the complaint before it reaches the 
tribunal if he is requested to do so by both parties or if he thinks that he has a reasonable prospect of success -  
see section 55(1) of the Act
37 Section 66(3)
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with the power of formal investigation, it again falls to the Commission to decide how this 
power should be used in fulfilment of its basic duties.
• The power to make administrative codes of practice
The Commission’s power to make codes of practice, as its only lawmaking power, 
is of special significance to a study of juridification. Section 47(10) of the Act sets out the 
precise legal effect of these codes:
A failure on the part of any person to observe any provision of a code of practice 
shall not of itself render him liable to any proceedings; but in any proceedings 
under this Act before an industrial tribunal any code of practice issued under this 
section shall be admissible in evidence, and if any provision of such a code 
appears to the tribunal to be relevant to any question arising in the proceedings it 
shall be taken into account in determining that question.
Thus the case of a claimant under the Act would be strengthened significantly if it 
could be shown that the behaviour of the respondent was contrary to one of the provisions 
of a relevant code of practice. Nonetheless, the underlying purpose of such a code is not so 
obvious. Section 47(1) specifically gives the Commission discretion to issue a code for the 
purpose of fulfilling “either or both” of its primary duties. Again therefore, the basic 
decision as to how codes should be integrated within an overall strategy is left to the 
Commission.
The issuing of a code of practice is accompanied by a lengthy procedure that 
ultimately gives Parliament the right to veto any proposals made by the Commission. The 
following table indicates the steps that must be taken before a code of practice can come 
into force:
38 Section 66(4)
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HEADING SECTION DETAILS I
Initial consultations 47(2), 47(3) • Consultations made with organisations representative of I 
employers or of workers, and any other bodies which the 1 
Commission believes to be appropriate.
• No specification of how long consultations must last.
• Left to Commission’s discretion as to whether to modify 
code in light of representations.
Secretary of State’s 
approval
47(4) • Secretary of State has to approve the code, or to publish 
reasons for not approving it.
• No time limit in place for this approval.
Consideration by 
Parliament
47(4), 47(5) • The code is laid before each House of Parliament.
• Parliament has 40 days to consider it.
Decision 47(5) • Either House has the power to pass a resolution that the code 
should not be implemented.
• If this is done, the Commission essentially has to start again.
Issue 47(7) • If authorised by Parliament, the Commission issues the code.
• The date on which it comes to force is determined by the 
Secretary of State.
|  Revision 47(9) • The Commission has the power to revise a code, but has to 
go through all the above steps to do so.
In this way, the Act tries to ensure that any new codes have general support. The above 
table indicates the variety of bodies involved in the drawing up of codes: business groups, 
trade unions, “other appropriate bodies”, the Secretary of State and Parliament, and we 
shall end this section by considering the nature of the Commission’s political and 
regulatory environment in more detail.
• The political and regulatory environment of the CRE
As with any regulatory agency, the Commission was not set up in a vacuum and 
the manner in which it was to fulfil its statutory duties would necessarily depend on its 
relationships with others. Politically, its critical relationship was with the Home Office 
which, as we shall see, was given some important general levers of control over the 
Commission. To a lesser extent, the Act also envisaged that the Commission would be 
accountable to Parliament, and would form relationships with key groups such as the trade 
unions and the CBI. In furtherance of its duty to promote racial equality, it might have been 
expected that the Commission would have to work closely with groups committed to 
improving the position of ethnic minorities, and this association can also be found in the
39 Throughout this chapter, the term “Secretary of State” is used so as to reflect the terminology of the Act.
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Act. Each of these relationships will now be taken in turn, before turning to the nature of 
the Commission*s regulatees.
The most important political relationship of the Commission was to be with the 
Secretary of State. All eight to fifteen Commissioners were to be appointed by the 
Secretary of State, including the chairman.40 Further control over decisions made by the 
Commission was likely to stem from the his control over both the Commission’s 
budgetary41 and salary42 levels.43 However, beyond that there is little in the Act pointing to 
the retention by the Secretary of State of day-to-day control over the Commission’s 
decisions and procedures. Although the Secretary of State was responsible for hiring 
Commissioners, his ability to remove them was limited to cases where they were “by 
reason of physical or mental illness, or for any other reason, incapable of carrying out 
[their] duties”.44 The Commission’s reporting duties to him were limited to an annual 
report45 and the maintenance of proper accounts and records 46 Meanwhile, whilst the 
Secretary of State had an important role in two of the Commission’s powers,47 he had no 
power of veto over formal investigations,48 nor over any individual decision made by the 
Commission to prosecute under sections 62 and 63 of the Act or to provide assistance to 
individual claimants under section 66. Instead, he was given his own duties and powers 
under the Act: the duty to appoint racial equality experts to sit with a county court judge in 
any case that connects to the Act,49 and the power to modify some sections of the Act
40 Section 43. Appointments were for up to five years, with re-appointments possible -  Schedule 1, section 
3(2) and 3(6)The Secretary of State also has the power through statutory instrument to change the number of 
Commissioners.
41 with the consent of the Treasury - Schedule 1, section 16.
42 Schedule 1, section 5.
43 Furthermore, whilst staffing levels could be set by the Commission, this was only after consultation with 
the Secretary of State and with the approval of the Minister for the Civil Service - Schedule 1, section 8.
44 Schedule 1, section 3(5)(c).
45 Section 46. This had to be presented to the Secretary of State, who would then lay it before Parliament and 
have it published.
46 Schedule 1, section 17. The accounts had to be presented to the Secretary of State at the end of each 
accounting year, following which they were to be examined by the Comptroller and the Auditor General.
47 These are the power to issue codes of practice, as can be seen from the table above, and the power under 
section 44 to provide financial assistance to organisations which also requires the Secretary of State’s consent.
48 Although under section 48(1) of the Act, he does have the power to require that the Commission launches 
one.
49 Section 67(4).
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through statutory instruments,50 although this was not to be done without first consulting 
the Commission.51
In terms of the Commission’s regulatory environment, the Act recognises a 
number of competing groups. Both business groups and trade unions are specifically 
mentioned as groups that must be consulted in the course of creating codes of practice. 
Moreover, as we have seen, the Commission is empowered to provide financial and other 
assistance to pressure groups and organisations committed to furthering the cause of racial 
equality.52 This raises a certain dilemma for the Commission: the extent to which it should 
identify itself with the racial groups that it is obligated to protect. Should it present itself as 
a spokes-body for racial minority groups or as an impartial enforcement agency? The 
former position has the potential to get in the way of a more conciliatory style of 
enforcement, whereas the latter position carries the risk of the Commission losing its most 
natural body of support, accused of being ‘soft’ or ‘captured’. Either way, the Act appears 
to be ambiguous on how this most basic of regulatory dilemmas should be resolved -  
indeed it fuels it by combining in one Commission the roles previously given to both the 
Race Relations Board and the Community Relations Commission.
Finally, if we consider the nature of the Commission’s regulatees under the Act, 
what stands out is the sheer variety of possibilities. In the area of employment 
discrimination alone, the Act relates generally to any employment at “an establishment in 
Great Britain”, and specifically to discrimination against contract workers,53 with respect to 
partnerships of firms consisting of six or more partners,54 within trade unions and 
professional and trade bodies,55 bodies providing qualifications or vocational training,56 and 
employment agencies.57 Other provisions of the Act, prohibiting discrimination in the 
provision of goods and services, housing and education, have the effect of widening the 
Commission’s regulatory remit towards (amongst others) hoteliers, restaurateurs, club 
owners and managers, insurance companies, banks, landlords, schools and health service
50 Section 73(1).
51 Section 73(2).
52 Section 44(1).
53 Section 7.
54 Section 10.
55 Section 11.
56 Sections 12 and 13 respectively.
57 Section 14.
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providers. In short, the Commission’s regulatees can come in virtually every size and 
shape, from huge multi-national companies to a single property-owning landlord. It is 
worth noting also that the nature of its contact with these regulatees can similarly vary -  it 
can be frequent and regular or occasional and perhaps even one-off.
Office o f  Fair Trading: powers, discretion and relationships 
• Introduction
Although the Office was conceived of primarily as a monitoring agency which 
could also engage in law reform, the Fair Trading Act 1973 did give a number of 
significant powers to the Office. The following table provides a summary:
sl3-33 Lawmaking through references to the CPAC
s34-42 Prosecuting persistent rogue traders
s44-56 Acting on monopoly situations by making references to the MMC
s57-77 Advising the Secretary of State as to the need for merger references
s94-l 17 Performing the duties of the Registrar of Restrictive Trading Agreements
sl24(l) Publishing information and advice
In addition to these powers, section 124(3) of the Act imposes a further duty on the 
Director General “to encourage relevant associations to prepare, and to disseminate to their 
members, codes of practice for guidance in safeguarding and promoting the interests of 
consumers in the United Kingdom”. How exactly such codes should be used in the context 
of a general strategy for safeguarding and promoting the interests of consumers is not
CO
specified, and it seems that this section was somewhat of an afterthought.
In the following sections, it will be argued that not only is the degree of discretion 
given to the Office under the Fair Trading Act significantly less than that given to the CRE 
under the Race Relations Act, but also that there is much in the Act to imply that a non- 
legalistic strategy should be followed. This is partially due to the lack of strong
58 See Ramsay (1987).
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enforcement powers given to the Office and partially due to the nature of its political 
environment as set out in the Act.
• Consumer protection: the lawmaking power
As well as creating the Office of Fair Trading, the Fair Trading Act 1973 also 
created another dedicated consumer body: the Consumer Protection Advisory Committee. 
The Committee was to consist of between ten and fifteen people appointed by the Secretary 
of State. Under section 14 of the Act, the Director General as well as the Secretary of State 
or any other Minister was empowered to refer to the CP AC any “consumer trade practice”, 
as defined in section 13. The Committee would then have to consider whether the practice 
adversely affected the economic interests of consumers within the UK and report back to 
the person who made the reference as well as the Secretary of State and Director General (if 
it was not their reference).59
Of more significance than this general power, however, was the power to make 
new regulations. Section 17(2) of the Act sets out the circumstances which entitle the 
Director General to begin the lawmaking process:
Where it appears to the Director that a consumer trade practice has the effect, or 
is likely to have the effect, -
(a) of misleading consumers as to, or withholding from them adequate 
information as to, or an adequate record of, their rights and obligations under 
relevant consumer transactions, or
(b) of otherwise misleading or confusing consumers with respect to any 
matter in connection with relevant consumer transactions, or
(c) of subjecting consumers to undue pressure to enter into relevant consumer 
transactions, or
(d) of causing the terms and conditions, on or subject to which consumers 
enter into relevant consumer transactions, to be so adverse to them as to be 
inequitable,
any reference made by the Director under section 14 of this Act with respect to 
that consumer trade practice may, if the Director thinks fit, include proposals for 
recommending to the Secretaiy of State that he should exercise his powers under 
the following provisions of this Part of this Act with respect to that consumer 
trade practice.
The procedure to make laws under the Act is as follows. Any proposals made by 
the Director General under this section have be submitted to the CP AC.60 The Committee
59 Sections 14(3) and 14(5).
60 Section 18.
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then has to decide whether the consumer trade practice adversely affects the economic 
interests of consumers and specifically whether it does so because of the section 17 effects
propounded in the reference.61 It can then choose whether to accept, modify or reject the
 , 0
proposals of the Director General in its report to the Secretary of State. The Committee
• 63 •has to take into account any representations made to them by relevant parties. Its report is 
then submitted to the Secretary of State64 who has to lay it before Parliament and arrange 
for it to be published in an appropriate manner.65 What happens after this depends on the 
content of the report. If the Advisory Committee has decided to reject the proposals, then 
the Secretary of State cannot act on them at all and the proposals are essentially dead.66 In 
any other case, the Secretary of State is given substantial discretion. He can choose to 
accept the proposal contained in the initial reference, or the modified proposal made by the 
CP AC (if they have done so), or to ignore the proposals altogether.67 He cannot, however, 
introduce anything new, such as a compromise between the initial and modified proposals. 
If he does decide to act, he does so through a statutory instrument which has to be laid to 
before and approved by Parliament. A breach of this order would be a criminal offence, 
punishable by a fine or imprisonment of up to two years.
As well as the procedure necessary for a proposal ultimately to become law, the 
Act also contains a number of other requirements, all of which would have to be satisfied. 
The following table sums up these requirements:
61 Section 21(1)
62 Section 21(2)
63 Defined in section 81(l)(a) as “persons appearing to them to have a substantial interest in the subject matter 
of the reference or bodies appearing to them to represent substantial number of persons who have such an 
interest.” The Advisory Committee have a degree of discretion as to their own procedures, although they have 
to act in accordance with general directions from the Secretary of State if he chooses to give any (sections 
81(2) and 81(3)).
64 Section 20 of the Act specifies a time limit of three months from the time of the initial reference for a report 
to be submitted to the Secretary of State. However, the Secretary of State can extend this by further 3 month 
periods after consultation with the Advisory Committee.
Section 83.
66 Section 22(1).
67 Section 22(2).
68 Section 23. The enforcement of any orders made under the Act falls to local weights and measures 
authorities (section 27). Sections 28 and 29 of the Act give substantial enforcement powers to these 
authorities, such as the power to enter premises and inspect and seize goods and documents, as well as the 
power to make test purchases.
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REQUIREMENT SECTION DETAILS |
Proposal has to relate 
to a ‘consumer trade 
practice’.
13 • Section 13 sets out six types of consumer trade practice. |
• Consumer trade practice can relate to the supply of either 1 
goods or services. |
Proposal has to be 
response to specific 
outcomes.
17(3) • The proposal must specify which effect the consumer trade 
practice has or is likely to have.
• The consumer trade practice has to have one of the four 
effects listed in section 17(2).
Proposal has to be 
sufficiently specific.
19(1) • The proposal has to have regard for the particular respects in 
which it appears that the consumer trade practice may adversely 
affect the economic interests of consumers.
• It also has to have regard for the class of relevant consumer 
transactions in relation to which it appears that the practice may 
so affect those consumers.
Thus, even though Sir Geoffrey Howe claimed in Parliament that the lawmaking power was 
“a reasonably swift and sensitive piece of machinery”,69 what emerges from the Act is an 
apparently quite lengthy prescribed process that tries to ensure that new criminal offences 
are not created lightly and without sufficient support.
• Consumer protection: Part III powers to deal with rogue traders
In considering this power, which is the only power of prosecution on the consumer 
protection side given to the Office under the Act, it is important to emphasise that it comes 
in the context of local enforcement. Ramsay (1989: 291) sets out the rationale behind this 
power, as follows:
Part in  of the Fair Trading Act originated in Sir Geoffrey Howe’s idea of 
adopting in a consumer context the historical power of the Attorney General to 
secure an injunction where there have been repeated breaches of the criminal law.
It was intended, therefore, to reinforce criminal enforcement of trading standards 
by local authorities, and was premised on the inadequacy of existing private-law 
and criminal-law prosecutions in controlling persistently unfair conduct.
The powers to deal with persistently unfair traders are introduced in section 34(1) 
of the Act:
Where it appears to the Director that the person carrying on a business has in the 
course of that business persisted in a course of conduct which -
(a) is detrimental to the interests of consumers in the United Kingdom, 
whether those interests are economic interests or interests in respect of health, 
safety or other matters, and
69 Official Reports HC, vol. 848, col. 459, quoted in Ramsay (1989:267).
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(b) in accordance with the following provisions of this section is to be 
regarded as unfair to consumers,
the Director shall use his best endeavours, by communication with that person or 
otherwise, to obtain from him a satisfactory written assurance that he will refrain 
from continuing that course of conduct and from carrying on any similar course 
of conduct in the course of that business.
If the Director General is unable to obtain a satisfactory assurance or if the 
assurance has been breached, he is then able to bring proceedings before the Restrictive 
Practices Court70 or a county court if the regulatee is small71 or if the matter is not
• 72sufficiently specialised so as to justify the specific use of the Restrictive Practices Court. 
The court is entitled to accept an undertaking from the person that he will refrain from 
continuing that course of conduct or any similar course of conduct. If the respondent 
refuses to do so, however, or if the court decides not to accept the undertaking and it is felt 
that it is likely that the course of conduct will continue, the court is empowered to make an 
order, the breach of which would be contempt of court. Under section 42, the respondent 
can then appeal a court order on questions of fact or law to the Court of Appeal.
The one feature of this power that stands out is the way in which prosecution 
comes across as a last resort. Note that first of all, the power only becomes operative if 
there has been a “course of conduct” that is detrimental to consumers. In practice, this is 
likely to consist of a series of offences under other legislation, but even here the Director 
General must seek an assurance that the conduct will not continue. If the trader then breaks 
the assurance, however, he cannot be punished. The most that can be done by the Director 
General is to take the trader to court, at which time the trader can simply undertake to cease 
the conduct if the court believes that this will mark the end of the conduct. If the trader 
subsequently breaches his undertaking, even this does not constitute an offence under the 
Act though. The only thing that a rogue trader can be punished for is non-compliance with 
a court order. In short, it seems that the power is less about punishing rogue traders than 
about trying to find a non-confrontational way to end the conduct they are pursuing.
For both the consumer protection powers then, there are some common themes: 
lengthy, mandatory procedures, an emphasis on finding consensus, and a degree of imposed
70 Section 35.
71 Defined in section 41 as having a share capital of under £10,000.
72 Section 41.
69
control over the ability of the Director General to act decisively and quickly due to his need 
to go through other institutions, political and legal. We shall see now whether the same 
points emerge in the context of his competition policy powers.
• Competition: restrictive trade practices
Originally,74 policy in the UK towards restrictive trade practices was the same as 
for other areas of monopoly control, with references to the Monopolies and Restrictive 
Practices Commission (as it was then) which had to decide whether the practices operated 
against the public interest. The style and substance of policy was changed dramatically, 
however, with the Restrictive Trade Practices Act 1956. The basic structure of the Act was 
to have a form-based approach, whereby specified types of agreements had to be placed on 
a public register and were presumed to be unlawful unless the Restrictive Practices Court 
adjudged that they satisfied certain exemption criteria (“gateways”) specified in the Act. 
There were, however, no sanctions contained in the Act either for the failure to submit 
details of an agreement to the Registrar or for the adoption of a restrictive trade practice in 
the first place.
Judge Bellamy (1999: 1-2) summarises the philosophy of the 1956 Act as follows:
In 1950s Britain, the weapon used to dismantle the cartels of the 1930s (which 
incidentally, had also provided a war-winning contribution in the 1940s) was the 
RTPA, and that was based effectively on three principles. First, the system of 
registration based on a legal rather than an effects based test In modem 
Eurospeak one would say that the principle of legal certainty had prevailed. La 
securite juridique was regarded by the legislators as more important than the 
effects of a particular agreement. Secondly, a public register which was based on 
what would now be called the principle of transparency, namely, that if people 
are to make or to be permitted to operate restrictive agreements that should be 
done in a public way so that everybody knows what is happening, and that there 
should be no possibility of hidden deals between the industry and the 
regulators... And thirdly, the possibility of justifying an agreement based on the 
public interest as defined in the various gateways in section 19 of the RTPA, 
which, when you read them, are not unlike Article 85(3) of the Treaty, even 
though they predate that provision by some 18 months.
Although the basic enforcement structure of the 1956 Act was retained, some of its 
details were altered by subsequent legislation. The Restrictive Trade Practices Act 1968
73 Section 37. Sections 38 and 39 make similar provisions for people who have consented or connived with 
courses of conduct.
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introduced three main changes: it rendered unregistered agreements void and gave third 
parties a right to sue if harmed by the agreements; it extended the scope of the Act to 
include some information agreements as would be specified in statutory instruments; and it 
relieved the Registrar from his normal duty to refer agreements to the Restrictive Practices 
Court where the restrictions in an agreement were of no significance. The Fair Trading Act 
1973, meanwhile made two further important changes: it transferred the functions of the 
Registrar to the Director General of Fair Trading, and extended the scope of the original 
Act to the services sector, again to be specified in statutory instrument.
Unlike the system put in place for monopolies and mergers control, the regulatory 
process for dealing with restrictive trade practices was therefore both formalistic, as there 
was a mandatory formal procedure in place for any agreements of a form specified in the 
relevant legislation, and legalistic, as judgement on whether agreements were unlawful 
under the Act fell to the Restrictive Practices Court as opposed to an administrative body. 
The OFT was responsible for implementing this process. However, it is worth pointing out 
the limits of its powers in this area. It could not prosecute a firm for failure to register. 
The most it could do was to send a notice requiring it to do so.76 It had only weak 
investigatory powers for the purpose of discovering if an unregistered agreement was 
operating. At the same time, the Director General’s power to exempt agreements from 
adjudication by the Restrictive Practices Court where they were of ‘no significance’ was 
potentially a useful tool to circumvent the formalities of the procedure in many cases, 
providing a degree of discretion in the context of an otherwise heavily circumscribed 
procedure. The exercise of this power was, however, subject to the approval of the 
Secretary of State.78
74 I.e. from the time of the Monopolies and Restrictive Practices Act 1948.
75 There were some consequences though for the failure to register the agreement cannot be defended before 
the Restrictive Practices Court, the restrictive provisions are void and thus unenforceable, and third parties are 
entitled to sue for breach of statutory duty. See generally, Whish (1989: 196-8).
76 This became section 36 of the Restrictive Trade Act 1976.
77 In particular, as a result of a Court of Appeal decision prior to the Fair Trading Act 1973, the Office could 
only issue a section 36 notice in the first place if it had a strong prima facie case that the cartel was in 
existence. It also had to specifically apply to the Court for permission to cross-examine the parties on oath.
78 This had been section 9(2) of the Restrictive Practices Act 1968, and became section 21(2) of the 
Restrictive Practices Act 1976..
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• Competition: monopolies and mergers control
In his overview of the Fair Trading Act 1973, Wilks (1999: 172) argues that the 
Act was deceptive in the sense that whilst the creation of a new regulatory agency in the 
Office of Fair Trading was momentous, the actual change to the substance of competition 
policy was slight. “Essentially,” he writes, “it was a consolidating statute which re-enacted 
the principles, methods and powers of the main extant legislation.” Above, it has been 
shown how this was the case for restrictive trade practices; now we turn to monopolies and 
mergers control.
The overall structure of monopoly control retained under the Act can be 
summarised as follows. The Director General was given a general power to obtain 
information relating to monopolies and uncompetitive practices. If it appeared to him that a 
monopoly situation existed in relation to the supply of either goods or services, he could 
refer the case to the Monopolies and Mergers Commission. If the Commission reported that 
the monopoly situation operated or could be expected to operate against the public interest, 
the Director General had the duty to try to obtain a suitable undertaking from the relevant 
party so as to remedy or prevent the adverse effect specified in the report. He then had to 
report back to the Secretary of State the outcome of these consultations and to recommend 
an appropriate course of action, which could include the issuing of a statutory order. Each 
of these stages will now be examined in more detail.
The general power to require information is set out in section 44 of the Act. 
Section 44(1) premises the exercise of this power on there being grounds for believing that 
a monopoly situation may exist. The Director General can then require from the relevant 
supplier or producer any information considered necessary with respect to the value, cost, 
price or quantity of goods, the capacity of any undertaking carried on by that person to 
supply, produce or make use of goods of that description, or the number of its employees. 
There is a slightly different procedure in place for ‘complex monopoly’ situations,79 where 
the Director General first has to submit proposals to the Secretary of State, stating why it is 
believed that a complex monopoly situation may exist and what information should be
79 Defined in section 11 of the Act. Essentially, it refers to a situation where at least 25% of a particular good 
or service is being supplied by two or more companies who “whether voluntarily or not, and whether by 
agreement or not, so conduct their respective affairs as in any way to prevent, restrict or distort 
competition...” (see sections 6(2) and 7(2) of the Act).
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required. The Secretary of State then has to approve these proposals for the Director 
General to proceed.80 With respect to either simple or complex monopoly situations, the 
refusal or neglect to furnish required information is made an offence under the Act,
o  1
punishable by a fine.
Under section 50 of the Act, the Director General is given the discretion to make a 
monopoly reference if he believes that a monopoly situation exists or may exist.82 The 
substance of monopoly references is set out in sections 47 to 49 of the Act, and references 
may be of two types: limited to the facts or not limited to the facts. Both types of reference 
require the Commission to investigate and report on the following questions:
(a) by virtue of which provisions of sections 6 to 8 of this Act that monopoly 
situation is taken to exist;
(b) in favour of what person or persons that monopoly situation exists;
(c) whether any steps (by way of uncompetitive practices or otherwise) are being 
taken by that person or those persons for the purpose of exploiting or maintaining 
the monopoly situation and, if so, by what uncompetitive practices or in what 
other way; and
(d) whether any action or omission on the part of that person or those persons is 
attributable to the existence of the monopoly situation and, if so, what action or 
omission and in what way it is so attributable...
Both types also have to include a description of the goods or services to which they relate, 
to state (if they relate to goods) whether they relate to the supply or export of goods (or 
both), and to specify which part of the United Kingdom they are limited, if they are indeed 
limited. The difference between them is that a reference not limited to the facts also 
requires a judgement as to whether or not the monopoly operates or may be expected to 
operate against the public interest.
If the Commission’s report concludes that a monopoly situation exists and either 
operates or may be expected to operate against the public interest, the Director General 
continues to have a central role. Firstly, he is given a statutory duty to try to secure a 
satisfactory undertaking from the party concerned for the purpose of remedying or
80 He can also choose to modify the proposals - see section 45 of the Act
81 Section 46(2) of the Act.
82 This power is subject to certain exclusions, specified in Schedule 5 and 7 of the Act. The list can be added 
to by statutory order.
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preventing the adverse effects specified in the report.83 Then he has to report back to the 
Secretary of State the outcome of his consultations, whether to provide details of an 
undertaking given, or to advise the Secretary of State that an appropriate undertaking has 
not been given nor would likely to be given within a reasonable time.84 Finally, the Director 
General is given a monitoring role following either an undertaking or an order, both to 
ensure compliance and to advise as to whether the details of the undertaking or order 
continue to be appropriate.85 The Secretary of State, on his part, has to take into account 
any advice given by the Director General before deciding whether or not to make an order 
under section 56.86 It is crucial, however, to note that the Act does not prohibit monopolies 
per se, or even anti-competitive behaviour -  it just makes them subject to investigation and 
potential, eventual statutory order. Firms engaging in behaviour already condemned by the 
MMC are thus not subject to any sanctions, and this was well in keeping with the tradition 
of UK competition policy since the Monopolies and Restrictive Practices Act 1948.
Meanwhile, if we turn to merger control, the basic point to make is that there is 
one significant difference in the procedure: the Director General is not empowered to make 
a reference directly to the Commission, but instead has to advise the Secretary of State as to 
whether or not a reference should be made.88 It then falls to the Secretary of State to make 
the decision. Thus if the transferring of the power to make monopoly references might be 
interpreted as a partial de-politicisation of monopoly control, the retention of the power in 
the area of merger control by the Secretary of State would seem to imply the opposite.
Overall, it can be concluded that many of the themes observed in the context of 
consumer protection are also a feature of the Office’s role in competition policy. Thus the 
competition provisions of the Fair Trading Act 1973 reveal a similar institutional 
fragmentation, a lack of coercive enforcement powers given to the Office to back up its 
general powers, highly-specified mandatory procedures, and an emphasis (at least with
83 Section 88(1). This reflected what had become the normal procedure following reports of the Monopolies 
Commission: to negotiate voluntary undertakings from the companies reported on, rather than to compel 
changes by Ministerial order. (Wilks??)
84 Sections 88(2) and 88(3).
85 Sections 88(4) and 88(5).
86 Section 56(3).
87 See Wilks (1999), chapter 6.
88 Section 76 of the Act.
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respect to monopolies and mergers control) on trying to find consensus before imposing an 
order.
• The political and regulatory environment of the OFT
In establishing the OFT, one of the justifications for having a separate regulatory 
agency as opposed to entrusting a governmental department was that it would be politically 
independent and enable a degree of continuity when different political parties came into 
office. However, there is much in the Act itself that points to the limits of this 
independence, and it will be further shown that this was very much intended.
The Secretary of State occupies a crucial position in the Office’s political 
environment. It is the Secretary of State who hires the Director General in the first place, 
for fixed five-year renewable terms of office, but with a power to terminate the 
appointment if he is particularly dissatisfied.89 The government of the day also has general 
control over budgetary and staffing arrangements.90 But more striking than these features 
are the specific powers that the Secretary of State has in virtually every area of policy 
covered by the Act. Section 12 of the Act gives him general powers as follows:
(1) The Secretary of State may give general directions indicating considerations 
to which the Director should have particular regard in determining the order of 
priority in which -
(a) Matters are to be brought under review in the performance of his duty 
under section 2(1) of this Act, or
(b) Classes of goods and services are to be brought under review by him for 
the purpose of considering whether a monopoly situation exists or may exist in 
relation to them.
(2) The Secretary of State may also give general directions indicating -
(a) Considerations to which in cases where it appears to the Director that a 
practice may adversely affect the interests of consumers in the United Kingdom, 
he should have particular regard in determining whether to make a 
recommendation to die Secretary of State under section 2(3)(b) of this Act, or
(b) Considerations to which, in cases where it appears to the Director that a 
consumer trade practice may adversely affect the economic interests of 
consumers in the United Kingdom, he should have particular regard in 
determining whether to make a reference to the Advisory Committee under Part 
II of this Act, or
(c) Considerations to which, in cases where it appears to the Director that a 
monopoly situation exists or may exist, he should have particular regard in
89 Section 1(3) provides that “the Secretary of State may remove any person from that office [i.e. of Director 
General] on the ground of incapacity or misbehaviour”.
90 See sections 135 and 1(5).
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determining whether to make a monopoly reference to the Commission under 
Part IV of this Act.
(3) The Secretary of State on giving any directions under this section, shall 
arrange for those directions to be published in such manner as the Secretary of 
State thinks most suitable in the circumstances.
This general legislative support given to political interference with the Office’s 
decisions under the Act is well backed up by the role of the Secretary of State in virtually 
all the Office’s areas of competence as set out above. With respect to the lawmaking power 
in Part II of the Act, the Secretary of State has the discretion to accept or reject the Office’s 
proposals, even after they have been approved by the Advisory Committee. In relation to 
monopoly control, whilst the power to make references is ceded to the Office, the Secretary 
of State retains a veto over any reference through section 50(6) of the Act. In the context of 
merger control, the Secretary of State retains the power to make references completely. In 
both cases, any action following a Commission report is left to the discretion of the 
Secretary of State. Even in the heavily formalised area of restrictive trade practices, the 
Office has to seek the Secretary of State’s approval when exempting an agreement of no 
significance. The only area in which there is no governmental involvement is with respect 
to the Part III powers against rogue traders. Significantly, this is the only power that has to 
be exercised through the courts, and is thus subject to legal controls. In all other areas, the 
conclusion must be that a large amount of political control was deliberately retained in both 
consumer protection and competition policy.
Wilks (1999: 186) confirms this impression of the legislation, quoting from an 
exchange of notes between the Department for Trade and Industry and the Civil Service 
Department that related to monopoly references:91
Should the Director be Completely Independent? The arguments point two ways.
You want to give him the appearance of considerable independence. In part this is 
to avoid any suspicion that the Department’s ‘sponsorship role’ puts it in the 
pocket of the industries sponsored, and makes it more reluctant to embark on 
investigations. On the other hand you want to retain ministerial control over the 
making of References... Given this degree of control my own view -  and I think 
you agreed when we discussed it -  is that the appearance of independence can be 
adequately ensured by setting up a separate Office and there is no need to 
strengthen it unduly.
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If we finally turn to the nature of the Office’s regulatory environment, it is difficult 
to make a judgement from the Act alone. Both business and consumer groups are relevant 
parties for the purposes of references to the CP AC under Part II of the Act.92 Except for 
this, there is nothing in the Act that specifically recognises a role for either in the 
implementation of consumer protection and competition policy. It is possible to speculate 
on the relative influence of each, however by considering their respective positions. In 
1973, the business lobby was well-organised and concentrated in the form of the CBI. The 
consumer lobby, however, was diffused, with no central body to channel complaints. Thus 
whilst the Office was partially set up to offset the abolition of the Consumer Council, it was 
more likely to receive pressures from pro-business than pro-consumer groups. Meanwhile, 
its regulatees would be as least as varied in size and nature as those of the CRE. From the 
transnational company considering a multi-million pound merger to a small-time rogue 
trader, the Office of Fair Trading would have dealings with all types of businesses and, as 
with the CRE, its contact would similarly vary from occasional to regular.
Comparing and contrasting the two agencies
The regulatory strategy literature
Before considering the evidence presented up to now, it is necessary first to set out 
the main explanatory factors contained in the regulatory strategy literature. For this 
purpose, we can rely mainly on Kagan’s (1994) review article, in which he sums up the 
different factors that have been found to influence regulatory strategies and discusses the 
relative importance of each. His findings are then neatly presented in a table, which is 
reproduced (although adapted slightly93) here:
91 Public Record Office, FV 60/57, IC3.460 Ptl, ‘Monopolies and Restrictive Practices Bill: instructions to 
parliamentary counsel’, exchange of correspondence with Civil Service Department (10 September 1971).
2 It will be recalled that, in forming a judgement over a reference, the Advisory Committee have to take into 
account representations made by “persons appearing to them to have a substantial interest in the subject 
matter of the reference or bodies appearing to them to represent substantial number of persons who have such 
an interest.” -  see section 81(l)(a) of the Act.
93 It should be noted in particular, that the stars indicating the importance of each cause are not included in 
Kagan’s table, although they are based on the comments he makes in the article.
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Legal design 
factors
Stringency of regulatory mission Church and Nakamura 1993 *
Legal powers
Ex ante/ex post controls Bardach 1989; Kagan 1991 *
Potency and immediacy 
of sanctions
Ayres and Braithwaite 1992 *
Legal rights of regulated - **
Legal rights of 
complainants
Scholzetal 1991 **
\ Specificity o f legal standards and penalties Day and Klein 1987 Not important
Task
environment
factors
Visibility o f 
violations
Frequency of interaction 
with regulated entities
Scholz 1984; Grabosky and 
Braithwaite 1986; Hutter 1989
****
Visibility of violations to 
complainants
Rees 1988; Sabatier and 
Mazmanian 1983’ Scholzetal 
1991; Reich 1992
*****
Regulated 
entities ’ 
willingness 
to comply
Size and/or sophistication 
of regulated entities
Bardach and Kagan 1982; 
Grabosky and Braithwaite 1986
**
Cost of compliance / 
economic resilience
Hutter 1989; Braithwaite 1985 **
Seriousness of risks to be prevented - ****
Political
environment
factors
Strength and aggressiveness of pro­
regulation interests
Scholz and Wei 1986; Sabatier 
and Mazmanian 1979; 
Gunningham 1987
****
Preferences 
ofpolitical 
authorities, 
as
influenced
by:
Recent catastrophes or 
scandals
Bardach and Kagan 1982 *****
Economically urgent 
projects subject to 
regulation
Carson 1982; Kagan 1991 ***
Political controversy over 
enforcement style
Scholzetal 1991; Noble 1986; 
Shoveretal 1986; Wood 1988
****
Electoral shifts / changes 
in regulatory leadership
Hutter 1989; Wood and 
Waterman 1991
***
Budgetary cutbacks Wood 1988 ***
Government as regulated 
entity
Kagan 1986 **
Leadership
factors
If strong- 
minded 
regulatory 
leader...
Leaders’ policy beliefs Shover et al 1986; Landy et al 
1990
**
Beliefs concerning 
enforcement style
- **
Degree o f staffprofessionalism /  internal 
culture
Melnick 1980; Katzmann 1986; 
Mashaw and Harfst 1991
**
Other factors might be added to his list. Hawkins (1984), in his study of 
environmental protection, emphasised the importance of moral judgements, arguing that 
enforcement officials tended to prosecute only in those cases where it was felt that the 
regulatee was morally in the wrong, such as where the infringement was flagrant or 
repeated. Hutter (1988), on her part, stressed the degree of social consensus as to the 
value o f compliance. At the same time, new institutionalist accounts would want to
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devote more attention to the structure and organisation of regulatory agencies, 
including factors such as management structures and the backgrounds of regulatory 
officials.94
Now let us return to the two regulatory agencies, considering how they compare in 
terms of some of these factors.
Comparing and contrasting the two agencies
In considering the evidence presented up to now, it is clear that — at the point at 
which they were established - there were some notable similarities between the two 
agencies. They were set up at similar times, in the context of the general industrial unrest 
and economic instability of the 1970s. They both would have to deal with a large, 
undefined and heterogeneous group of regulatees -  an important similarity given that many 
researchers have pointed to a strong relationship between the nature of an agency’s 
regulatees and its enforcement strategy.95 They were both given an array of different 
powers -  some more coercive than others -  and both agencies would have to make 
important strategic choices as to where its priorities should lie. Moreover, some of these 
powers offer intriguing parallels: both agencies were given a lawmaking power requiring a 
lengthy procedure, both agencies had powers to prosecute persistent offenders, both 
agencies had general monitoring duties.
Overall, however, the differences between the two agencies are more striking. The 
first, and most difficult to interpret, is their institutional structure. The Office of Fair 
Trading was set up as a single-person regulator -  a structure which, as Wilks (1999: 186) 
notes, was “momentous” in providing “the model of the ‘single person’ regulator which 
became such a distinctive feature of the British system of utility regulation”. The 
Commission for Racial Equality, however, was to be a commission of between eight to 
fifteen Commissioners. In principle, the difference might be expected to impact on the 
nature of their respective discretion -  after all, the very notion of a single-person regulator 
is one of a person with substantial personal authority. Without the constraints of a Board, it 
would be expected that such a person would have significant influence over the direction of
94 For an excellent introduction, see Guy Peters (1999).
95 See for instance, the studies by Scholz (1984); Grabosky and Braithwaite (1986) and Hutter (1989).
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policy and areas of focus. The distinction can be exaggerated, however: a strong Chair of a 
Commission of like-minded individuals would also be likely to have substantial influence 
over the direction of policy.
More significant than the Commission/single-person regulator distinction then is 
the controls that would operate to curb the discretion of either. Thus following the general 
approach of the principal-agency literature, it should be possible to use a ‘powers minus 
controls’ approach to predict the level of discretion actually possessed by each agency. 
Thatcher and Stone-Sweet (2002: 5) put it this way:
In the American literature the question of how best to define and operationalise 
the gap that (inevitably) develops between what principals want from agents and 
what agents actually do remains an open one. Underlying the debate are differing 
views of the nature of discretion. In this volume, we conceive of this gap in terms 
of a theoretical ‘zone of discretion’. This zone is constituted by (a) the sum of 
delegated powers (policy discretion) granted by the principal to the agent, minus
(b) the sum of control instruments, available for use by the principals to shape 
(constrain) or annul (reverse) policy outcomes that emeige as a result of the 
agent’s performance of set tasks.
Pollack (2002: 202) summarises as follows: “ceteris paribus... we should expect agencies 
to be most responsive to their legislative principals when control mechanisms are extensive, 
and most autonomous when administrative procedures are few and oversight is weak”.
The cases of the CRE and OFT appear very different when following this 
approach. The CRE was given substantial powers under the Race Relations Act 1976 and, 
except for its power to issue codes of practice in the field of employment, was subject to 
few controls. The use of its most coercive power for instance -  the power to launch formal 
investigations - was subject to no direct political controls at all, and (as was argued in the 
above section) the Act was profoundly ambiguous as to how this power should operate in 
practice. This contrasts starkly with the case of the Office. In carrying out its general 
monitoring duties, the Office had substantial discretion to determine areas of focus and to 
set the agenda. In exercising any of its more coercive powers under the Act, however, the 
Office was nearly always constrained by external, political controls. Consistently, the 
Office had to go through other institutions, follow lengthy procedures, and face the 
prospect of being overruled by the Secretary of State. The Director General of Fair Trading 
was, moreover, personally at greater risk of being dismissed by the Secretary of State than
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the Chair of the Commission for Racial Equality. Following the basic guidelines of the 
principal-agency approach therefore, the most straightforward implication to read into this 
contrast is that the Office would have to be more sensitive to prevailing political will than 
the Commission, and that an aggressive enforcement strategy would be more difficult to 
pursue - even if desired. It is submitted that these factors are far more significant than the 
Commission / single-person regulator distinction, which would otherwise have pointed to a 
different conclusion.96
There were other differences between the agencies. In general terms, the Office 
was given few coercive powers and was seen less as a law enforcement agency than as a 
monitoring and law-reform agency. The CRE, on the other hand, was given strong 
investigatory powers to back up its main enforcement power of formal investigation, and 
powers to prosecute a number of offences under the Act.
Next, there was an important difference in the nature of their respective areas of 
regulation: in particular, the regulation of racial equality carries a more obvious moral 
dimension than the competition work of the OFT for instance -  compare an accusation of 
racial discrimination with one of carrying out a restrictive trade practice without placing it 
on the register. Their political environments differed also in significant respects. Whereas 
the business lobby would be present for both, there was a major variation in the forces that 
opposed it. In the areas of consumer protection and competition, the Office was set up in 
the context of a weak and diffuse consumer lobby, highlighted by the lack of a dedicated 
pro-consumer group following the abolition of the Consumer Council. In the area of racial 
equality, however, there were strong pro-regulation groups which, in particular, had both 
institutional and personal links with the Commission.
Before showing how these differences relate to the overall research design, it is 
worth dealing first with two other features of the agencies which, whilst relevant, are not to 
be found within the relevant Acts and thus have not yet been discussed. These are the 
respective staffing arrangements and initial leaders of the two agencies. Consider the Office 
of Fair Trading first. When it was established, it was intended that it would have an eclectic
96 See, however, the discussion in Wilks (2002: 159-160). Wilks argues that the OFT was given “very 
considerable independence” -  however, he subsequently qualifies this by noting that this independence was 
“limited”.
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mix of staff, and that specialist ‘outsiders* would be appointed to key positions. Ramsay 
(1987: 181-2) observes that things did not work out this way, however:
However, apart from the current Director General himself, Sir Gordon Bonie, the 
influx of outside expertise to the OFT was relatively small and of limited 
duration. Since 1976 only one position has been advertised outside the civil 
service... One reason for this situation has been the influence of the civil service 
unions, who have a ‘strong understanding’ with the Director General that posts 
will be filled from within the Civil Service...
Wilks (2002: 161) concludes that because of this, “a predisposition to conform to civil 
service standards and priorities was built into the Office”. Meanwhile, the first Director 
General of Fair Trading was to be Mr John Methven -  a man taken straight from industry 
(ICI Ltd), and a prominent industrial lobbyist, although he had also spent a year with the 
Monopolies and Mergers Commission.97
The Commission for Racial Equality had a different arrangement, recruiting its 
own staff who were not civil servants (McCrudden et al 1991: 50). Most of its staff was 
recruited from existing bodies: the Race Relations Board and Community Relations 
Commission. The transfer of staff was controversial: the majority of staff from the former 
body was white, whilst the latter had been largely run by staff from ethnic minority 
backgrounds, implying that from the start there might be additional pressures for tough 
enforcement {ibid., 55). Its first Chairman was to be Mr David Lane -  at that time the 
Conservative MP for Cambridge and previously the junior minister responsible for race 
relations, but also with prior jobs within industry and the Bar.98 The fact that it was a 
Labour government that appointed him confirms the impression that he was likely to be 
considerably more independent from government control than the Director General of Fair 
Trading.
97 Source: Who Was Who.
Conclusion
The following table sums up the main differences between the two case studies. 
Grey shading is used to indicate those features which would suggest against a coercive 
regulatory strategy.
Formal structure o f agency Commission Single-person regulator
Background o f first head of 
organisation
David Lane -  previously Parliamentary 
Under-Secretary of State at the Home 
Office, with special responsibility for 
race relations.
John Methven -  previously in 
industry.
Background o f regulatory 
officials
Mixed -  from outside civil service mman y c m  service
Complaints-based? Partially -  part of CRE’s mandate to 
assist individual complainants
Strength and aggressiveness 
o f pro-regulation interests
High -  communal pressures + internal 
links with ethnic minority groups.
Low: pro-consumer lobby 
diffused and not as influential as 
pro-business lobby.
Breach usually seen as 
moral offence?
Yes No, and never on competition 
side.
Political controls Low High
Strength o f enforcement 
powers
Strong Weak
The table highlights how, according to the guidelines of the regulatory strategy 
literature, it was likely that the two agencies were about to embark on very different 
courses.
The CRE, faced with pressure from pro-regulation groups to which it was strongly 
attached, and made up of staff also with a strong drive to pursue an aggressive regulatory 
policy, had the will to mount a tough enforcement strategy. It would further be relatively 
free to do so due to the general lack of direct legal and political controls included in the 
Act. And with strong investigatory powers, it certainly had the legal tools to carry out a 
deterrence-based approach.
The OFT, on the other hand, was faced with far stronger and better-organised pro­
business groups than consumer groups, was staffed nearly exclusively from the civil
98 He worked for Shell at senior level from 1959 to 1967, and was called to the Bar in 1955. See the obituary 
in the Times, 18th November, 1998.
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service, and was subject to close controls from the Board of Trade. And its Director 
General was appointed from the business world. In comparison to the CRE, its enforcement 
powers were relatively weak -  indeed, it was seen more as a monitoring and law-reform 
agency than as an enforcement body. There was little therefore to suggest that the OFT 
would be able to launch an aggressive enforcement policy, even if it wished to do so.
Add to these factors the institutional history to their respective regulatory fields - 
the Commission just given new enforcement powers for which it had campaigned under its 
former guise; the Office taking over the implementation of a competition policy that for 
many years already had been dealt with in as non-confrontational a manner as possible -  
and it is clear that the regulatory strategy literature would have predicted very different 
things for these agencies at the point at which they were set up.
In light of this, and the connections noted in Chapter 1 between choice of 
regulatory strategy and the level of juridification, a comparison of these two agencies 
provides a particularly good test of the extent and causes of juridification (or the absence of 
juridification), the impact of regulatory strategy for juridification and vice versa. We turn 
now to the case studies to begin this test.
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CHAPTER 3
The Commission for Racial Equality and its regulatees: 
de-juridification in the regulation of racial equality.
Introduction
In the previous chapter, it was argued that the Commission for Racial Equality was 
left with a great deal of discretion under the Race Relations Act 1976. The nature of this 
discretion was such that the Commission was not only given freedom to interpret the 
specific details of how its powers should operate, but also more generally to work out how 
each power should fit into an overall enforcement strategy. It was further argued that, at the 
point at which it was set up, there were several factors that would have suggested that it 
was likely to pursue a tough enforcement strategy.
In assessing the nature of the Commission’s enforcement strategies over a period 
of time, it is helpful to begin by reviewing the types of decisions it had to make about the 
operation of its powers. The following table indicates some of the choices open to the 
Commission, the resolution of which would necessarily impact on the nature of its 
relationships with its regulatees.
Formal investigations • What type of investigation should be used?
• How often should they be launched? Against whom?
• Should investigations form part of a wider strategy or should they be seen as 
action against specific offenders?
• When should non-discrimination notices be issued?
Assisting individual 
complainants
• Should assistance be given as often as possible, or should it be based on 
strategic considerations?
• Should the Commission look to take as many cases to court/tribunal as 
possible, or is settlement more economical? What form of settlement?
Prosecutions • How often should court action be sought against offenders under the Act?
Codes of practice • How do codes of practice fit into a wider enforcement strategy?
It is important to remember also that it is not only the manner in which each power 
is exercised that is important -  it is also the question of which power is chosen in the first
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place. A decision by the Commission to resolve a complaint through persuasion and 
education implies a different relationship from one in which the Commission decides to 
resolve the same problem through the launch of a formal investigation.
Moreover, this chapter further argues that two other levels are significant as well. 
Firstly, it is argued that the way in which the Commission fits the use of a particular power 
into its overall strategy has implications for the level of juridification. For instance, it will 
be argued that initially the Commission tended to see its powers in separation from one 
another -  a fact highlighted by the use of the terms “promotion”1 and “enforcement”2 to 
describe its differing activities. When “enforcement” against a regulatee was decided upon, 
this was thus in itself a significant decision, suggesting a particular kind of relationship 
with that regulatee. Later however, the Commission began to focus more upon outcomes, 
and there was greater inteiplay between its different powers. It is argued that this increasing 
flexibility was evidence of de-juridification as it indicated the increasing importance of 
non-legal considerations over legal considerations. Secondly, the overall regulatory strategy 
pursued by the Commission itself connects with juridification. A more deterrence-based 
strategy links well with the “eliminating discrimination” duty of the Commission and is 
basically backward-looking. It focuses on past events, aims to rectify past wrongs and to 
punish regulatees guilty of these wrongs. As such, it tends both to imply and to give rise to 
a more legalistic relationship with regulatees than its alternative -  a persuasive approach, 
which connects with the ‘promoting equal opportunities’ duty. This approach is less 
concerned with past events than with achieving change, and because of this is more flexible 
in nature. Prima facie then, a switch from a deterrence to a persuasive strategy would 
constitute some evidence of de-juridification, and it is argued that this was indeed what 
happened, for instance, with respect to the Commission’s approach to formal investigations 
after 1983.
Both these examples point to the overriding claim of this chapter, that -  in direct 
contrast to the juridification thesis -  the relationships between the Commission and its 
regulatees became progressively less juridified over the course of 25 years. After an initial 
period in which the Commission either had formal relationships with its regulatees
1 A term meant to imply informal processes of education and persuasion.
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(frequently characterised by litigation, lawyers and references to legal rules) or informal 
relationships characterised largely by the provision of education and advice, with little in 
between, the Commission gradually became more flexible about its enforcement strategy, 
changing in the process from a deterrence-based approach to a persuasive approach. The 
result was progressively fewer formal contacts -  a fact that this chapter aims to highlight by 
dividing the period under review into four separate policy phases, each less juridified than 
the last.3
First Phase: 1977-1982
• The relationship between enforcement and promotion
In order to understand the key characteristics of this first phase, it is important to 
recognise that initially, the Commission’s approach was affected by its specific institutional 
history. Not only was it set up in formal terms as a combination of the Race Relations 
Board and the Community Relations Commission,4 but there was a continuity in terms of 
the transfer of staff from the previous bodies. Moreover, the CRE was originally structured 
in two divisions -  the Equal Opportunities Division and the Community Affairs and 
Liaison Division - each reflecting the activities of their respective predecessors.5 
McCrudden et al (1991: 56) conclude that between 1977 and 1982:
none of the staff (apart from the Chief Executive) could be said to have had a foot 
both in the promotional camp and in the formal investigation camp. No forum,
2 The use of its formal powers (in particular, formal investigations, prosecutions, and assisting victims of 
discrimination with their cases in the industrial tribunals).
3 The divisions made in this chapter are 1977-82, 1983-1988, 1989-1992 and 1993-1998. Several researchers 
have attempted divisions which are not dissimilar. McCrudden et al 1991 distinguished between two 
generations of formal investigations (1977-82 and 1983-9), whilst in a recent report commissioned by the 
CRE, Clarke and Speeden 2001 divide the CRE’s strategies into 3 periods: 1977-1984 -  enforcing the law; 
1985-1992 -promoting equal opportunities; and 1993-2000 -  campaigning for (e)quality.
4 A graphic illustration of this is that its initial staff complement of 221 was approved by the Civil Service 
Department “subject to the proviso that the number of staff to be employed should not exceed the combined 
aggregate of the staffs of the two separate predecessor bodies” -  see Evidence to the House of Commons 
Select Committee on Home Affairs (1981: 2)
5 See Appendix 4. The EOD was responsible for formal investigations and litigation powers. The CALD was 
responsible for promoting equality of opportunity and good race relations, the administration of grant aid 
under section 44 of the Act, assisting the work of the local organisations such as the local CRCs and ethnic 
minority organisations, and basing with police, ethnic minority organisations and so on.
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therefore, naturally existed where a choice between strategies could be made. The 
main concern of die EOD was whether or not to mount a formal investigation in 
the field; the main concern of the relevant promotional sections was whether or 
not to mount a promotional effort; nobody’s main concern appeared to be the 
strategic choice between the two.
In assessing this claim, it should be noted that it contradicts what was said at the 
time by the Commission, keen to stress that it had a coherent strategy. In its evidence to the 
Home Affairs Select Committee 1981, for instance, the Commission was emphasising how 
it “recognised from the beginning that law enforcement and promotional work were 
interrelated parts of the same strategy for the elimination of discrimination and the 
promotion of equality of opportunity and good race relations” (at p3). Moreover, the 
exercise of all of its powers was “carefully co-ordinated”, including “its work in law 
enforcement with its promotional and educative work generally, and with its research and 
the research which it finances under Section 45 of the Act. Already reports on some 
investigations have been major promotional documents and this will be true of many more 
reports in future” (p7). With regards to this last claim, indeed there were examples of 
reports being used for purposes beyond the specific enforcement action even at this early 
stage. Following the formal investigation into BL Cars, for instance, the CBI and the TUC 
were both urged to take action on the report through their race relations committees, and 
other motor manufacturers were approached and asked to supply information on their 
policies and practices for discussion with staff (AR 1981: 15). The Commission also 
followed up the formal investigation into Cottrell and Rothon, an estate agent, by holding 
discussions with the relevant professional associations.6
Nonetheless, these stand out as exceptional rather than typical of this early period. 
Not only was there nothing systematic about the promotional use of formal investigations at 
this point, but there was also a lot of promotional work that did not even relate to its 
enforcement strategy.7 In all, the Select Committee reached the following judgement:
6 i.e. the Royal Institute of Chartered Surveyors, the National Association of Estate Agents, and the 
Incorporated Society of Valuers and Surveyors.
7 This was sharply criticised by the Select Committee, which observed (at §79) that “while the Commission 
recognise that they should be operating centrally rather than locally, much effort is spent on unplanned local 
sorties in response to particular pressures or individual requests”. Even more bluntly, it concluded that “the 
general pattern of the Commission’s promotional work which emerges is of the propounding of ambitious and 
vague programmes, the commitment to undefined targets of limited staff resources, and final disappointment
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There sometimes seems to be little or no connection between tbe Commission’s 
advisory and promotional work and its law enforcement duties; they should be 
complementary and to some degree inter-dependent... We recommend that the 
Commission’s dual role be continued provided that the promotional work is 
solely dictated by the need to eradicate racial discrimination.8
And indeed, the Commission itself accepted the limitations of its strategic thinking 
at this time, in a later Annual Report (AR 1986: 6):
In the early years of the Commission, it undertook a heavy weight of 
investigation work which the 1976 Act made possible. While this investigative 
work was being undertaken, inevitably much of the Commission’s effort to 
persuade and to educate was detached from its law enforcement effort. There 
were not enough completed investigations, for example, to enable promotional 
work to be securely based upon their results.
This impact of this detachment between enforcement and promotion on the nature 
of the Commission’s contacts with regulatees subject to enforcement action will be seen 
shortly. Before examining the Commission’s approach to individual enforcement powers in 
detail though, it is necessary to consider which powers were being favoured in the first 
place. This is a fairly simple task. In the first four years of the Commission’s existence, the 
Equal Opportunities Division placed an emphasis on its power to launch formal 
investigations that has not even nearly been matched since. In the CRE’s first full year, it 
started 26 formal investigations. In the next year, it launched a further 10, followed by 6 
more in 1980. In all, by the end of 1982, a total of forty seven formal investigations had 
been initiated9 -  an extraordinary, and ultimately unmanageable, number. McCrudden et al 
(1991: 56) describe how the decision was reached to launch an investigation:
When EOD staff felt that a formal investigation was possible and desirable, a 
proposal went to the CRE’s Equal Opportunities Committee. In the vast majority 
of cases the formal investigation was approved and this decision was handed on 
to the full Commission for formal endorsement. In effect the importance of an
at the paucity of results flowing from this commitment of time and effort.. Few local authorities, employers, 
trade unions or other bodies have been significantly affected by the Commission’s promotional activities.”
8 Emphasis in original. This particular recommendation was later rejected by the Commission, and the Home 
Office accepted the Commission’s stance that promotional work also had to be geared to improving equal 
opportunities and race relations, implying a far broader range of activities than the Select Committee had 
allowed for.
9 One of these was discontinued due to the company going into liquidation.
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issue to the CRE, when endorsed by the Committee, was translated directly into a 
decision to mount a formal investigation.
If formal investigations were central to the Commission’s overall enforcement 
strategy, its other enforcement powers were of more peripheral importance. In comparison 
with subsequent years, relatively few people were turning to the Commission for assistance 
with their individual claims during this period due to a combination of low awards and low 
success rates.10 More significantly, the Commission’s approach was ‘responsive’ in nature 
— in other words, it tended to provide assistance in all the cases that matched the minimum 
criteria in the Act and carried a reasonable prospect of success.11 At this stage therefore, 
there was no attempt by the Commission to integrate this power within its overall 
enforcement strategy. Meanwhile, complaints about discriminatory advertisements tended
to be resolved informally, and although complaints of pressure to discriminate tended to
10  1 ^ result in the Commission bringing proceedings, there were very few of these altogether.
As its most coercive of legal powers, it might be suggested that the pivotal role of
formal investigations during this early period was, in itself, indicative of juridification.
However, it was pointed out in the previous chapter that the 1976 Act left open many
particulars: when they should be launched, what procedures should be used, how flexibly
they should be approached. We know that the Act gave investigatees the right of appeal,
and that in any case there was the possibility of judicial review. We do not yet know
whether court appearances were commonplace. All these aspects of formal investigations
will now be examined in detail.
• The conduct of formal investigations: 1977-1982
This section begins by looking at some quantitative evidence to establish the main 
trends in the conduct of formal investigations over this period. It then takes one 
investigation clearly affected by juridification in more detail in order to illustrate how these 
general trends operated in the context of particular investigations, before finally turning to 
the general qualitative evidence.
10 In 1980, this figure reached a low of 779 complaints. This compares with 1033 two years previously and a 
figure of just under 2000 for much of the 1990s (see later in this chapter).
11 This worked out as approximately 15% of complaints.
12 For instance, six out of seven such complaints were dealt with formally in 1981.
91
a) the quantitative evidence
The following table establishes those aspects of juridification which can be 
quantified: the extent to which lawyers were involved, the average length of investigations, 
and especially the extent to which investigations were subject to legal challenges or legal 
obstacles. The data used for these figures are recorded in Appendix 1.
Number of ‘belief 30
Number of ‘strategic’ 15
Number of ‘general’ 2
Number in which discrimination admitted during investigation 3
Number in which lawyers present 27
Number in which subpoena issued by Commission 7
Number in which further court orders sought by Commission 4
Number challenged through judicial review 5
Number challenged through appeal 10
Number affected by other legal cases15 12
Number in which non-discrimination notice could have been issued1 b 27
Number in which non-discrimination notice issued 24
Number in which non-discrimination notice quashed on appeal 4
Number in which non-discrimination notice changed following litigation 7
Mean length (months) 35.2
I  o
Total number affected by litigation of any type 33
Overall, the figures paint a picture of adversarialism, significant delays and 
frequent involvement of the courts. More than half the investigatees turned to their lawyers, 
but it is the final statistic that is the most extraordinary: 33 out of 47, or over 70%, of 
investigations being affected by litigation in one way or another.
13 All these powers will be dealt with in much greater detail later in the chapter.
14 See the note in Appendix 1 about the classification of investigations.
15 These mainly consist of those investigations which had to be either scrapped, restarted or changed into 
inquiries as a result of the Hillingdon and Prestige decisions. See further below.
16 i.e. this excludes general investigations, investigations in the fields where the Commission only has the 
power to make recommendations (such as the field of education), investigations where no finding of 
discrimination was reached and investigations where the Commission were precluded from issuing non­
discrimination notices for legal reasons.
17 Either directly by a court decision or through settlement under threat of appeal.
18 This includes all the investigations where the Commission was forced to use its legal powers to get hold of 
evidence, investigations where the non-discrimination notice was appealed or judicial review was applied for, 
and investigations affected by other judicial review cases.
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Prima facie, the figures suggest that there was substantial juridification in this area. 
Before confirming this through the general qualitative evidence, it is proposed first to show 
more concretely the nature of juridification by focusing on one particular investigation. The 
case chosen is the investigation into the system of issuing Hackney carriage drivers’ and 
vehicle licences in the city of Birmingham, and it is chosen because it constituted a clear 
case of juridification in practice. As will be seen, this proved to be a complicated case of 
indirect discrimination, as much about establishing law as facts.
b) the Hackney carriages investigation
In 1979, the Commission decided to launch a formal investigation into the system 
of issuing Hackney carriage drivers’ and vehicle licences in Birmingham. The investigation 
was launched following complaints from Asians working as private hire car drivers that 
they were unable to obtain Hackney carriage drivers’ licences because of a rule that 
applicants had to be sponsored by an existing Hackney carriage owner. This investigation 
was thus focusing on indirect rather than direct discrimination, in the field of employment, 
and it was directed against a public body.
The investigation was wide in scope. It included various surveys, interviews, 
ongoing contact with Birmingham City Council, and comparisons with the records of other 
local authorities. Much of the investigation, however, was less a matter of establishing the 
facts as of forming judgements over those facts. For instance, part of the definition of 
indirect discrimination is that the application of a requirement has to have a 
‘disproportionate’ effect -  this however, depended on whether the proportion of black 
persons in the city as a whole or just the proportion of black private hire drivers was to be 
considered. An even more difficult matter was whether or not the sponsorship requirement 
could be considered to be ‘justifiable’. The council argued that it was justifiable because it 
was a reasonable way of controlling the demand for licences.
For all these questions, any decisions reached very closely resemble legal 
judgments, necessitating the interpretation of statutory phrases and their application to 
specific cases. The style of the report of the investigation reflects this fact, addressing each
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element of the four-part definition of indirect discrimination in turn.19 There is further a 
strong sense in the report that the Commission was very consciously laying down legal 
precedent in this investigation — setting out authoritatively how the Act was to be 
interpreted.20 In this case, it would have been extraordinary had the Commission accepted 
the Council’s representations: sponsorship requirements are virtually the paradigmatic 
example of indirect discrimination, and this was the first test of the Act. The Commission 
found that the sponsorship requirement constituted indirect discrimination under the Act 
and issued a non-discrimination notice.
The Council responded to such an overtly legal decision through legal channels. 
Following the non-discrimination notice, served by the Commission in April 1982, the 
Council decided both to appeal against the notice in an industrial tribunal and to seek 
judicial review of the decision. The basis of the application for judicial review was that 
whilst the Commission’s findings of fact were not in dispute, it was impossible to find from 
these facts that the practices were indirectly discriminatory. In other words, the Council 
were very clearly recognising the decision for what it was - a legal decision -  and they were 
challenging it through legal avenues.
As it turned out, in April 1983, the Council made an internal decision that the 
sponsorship requirement would be changed and withdrew its judicial review application. In 
response, the Commission consented to the industrial tribunal quashing the requirements in 
the notice that had been overtaken by events, and the appeal was settled on this basis in 
February 1984 -  five years after investigation begun. The heavy involvement of lawyers 
and legal channels, the dominance of legal considerations in the exchanges, and the mutual 
awareness that the dispute centred around legal principle all constituted strong evidence of 
juridification, with the length of the investigation a direct consequence.
c) the general qualitative evidence
Whilst the quantitative evidence is significant, it is important also to consider more 
qualitative evidence. In this subsection therefore, a number of issues are discussed: the
19 In fact, reports of later indirect discrimination investigations have done this much more overtly with 
specific sub-headings breaking up the separate legal aspects of the offence.
2 The findings of the case were indeed referred to in subsequent investigations, one example being the 
Handsworth investigation.
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reasons why investigations were launched, the extent to which legal procedures were 
adopted by the Commission, the extent to which legal values were assimilated by the 
Commission and the degree of its flexibility towards investigatees once the decision had 
been made to embark upon an investigation.
It was argued above that formal investigations operated at the heart of the 
Commission’s enforcement strategy. They were not always chosen, however, for broad 
strategic purposes, as was made clear in the Genture investigation (at pi):
In order to exercise this power most effectively, the Commission have devised a 
strategy of investigations and will be examining in depth those areas of activity 
where, in their view, it is most important that discrimination should be eliminated 
and equality of opportunity provided. Moreover, in addition to these broad, 
strategic enquiries, the Commission will conduct formal investigations if they 
receive strong evidence of particular acts of discrimination and it appears that an 
investigation would be the best way of tackling the matter... These investigations 
will not generally be extensive but sometimes they will have far reaching 
consequences and implications. They may, for example, identify unlawful 
practises which are used throughout the country; or they may bring home to other 
organisations in the same field of activity the need to ensure as effectively as 
possible that their practices are free from discrimination.
The extract suggests strongly that formal investigations were used as part of a
deterrence-based approach to enforcement, and this claim is supported by the fact that there
were several other narrow investigations into specific acts of discrimination during this 
^ 1
period, and by the Commission’s general strategy of launching as many investigations in
1
as many different sectors and geographical locations as possible. As the above extract 
makes clear, the strategy rested on the belief that the more investigations launched, the 
greater the chance that organisations would be deterred from pursuing discriminatory 
practices.
In Chapter 1, it was noted that there is a clear affinity between the deterrence style 
of enforcement and juridification, primarily because a deterrence-based approach implies a 
focus on rules and legal processes over outcomes, and a legalistic inflexibility in dealings
21 Examples include the Antwerp Arms Public House, Rank Leisure and the Tottenham Trades and Social 
Club investigations.
22 Of the 47 investigations launched, 24 were in the field of employment, 11 in housing, 9 in the provision of 
goods and services, 2 in education and 1 in immigration. There were 15 investigations into public bodies. 
There was a diverse range of private sector firms investigated by the Commission, the products of which 
included such things as insurance, food, leisure, textiles, plastics, construction and electronics.
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with investigatees. This affinity can be clearly seen in several aspects of the Commission’s 
approach to formal investigations during this early period.
For instance, consider the degree of flexibility shown by the Commission in its 
approach to investigations. On very few occasions when the Commission was in the 
position to issue non-discrimination notices did it choose not to do so. Indeed, this 
happened in only three investigations, of which all were characterised by the positive 
attitudes of the regulatees and their prior adoption of policies which would have formed 
part of the non-discrimination notices had they been issued.23 Except for these cases, the 
Commission’s approach was basically inflexible. Non-discrimination notices gave the 
Commission the power to monitor the organisations in question and to require specific 
policies. Having chosen to go through a formal process, the Commission saw little reason 
to depart from it.24
This inflexibility is well illustrated by the postscript to the Genture investigation. 
The investigation attracted a lot of media attention, and Mr Weston Edwards (the owner of 
the restaurant concerned) gave several interviews. In some of these, he intimated that he 
aimed to maintain a racial balance at the club. On the basis of these comments, the 
Commission initiated correspondence with Genture’s solicitors who replied that the club 
was not going to try to maintain a racial balance, and was not going to refuse admission to 
anyone on the grounds of race. An instruction was also sent to all members of staff that 
they were not to discriminate. Nonetheless, the Commission was not convinced and 
brought proceedings in the county court under section 62 of the Act. The judge refused to 
grant the injunction. On appeal, Lord Denning MR gave his verdict on the application:25
It seems to me -  as it must have to the judge -  that in view of the letter of the 14th
December, 1978 and in view of the undertaking which was offered, if the
Commission sought an injunction, they ought to have given evidence of some
23 See the Allocation o f  Council Housing, Dunlop Ltd  and Walsall MBC  investigations.
24 This sense is strengthened by the fact that in these early investigations (in contrast to later investigations), 
reasons for issuing non-discrimination notices are rarely provided. Even where the contents of the 
representations of the investigatee is disclosed, there seems to have been an assumption that a non- 
discrimination notice should be the normal outcome if a finding of discrimination was reached. For instance, 
in the Woodhouse Recreation Club investigation, the Club’s Committee (which was different from that which 
had instituted the colour bar at the basis of the investigation) expressed its support for changes in practice, and 
asked that a non-discrimination notice not be issued as this “could only cause resentment and friction”. The 
argument was rejected by the Commission, with a non-discrimination notice seen as “the most appropriate 
and effective basis for ending the Club’s discriminatory practices.”
25 Commission for Racial Equality v Genture Restaurants Ltd & Another (Court of Appeal) (Unreported)
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discriminatory acts subsequent to their notice. There is not a shred of evidence to 
show that over the last two or three years this club or its owners have been guilty 
of discrimination whatsoever. All the Commission relied upon were the 
statements which were made to the newspapers and the media long ago in 
November 1978 before Mr Weston Edwards had obtained legal advice. It seems 
to me that the statements to the newspapers and the media have been displaced 
altogether by the subsequent letters and the undertaking which have been given...
It is worth considering also the evidence contained in a slightly later case - R v 
CRE. ex parte Westminster City Council.26 Although the Commission won this case, Woolf 
J concluded with the following comments:
Before I leave this case I return to the forceful submissions Mr Irvine made about 
the injustice of this case, having regard to Mr Rolfe's admirable record with 
regard to race relations. Here I draw attention to the fact that in exercising their 
functions it is the duty of the Commission to work toward the elimination of 
discrimination, to promote equality of opportunity and good relations between 
persons of different racial groups generally. These functions of the Commission 
are difficult ones to perform and it is important to remember that the Commission 
have a discretion as to whether to serve a non-discrimination Notice and if so as 
to the terms of that Notice. On the material before me, I can only say that I have a 
reservation as to whether or not it was necessary as a matter of discretion to name 
Mr Rolfe in a Notice which was issued in March 1983 in respect of a decision he 
took in May 1980, when on any showing he was being subject to considerable 
pressure by the union and had a very difficult decision to make.
For our purposes, less important than the criticisms of the Commission are the facts that 
this constitutes further evidence of the rigidity of the Commission once it had made the 
decision to launch a formal investigation, and that this rigidity was an important cause of 
subsequent legal challenges. Moreover, Woolf J was perceptive in noting that the 
Commission was linking the power of formal investigation to its duty to eliminate 
discrimination at the expense of its other statutory duty. Its legalistic approach might have 
helped to deter those thinking of discriminating, but it did not sit easily with its duty to 
promote good race relations -  to persuade.
Whilst the Commission’s inflexibility during this period is suggestive of 
juridification, there is also more direct evidence. For instance, the Commission was very 
mindful of judicial review. This we know from various annual reports27 and the
26 [1984] ICR 770
27 See e.g. AR 1983: 10 -  “The Commission remains particularly concerned about the legal problems 
besetting formal investigations.”
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Commission’s evidence to the Home Affairs Select Committee in 1981. McCrudden et al 
(1991: 67) add the following:
The CRE staff, Commissioners and legal advisers developed internal procedures 
on the conduct of formal investigations with the possibility of judicial review 
very much in mind. In part this recognition was due to the experience of the Race 
Relations Board; in part it was due to the advice of counsel which was often 
sought.
The assimilation of legal values by the Commission is further suggested by the 
regular consultations with its legal advisers,28 and evidence in several of the reports of 
specific legal phraseology being used. This includes not only those reports dealing with 
indirect discrimination, but also a handful of reports where a final decision is reached “on 
the balance of probabilities”.29 The Commission also attached clear value to precedent. Not 
only were the outcomes of formal investigations used by the Commission in industrial 
tribunal cases and in the course of formulating codes of practice, but there are also some 
examples of cross referencing between formal investigations,30 especially those dealing 
with indirect discrimination.31 An important function of formal investigations were thus to 
establish the law on the ground.
Finally, it is worth considering the extent to which legal procedures were adopted 
by the Commission. On one hand, investigations were not carried out in a manner akin to 
an adversarial legal trial. In the case of R v CRE. ex parte Cottrell & Rothon.32 it was held 
that the Commission’s refusal to allow the investigatee to cross-examine witnesses was not 
in breach of the rules of natural justice, with Lord Lane CJ describing the process as more 
administrative than judicial in nature.33 On the other hand, the right of legal representation
28 The Equal Opportunities Division was assisted by a part-time legal adviser, the Legal Section consisting of 
four lawyers, and Counsel when required. See Evidence to the Home Affairs Select Committee (1981: 6). For 
two cases in which consultation with legal advisors is specifically mentioned, see the Collingwood Housing 
Association  and the Allocation o f  council housing with particular reference to work perm it holders 
investigations.
29 Le. the legal standard of proof for civil proceedings. See, for instance, the investigations into Antwerp 
Arms Public House and the Woodhouse Recreation Club.
30 This might have been even more common was it not for the fact that the Commission generally tried to 
avoid launching investigations that would duplicate previous work.
31 See for instance, its approach to handwriting requirements in the Polymer Engineering, Massey Perkins ,  
and Handsworth investigations.
32 [1980] 3 All ER 265
33 It could be argued though that this presupposes a certain notion of what judicial proceedings are -  namely 
adversarial rather than inquisitorial. Lord Lane CJ generally praised the Commission, arguing (at 272) that it
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was specifically provided for in the Race Relations Act, and the Commission was 
accustomed to drawing attention both to this right and to the right to make written and oral 
representations.34 The style of both terms of reference and non-discrimination notices was 
formal, and always contained references to the relevant provisions of the Race Relations 
Act.35 Particularly revealing is the Massey Ferguson investigation, cited by McCrudden et 
al (1991: 58) The company had asked for a settlement instead of a non-discrimination 
notice. This was rejected by the Commission, however: counsel had advised that there was 
no legal basis for doing so.
Overall, the conclusion has to be that the conduct of formal investigations during 
this period was substantially juridified. The frequent presence of lawyers, the high 
percentage of investigations that led to legal action, the use of legal phraseology, the 
formality of some of the procedures used, and the inflexibility of the Commission with 
respect to non-discrimination notices - these all constitute strong evidence. Moreover, it is 
clear that, from the start, the Commission itself saw formal investigations in such terms: as 
necessarily a formal process with the authority of the law behind it, to be contrasted with 
informal dealings. In several reports, the Commission mentions the informal contacts that 
preceded formal investigations, commenting specifically that it was felt that a formal 
approach was necessary.36
This takes us back to the distinction made by the Commission between 
enforcement and promotion. In practice, the detachment between the two both implied and 
helped to cause juridification. It implied juridification because enforcement powers, when 
used, were chosen precisely because of their formal and legal qualities. It helped to cause 
juridification because it led to a focus on rules over outcomes. Regulatees, on their part, 
responded to this legalistic approach through legal challenges.
As we shall see though, this adversarial position was not self-sustaining. It 
generated strains that, by 1983, had forced the Commission to change track.
“undoubtedly went to very great lengths to investigate and examine all the voluminous evidence which was 
put before them... [n]o one can complain that this matter was not thoroughly investigated.”
4 This is specifically mentioned in all of the reports of formal investigations without exception.
35 See Appendix 3 for an example of each.
36 In the Woodhouse Recreation Club investigation, for instance, the Commission wrote that “in view of the 
Club’s history of discrimination... we believed that it was essential for the law to be firmly enforced, and we 
had no hesitation, firstly in embarking on the investigation, and finally in issuing a non-discrimination 
notice...”
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Second phase: 1983-1987
• The relationship between enforcement and promotion
The various pressures that led to the Commission’s first major change of direction 
have been well-documented.37 They include a much-publicised report from a Home Office 
Select Committee criticising the Commission’s procedures and organisation,38 a series of 
adverse legal decisions,39 a severe backlog of formal investigations40 and budgetary 
constraints.41 Also important, however, was the fact that the Commission was maturing as 
an organisation. It had an expanding base of knowledge gained from previous formal 
investigations, tribunal cases and Commission-sponsored research, and had thus reached 
the position where it was able to make the changes that it did. It was also subject to a 
change of leadership, with Peter Newsam -  previously the Education Director of the Inner 
London Education Authority - taking over from David Lane.42
The change of approach was signalled first by a change of organisational 
structure.43 In place of the Equal Opportunities Division and the Community Affairs and 
Liaison Division, there were now four new divisions: Education, Housing and Services;
37 E.g. Munroe (1985), McCrudden (1987), McCrudden et al (1991)
38 House of Commons, Home Affairs Committee, Race Relations and Immigration Sub-Committee, Session 
1981-2, Commission for Racial Equality, (HC 46 1981). This was then followed in 1982 by a Home Office 
research report on formal investigations -  see subsection below on formal investigations.
39 In particular, the Hillingdon and Prestige cases are emphasised by commentators. Another significant case 
which has not received the same attention was Commission for Racial Equality v Amari Plastics Ltd 
(Employment Appeal Tribunal) [1982] QB 265, in which the findings of the Commission against Amari were 
overturned directly by the EAT. This decision may well have been more embarrassing to the Commission 
than the House of Lords decisions, as it was less a matter of the courts coming up with a different 
interpretation of the Race Relations Act than a damning verdict on the Commission’s ability to investigate 
properly. The case also had legal ramifications: in Commission for Racial Equality v Amari [1982] IRLR 252, 
the Court of Appeal made it clear that tribunals were entitled to reconsider de novo not only the facts relating 
to the reasonableness of the requirement but also the findings of fact on which the non-discrimination notice 
was based.
40 By the end of 1983, there were still 18 investigations to be reported on - see AR 1983: 11.
41 The Commission cited these constraints in its evidence to the Home Affairs Select Committee (1981: 3-4, 
esp. §2.7), arguing that its original plans had been based upon the expectation of a substantial increase in its 
staff complement. The Home Office announced in May 1979 that there would be a freeze on all further 
recruitment and that its budget would be cut by £lm.
42 Apparently, it was widely felt that had it not been for the Select Committee report, Lane would have 
remained in his post, even though he had reached the natural end of his period of tenure. See The Times, 
Wednesday 18th November 1998 (Features Section).
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Employment; Field Services; and Legal. Hence, instead of the previous system with one 
division for enforcement and a separate division for promotion, the Commission now had 
divisions for specific target areas of its activities, and it would be for each division to 
decide upon the best approach to take to the fulfilment of its duties in these areas. The new 
legal division was responsible largely for dealing with individual complaints and for 
providing legal advice and services to the other divisions. In its 1983 Annual Report, the 
Commission argued that the restructuring was designed to achieve the “best possible 
balance between enforcing law and promoting best practices”, and that “in each area of the 
Commission’s work, the importance of achieving this balance was in the minds of 
Commissioners and Commission staff when decisions had to be made”.
It took until 1986 for the Commission to be referring to a new emphasis on 
outcomes over processes44 -  a logical consequence of the structural change of 1983. It is 
possible, however, to spot the movement towards this in the years between. The first 
change was with respect to the number of formal investigations launched. Whilst there had 
been 47 launched between 1977 and 1982, between 1983 and 1989 fewer than half this 
number were launched.45 It is important not to overstate the significance of this fact: the 
formal investigation was still very much seen as a legal power of central importance, as the 
Commission continued to argue up to the early 1990s. To some extent then, the reduced 
number was merely a reaction to the backlog that had been experienced in the first six 
years, a reflection of greater understanding of the resources required. Moreover, in some 
areas of its work -  especially housing -  the use of formal investigations still dominated its 
enforcement strategy. The following provides a typical example: “the Commission believes 
that discrimination should be dealt with firmly by the use of the law and in 1987 we 
continued to make greater use of our law enforcement powers in the area of housing.”46 
(AR 1987: 49)
43 See Appendix 4.
44 See AR 1986: 7.
45 This was a controversial decision -  see, for instance, the criticisms made by a former Deputy Chairman of 
the Commission in the course of the 1981 Runnymede Trust seminar (Sheth 1982: 94).
46 The main reason for this was that whilst the Commission would do what promotional work it could with 
housing associations, building societies and local authorities, “because of the diverse and individual nature of 
these types of organisations, tackling discrimination in this area is difficult and we continue to rely heavily on 
individual complainants” (AR 1983: 27). Other reasons are provided by McCrudden et al (1991: 105-7).
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Overall however, and especially with respect to the field of employment, the 
reduced number of investigations pointed to a changed relationship between enforcement 
and promotion. This assertion is backed up by the fact that during the same period, there 
was also a change in the type of formal investigation used. The catalyst for this was the 
legal case of Re Prestige pic47, in which the House of Lords ruled that the 1976 Act did not 
enable the Commission to conduct named persons investigations without prior belief of 
discrimination (so-called ‘strategic* investigations). At the time of the initial hearing of 
Prestige, the Commission had already launched 15 of these strategic investigations, seven 
of which were still outstanding. As a result of the final decision in the House of Lords, the 
Commission had to drop four of them;48 in the other three cases, a report was published 
with the consent of the organisations involved.49 Even without the Prestige case, however, 
the Commission may well have been forced to re-think its approach to strategic 
investigations. By the end of 1982, reports had been published in only one-third of the 
investigations started since 1977. As it later admitted, the Commission had “underestimated 
the practical and legal difficulties involved”.50 Moreover, internal pressures were being 
matched by external pressures. The Home Office Select Committee had quoted from 
companies complaining that the Commission “did not really know what it was looking for 
and therefore sought too much information”,51 concluding that the Commission had a 
“surviving amateurishness” and that it had “not yet developed that style of brisk and 
systematic investigation which might be expected of them”.52 There is a certain congruence 
then between this political verdict and the legal judgment of Prestige -  after all, it was 
precisely the ‘strategic’ investigations declared unlawful by the courts that would be most 
exploratory by nature.53
47 [1984] 1 WLR 335 (HL). The House of Lords backed the judgment in the lower court made in 1983.
48 Investigations of Philips Electronics and Associated Industries Ltd., Prestige Group pic, Smith and Nephew 
Associated Companies pic,  and USMC International Ltd. Two further such investigations were already 
subject to litigation and were settled.
49 National Bus Company, Unigate Dairies Ltd., and Employment in the Metropolitan Borough o f  Kirklees.
50 AR 1989: 14.
51 §54
52 §60
53 There is another example of the fit between legal and non-legal pressures: the Hillingdon case, in which the 
House of Lords ruled that the terms of reference before an investigation had to be drawn more precisely for 
natural justice reasons. Being forced to be more specific with terms of reference matched well the 
recommendation of the Select Committee of having a firmer idea of what it wanted to get out of an 
investigation. See Hillingdon LBC v Commission for Racial Equality (HL) [1982] AC 779.
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In place of the named persons strategic investigations, the Employment Division 
of the Commission turned to its power of general investigation: six out of the twelve formal 
investigations it started from 1983-1988 were of this type. The first of these - the 
investigation into the Beaumont Leys Shopping Centre in Leicester -  provides a good 
example of how these investigations could be used as part of a persuasive regulatory 
strategy. The target was chosen because it allowed an examination of equal opportunities in 
recruitment to about 1000 new jobs in an area of the job market upon which the 
Commission wished to have an impact.54 Reasons for the different success rates of ethnic 
minority applicants were examined, and various recommendations were made in the report 
as to how equal opportunities could be promoted. But more significant were the detailed 
recommendations made to the individual companies involved, most of which were well- 
known high street retail chains such as Boots, Dixons and Tesco. Copies of the report were 
also sent to 40 other major retail companies with an offer to advise on the development of 
equal opportunities. The benefits of a general formal investigation were clearly illustrated 
by this: not only was it capable of providing the Commission with information about the 
mechanics of a particular job market, but it could also act as a springboard through which 
change could take place. And in the absence of confrontation and costly legal challenges, 
the report was completed less than a year after the investigation was launched. The 
Beaumont Leys investigation was thus followed by a series of further general investigations 
focusing on chartered accountancy, the abolition of the GLC, Cardiff employers, the hotel 
industry, and Bradford school leavers.
If the Employment Division’s new use of general investigations was one way to 
provide a link between enforcement and promotional work, an even more basic way was 
the new Code of Practice in Employment that became operational in April 1984.55 On the 
surface, the launching of a code would seem to be a strong sign of juridification. After all, 
this was a document which essentially codified all the Commission’s experiences in 
employment discrimination. Christopher McCrudden’s term, ‘administrative rule-making’,
54 In this case, most of the jobs available did not need high levels of skill, experience or qualification.
55 For a full account of the political manoeuvrings that led to the final acceptance of the code in Parliament, 
see McCrudden (1988).
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also points to its specific legal implications as evidence in industrial tribunal proceedings.56 
And certainly this was important to the Commission, affecting its success in the provision 
of assistance to individual complainants under the Act.57 In 1987, it observed that (AR 
1987: 26):
Since the Code of Practice came into operation in 1984 its use in industrial 
tribunals has been steadily developing. In the past three years there has been an 
increase in the number of references to its specific, detailed recommendations in 
areas such as training, reviewing selection criteria and ethnic monitoring. In 
particular, tribunals have stressed the ineffectiveness of equal opportunity 
policies that are little more than paper exercises, and have asked employers to 
adopt practical, remedial measures.
This would have significant implications in the longer term. Yet from the very beginning, 
the Commission saw the Code primarily as a springboard for its promotional efforts. In the 
drive to get the Code known, the Commission arranged a full press conference, a full page 
advertisement in the Financial Times in which 73 major employers and 23 unions stated 
commitment to making equal opportunities a reality, a series of public meetings, and the 
distribution of leaflets and 120,000 copies of Code. Nor did the use of the Code as a 
promotional tool end with these initial measures. The Commission approached at national 
level thirty of the largest private sector companies in 1985 and one hundred more in 1986. 
Such approaches included the provision of education, such as a training seminar organised 
in 1984 for those companies which had just introduced equal opportunity policies (AR 
1984: 12-13).59 In continuing to push the Code throughout the 1980s, the Commission also
56 Ibid. The best-known example of a code with similar evidentiary effect is the Highway Code -  see Road 
Traffic Act 1988, s38(7), cited in Baldwin (1995: 82-3)
57 The low success rate of cases in the tribunals had long been a complaint of the Commission. It had been 
suggested for instance that tribunals were unprepared to make necessary inferences of racial discrimination. 
The code did appear to have an impact, however, and a decision by the Employment Appeals Tribunal in 
1987 was especially significant, citing the authority of the Code in upholding the decision of a tribunal to 
order the disclosure of ethnic monitoring data by an employer - see West Midlands Passenger Transport 
Executive v. Singh [1987] DRLR 351, upheld in the Court of Appeal [1988] IRLR 186.
49 Examples include GEC, EMI, ICI, ICL, Unilever, Allied Lyons, IBM, Trust House Forte, Woolworth, BP, 
Prudential Assurance, Legal and General Assurance Company, Halifax Building Society, the four clearing 
banks, WH Smith and British Aerospace.
59 See also the 1986 Annual Report, where it was noted that more companies were developing systems to 
make sure that their policies were working, and that the Commission was increasingly being approached by 
companies wanting advice on how to increase the number of black applicants. In response, the Commission 
arranged a seminar through which companies could share experiences of equal opportunities policies (AR 
1986:25).
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funded research on how aware companies were of its existence, thus indicating a strategic 
use of funding.60
This approach of the Commission towards the Code of Practice reflected the 
beginning of a concentration on outcomes rather than processes, as the following excerpt 
makes explicit (AR 1986: 7):61
Increasingly, the questions asked of any set of practices or of an institution have 
been less concerned with how they have come to be in the situation they are in, or 
what procedures have or have not been adopted in the past, and more concerned 
with what can be done, within what time-scale, to put things right.
There were two initial consequences. Firstly, formal investigations were no longer seen as 
means of punishing past conduct, but as means of changing future conduct. This will be 
seen more clearly when the Commission’s approach to formal investigations over the 
period is examined in detail. Secondly though, it also meant that greater value was now 
being attached to promotional efforts. If education, advice and persuasion was just as 
capable of achieving the end results, they were now preferred to law enforcement.62
Before turning to the Commission’s approach to its enforcement powers, it is 
worth dwelling first on just how central to its activities this promotional work became 
during the 1980s. In particular, there are two main points to make. Firstly, the Commission 
was often achieving through negotiation and advice what it had previously tried to achieve 
through the use of its formal powers. For instance, regular contact with the BBC was 
established in 1984; this was followed in 1985 by advice being given on positive action; 
then a report that outlined an equal opportunity programme for the next two years and set a 
framework for further action at corporate and directorate levels was approved by the BBC
60 It also reported to the House of Commons Employment Committee twice during 1985 on the progress made 
in implementing the code.
61 Note how, in terms of one of the dilemmas posed in the previous chapter, this meant the beginning of the 
search for a synthesis between its primaiy duties: the elimination of discrimination and the promotion of equal 
opportunities.
See also McCrudden et al (1991: 90-5)
63 Positive action is not the same as positive or reverse discrimination. The latter describes a situation where 
individuals from ethnic minority groups are deliberately preferred over others for vacancies, promotions and 
so on. The former refers to action to fay to redress inequalities, for instance the placing of job advertisements 
in ethnic minority community newspapers to encourage ethnic minorities to apply. See s38 of the Race 
Relations Act 1976, the 1985 Annual Report (at p 15) and CRE (1985).
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in 1987.64 Secondly, there was now a significant degree of interplay between its 
enforcement and promotional activities. To take some examples from the work of the 
Employment Division: extensive contacts with the Manpower Services Commission led to 
an increase in the number of instructions to discriminate cases -  from about 10 per year in 
1982-4 to an average of 47 per year in 1985-7 (AR 1987: 30);65 general contacts with Area 
Health Authorities and hospitals led to increasing concern as to the disproportionately low 
levels of ethnic minority doctors employed at higher grades in NHS hospital, the 
subsequent launching of two formal investigations66 and the provision of assistance to an 
affected individual;67 and -  in the other direction -  the Commission followed up a formal 
investigation into Bradford Metro by putting on a one-day seminar for senior officials of 
the eight Public Transport Executives and visiting all the passenger transport executives in 
the country (AR 1984: 19).68 The Commission’s promotional work was thus now an
64 There are many other examples. For instance, the Commission also pressed for changes in the course of 
contact with the Civil and Public Servants Association (CPSA) following the release of a study indicating the 
extent of the under-representation of ethnic minorities in the civil service. And continuing correspondence 
with the Ministry of Defence finally yielded fruit when the Ministry of Defence agreed to the ethnic 
monitoring of applicants and new entrants to armed forces, although it declined to extend this to cover their 
posting to particular units or subsequent career patterns. In general, there was a large variety in organisations 
approached -  from household name companies to the British Airport Authority, from trade unions to the Law 
Society.
65 Contacts with the MSC also led to the general formal investigation into Bradford school leavers, and named 
persons investigations into Birmingham Colleges YTS and JHP Training Ltd. Much of the general contact 
related to the YTS scheme which was run by the MSC, as it became apparent that there was an under­
representation of young black people in employer-based Mode A schemes. The Commission funded research 
in the area, alerting the MSC to the problem. The MSC then agreed to a series of Commission 
recommendations: firstly, on some positive action measures (twenty Development Officer posts were 
introduced for instance); secondly, on monitoring, introduced into career services in 1985; and thirdly on 
targeting, agreed in 1986.
66 One of these related to applications in St. George’s Medical School (1986), the other dealt with the 
employment and promotion of ethnic minorities in the Withington Hospital (1988).
67 This was the case of Dr Noone, challenging the decision of the North West Thames Regional Health 
Authority not to employ her as a Consultant Microbiologist at the Ashford Hospital. She was awarded £5,000, 
and both the tribunal and the EAT criticised the appointments system. With the weight of these comments 
behind it, the Commission asked the relevant Secretary of State to revise the appointments system for NHS 
consultants, which is governed by Statutory Instrument (AR 1986: 27).
68 Nor was it just the Employment Division that expanded its promotional work. The Education, Housing and 
Services Division also did so, maintaining extensive contacts with (amongst others) teachers’ unions, relevant 
local authority departments, the media, police, prison authorities and Housing Corporation. The value 
attached to promotional work by this Division is indicated by the following excerpt -  not a priority, but still 
important: “Given the Commission’s limited resources, an important element in its policies has been to 
encourage others to take action. The Commission has established and maintained working relationships with a 
number of important national education bodies and oiganisations...” (AR 1984: 22).
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essential part of its overall strategy both to eliminate discrimination and to promote racial 
equality.69
All this needs to be kept in mind as the Commission’s approach to its enforcement 
powers is now examined in detail.
• The conduct of formal investigations: 1983-1988
In this section, it is argued that the new general emphasis by the Commission on 
achieving outcomes rather than following processes -  a central feature of the persuasive 
strategy -  had filtered through to the conduct of formal investigations. The increased 
flexibility of the Commission and the de-juridifying effects of this are highlighted by the 
following set of figures (which go up to 1998 to enable easier comparisons with the period 
prior to 1983):
Number of belief 31 30
Number of strategic o 15
Number of general 12 2
Number suspended / terminated (other than due to litigation) g 1
Number in which non-discrimination notice could have been issued 22 27
Number in which non-discrimination notice actually issued 13 (59%) 24 (89%)
Number in which presence of lawyers specifically mentioned 3 27
Mean length o f  investigation (months) 23.9 35.2
Number affected by litigation of any type 5 33
The table offers some striking contrasts, two of which are especially worth 
emphasising. Firstly, it was far less likely after 1983 for investigations to be affected by 
litigation. The figure of 5 out of 43 becomes even more notable when it is considered that
69 Another aspect of the Commission’s work that can be added to this list is its attempt to be a force for 
change in public policy. It was often unsuccessful in these efforts - sometimes spectacularly so, such as when 
the Government failed even to respond to the Commission’s proposals for legislative change in 1985. But 
there were also some successes. For instance, there were important contacts with the Department for 
Education and Science, new powers secured to issue codes of practice in housing, and successful negotiations 
with the Department of Health to implement an ethnic monitoring system covering all those compulsorily 
detained under the Mental Health Act.
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•  •  •  70in only one of these was it the respondent appealing against the non-discrimination notice.
In all the remaining investigations recorded as being affected by litigation, it was the 
Commission which issued proceedings, after the investigation was completed, usually in 
order to secure compliance with a non-discrimination notice.71 Secondly, the figures 
suggest that the Commission was far more flexible in its approach towards investigations 
after 1983. This is reflected especially in the increased number of investigations suspended 
or terminated, and in the sharp percentage increase in decisions not to issue a non­
discrimination notice. In many of these cases, the Commission was prepared to accept a 
package of measures in lieu of a notice.72 The increased flexibility was further reflected in 
the decisions as to whether to launch an investigation in the first place. In 1986 for instance, 
the Commission drew up three terms of reference, but decided not to proceed with the 
investigations following representations. It is worth noting also that investigations were, 
on average, taking a year less to complete than they had done prior to 1983.
Moreover, whereas investigations prior to 1983 were often launched in response to 
specific acts of discrimination, the reasons for proceeding with investigations after 1983 
were far more consistently strategic in nature. McCrudden et al (1991: 87), in their review 
of an internal paper written by the Director of the Employment Division, show clearly the 
non-legal nature of the considerations employed:
A number of criteria were set out for deciding when it was appropriate to choose 
a formal investigation...
• when there was a need to demonstrate a system of unlawful discriminatory 
practice;
• when the institution was unlikely to want to effect change without an element 
of compulsion; or
70 This was the Handsworth Horticultural Institute  investigation. In one other case {Norman Lester), the 
respondent attempted to appeal but lodged out of time.
71 In 3 cases, the Commission instigated proceedings to try to secure compliance with non-discrimination 
notices. In the remaining case, the Commission applied for judicial review of the Secretary of State’s decision 
to ignore its recommendations in the field of education. The litigation essentially arose out of a conflict 
between the Education Act 1980 and the Race Relations Act 1976: in this case, the investigatee was actually 
in full agreement with the Commission but felt bound by the former Act.
72 For two examples, see the St George’s Hospital Medical School and Oldham Housing Allocations 
investigations. See generally McCrudden et al (1991: 84-5).
73 This compares to two cases in the entire period 1977-83. The reasons varied: in one of the 1986 cases 
(dealing with planning), counsel advised that it was not covered by the Race Relations Act (an amendment to 
the Act was subsequently secured); in the second case, the offending practice had ceased by the time of the 
representations; in the third, the Commission was satisfied with negotiations over die provision of 
information. See AR 1986: 18.
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• where the discovery and exposure of an unlawful discriminatory practice was 
likely to provide scope for a ripple effect.
According to the paper, the underlying principle was that, except in the case of 
individual complaints, persuasion tactics were preferable to those of coercion.
Law enforcement would only be initiated by the Commission where it seemed 
likely that desired changes could not be secured as effectively and efficiently by 
other methods.
Overall therefore, many of the features of formal investigations that had suggested 
juridification prior to 1983 were no longer present since then. Court appearances were now 
far less common, judicial review no longer had a direct influence on the conduct of 
investigations, it was no longer unusual for legal processes to be set aside in favour of 
negotiated change, the focus was now less on past acts of discrimination than on how to 
secure future change and non-discrimination notice were no longer issued as a matter of 
course. The Commission’s approach was more flexible and less dominated by legal 
considerations. Regulatees responded to a persuasive enforcement strategy by staying out 
of the courts. The conduct of formal investigations was thus substantially de-juridified after 
1983.74
• The growth of individual complaints: 1977-1988
McCrudden et al (1991: 211) sum up well the dilemma of the Commission with 
respect to assistance to individual complainants, as follows:
There has been considerable debate within the Commission over what the 
function of the Commission should be in assisting individual complainants. The 
power to grant assistance in individual cases may be viewed in one of two ways: 
as a way of helping individuals, or as a way of pursuing the Commission’s 
strategic objectives as a law enforcement agency.
The dilemma is strongly linked with some of the themes that have been running 
through this chapter. The notion of this statutory power as being primarily a means of 
helping individuals (and by extension, of punishing discriminatory employers) closely 
reflects the deterrence style of enforcement, and the ‘eliminating discrimination’ duty of the 
Commission. It is basically backward-looking, focusing on past events, rectifying past
74 It was not completely de-juridified though: representations tended to be heard in a relatively formal setting 
with a legal adviser present, and the legal adviser would normally then instruct the Commissioners as to the 
legal merits of a proposed investigation (McCrudden et al 1991: 82). Terms of reference and non-
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wrongs. The alternative view, meanwhile, is closely related to a persuasive enforcement 
strategy and connects with the ‘promoting equal opportunities’ duty. It is less concerned 
with past events than with achieving change. This will be seen more clearly as the approach 
that the Commission took at various stages is examined in detail.
The power to provide assistance to individuals was capable of serving a number of 
different strategic objectives. One possibility was to use the power in order to test the scope 
of the law, thus focusing on cases that raised points of principle. Another was to link the 
power to the Commission’s other activities. Under this strategy, cases would be chosen, for 
instance, because they most closely related to issues raised in formal investigations, or 
because they were likely to have the greatest impact on others (so that, for instance, cases 
against a company in an area highly populated by ethnic minorities would be prioritised). 
Moreover, its strategic objectives could be served not only through the choice of cases to 
support, but also through the nature of that support. For instance, the Commission’s aim 
might have been to win as many cases inside the tribunals as possible for deterrence 
purposes, or it could have been to pursue settlements capable not only of satisfying the 
injured party, but also of leading to change inside the company concerned.
Up until 1988, the Commission saw the power of providing assistance to 
individuals primarily as one of helping individuals. It is true that there were certain basic 
strategic considerations employed. For instance, in its evidence to the Home Affairs Select 
Committee, the Commission drew attention to its care in avoiding duplication of formal 
investigations when providing assistance. Moreover, the Commission was always willing to 
support complainants when the case concerned raised a matter of legal principle (i.e. the 
first of the strategic considerations mentioned above). The basic policy, however, was one 
of responsive rather than strategic assistance. As such, the use of this power was not 
integrated with its other enforcement activities.
The implications for juridification of the policy of responsive over strategic 
assistance will be considered at the end of this section. Before this though, it is important to 
identify some trends of the first ten years so as to put the policy in context.
discrimination notice were also still written in a legal style, emphasising that use of the power still implied a 
relatively formal and coercive relationship between the Commission and the regulatee concerned.
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The first thing to note is the growth of individual complaints from 1977 to 1988, as 
shown by Table 2 and the line graph below it:
1978 1033 699 334 N/A -
1979 986 619 367 N/A -4.77
1980 779 458 321 N/A -26.57
1981 864 547 317 N/A +9.84
1982 956 595 361 N/A +9.62
1983 994 567 427 N/A +3.82
1984 1202 765 410 27 +17.30
1985 1150 734 402 14 -4.52
1986 1016 619 380 17 -13.19
1987 1271 827 428 16 +20.06
1988 1440 982 449 9 +11.74
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Gradually, this increase in applications began to stretch the limited resources c 
the Commission, and the result is made clear in the graph below:
1978 854 170 557™ 99 28 94
1979 853 141 591 52 69 23
1980 610 73 400 84 53 28
1981 682 147 374 110 51 41
1982 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
1983 1022 181 630 90 121 174
1984 1189 231 507 324 127 187
1985 1112 155 600 219 115 196
1986 1032 194 566 169 103 260
1987 1275 267 700 191 117 327
1988 1403 254 800 261 88 311
75 The extent of advice and assistance given is unclear from the Annual Reports. In the earlier repon 
separate figures are given for “initial advice only” and “extensive advice and assistance”.
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The graph illustrates well the strains that were starting to be felt by the Complaint* 
Committee. Compare the lines of 1978 to 1988. The turquoise and blue lines (carried over, 
no assistance) jump to twice or three times their original level, overtaking the ret 
(representation) line in the process. Increasingly unable to process all the complaints it wa 
receiving, the Committee was having to be more selective.
Finally, the following table and the histogram below it indicate the outcome of th< 
cases supported by the Commission. The histogram goes up to 1994 so as to indicate th< 
trends more clearly.76
76 The source for all these figures are Annual Reports. N/A is written where the figures are not available fror 
the relevant Annual Report.
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1978 N/A N/A N/A
1979 N/A N/A N/A
1980 14 19 126
1981 N/A 22 N/A
1982 N/A N/A N/A
1983 N/A N/A N/A
1984 45 23 64
1985 58 53 56
1986 45 25 38
1987 71 46 57
1988 82 33 49
Outcome of Commission-sponsored cases.
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The two key changes during this period were thus as follows: the number of cases 
lost by the Commission gradually went down, whilst the number of cases settled went up - 
a trend that actually preceded the Commission’s change o f policy in 1989. Meanwhile, the 
number of cases won by the Commission was staying roughly constant: at all times, it wa: 
quite low, but from about 1985 onwards, it was roughly equivalent to the number lost fr 
the Commission.
l b
It can be suggested that, taken together, this evidence implies two main things 
about the nature of the Commission’s relationship with its regulatees. Firstly, the increased 
number of settlements is another example of the increasingly flexible attitude of the 
Commission towards the relationship with its regulatees. Hence, it mirrors the findings 
made with respect to formal investigations. Secondly, the increasing proportion of 
Commission time spent on dealing with such complaints was impacting on its overall legal 
strategy. Writing about the period up to the end of 1988, McCrudden et al argued as follows 
(1991:223):
The effectiveness of the CRE in assisting individual applicants has deflected the 
intentions behind the 1976 Act in 2 ways. First, it has moved the emphasis away 
from strategic law enforcement towards processing individual complaints.
Second, it has discouraged the development of alternative sources of support to 
individual complainants...77
It is debatable how far the Commission had strayed from the intentions of the Act. 
After all, the Act gives no indication of the specific purpose of the power of assistance; 
indeed, the most plausible reading is that a mixture of purposes is served by the exercise of 
this power, including helping precisely those individuals who would be unlikely to win the 
case on their own. In short, it could be argued that the Commission had simply associated 
the power of assistance with one of its primary duties over another, preferring to promote 
equal opportunities through its informal contacts. This is significant in itself, however, 
pointing to a split in the fulfilment of its duties. The idea here is that the Commission 
primarily approached its duty to eliminate discrimination through its formal legal powers, 
whilst it tried to fulfil its duty to promote equal opportunities largely through persuasion, 
advice and education. It will be seen shortly how the Commission bridged that divide in the 
1990s.
• Other enforcement actions: 1983-1988
In the three years from 1985 to 1987, the Commission had to deal with an average 
of 47 instructions or pressure to discriminate cases annually compared with average of 10 
cases per annum in the previous 3 years. This was due largely to its increased level of
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cases per annum in the previous 3 years. This was due largely to its increased level of 
contact with the Manpower Services Commission. The result can be seen in the sudden rise 
in the number o f complaints carried over:
1978 10 ^78 5 2 1
1979 19 5 7 7 0
1980 31 1 14 16 0
1981 17 l l 79 1 5 0
1982 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
1983 14 7 0 7 0
1984 12 9 3 0 9
1985 28 14 12 2 16
1986 51 30 11 10 15
1987 44 22 13 9 15
Instructions/Pressure to Discriminate
Decisions of the CRE 1978-1987
Q.
Year
Proceedings Settled informally
Insufficient eviden Carried over
78 Two of these were subject to formal investigations, one was the subject of Industrial Tribunal proceeding:
79 Four of these were subject to formal investigations rather than Industrial Tribunal proceedings.
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There are several other points that can be made. Firstly, the overall figures indicate 
that legal action was taken in about half of the cases in which a complaint was made to the 
Commission. There were, however, more cases settled informally from 1985 onwards, 
perhaps reflecting the general increase in cases in those years. Overall, the Commission’s 
approach to the pressure or instructions to discriminate cases during this period can be seen 
as further evidence of its preference for dealing with past acts of discrimination through 
formal channels.
This can be contrasted with the Commission’s policy from the start towards 
discriminatory advertisements, which was nearly always to seek for informal resolutions 
such as apologies and undertakings of no repetition. The reason that it was rare for the 
Commission to prosecute in these cases was that unlawful behaviour was usually based on 
misunderstandings as to the scope of the exceptions incorporated in the Race Relations Act 
1976,80 as opposed to prejudice. Hence, the Commission’s function in this area was 
primarily to educate rather than punish.81
Third phase: 1988-1992 
• Introduction
From 1988 to 1992, there were many continuities with the previous five years. The 
basic approach to formal investigations remained the same, although general investigations 
were now being used in the field of housing. There was continuing contact with various 
elements of the criminal justice system, local authorities, employers, hospitals and 
government departments. Overall the relationship and balance between enforcement and 
promotional activities remained similar to the previous few years.
There were, however, a number of policy developments during this period with 
important implications for the degree of juridification between the Commission and its 
regulatees. The period is thus treated as a separate policy phase, with three changes singled
80 In particular, there was often misunderstanding as to the scope of the phrase “does not apply to any 
employment where being of a particular racial group is a genuine occupational qualification for the job”. 
There were also complaints about positive action provisions, exempt under s5(2)(d) of the Race Relations Act 
1976. See generally sections 5 and 29 of the Race Relations Act
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out in particular: a new approach to individual complaints, a new policy with respect to 
prosecutions under the Act, and a change of emphasis towards non-employment sectors so 
that the work of the non-employment Divisions increasingly begun to mirror that done by 
the Employment Division. It will be argued that all of these changes were essentially de- 
juridifying.
In order to understand these changes though, and especially the fact that they were 
all inter-related, it is necessary first to consider the general context of organisational change 
within the Commission. Essentially, the period 1988-93 was a period of flux within the 
Commission, marked by a series of changes of organisational structure, by the introduction 
of new management techniques and by a changing approach towards ethnic minority 
communities.
By the time Sir Herman Ouseley took over as Commission Chair in 1993, the 
organisational structure of the Commission had changed significantly from that of the mid-
o*y
1980s. The new Social Policy Division reflected the changing concerns of the times, but 
also a more confident Commission explicitly concerning itself with all areas of government 
policy. The fact that the new Public Affairs Division (with responsibility towards the 
media) was now the biggest Division is further evidence of this.
The most significant general change during this period, however, was the 
emphasis on new management techniques. This emphasis is suggested by the 
reorganisation of the support divisions, and by the new jargon that was beginning to appear 
in the annual reports: “professionalism”, “high-standards”, “value for money” and so on. 
The catalyst for these changes was the ‘Pliatzky review’ carried out by Home Office 
officials and received by the Commission in 1986. McCrudden et al (1991: 52) point out 
the significance of this review:
Since this review there has been something of a change in the relationship 
between the Home Office and the CRE, in that the Home Office now has to be 
satisfied that the CRE is providing ‘value for money’. Since then the CRE has 
also been more closely involved in the bids which the Home Office has made 
each year to the Treasury for funding. There are now monthly meetings between 
the CRE Chairman and officials and Home Office Officials, in addition to ad hoc 
meetings when necessary.
81 See, for instance, AR 1984: 15.
82 In particular, it reflected the fact that the nature of the contact between the police and ethnic minorities was 
becoming a central race issue.
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A number of changes followed. In 1988, the Commission succeeded in changing 
the nature of its relationships with the Community Relations Councils (CRCs), now 
reconstituted as Racial Equality Councils (RECs).83 Relationships between the CRCs and 
the Commission had frequently been fractious,84 stemming from the fact that the CRCs 
were generally keen to guard their independence, and yet the Commission was a major 
source of their funding.85 Under the Commission’s proposals, the new RECs were to have 
the sole purpose of working to eliminate racial discrimination and of promoting racial 
equality and good race relations, with work programmes drawn up along three-year 
planning cycles and Commission grant-aid dependent on satisfactory progress towards 
agreed targets.86 This was followed a year later by a changed approach to Project Aid 
(funding under section 44 of the Race Relations Act 1976),87 with a decision to move from 
responsive funding to strategic funding for projects more closely related to the 
Commission’s work plans.88 Then in 1991, new planning procedures were introduced with 
the aim of ensuring that all of its activities would be both strategically directed and cost- 
effective, following consultation with the Home Office (AR 1991).
More significantly for our purposes though, this increased concern with cost- 
effectiveness was the main cause of two of the three de-juridifying changes considered in 
this section, to which we now turn.
83 The CRCs were bodies that worked in local communities in four areas relating to racial equality: policy 
development, public education, community development and community service. As their work was done at a 
grass-roots level, they were potentially of great use to the Commission, and from an early stage were the 
biggest source of referrals of individual applications for assistance.
84 The developments in these relationships are well-documented in the Commission’s Annual Reports.
85 Whilst the bulk of CRC funding came from local authorities, this funding was rarely enough and often one 
of the casualties of reduced local authority budgets. The CRE thus supplemented the income of the CRCs 
under section 44 of the Race Relations Act.
86 See CRE (1989). The Commission put considerable effort into securing these changes: not only did it have 
to persuade individual CRCs, the trade union of Community Relations Officers (MSF) and the National 
Association of Community Relations Councils (NACRC) as to the value of the reforms, but it also had to 
persuade local authorities to provide adequate funding to the new RECs.
Section 44 funding had previously been given to a wide-range of organisations. Some examples from 1980 
include the Asian Artists Association, the Bradford Law Centre, the Bengali Cultural Association, an Ebony 
Steel Band playing in the Notting Hill Carnival, the Polish Social and Cultural Association and Walsall 
Advice Centre. Clearly not all of these related closely to the Commission’s primary duties.
88 It can be suggested that if the Commission had been equivocal in the past as to whether it was an 
independent enforcement agency or a representative of ethnic minority interests, these two developments
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• Assistance for individual complainants
Until 1988, the Commission’s policy had been to provide representation to all 
cases with a reasonable chance of success where the section 66 criteria were met.89 
Towards the end of 1988, the Commission ran out of money, and the budgetary constraints 
meant that for the first time, the Commission had to turn away applicants with “otherwise 
meritorious cases”. The graphs in the previous section highlighted the build-up of some of 
these pressures. The Commission then decided in 1989 to move to a policy of supporting 
only those cases with strategic importance. At the same time, the Commission tried to back 
up this new policy by reinforcing its long-standing policy of encouraging and actively 
developing other agencies to take up and support cases of racial discrimination. This 
included the trade unions, which the Commission had always thought ought to be the first 
point of call for applicants in employment cases, and the RECs as part of the new 
partnership.
The change to strategic assistance manifested itself in two main ways. The first 
was that the Commission was now highlighting certain priority areas in which it would 
provide assistance. In its 1989 Annual Report, for instance, the Commission specified 
seven priority employers against which assistance was more likely to be given90 - areas 
which had long been of concern to the Commission on the basis of continuing informal 
contact.91 The second was the increasing role of settlements: not only in terms of quantity92 
but also in terms of how they were fitting into the Commission’s general strategy. In a case 
against the TUC, for instance, the complainant alleged that she had been treated less 
favourably on racial grounds when she went for her first interview for the post of Assistant 
Secretary, Equal Rights Department, and was excluded from consideration for the post. The
implied that it was now firmly committing itself to being the former. Whether or not this is true however, it is 
difficult to prove that this led to changes to the Commission’s enforcement strategy.
89 Given that complainants were normally ill-equipped to fight cases alone, and that one of these criteria was 
the unreasonableness of expecting an applicant to deal with a case unaided in light of his or her position in 
relation to the respondent, there were few cases where the s66 criteria were not met.
90 These were: the ambulance services, fire brigades, the construction industry, the civil service, H M Forces, 
the NHS and the police. See AR 1989, Appendix 6.
91 Several of them were later subject to formal investigations
92 The quantum of damages was significantly affected by the cases of Alexander v Home Office and Noone v 
North West Thames Regional Health Authority (both supported by the Commission), which established that 
awards for injury to feelings should not be nominal and could include both aggravated and exemplary 
damages. Raising the level of damages meant that more claims were made, and that for the first time, there
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case was settled on the following terms: an apology, £2500 as compensation for injury to 
feelings and an undertaking, as part of a review of TUC employment procedures, to cease 
the practice of automatic final shortlisting of internal candidates (AR 1989: 117-8). Whilst 
still relatively infrequent at this stage, the success of these early cases would pave the way 
for the power of assistance to form the backbone of the Commission’s enforcement strategy 
in the mid-1990s.
At its most fundamental level, this change of policy implied a change in 
interpretation of the purpose of this power. It was no longer only about the elimination of 
discrimination, no longer solely about a concern with punishing and compensating for past 
acts. For the first time, the Commission was considering also how the power could relate to 
its other duty: the promotion of equal opportunities and good race relations.
The switch from responsive to strategic assistance was moreover a de-juridifying 
decision. Previously, the questions asked by the Commission was whether a case had a 
reasonable chance of success and whether the section 66 criteria were met -  both legal 
questions. If it answered those questions positively, then assistance would be given. 
Moreover, as was shown above, the form of this assistance was often to argue the case in 
tribunal, rather than to try to negotiate change with the employer. Now, however, the 
considerations made by the Commission were largely non-legal in nature, influenced by 
strategic considerations and driven by budgetary constraints. And when the Commission 
did decide to provide assistance, the form of this assistance was more likely to take the 
shape of a negotiated settlement. Even more importantly though, it was beginning to 
negotiate changes from employers that had nothing whatsoever to do with compensating 
individuals -  in short, even the form of the legal settlement itself was beginning to be 
governed by non-legal values and considerations.
• Prosecutions under the Act
Above it was noted that between 1985 and 1987, there was a sharp rise in the 
number of cases involving instructions or pressure to discriminate. Previously, the
was now a major financial deterrent against employers intending to discriminate. Importantly also, it 
increased the bargaining power of the Commission with respect to settlements
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Commission had largely responded by seeking court action. In 1988, the Commission 
reviewed its policy (AR 1988:26):
Most of referrals by job centres and careers services involve very small 
employers, and the effect of action by the Commission is therefore limited. The 
only sanction normally available under the Race Relations Act is a declaration by 
an industrial tribunal that an unlawful act has taken place. In the light of this, we 
reviewed our policy in 1988 and decided that in future we would be more 
selective in authorising proceedings.
Thus whereas previously the Commission had looked to take offenders to court, now it was 
preferring to negotiate change outside court - a de-juridifying decision that was linked 
directly to its increasing concern with obtaining ‘value for money’. From 1989 to 1999, 
proceedings were authorised in an average of only one-sixth of cases, and the vast majority 
of these cases were settled before they reached the courts.93
• Codes of Practice in Housing. Health and Education
During the mid-1980s, there was a clear divide between the Commission’s 
Employment Division and its Education, Housing and Services Division. Whilst the 
Employment Division was concentrating on trying to get its Code of Practice known and 
implemented, the Education, Housing and Services Division was using formal 
investigations as the central plank in its enforcement armoury. In 1989, the newly named 
Social Policy Division continued to employ its law enforcement powers “as extensively as 
possible”, and 60% of Housing Section’s resources were still being devoted to the use of its 
law enforcement powers.94 Five new formal investigations were started that year, three 
more in 1990, and one in 1991. Some of these were general investigations, thus mirroring 
the approach of the Employment Division in the mid-1980s. In any case though, this 
reliance on formal powers contrasts strongly with the Employment Division in the same 
period, which did not launch any new investigations at all in 1989 and only one in 1990.95
The emphasis of the Social Policy Division was beginning to change, however, 
away from its formal legal powers. As with the Employment Division, a key catalyst was
93 Source: Annual Reports
94 AR 1989: 18-20
95 This was the investigation into T & T Personnel Ltd (an employment agency).
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the introduction of codes of practice. The first of these codes dealt with the rented sector in 
housing96 and this was soon followed by a code into the non-rented sector, as well as 
several non-statutory codes in the areas of education and health service provision. All of 
these codes were backed up with strong publicity and contacts with relevant
07organisations. As a result, the work of the Division was becoming more closely aligned 
with that of the Employment Division, with its preference for persuasion and education 
over prosecutions and formal investigations.98
Fourth phase: 1993-2000
The year 1993 saw the arrival of a new Commission chairman, Herman Ouseley, 
with a background in local government and race relations.99 Whilst Ouseley had a strong 
influence on the direction of the Commission, many of the changes he introduced were 
incremental, building upon previous developments. This section briefly outlines the main 
activities of the Commission in the years before the Race Relations (Amendment) Act 
2000, focusing particularly on its enforcement activities. It will be shown that two aspects 
of the Commission’s enforcement strategy in particular: the discarding of formal 
investigations except as a last resort and their replacement by negotiations in the context of 
individual complaints under the Act as the central component in its enforcement strategy 
led to a further de-juridification of relationships between the Commission and its 
regulatees.
96 Statutory backing for this was achieved by securing an additional clause in the Housing Act 1988. The 
Commission had to wait a little longer for a code into the non-rented housing sector as this could not be 
accommodated into the Long Title which defined the 1988 Bill. Instead, an amendment was secured to the 
Local Government and Housing Act 1989.
97 For instance, in formulating the code dealing with the rented housing sector, the Commission distributed a 
consultation draft of the code to over 1000 relevant organisations. Following its launch in 1991, copies were 
sent to all relevant housing organisations in Britain. Accompanying the Code were leaflets and various posters 
to publicise its existence and contents, as well as a series of guides (see A Guide fo r  Estate Agents and 
Vendors’, Training fo r  Racial Equality in Housing; Race, Housing and Immigration and Positive Action in 
Housing)
98 Interestingly, this sense that the Social Policy Division was “catching up” with the Employment Division 
seems to have been felt within the Commission itself. See McCrudden et al (1991: 106-7).
99 He was previously Chief Executive of Lambeth LBC, former chief executive of ILEA, background also in 
race relations.
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It would be misleading however, to deal just with the enforcement strategies of the 
Commission, whilst failing to mention its new overall focus. In many ways, the CRE of the 
mid to late 1990s comes across as a body with a new-found confidence, deliberately setting 
out to foster a higher public profile and to make extensive use of the media. Hard-hitting 
and well-publicised campaigns were launched, such as the ‘Let’s kick racism out of 
football’ campaign and the ‘Leadership Challenge’. Meanwhile, the Commission was 
continuing to grow as a pressure group aiming to influence government policy. It was a 
particularly vocal force, for instance, at the time of the debates concerning racial 
harassment and violence, backing up its public arguments with private lobbying of the 
Home Office.100 There was also a European dimension to this work, with the Commission 
emerging as a leading force for change in Europe.101 Its biggest boost, however, came not 
so much from its own efforts but from a change of government in 1997. Whilst its previous 
reviews of the Race Relations Act had been either ignored or rejected,102 the new 
government was far more sympathetic. The legislative reforms that the Commission had 
been pushing for went through Parliament in 1998, and came into force in the form of the 
Race Relations (Amendments) Act 2000. Amongst other things, the new Act extended the 
provisions of the 1976 by imposing a general duty upon public bodies (apart from a few 
specified exceptions) to promote racial equality and eliminate racial discrimination, 
enforceable by the CRE.103
The Commission’s generally higher public profile was fostered by some internal 
changes, continuing processes that had begun in the previous policy phase. One of the new 
Chairman’s first tasks was to merge the Employment and Social Policy Divisions, and this 
was followed by continuing management reforms. In 1993, Price Waterhouse was awarded 
a contract to undertake an internal audit of the CRE’s practice and procedures, resulting in 
changes being made to many aspects of the CRE’s approach to budgetary control, banking
100 See, for example, AR 1996: 17
101 See e.g. AR 1994: 36-8, AR 1997: 26, AR 1999: 29-30. Significantly, when the Race Directive on Article 
13 was finally issued, it was to a large extent using the UK experience as a model.
102 The Commission had tried twice: in 1985, when the Government failed even to respond to its 
recommendations for change, and in 1990, when the Government rejected the vast majority of its proposals.
103 Further legislation is expected shortly in order to comply with the new EU Race Directive on Article 13. 
The new legislation is likely to incorporate a new and wider definition of indirect discrimination, a shift in the 
burden of proof once a prima facie case has been established and to abolish laws and regulations that are 
contrary to the principle of equal treatment.
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arrangements and performance indicators.104 And in 1994, an executive policy group and an 
enlarged executive office was established in order to provide the chairman, the executive 
director and the Commissioners with a flexible team, able to evaluate the need for new 
initiatives, and to co-ordinate and develop work on networking, research and 
information.105 The policy group also handled the growing volume of speeches and 
briefings, thus highlighting the Commission’s changing priorities.
• A new enforcement strategy
Meanwhile, the provision of assistance to individual victims of discrimination was 
now placed unequivocally at the centre of the Commission’s enforcement strategy. This 
was indicated not simply by the sheer volume of complaints that were now handled by the 
newly formed Legal Committee -  up to 1709 applications by 1993, and remaining at just 
under 2000 applications per year throughout the rest of the 1990s. Far more than this, it was 
the manner in which the Commission was now using these applications as a springboard for 
a persuasive enforcement strategy. This was highlighted by two elements in particular the 
Commission’s approach to applications when they were first received, and the new strategy 
of the Commission in following up respondents after racial discrimination cases had been 
concluded. Each of these will now be taken in turn.
Once an application for assistance had been received, the policy of the 
Commission in all cases was to try to secure a favourable settlement as early as possible. 
Significantly, many of the settlements secured contained commitments by the employer or 
service provider to work with the Commission to implement equal opportunity 
programmes. By 1997, nearly two-thirds of cases supported by the Commission were 
settled before a hearing, with compensation paid to the victims and a commitment made by 
those accused of discrimination to make changes to their policies and practice (AR 1997: 
4).
104 In addition, a review of the Commission’s printing, publishing and marketing procedures was 
implemented, leading to the closure of an in-house print facility, the re-pricing of all titles and a reassessment 
of publications strategy.
105 Other management reforms included a new commitment to implement charter standards specifying the 
standard of service the public could expect in its dealings with CRE staff, updating the computerised database 
and the introduction of a new system of performance pay.
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Meanwhile, in 1995 the Commission introduced a new strategy of following up 
respondents after racial discrimination cases had been concluded.106 The catalyst was again 
some internal changes: in 1994, a new unit was created within the Legal Division to co­
ordinate the strategic aspects of the Commission’s legal work. When this reorganisation 
was completed, the Commission immediately launched its new policy, identifying 65 cases 
for follow-up work. This increased to 163 in 1996, of which 64 follow-up initiatives were 
concluded with 37 of these (58%) resulting in all or most objectives being met (AR 1996: 
6). In 1997, 150 cases were identified for follow-up work, 78 case projects were concluded 
and all or most of the Commission’s objectives were met in 54 of these (69%). Mostly the 
follow-up was specifically focused on a single company, but on other occasions it was far 
broader. For instance, in 1996 there were 23 such case projects extending to the relevant 
sector or class of organisation.
The Commission’s follow-up work quickly became as important as its actual legal 
case-work. In 2001, the Commission offered full legal representation in 81 cases, and more 
limited representation in 41 cases, making a total of 122 cases. Most of these were 
settled.107 In the same year, the Commission also followed up 122 industrial tribunal
10Scases. Both elements implied a changed philosophy of enforcement: for the first time, the 
Commission had found a synthesis between its two primary duties: a way both to correct 
past wrongs and to secure future change.
The Commission’s ability to pursue the strategy of negotiating change was aided 
greatly by two factors. The first was the increased success rate of cases when they did come 
to be heard in the tribunals. At the start of the 1990s, the success rate in tribunals was still 
low. Having long pushed for an increase in the number of ethnic minority chairs and 
members in industrial tribunals, the President of Tribunals and the Department of 
Employment finally agreed in 1993 that more ethnic minority chairs and members were 
needed, and that the Commission could assist in bringing this about. By 1995, the total 
number of ethnic minority members had increased to 115 - 4.6% of the total. Meanwhile, 
the level of awards was rising steadily. In 1997, the average total tribunal award in
106 i.e. not just cases where the Commission had represented the applicants, but all the racial discrimination 
cases on record.
107 In the same year, 66 cases were settled by CRE case officers.
108 See AR 2001: 24
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employment cases represented by the Commission was £7,405,109 and the average 
settlement was £9,902. Much of this was due to the passage of the Race Relations 
(Remedies) Act 1994, in which the upper limit on compensation awards in racial 
discrimination cases was removed.
The second factor was the increasing role of other agencies in splitting the work­
load of representing complainants. For several years, the Commission had been trying to 
establish other centres capable of providing legal representation and other assistance to 
individual complainants, with limited success. Fresh impetus was then given following the 
publication of ‘Racial Justice at Work’ -  a Policy Studies Institute research study which 
concluded that a twin-track system was developing whereby complainants who were 
represented by the CRE were far more likely to succeed in the industrial tribunals. The 
Commission began systematically to make more demands on other organisations with 
complainant aid responsibility -  including trade unions, the National Association of Citizen 
Advice Bureaux, local law centres and the RECs.110 In the next few years, the Commission 
began more frequently to refer cases to other bodies, so that by 1997, 79 cases were 
referred for representation to other organisations, including 50 to trade unions and 16 to 
RECs (AR 1997: 6).
• The demise of formal investigations
As the benefits of focusing on individual complaints became increasingly 
apparent, so formal investigations appeared less and less attractive. In its 1993 Annual 
Report, the Commission was still referring to the benefits of formal investigations. “There 
are some who will still not respond to our efforts to persuade”, it was argued. Four new 
investigations were begun.111 In 1994, however, whilst a further two investigations were 
started, it was reported that formal investigations were now to be used as “a weapon of last 
resort”, with an emphasis instead on persuading organisations to enter into voluntary
109 This figure does not include two exceptional six-figure sum awards made during the year.
110 In 1994, for instance, the Commission wrote to all the general secretaries of all the trade unions affiliated 
to the Trades Union Congress, to encourage them to give greater support to racial discrimination complaints 
brought by their members. Over half of the unions had accepted the Commission’s points by the end of the 
year.
These were the investigations into Mobile Doctors Ltd., Computacenter Ltd., Large Companies and 
Ministry of Defence (Household Cavalry).
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agreements (AR 1994: 5).112 In comparison to general negotiation based around 
settlements, to launch a formal investigation was an expensive and time-consuming way of 
achieving the same change.113 The previous use of formal investigations as a source of 
information for the Commission, especially of the mechanisms of indirect discrimination, 
had moreover diminished as the Commission had matured. The Commission continued to 
operate the new policy of formal action as a last resort throughout the rest of the 1990s, and 
the following extract sums up the complete turn-around in the relationships between the 
Commission and its regulatees since the first policy phase (AR 1998: 4):
We continued our strategy of using our formal investigation power as the ultimate 
sanction, preferring instead to pursue detailed preliminary enquiries into 
organisations, followed by negotiated agreements for change. This resulted last 
year in two widely publicised partnerships with the Ministry of Defence and 
Hackney Council.
We used a similar approach in our legal casework, and it explains the high level 
of satisfactory settlements of complaints before they reached the tribunals and 
courts. We also continued to follow up respondents after tribunal and court 
hearings and worked closely with them to prevent further complaints. Only rarely 
do employers refuse to co-operate with the Commission.
The link between a deterrence-based regulatory strategy and an adversarial response from 
regulatees, as well as the converse -  a persuasive regulatory strategy and a co-operative 
response from regulatees - is clearly discernible here.
Before looking briefly at the impact of the Race Relations (Amendment) Act 2000, 
it is necessary to consider finally a potential piece of counter-evidence: an extract that could 
be taken to suggest the beginning of juridification in the conduct of racial discrimination 
cases (AR 1998: 23-4):
Racial discrimination cases are becoming increasingly complex. The law is 
developing rapidly as rulings from other equality jurisdictions and EC law are 
imported into the arguments; it will not be long, too, before human rights 
legislation, although welcome, introduces another factor. Compensation levels 
have also been rising continuously, compelling respondents to take allegations of 
racial discrimination more seriously, but, equally, making them more likely to 
turn to specialist firms of solicitors and counsel to represent them. Tribunal
112 This approach was adopted, for example, with the trade union UNISON, who agreed to develop an 
extensive action plan to deal with concerns about union services to ethnic minority members, especially in 
relation to racial discrimination cases (AR 1996: 10).
1,3 In a recent consultation regarding the Commission’s proposed legal strategy, it is written: “Formal 
investigations can be effective in tackling institutional discrimination, yet they can be overly complex and 
resource intensive and neither clarifies the law nor, generally, provides compensation for victims.”
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hearings are therefore no longer simple or informal affairs, and they are much 
costlier. All these developments have grave implications for applicants, 
particularly those who represent themselves or use lay representatives. At the 
same time, the resources available to the Commission and to other advice 
agencies, both in absolute and relative terms, have substantially decreased, while 
the demand for assistance continues as strong as ever.
Despite these constraints, however, while fewer applicants received full 
representation from the Commission in 1998, the number who were granted 
limited representation increased threefold.
Whilst this may be interesting, and the growing formality and complexity of 
tribunal proceedings is widely observed elsewhere,114 it is difficult to see how this affected 
relationships between the Commission and respondents under the Act. Even when tribunal 
proceedings were more informal, the decision to take a case to industrial tribunal was 
always the most juridified option the Commission had when dealing with a complaint under 
the Act. In terms of the relationships between the Commission and its regulatees therefore, 
of far greater significance was the fact that the Commission was consistently preferring to 
negotiate a settlement before a hearing took place, and regulatees were normally preferring 
to accept this option. In 2001, only 8 cases supported by the Commission actually went to a 
hearing -  a remarkably small number.115
The impact o f the Race Relations (Amendment) Act 2000
In 1998, Parliament passed the Race Relations (Amendments) Act 2000. The most 
significant innovation of the new Act was the imposition of a general duty upon public 
bodies (apart from a few specified exceptions) to promote racial equality and eliminate 
racial discrimination.116 This was backed up in s71(2) by specific duties, to be imposed by 
the Secretary of State through secondary legislation. The Commission was given two main 
additional powers: a power to issue codes of practice117 and the power to enforce a specific 
duty by issuing a “compliance notice”. Such a notice would require the regulatee to comply
1,4 See for example, Baldwin et al (1992:155) and Harlow and Rawlings (1997: chapter 14) in relation to 
social security tribunals.
115 If anything then, the growing complexity of tribunal cases merely provided an additional incentive for 
parties to settle before a hearing.
16 Section 71(1) of the Race Relations Act 1976 as amended.
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with the duty imposed under section 71(2) and to inform the Commission within 28 days
11 o
what steps were being taken to comply with the duty. The Commission could also 
include in such a notice a requirement to provide information as reasonably necessary.119 
In the event of non-compliance with the notice, the Commission then had the power to 
apply for a court order.120
The new duties were imposed following a consultation, through the Race Relations 
Act 1976 (Statutory Duties) Order 2001, coming into force on 3rd December 2001. The 
main duty contained in the order was for specified public bodies to publish “Race Equality 
Schemes” indicating how the particular body was intending to fulfil its general duty Under 
the Act. There were further specifications of what had to be contained within these Race 
Equality Schemes,121 and a duty to review them every three years. There were also further 
specific duties in the areas of employment and education, including a requirement for 
regular monitoring and annual reviews. The Commission published a statutory code of 
practice and four non-statutory codes to assist organisations in complying with the amended 
Act.
The amended Act puts the relationship between the Commission and public 
authorities on a new footing, with contacts centring around Race Equality Schemes. Formal 
action though, such as the issuing of compliance notices under s71(D), is likely to be 
extremely rare, with the Commission’s primary function in this area being one of education 
and advice, and occasional persuasion. Thus far, the Commission has not issued a single 
compliance notice under the Act.122 The new legislation can thus be seen as a form of 
imposed self-regulation with the details of how best to comply with the general duty to 
promote racial equality left to individual public authorities. Even at this early stage 
therefore, it can be concluded that the Act has not led, and is unlikely to lead to 
juridification in the relationships between the Commission and public authorities.
117 Section 71(C). The procedures for any code under the new Act are identical to other codes under the 
original Act.
118 S71(D)(2) of the Act.
119 It could also specify the manner and form in which this information was to be presented, as well as a 
suitable time limit.
120 Section 71(E) of the amended Act.
121 For instance, a Scheme had to contain an assessment of which policies and functions were relevant to 
racial equality, an indication of how policies would be monitored to see how they were affecting racial 
equality and proposals for training of staff members.
12 Correct as of 31st December, 2002.
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Conclusion
The evidence presented in this chapter is striking. Not only does it confirm that 
juridification is far from inevitable, but it actually points to exactly the opposite conclusion. 
Over the course of 25 years, contacts between the Commission for Racial Equality and its 
regulatees were governed less and less by law and legal considerations. Following a period 
of heavily juridified contacts in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the CRE increasingly 
concentrated on informal processes until, by the mid to late 1990s, it had ceased to use most 
of its formal powers altogether, preferring to bargain in the shadow of the law. This chapter 
served to highlight this by dividing the Commission’s activities into four separate policy 
phases, and the changing levels of juridification in each is summed up in the following 
tables:
Type I  juridification between the CRE and its regulatees: 1977-2000
1977
Frequent litigation 
✓
Many legal challenges to formal investigations. 
‘Responsive’ approach to individual complaints under 
the Act meant that litigation the norm if the requirements 
of the Act had been met.
to
1982
Coercive, inflexible regulatory strategy 
✓
Very little flexibility throughout the formal investigation 
process. Sharp distinction between ‘enforcement’ and
✓ ‘promotion’. Strong evidence of deterrence strategy.
(5/5) Reliance on formal, legal process 
✓
Yes: provisions of Act followed rigidly; formal terms of 
reference and non-discrimination notices.
Frequent prosecution in response to 
breach of law *
The cornerstone of the CRE’s strategy in this period.
High presence / involvement of lawyers 
✓
CRE lawyers heavily involved in conduct of 
investigations and decisions on individual complainants 
under the Act. Lawyers of investigated companies 
present in about two-thirds of cases.
Frequent litigation 
* X
Fewer formal investigations and far fewer legal 
challenges in response. Still a responsive approach to 
individual complainants, and litigation still the norm 
with other breaches o f the Act.
1983
to
1987
Coercive, inflexible regulatory strategy 
* X
More flexibility shown in the conduct of formal 
investigations, greater integration of different elements 
of strategy. Still a separation between enforcement and 
promotion, however -  implying that inflexibility once 
enforcement decided upon.
* X
(3/5)
Reliance on formal, legal process 
* X
Commission slightly less rigid in approach to formal 
investigations, focusing more on outcomes. However, it 
still relied on legal avenues with its other powers.
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Frequent prosecution in response to 
breach of law 
</
Still the norm with cases of persistent discrimination and 
pressure to discriminate. Legal action still the norm to 
help individual complainants under the Act. Fewer 
formal investigations launched.
High presence / involvement of lawyers 
* X
Lawyers had the same role as previously, but the far 
greater emphasis placed on achieving change through its 
promotional work meant that the work of lawyers was 
less important to the CRE as a whole.
1988
to
1992
X
(0/5)
Frequent litigation 
X
Far less litigation than previously: only one legal 
challenge to formal investigation, reliance on settlements 
rather than litigation with s26-28 actions, litigation used 
less to aid complainants under the Act.
Coercive, inflexible regulatory strategy 
X
Far greater flexibility with integration of enforcement 
and promotional work. Persuasion and search for 
settlements now more common than prosecution.
Reliance on formal, legal process 
X
Legal tools such as formal investigations still used; 
however, generally a greater reliance on settlements.
Frequent prosecution in response to 
breach of law *
No longer true: fundamental change of strategy with 
respect to prosecutions under the Act, so that the norm 
was to search for a settlement if possible.
High presence / involvement of lawyers 
X
Change of strategy meant that lawyers within the CRE 
were less important.
1993
to
2000
X
(0/5)
Frequent litigation 
X
Litigation avoided wherever possible: settlements seen as 
more fruitful and less expensive option.
Coercive, inflexible regulatory strategy 
X
Commission’s strategy the opposite of this: it was based 
on negotiation and flexibility to try to achieve change.
Reliance on formal, legal process 
X
Bargaining in the shadow of the law far more common. 
Formal investigations barely used.
Frequent prosecution in response to 
breach of law x
Settlements now at the centre of the CRE’s strategy, with 
wide-ranging settlements aimed to promote change.
High presence / involvement of lawyers 
X
As before.
Type IIjuridification between the CRE and its regulatees: 1977-2000
1977
to
1982
✓
(5/5)
Explicit legal argument 
✓
Yes -  legal argument recorded faithfully in reports of 
formal investigations. Very common especially in 
indirect discrimination cases.
Regulatory contact seen as setting legal 
precedent 
✓
Outcomes of formal investigations used by the 
Commission in industrial tribunal cases and in the course 
of formulating codes of practice. Some cross-referencing 
between investigations.
High presence / involvement of lawyers 
✓
CRE lawyers heavily involved in conduct of 
investigations and decisions on individual complainants 
under the Act. Lawyers of investigated companies 
present in about two-thirds of cases.
References to law and legal cases 
✓
Very common: reference to relevant sections of the Act 
the norm in formal investigations, frequent reference to 
legal developments in annual reports.
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Adoption of overtly legal values 
✓
References to natural justice, and to the need to make a 
finding “on the balance of probabilities”. Frequent 
consultations with legal advisers.
1983 
to 
1987 
^ X
(3/5)
Explicit legal argument 
✓
Still common, especially in indirect discrimination cases
Regulatory contact seen as setting legal 
precedent 
X
Less applicable than previously, as Commission had now 
built up a body of ‘case law’ which it then used in 
formulating codes of practice.
High presence / involvement of lawyers 
* X
Lawyers had the same role as previously, but the far 
greater emphasis placed on achieving change through its 
promotional work meant that the work of lawyers was 
less important to the CRE as a whole.
References to law and legal cases 
✓
Same as previously, albeit that formal investigations 
used less.
Adoption of overtly legal values 
* X
Legal values still important; however, the new emphasis 
on achieving outcomes rather than sticking to legal 
processes indicates that achievement seen as more 
important than following the requirements of the law.
1988
to
1992
X
(1W5)
Explicit legal argument 
* X
Becoming far less obvious due to the decline in number 
of formal investigations and tribunal appearances. Legal 
argument used in the course of reaching settlements.
Regulatory contact seen as setting legal 
precedent x
As in previous period
High presence / involvement of lawyers 
X
As in previous period, but even more so because of 
changes of strategy in relation to individual complaints 
and prosecutions under the Act.
References to law and legal cases 
✓
As in previous period: references still made in the course 
of legal contacts.
Adoption of overtly legal values 
X
If anything, Commission becoming keen to avoid the use 
of law wherever possible, preferring non-legal 
approaches and bargaining in the shadow of the law.
1993
to
2000
X
(1/5)
Explicit legal argument 
* X
As in previous period
Regulatory contact seen as setting legal 
precedent *
Legal precedent less important than achieving far- 
reaching change in the shadow of law.
High presence / involvement of lawyers 
X
As before.
References to law and legal cases 
* X
Less common, due to use of formal investigation as a last 
resort only. Still used in the course of negotiating 
settlements, however.
Adoption of overtly legal values 
X
As before.
The chapter has also highlighted some of the main reasons why de-juridification 
occurred. Strikingly, one of the most basic reasons is that the features of Type I 
juridification itself made the strategies that had caused it in the first place unsustainable. 
The frequent legal challenges, delays and general lack of co-operation from regulatees in 
response to an inflexible style of regulation by the Commission, had a direct effect on the 
Commission’s capacity to launch further formal investigations, but also gave rise to
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political and judicial intervention. The Commission was thus forced to change its strategy, 
as it was again towards the end of the 1980s when budgetary constraints and imposed 
management reforms led to a new focus on ensuring that contacts with regulatees achieved 
tangible benefits in the most cost-efficient manner. In short, the costs of juridification led 
the Commission to seek a way around it.
We turn now to the relationship between the Office of Fair Trading and its 
regulatees to see whether the same trends can be found in a case where a persuasive 
regulatory strategy might be expected.
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Appendix 1
Full list of formal investigations 1977-83 with key characteristics
Information is listed as follows:_______________________________________________
Name of investigation -  year started -  length of investigation -  type of investigation -  
whether company co-operative/admitting charges -  whether lawyers present -  whether 
subpoena/court orders necessary -  whether litigation - whether non-discrimination notice 
issued.
Notes:
• Length o f investigation. In a few cases, the exact month in which the investigation was 
initiated or completed is unknown. The approach taken in these cases has been to 
provide the lowest possible figure (i.e. assuming December of the start year and/or 
January of the end year). This is so that the point made in the chapter as to the length of 
investigations can rest on the least-case scenario.
• Lawyers present. The presence of lawyers is only recorded here where this is mentioned 
specifically in the report of the investigation. The actual number is likely, however, to 
be higher than this -  especially given that some companies will have been in a position 
to get legal advice internally.
1. Abbey National Building Society -  1981 -  34 months -  belief, direct, employment -  
discrimination not admitted -  lawyers -  non-discrimination notice overturned on appeal 
b/c company introduced new evidence.
2. Allen’s Accommodation Bureau -  1980 -  5 months -  belief, direct, housing -  
discrimination admitted -  lawyers -  non-discrimination notice issued.
3. Allocation of council housing, with particular reference to work permit holders -  1978
-  43 months -  strategic, indirect, housing -  discrimination not admitted by some 
councils - lawyers -  2 councils agreed to change policies under threat of non­
discrimination notice, hence notices not issued.
4. Amari Plastics -  1978 -  66 months -  belief, direct, employment -  discrimination not 
admitted -  lawyers -  non-discrimination notice overturned on appeal and replaced with 
more limited notice after an EAT and then a Court of Appeal decision upholding the 
right of the industrial tribunal to enquire into the facts of the investigation.
5. Antwerp Arms Public House -  1978 -  9 months -  belief, direct, provision of services -  
discrimination not admitted -  lawyers -  non-discrimination notice issued.
6. Barlavington Manor Children’s Home. Mr and Mrs John Ellis -  1977 -  16 months -  
belief, direct and indirect, provision of services -  discrimination not admitted -  lawyers
-  certain requirements of non-discrimination notice appealed, informal discussions led 
to change in some provisions and appeal dropped.
7. Birmingham AHA ("teaching). St. Chad’s Hospital -  1979 -  36 months -  belief, direct, 
employment -  discrimination not admitted - lawyers - subpoena notice and enforcement 
order necessary -  non-discrimination notice appealed in industrial tribunal, but after the
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Authority went out of existence as a result of reorganisation of NHS, the new AHA 
accepted liability for non-discrimination notice and withdrew the appeal.
8. Birmingham LEA and schools: referral and suspension of pupils -  1979 -  49 months -  
strategic, education -  recommendations made.
9. BL cars Castle Bromwich -  1978 -  24 months -  belief, direct, employment -  
discrimination not admitted -  lawyers -  subpoena notices necessary -  appeal against 
non-discrimination notice withdrawn following settlement.
10. Bondina Ltd.. National Union of Dvers. Bleachers and Textiles Workers, and Mr. 
Nutton -  1978 -  N/A - strategic, employment - enquiries completed, but investigation 
discontinued following Hillingdon decision.
11. Broomfield Ltd -  1978 -  4 months -  belief, direct and indirect, employment, 
discrimination not admitted -  company’s legal department -  company co-operative + 
allegations not believed, so no non-discrimination notice. Recommendations made.
12-15. Brvmbo Community Council. Rogers. Stanley. Greenaway (4 investigations) -  
1980 -  7 months -  belief, direct, housing -  discrimination not admitted -  lawyers - 
subpoena notice necessary for one case -  three non-discrimination notices served.
16. Chubb & Sons -  1978 -  49 months - strategic, employment -  company very co­
operative - no non-discrimination notice - investigation delayed because of legal 
challenge in another case.
17. Collingwood Housing Association -  1978 -  49 months - strategic, direct and indirect, 
housing -  discrimination not admitted -  recommendations made, Commission’s 
approach affected by Percy Ingle Bakeries decision.
18. Cottrell & Rothon estate agent -  1978 -  26 months -  belief, direct, housing -  
discrimination not admitted -  lawyers -  respondent applied for injunction during course 
of investigation and judicial review following the issuing of the non-discrimination 
notice -  unsuccessful, so non-discrimination notice stood.
19. Dunlop Ltd.. Polymer Engineering Division -  1982 - 20 months, not including original 
investigation -  belief, indirect, employment -  discrimination not admitted -  
investigation had to be restarted with new terms of reference following Hillingdon -  
non-discrimination notice not issued for reasons given in paragraph 23.
20. Genture Restaurants and Mr Weston-Edwards -  1977 -  12 months -  belief, direct,
provision of services -  discrimination not admitted -  lawyers -  no appeal/review -  non­
discrimination notice -  suspicion of continuing discrimination led the Commission to 
seek further injunction, which was not granted by the court.
21. Hackney carriage drivers in Birmingham -  1979 -  49 months -  belief, indirect,
employment -  discrimination not admitted -  lawyers -  appeal + judicial review both 
dropped, non-discrimination notice changed to reflect changed practice.
22. Hackney LBC. housing allocations -  1978 -  61 months -  strategic, housing -  full co­
operation -  non-discrimination notice issued, council agreed not to issue proceedings 
against Commission despite Prestige decision.
23. Hillingdon LBC homeless applicants -  1978 -  N/A - strategic, housing -  lawyers -  
judicial review challenge won by Hillingdon and investigation terminated.
24. Home Office immigration procedures -  1979 -  72 months -  general, immigration -  
lawyers - judicial review case to establish whether or not investigation within scope of 
Commission’s powers. Lengthy recommendations made.
136
25. Kirklees Metropolitan Borough Council -  1981 -  18 months -  strategic, employment - 
published as study rather than formal investigation because of the Prestige decision.
26. London Drivers Supplied Services Ltd. -  1978 -  4 months -  belief, direct, employment
-  discrimination not admitted -  finding of discrimination not made, so no non­
discrimination notice, but recommendations were made.
27. Massey Ferguson Perkins -  1978 -  49 months -  belief, direct and indirect, employment
-  discrimination not admitted -  lawyers -  appeal against all requirements of non­
discrimination notice dropped after agreement.
28. Mr G.D. Midda and PS Services Ltd -  1978 -  22 months -  belief, direct, housing -  
discrimination not admitted -  subpoena notice, court proceedings to enforce it and 
further proceedings to enforce court order necessary, non-discrimination notice issued 
and not appealed, but further court order necessary to enforce non-discrimination 
notice.
29. Mortgage allocations in Rochdale -  1979 -  49 months -  general, indirect, housing -  
recommendations made.
30. Mount Pleasant United Working Men’s Club -  1978 -  16 months -  belief, direct -  
goods and services -  non-discrimination notice.
31. National Bus Company -  1978 -  85 months -  strategic, indirect, employment -  
recommendations made, original formal investigation changed into enquiry with 
consent of company following Prestige decision.
32. Pembroke & Pembroke employment agency -  1977 -  67 months -  belief, direct, 
employment -  discrimination not admitted -  lawyers -  original terms of reference 
revised following representations, subpoena notice + court order necessary, several 
documents missing -  no non-discrimination notice b/c not enough evidence.
33. Percy Ingle Bakeries -  1978 -  49 months -  belief, direct and indirect, employment -  
lawyers -  appeal against non-discrimination notice delayed until decision in Amari had 
been reached, but then successful.123
34. Philips Electronics Ltd. -  1978 -  N/A - strategic, employment - dropped because of 
Prestige, hence no report.
35. Prestige Ltd. -  1978 -  N/A - strategic, direct and indirect, employment -  lawyers -  
appeal against notice in industrial tribunal, followed by judicial review against non­
discrimination notice, and investigation declared void.
36. Rank Leisure -  1979 -  49 months -  belief, direct, provision of services -  discrimination 
not admitted -  lawyers -  appeal against non-discrimination notice delayed pending 
outcome of another case and later withdrawn.
37. Secondary school allocations in Reading (Berkshire LEA) -  1978 -  49 months -  belief, 
education - no finding of discrimination made, but recommendations.
38. Slough housing allocations -  1978 -  N/A - strategic, indirect - discontinued following 
Hillingdon judgment.
39. Smith & Nephew -  1978 -  N/A - strategic, employment - dropped because of Prestige, 
hence no report.
123 i.e. it was held that requirement or condition had to affect disproportionate number of racial group in 
question + as proportion could not be 100%, this was not a case of indirect discrimination. Whilst this was 
presented by the Commission as a technicality + they used the case to try to achieve law reform, the case can 
be seen in another light: this was really a case of direct discrimination, but lack of evidence.
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40. Tottenham Trades and Social Club -  1980 — 17 months -  belief, direct, provision of 
services -  discrimination not admitted -  lawyers -  some original terms of reference 
dropped following initial representations -  non-discrimination notice not appealed.
41. Unigate Dairies -  1978 -  66 months -  strategic, employment - recommendations made, 
original formal investigation changed to non-statutory enquiry with consent of company 
following Prestige decision.
42. USMC International -  1978 -  N/A - strategic, employment - dropped because of 
Prestige, hence no report.
43. Walsall Metropolitan BC housing allocation practices -  1979 -  52 months -  belief, 
direct and indirect, housing -  discrimination not admitted -  subpoena notice issued -  
original investigation had to be terminated due to Hillingdon case, new terms of 
reference issued -  non-discrimination notice not issued because of progress made.
44. West Yorkshire Passenger Transport Executive (Bradford Metro) -  1979 -  41 months -  
belief, direct and indirect, employment -  discrimination not admitted, but full co­
operation -  investigation restarted with new terms of reference following Hillingdon - 
non-discrimination notice issued.
45. Westminster CC. NUPE and 4 named NUPE officers -  1979 -  96 months - belief, 
direct, employment -  lawyers - terminated and restarted due to Hillingdon decision, 
then judicial review at first instance and in Court of Appeal, then non-discrimination 
notice quashed on appeal in county court.
46. Woodhouse Recreation Club -  1979 -  11 months -  belief, direct, provision of services 
-  discrimination admitted + advice sought -  lawyers -  ‘on balance of probabilities* -  no 
appeal/review -  non-discrimination notice unchanged
47. Zone Insurance Co. -  1978 -  N/A -  belief, indirect, provision of services -  
discrimination not admitted -  lawyers -  subpoena notice + court order necessary to get 
information - investigation discontinued when company went into liquidation
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Appendix 2
Full list of formal investigations 1984-1998 with key characteristics
Information listed as follows:_________________________________________ _______
Name of investigation -  year started -  length -  type of investigation -  whether company 
co-operative/admitting charges -  whether lawyers present -  whether subpoena/court orders 
necessary -  whether litigation - whether non-discrimination notice issued______________
1. Abolition of the GLC -  1986 -  N/A -  employment, general -  terminated, no reason 
given as to why.
2. Appointing NHS Consultants and Senior Registrars -  1992 -  37 months - employment, 
general -  recommendations
3. Beaumont Levs Shopping Centre -  1985 -  12 months -  employment, general -  
recommendations made.
4. Bradford School Leavers - 1988 -  36 months - employment, general -  
recommendations made.
5-7. Brook Street Bureau. Brittania Cards and Network Recruitment Agency (3 
investigations) -  1992 -  19 months - employment, belief -  non-discrimination notices 
issued against Network and Brittania
8. Calderdale LEA, teaching English as a second language -  1985 -  22 months -  
education, belief -  recommendations made.
9. Cardiff Employers -  1987 -  49 months -  employment, general -  recommendations 
made.
10. Chartered Accountancy Training Contracts -  1985 -  18 months -  employment, general
-  recommendations made.
11. Civil Service recruitment -  1992 -  N/A - employment, belief -  suspended pending 
internal inquiry.
12. Cleveland LEA -  1988 -  43 months -  education, belief -  yes, but LEA felt bound by 
Education Act 1980 -  lawyers -  Secretary of State rejected Commission’s interpretation
-  Commission applied for judicial review to determine conflict between two statutes, 
lost at first instance -  no non-discrimination notice because field of education.
13. Computacenter Ltd -  1994 -  N/A - employment, belief -  full co-operation -  
investigation suspended following agreement.
14. Construction Industry Training Board -  1992 -  ? -  employment, belief -  full co­
operation - no direct findings of discrimination -  recommendations.
15. Council for Legal Education -  1993 -  N/A - education, belief - investigation suspended 
as Council offered to fund an independent inquiry.
16. Hacknev LBC -  1996 -  26 months - employment, belief -  investigation suspended as 
independent inquiry commissioned -  formal undertakings in lieu of non-discrimination 
notice.
17. Handsworth Horticultural Institute Ltd. -  1988 -  48 months -  services, belief -  
company not responsive to persuasion prior to investigation - lawyers - non­
discrimination notice -  appeal in county court, dismissed.
18. Hertfordshire County Council, secondary school admissions -  (Feb) 1989 -  ? - 
education, belief, finding of indirect discrimination -  recommendations made.
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19. Hestair Management Services Ltd -  1988 -  36 months - employment, belief - 
investigation foreshortened when company reached out-of-court settlement with 
individual complainant, including an admission of discrimination -  no non­
discrimination notice.
20. Housing Associations in England and Wales -  1991 -  18 months -  housing, general
21. Housing Associations in Scotland -  1991 -  18 months -  housing, general
22. JHP Training Ltd -  July 1987 -  ? - employment, belief -  general co-operation, although 
information not given at first because of confidentiality considerations.
23. Large Companies -  1993 -  18 months - employment, general
24. Lecturer appointments in Leicestershire -  1989 -  20 months - employment, belief -  full 
co-operation -  non-discrimination notice not issued due to changes in who was now 
responsible for recruitment.
25. Liverpool Citv Council -  1987 -  27 months -  housing, belief -  Council did not refute 
findings -  non-discrimination notice, reasons given -  court order later sought because 
of slowness of implementation.
26. Ministry of Defence (Household Cavalry") -  1993 - 30 months -  employment, belief -  
formal agreement in lieu of non-discrimination notice.
27. Mobile Doctors Ltd -  1993 -  24 months - employment, belief -  non-discrimination 
notice issued.
28. Norman Lester & Co. Oldham Estate Agency -  1988 -  9 months - housing, belief 
(although only after testing, no prior complaint) -  non-discrimination notice -  appealed 
in county court, dismissed because lodged out of time -  company subsequently refused 
to comply with non-discrimination notice and Commission started further legal 
proceedings + OFT informed under Estate Agency Act 1979.
29. Oaklawn Property Developments. Leicestershire -  1987 -  16 months -  housing, belief 
(strengthened by tests prior to investigation) -  non-discrimination notice.
30. Oldham Housing Allocations -  1990 -  28 months -  housing, belief -  disagreed with 
findings, but co-operative -  contract of agreement in lieu of non-discrimination notice
31. Psychiatric patients -  1991 -  N/A - terminated following new Act -  health, general.
32. Refugee Housing Association Ltd -  1990 -  10 months - housing, belief -  company co­
operative -  non-discrimination notice issued -  initial indications that company would 
appeal, but it decided not to.
33. Richard Barclay & Co.. London Estate Agency -  1987 -  8 months -  housing, belief 
(strengthened by tests prior to investigation) -  non-discrimination notice.
34. Rail. Maritime and Transport Workers Union (RMT) -  1992 -  N/A - formal 
investigation suspended on condition that the union took steps to implement agreed 
package of racial equality measures -  services, belief.
35. Salford Van Hire -  1992 -  21 months - services, belief - company did not accept that 
discrimination had taken place, but co-operated with the investigation -  non­
discrimination notice issued.
36. South Manchester District Health Authority — 1985 -  28 months -  health, belief -  
recommendations made.
37. Southwark LBC -  1989 -  12 months - housing, belief, indirect -  full co-operation -  
lawyers + legal argument centring around concept of justifiability - non-discrimination 
notice mainly to impose discipline on racial equality policies.
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38. St. George’s Hospital Medical School -  1986 -  ? - higher education, belief -  full co­
operation, internal investigation and admitting of discrimination - non-discrimination 
notice not issued despite finding of discrimination because of equal opportunity 
undertakings.
39. Strathclyde LEA -  started ? - ended 1995 -  education, belief -  no finding of 
discrimination, recommendations made.
40. T&T Personnel Employment Agency -  1990 -  20 months - employment, belief - 
lawyers -  finding of discrimination “on the balance of probabilities”, non­
discrimination notice
41. Testing in the Private Rented Sector -  1989 - 20 months -  housing, general
42. Tower Hamlets LBC -  1986 -  28 months -  housing, belief -  discrimination partially 
admitted -  non-discrimination notice -  court order later sought because of failure to 
meet requirements in notice.
43. Working in Hotels -  1987 - 45 months -  employment, general -  recommendations 
made.
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Appendix 3
Examples of terms of reference and a non-discrimination notice
(1) Terms of reference (Genture investigation)
The Commission believes that Genture Restaurants Ltd. and Mr J. Weston-Edwards, its Chairman, may have 
done or be doing acts of any or all of the following descriptions:
a. unlawful discriminatory acts in breach of section 20 of the Race Relations Act 
1976;
b. contraventions of section 30 of the Race Relations Act 1976.
The investigation shall be confined to those acts.
(2) Non-discrimination notice (Rank Leisure investigation)
Non-discrimination notice 
(Race Relations Act 1976. section 581
To: Rank Leisure Limited
38 South Street 
LONDON W1A 4QU
Whereas in the course of a formal investigation, the Commission for Racial Equality (‘The Commission”) 
have become satisfied that you had committed acts to which section 58(2) of the Race Relations Act 1976 
(“the Act”) applies namely:
that on 20 March 1979 and on diverse occasions since the 13* day of June 1977, you discriminated 
on racial grounds in the admission of members of the public to the Top Rank Suite, Station Hill, 
Reading, in contravention of section 20 of the Act,
and are of the opinion that further acts are likely to be committed unless changes are made in your practices or 
other arrangements as respects the admission of the public to the Top Rank Suite in Reading (“the Suite).
Now therefore, without prejudice to your other duties under the Act, you are hereby required, in pursuance of 
Section 58(2) of the Act, not to commit any such act as aforesaid or any other act which is an unlawful 
discriminatory act by virtue of Section 20 of the Act.
In so far as compliance with the aforesaid requirement involves changes in any of your practices or other 
arrangements, you are further required, in pursuance of the said Section 58(2), to inform the Commission as 
hereinafter provided that you have effected these changes, and what these changes are and to take the 
following steps for the purpose of affording that information to other persons concerned namely:
i. within 30 days of the date on which this notice becomes final, to notify in writing 
all employees or agents concerned with the admission of the public to the Suite, 
that the policy of the Company is not to discriminate on racial grounds in the 
admission of members of the public to the Suite;
ii. to reissue these notifications every 6 months for a period of two years.
You are further required in pursuance of Section 58(3) of the Act, to furnish the Commission as hereinafter 
provided with the following information to enable them to verify your compliance with this notice namely:
Verification that you have issued the notifications specified above and the date on which they were 
issued.
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The information to be furnished by you to the Commission in pursuance of this notice should be furnished as 
follows, namely:
By providing the Commission with copies of the written notifications referred to in (i) and (ii) above 
within 14 days of the date of issue, each copy bearing the signature of the person to whom the 
notification was issued in acknowledgement of receipt together with his/her full name and postal 
address in block capitals.
Dated the 20* day of March 1981.
This notice was issued by the Commissioners, the provisions of Section 58(5) of the Act having been 
complied with.
[Signed by the Deputy Chairman.]
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Appendix 4
Organisational structure of the Commission
Organisational structure of the Commission 1977-1982 
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Organisational structure of the Commission: 1983-1988
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Organisational structure of the Commission 1990-1992
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Chapter 4
The Office of Fair Trading and consumer 
protection 1973-2002
Introduction
• Assessing enforcement strategies over time
In Chapter 2, it was noted that in establishing the Office of Fair Trading (OFT) 
through the Fair Trading Act 1973, policy-makers had intended to create a non-legalistic 
regulatory regime. This aim was reflected in specific features of the legislation: the strong 
involvement of the Secretary of State in many aspects of the implementation of competition 
and consumer protection policy, the open-ended and permissive language of the clauses 
outlining the powers of the Director General of Fair Trading (DGFT), indeed the very 
notion of a single person regulator which, at the time, was novel in the UK. For these 
reasons, and several others set out in Chapter 2, it was predicted that the Office of Fair 
Trading would be likely to follow a persuasive and non-legalistic regulatory strategy.
At the same time, it is also true that the OFT had both the range of powers and 
degree of discretion to make its own choices. The following table indicates some of these 
choices, the resolution of which would necessarily impact on the nature of its relationships 
with its regulatees. Moreover, one further power -  the Part II power to make some 
consumer trade practices into criminal offences through references to the Consumer 
Protection Advisory Committee (CPAC) -  provided a medium through which juridification 
might have occurred directly.
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Codes of practice • Should they be standardised?
• Should the Office continue to support them if not properly enforced?
Part HI powers against 
rogue traders
• How much flexibility should be shown towards rogue traders?
• What type of hearing should be given towards rogue traders?
• Should there be an active prosecution policy, or should every effort be made 
to encourage change without court action?
Consumer credit 
licensing
• How much warning should there be before a license is revoked?
• How strict should the Office be towards licensees?
Restrictive trade 
practices
• How often should the Office get round the formal provisions by 
recommending that an agreement is “of no significance”?
• In particular, how far should it use negotiations to try to avoid court 
appearances?
Monopoly references • How frequently should references be made?
• Should the threat of references be used as part of a process of bargaining?
• How much flexibility should be shown to companies post-investigation 
when trying to secure an undertaking?
Merger advice • Should there be set guidelines on what makes the Office recommend a 
merger?
• How interventionist should the advice policy be?
As was pointed out in the previous chapter, it is important to remember that it is 
not only the manner in which each power is exercised that is important -  it is also the 
question of which power is chosen in the first place. A decision by the Office to resolve a 
problem through promulgating and monitoring a particular code of practice under s i24(3) 
implies a different relationship from one in which the Office decides to resolve the same 
problem through a reference to the CP AC, with the intention of turning the detrimental 
consumer trade practice into a criminal offence.
Both this and the next chapter are divided into chronological sections, so as to 
break up what is a long period under review. Unlike the previous chapter on the CRE 
however, the use of these chronological breaks does not imply change in the degree of 
juridification. In terms of where to draw the boundaries, there are various suggestions in the 
secondary literature. Writing in 1987, Ramsay suggests dividing the OFT’s consumer 
activity into two periods: the ‘crusading’ period from 1973 to 1978 and the ‘transitional’ 
period from 1979. Focusing on the competition side, Wilks (1999: 285) suggests that 1979- 
80 could be considered one useful dividing point, marking as it did the election of a new 
Conservative government and the passage of the Competition Act 1980, and 1989-92 a 
further transition, marking a period of notable budget and staffing increases. Wilks then 
makes a further suggestion: “to look at the OFT from the point of view of successive
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Directors General”, which he considers especially appropriate because “Gordon Borrie 
dominated the history of the OFT, and his period of office, 1976-92, over sixteen years, can 
almost be taken as a policy period in its own right” (ibid.). It is proposed to combine 
elements of these suggestions, taking three periods as follows. The first period will run 
from the establishment of the OFT to 1979-80 - an attractive break as both Ramsay (writing 
about the consumer side of the OFT) and Wilks (writing about the competition side) see it 
as a turning point in their respective focus. The second period runs from then until 1992 -  
the year of Gordon Borrie’s retirement as Director General. The final period begins with 
the appointment of Sir Brian Carsberg as the new Director General and ends with the 
passing of the Enterprise Act 2002. On the competition side, however, the analysis stops 
with the Competition Act 1998, and there is a separate chapter on the impact of that 
legislation.
The next three chapters trace change in the level of juridification between the OFT 
and its regulatees over a period of almost 30 years, from its establishment in 1973 up to the 
passage of the Enterprise Act 2002. Before beginning this task though, it is first necessary 
to justify separating the two areas of consumer protection and competition policy into two 
different chapters.
• The relationship between the competition and consumer protection sides
Initially, much of the time of the first Director General, John Methven, was spent 
with organisational matters. The new Office was organised into five divisions: Monopolies 
and Mergers, Restrictive Trade Practices, Consumer Affairs, Legal and Information.1 With 
the first two of these divisions, the Director General was able to draw upon staff from 
previously existing organisations. The other three divisions had to be created from scratch, 
however, as did the new consumer credit division set up to discharge the duties that would 
arise under the new Consumer Credit Act 1974. The build-up of staff was initially slow,
1 Wilks (1994:21-2) points out that the limited number of lawyers that there were in the Office (an average of 
10) were separated into a parallel support division, and thus -  like economists -  were consulted on decisions 
rather than being actual decision-makers.
2 Hence, the staff of the Registrar of Restrictive Trading Agreements manned the Restrictive Trade Practices 
Division which took over its duties, and a small number of staff from the DTI including the Mergers 
Secretariat were transferred to the Monopolies and Mergers Division.
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due to difficulties in finding people of the right calibre from a variety of backgrounds.3 By 
the end of 1976 though, the number of people working at the Office had more or less settled 
at 324.
From the start, both John Methven and his successor, Sir Gordon Borrie, were 
arguing that the two main fields of activity of the OFT were not only compatible with each 
other, but complementary. Sir Gordon put it this way: the safeguarding of competition was 
a natural corollary to the protection of the economic interests of consumers for two reasons: 
firstly, because the restriction of competition involved a diminution of choices open to the 
consumer and therefore higher prices; and secondly because a well-informed buying public 
was a valuable stimulus for industry to remain alert to market requirements and in tune with 
changing needs (AR 1981:11). Ultimately these boil down to one basic point: that the 
ultimately beneficiary of competition policy is the consumer.
This does not alter the fact though that the two spheres of activity were always, to 
a degree, going to be competing for the tight budgetary and time resources of the OFT 
generally, and the Director General in particular. Hence, in his first Annual Report, John 
Methven admitted that “much of my time and attention over the past year has been given to 
the consumer affairs side of my Office since this was entirely new”. Wilks (1999: 187-8) 
notes the neglect given to competition issues as a result, pointing out that it was not until 
July 1974 that the first monopoly reference was made to the MMC. Moreover, there are 
several areas where the two policy fields may conflict directly. Probably the best example 
is the introduction of a code of practice in an industry which, whilst providing certain 
benefits for consumers, might also constitute a new barrier of entry for potential market 
entrants. Hence although most codes of practice would normally have to be registered 
under the restrictive trade practices legislation, the practice was for the Director General to 
recommend to the Secretary of State that the agreement should be exempt from court 
proceedings (AR 1976: 10-11).4 The 1982 Annual Report explicitly concedes the potential 
for conflict in this regard: “self-regulation can bring its own problems when it includes
3 See the first Annual Report (AR 1974: 13). John Methven emphasised his desire to bring together a staff 
with a wide variety of experiences -  “from manufacturing, retailing, consumer affairs, advertising, central and 
local government to take but a few examples”, but his success was limited largely due to the influence of civil 
service unions (See Chapter 2, and generally Ramsay 1987).
149
restrictions on competition, such as those preventing members of a profession from 
publicising their services.. .’\ 5
The justification for separating the consumer protection and competition work of 
the Office into two chapters is that, by and large, the two spheres have been kept separate. 
Throughout the period under review, despite several changes in the organisational structure 
of the Office, there have always been separate divisions dealing with these areas of policy. 
Moreover, as pointed out above, at least initially, the staff for the different divisions came 
from different sources. The staff for the competition side of the Office came from the 
Office’s predecessors in the enforcement of policy -  the DTI and the Restrictive Trade 
Registrar - whilst the staff for the consumer side were recruited separately from within the 
civil service.
This separation of roles was confirmed by Lord Borrie in an interview, who stated 
not only that there was little liaison between the two sides, but also that the statutory 
separation between the two made co-ordination difficult in practice. Civil servants in the 
Office tended to follow their own particular sets of statutes and instructions and, except for 
the Director General himself, no-one really had a wider perspective.6 This is what Wilks 
(1999: 187-8) says about the institutional coupling of competition and consumer protection 
policy:
In practice, however, the two activities have been administered in substantial 
separation from one another and it is not very clear that there are great benefits. 
Consumer protection policy is concerned with developing and applying quite 
detailed rules about commercial behaviour. There is no obvious or logical link 
with market structure or competitive conditions, and the clients tend to be the 
public, consumer groups and local authorities through their trading standards 
offices. In contrast, competition policy is about business structure and strategy, 
and the clients tend to be businesses, lawyers and economists. Clearly ‘the 
consumer’ should be the ultimate beneficiary but that statement verges on pious 
moralising. The downside of the marriage has been the diversion of energies, the 
consumer preoccupation of Directors General, and the diffitsion of attention away 
from the competition brief.
4 Lord Borrie (interview -  21st Januaiy, 2003) provided an example in the other direction: he pointed to 
sectors such as the used car sector where there was a lot of competition, but regulation was difficult as a 
result.
5 Rather strangely, this is contradicted in a later Annual Report in which the problem is described as “trivial”.
6 Interview with Lord Borrie, 21st January, 2003.
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The two areas are thus taken separately: consumer protection in this chapter, competition in 
the following two.
This chapter thus deals only with the consumer protection side of the Office’s 
work and it is argued that, contrary to the ‘juridification thesis’, relations between the 
Office and its regulatees have remained non-legalistic over a substantial period of time. 
Indeed, not all that much has changed in this regard since the general tone was set by the 
first Director General, John Methven, in his second Annual Report (AR 1975: 12):
Over the whole area of the Office’s activities, therefore, I would like to 
emphasise the importance I attach to securing improvements by negotiation 
whenever possible and, where it is necessary to use the statutory powers, to do so 
flexibly and not in any doctrinaire way.
Most of the chapter shows how this statement of intent has been translated into 
practice: how over a long period of time, the Office has regularly chosen informality and 
flexibility over legalism and rigidity. If there was any suspicion that, in the context of an 
Annual Report, the Director General had one eye on the need to reassure the business 
community, there can be little doubt in retrospect that the statement fits very closely with 
the approach actually taken by the Office in the subsequent 25 years.
This is, however, subject to two qualifications. The first is that there is evidence 
that regulatees have become more adversarial, more willing to pursue legal avenues. The 
second is that there is evidence of some change in the last few years as the result of EC 
Directives. The impact of new powers coming from these Directives will be considered 
towards the end of the chapter.
The Early Years: 1973-9
• Introduction: the balance struck between the consumer protection powers
In looking at the general balance struck between these different powers in the early 
years of the OFT, several points can be made. The first two relate to each other directly: 
that there was an early abandonment by the OFT of its lawmaking power under Part II of 
the Fair Trading Act, and that conversely there was an emphasis on the promotion of
151
industry-wide codes of practice. Hence, by 1980, there were 19 codes of practice in 
existence, but there had only been 4 references to the Advisory Committee. Prima facie 
then, this would seem to indicate a preference for a more consensual, less legalistic power 
over an imposed, formal and legal tool. We shall see shortly whether this was indeed the 
case. Next, in contrast to the early approach of the Commission for Racial Equality, 
‘promotion* and ‘enforcement’ were not seen as alternatives, nor were separate departments 
set up to deal with them -  indeed the very terms do not generally appear in the Annual 
Reports. Rather, both enforcement measures and the provision of information and advice 
were always seen as necessary responses to a problem. Finally, both the power to secure 
undertakings from rogue traders and the power to refuse or revoke consumer credit licences 
were used as ‘powers of last resort*. In other words, they were the exception that proved the 
rule that the vast bulk of the contact between the Office and its regulatees was informal and 
consensual, based on a process of persuasion and education that went in both directions.
• The trial and rejection of lawmaking through the CP AC
The speedy falling into disuse of this lawmaking power would have been a 
surprise to the legislators of the Fair Trading Act 1973, as well as to the staff of the Office. 
It was intended specifically as a fast-track procedure, without the costs associated with the 
introduction of new Parliamentary legislation (such as the difficulties of securing 
Parliamentary time and majority and the need for wide consultations). Ramsay records 
from an interview that “those within the agency viewed it as an important measure of 
output, success to be measured by the ability of the Office to obtain a string of Part II 
orders” (Ramsay 1987: 188). Yet within four years the last reference had been made, and 
within nine years the Consumer Protection Advisory Committee (CPAC) had been 
disbanded. As the use of this power represented the most legalistic alternative possessed by 
the Office, it is particularly important to examine the reasons for its demise in detail.
The procedure, set out under sections 13-33 of the Fair Trading Act 1973, was as 
follows. The Director General would initiate action by inviting the Advisoiy Committee to 
consider whether a particular trade practice adversely affected consumers’ economic 
interests and had one or more of certain detrimental effects mentioned in the Act. He would 
also ask it at the same time to consider his proposals for curbing or regulating the practice.
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If the committee was satisfied that the practice adversely affected the economics interests 
of consumers and did so in one of the particular ways mentioned in the Act (e.g. by 
misleading them about their rights), it then had to report to the Secretary of State, agreeing, 
rejecting or modifying the proposals. If the committee did not think the practice 
detrimental, the proposals could not go forward. Nor could an Order be made if the 
Committee disagreed with the Director General’s proposals and suggested no modification 
of them.
The power was an extreme one for two main reasons. Firstly, it was supposed to 
be a fast-track procedure which, in particular, did not require Parliamentary approval. 
Secondly, the power was to create new criminal offences. Combined, it can be suggested 
that this implied a heavy-handed response to a problem that was at risk of being vulnerable 
to legitimacy concerns. In anticipation of this, the Director General set out to establish a 
consultation procedure before references to the CPAC were made. This involved sending a 
letter to approximately sixty trade, consumer and other organisations, detailing the trade 
practice which was of concern together with the proposed remedy, and inviting comment. It 
was also the practice of the Office to make available to the public and to those who may 
wish to make representations the dossier which was submitted to the Committee following 
a reference. Such a procedure ought to have been capable of strengthening the weight of its 
proposals in the eyes of the CPAC and the Secretary of State. It is also, however, evidence 
of the preference of the Office for consensus over confrontation even, or perhaps 
especially, for this most imposed of powers. As stated in his first Annual Report, John 
Methven was “anxious to make this procedure as open as possible” (AR 1974: 15).
An examination of the Annual Reports indicates how quickly the power was 
abandoned by the OFT. In 1974, two references were made: one relating to clauses 
purporting to exclude inalienable rights of consumers, the other dealing with the seeking of 
pre-payments from consumers without undertaking to return the money if the goods were 
not delivered within a specified period. In 1975, one reference was made concerning the 
practice of seeking to sell goods to consumers without revealing that the goods are being 
sold in the course of business.7 Consultations were also made on two sets of tentative
7 An example given in the Annual Report is an advertisement in the classified column of a newspaper 
offering goods without giving any indication that they are being sold by a trader. Having responded to the
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proposals. In 1976, there were no references at all, then in 1977 a final reference was made 
relating to the practice of pricing goods and services exclusive of VAT. This was the last 
time the power was used, however, and the CPAC was disbanded in 1982 with the 
following, rather cryptic remarks, in the press notice (AR 1982:45):
References can only be made to the Committee in circumstances which are 
prescribed in Sections 13, 14 and in some cases 17 of the [Fair Trading] Act 
[1973]. It has proved difficult to identify practices which meet these requirements 
and which are suitable for references to the Committee.
Whether or not this was a cause of the lack of references, the evidence prior to 
1982 points to more obvious reasons. In particular, what had been anticipated as a fast-track 
procedure was proving nothing of the sort. As early as 1975, the Director General was 
writing, “while I totally accept that any change in the law should not be undertaken lightly, 
I am nevertheless disappointed that changes in the law have not yet resulted from the 
References I have already made to the Consumer Protection Advisory Committee” (AR 
1975: 9).8 And the following table indicates well that this was not only a feature of the 
initial references:
advertisement, members of the public may be left in their dealings with the trader with the mistaken 
impression that they are buying from a private individual.
8 He did, however, note that the effect of the references were to provide an opportunity for airing views held 
by shoppers, traders, Trading Standards Officers and the media concerning trading practices, thus increasing 
general awareness {ibid.).
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Clauses purporting to 
exclude inalienable 
rights of consumers
Nov 1973 May 1974 Dec 1974 Nov 1976
The Consumer 
Transactions 
(Restrictions on 
Statements) Order 1976
Clauses seeking 
prepayments without 
undertaking to return 
money if  goods not 
delivered
Nov 1973 May 1974 1976 
[month unknown]
Nov 1976
Mail Order Transactions 
(Information) Order 
1976
Practice of seeking to 
sell goods without 
revealing that in 
course of business
May 1974 March
1975
June 1975 Nov 1977
The Business 
Advertisements 
(Disclosure) Order 1977
Practice of pricing 
goods and services 
exclusive of VAT
Dec 1975 Jan 1977 May 1977 M arch 1979
Price Marking (Food and 
Drink on Premises) 
Order 1979
Hence, the average time from when an issue was first considered by the Office to when the 
Secretary of State was issuing an Order through statutory instrument was 38 months, and 
the average time from a reference being made to the CPAC to the Order being issued was 
just under 30 months -  some two and a half years.
The following statement given to Parliament in December 1974 by the Secretary 
of State provides some indication of why the process might have been taking so long:9
The Committee has in general endorsed the DGFT’s proposals that the 
purported exclusion of consumers’ inalienable rights when buying or otherwise 
acquiring goods should be prohibited. The Committee has also, however, 
identified certain problems which will need further consideration in the 
preparation of a draft order.
Subject to this I accept the conclusions of the report and intend to use my 
order-making powers under s22 of the FTA 1973 to make such an order as may 
be appropriate for giving effect to it. But because the procedure is new and the 
time available for representations has so far been limited, on a matter which is of 
wide concern to businessmen and consumers alike, I propose, exceptionally in 
this case, to ask interested parties to comment on the proposed provisions within 
a strictly limited period before inviting Parliament to approve an Order. This will 
also allow traders more time to amend guarantee and other documents which will 
be affected.
Special consideration will need to be given to notices and statements such as 
‘No goods exchanged’ which are not void in law but may seriously mislead the
9 HC Deb. (1974-5) 882, 2nd Dec 1974, 367-8.
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customer as to his rights. Should it not prove possible to ensure that such 
statements are suitably qualified the DGFT has indicated that he would be 
prepared to consider making a further reference.
The statement is useful because it indicates well how the main institutional 
features of the process led to delays. First of all, it points to the delaying effect of the 
CPAC’s input. Although the above table might be taken to indicate that the Committee was 
not delaying proceedings all that much (after all, in two out of the four references, the 
CPAC had submitted a report to the Secretary of State within four months), it is important 
to recognise that it modified the Director General’s proposals in every case. Hence, with 
respect to the first reference, the Committee considered the proposed Order to be too 
widely-drafted and the ministerial response is indicated in the above excerpt; the statutory 
results of the second reference are described in the 1977 Annual Report as “very limited” 
(AR 1977: 17); and with respect to the last reference, the Committee modified some of the 
proposals and rejected others outright (ibid: 15). In the end, the final statutory order related 
solely to food and drink - enough of an indication that three and a half years of 
researching, consulting, referring and waiting had not achieved as much as the Office 
would have hoped. This points to the second aspect of the above statement: the ministerial 
discretion retained under the powers. In the case of this first order, such discretion meant 
that further consultations were made. Ramsay (1987: 189) describes in a little more detail 
what happened following the CPAC report in this case:
In addition, after submission of the CPAC report to the Department the relevant 
civil servants reopened the consultation process. They felt that they could not 
adequately advise the Minister unless they were ‘in touch’ with the views of 
interested parties. The Minister after consultation with relevant groups ultimately 
made a decision on political grounds.
The effect of this retention of ministerial discretion was thus to make politicisation more 
likely. It was hardly easier to gain backing for a Part II order than it was to secure 
legislation. Together, the two institutional features combined so that even the procedures 
that had been introduced by the Director General in order to shore up the legitimacy of his 
references were insufficient.
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Other institutional factors were also significant. A House of Commons debate on 
the Consumer Transactions (Restrictions on Statements) Order points well to the rigidities 
in the process:10
MR ROGER SIMS: If the Department is not entirely satisfied with the 
proposals, is there no alternative to taking no action, or can it negotiate with the 
Director General about a form in which the proposals might be modified?
MR FRASER: It is not open to the Government to negotiate. The process 
would have to start all over again with a new set of proposals, which would go to 
the Consumer Protection Advisory Council. In the debates on the Fair Trading 
Act, the Consumer Protection Advisory Council was described as a jury. Because 
the Orders create new criminal offences the CPAC is interposed as a jury. If the 
verdict of the jury is against the proposals, it is not open to the Government to 
introduce their own remedies, even for negotiation. The matter must then drop...
I conclude by reminding the House that the Government are severely 
circumscribed by the provisions of the Fair Trading Act.
It is worth noting then firstly the inability of the Government to subsequently 
negotiate with the Director General if the CPAC disagreed with the original proposals -  
even if the point was largely technical in nature; and secondly, the reference to the Orders 
creating criminal offences which increased the caution of all involved. In light of these 
points, the factor mentioned in the press statement above (i.e. the difficulties of finding 
situations that matched the requirements of the Act) would seem to have been of secondary 
importance. After all, there were several examples of reviews that were undertaken with a 
reference to the CPAC in mind, but at the end of which the Office decided to use a different 
power.11 Hence, in 1975, reviews were undertaken of one-day sales, doorstep selling and 
party-plan selling. In the case of doorstep selling, the Director General decided as a first 
step to concentrate upon the improvement of information to the public (AR 1975:13). 
Reviews of unfair contract terms, prepayments and bargain offer claims constitute other 
examples of areas that might have ended in references to the CPAC but did not. In the case 
of bargain offer claims, the Office had been inviting comments since 1975. Then in 
February 1978, two recommendations were made to the Secretary of State under s2(3) of 
the Fair Trading Act 1973, proposing a ban on a wide range of claims which may mislead
10 Official Reports HC, vol. 916-1, cols. 1161-64,30 July 1976, reproduced in Ramsay 1989: 279.
11 This notwithstanding, Sir Gordon Borrie did point to areas in which he might have liked to use the power 
but was unable to. The specific example he gave was misdescriptions of house property “which often cause 
potential purchasers to waste time looking at unsuitable properties but the definition of ‘consumer trade 
practice’ covered only goods and services and not houses”. (Borrie 1984: 127)
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or confuse consumers. The result was the Price Marking (Bargain Offers) Order 1979, 
accepting most, although not all of the recommendations.13 But in finding alternatives to 
references to the CPAC, the Office had settled on its power to negotiate codes of practice 
and it is to this that we now turn.
• Codes of Practice -  supervised self-regulation
The following indicates well the early preference of John Methven for the use of 
codes of practice (AR 1974: 10):.
I attach great importance to the use of powers of persuasion as well as to the 
statutory powers. I believe that it is greatly in the interest of trade and commerce 
in the UK to provide voluntary codes of practice and I have tried to encourage 
this. The more effective voluntary codes there are, the less need for statutory 
control. Regulations are too often negative and tell people what they must not do.
Codes are positive and lead to a greater understanding of the problems which 
exist on both sides of the counter and the ways in which they can be dealt with.
At first glance then, it would indeed appear that the use of such codes is strong evidence of 
i preference for negotiated and informal relationships with regulatees over imposed, 
formalistic and legalistic relationships. Whether this really was the case, however, depends 
Tery much on the answers to a series of questions about how such codes actually operated: 
tie degree to which they differed from each other (standardisation), their legal effect, the 
extent to which such codes were monitored and enforced, whether these codes changed 
over time and so on. In other words, to say that the OFT favoured codes of practice is not 
enough: it is necessary also to determine the flexibility, formality and legal nature of this 
Egulatory device.
From the start, the Office was approving codes of practice for a wide range of 
ndustries. In 1974, three organisations launched codes of practice which had been prepared 
n conjunction with the OFT: the Association of Manufacturers of Domestic Electrical 
Appliances, the Association of British Travel Agents (ABTA) and the Croydon Chamber of
1 SI 1979/364
1 The order was eventually replaced by s20 of the Consumer Protection Act 1987. Another example of an 
Order made under s4 of the Prices Act related to the displaying of petrol prices by major oil companies and 
ssociations representing petrol traders. In 1976, the Office had negotiated an agreement, but a survey of its 
ffectiveness indicated that adherence to the agreement was unsatisfactory, and the Order was a response to 
tiose results (see Annual Reports 1976:14,1977:13)
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Commerce. This was followed in 1975 by further codes from the Electricity Council, the 
Scottish Motor Trade Association, the Vehicle Builders and Repairers Association and the 
National Federation of Housing Associations. In 1976, codes were agreed that related to 
shoe repair, laundries and cleaners, footwear distribution, and radio, electrical and 
television retailers. One more code was agreed in 1977 (mail order publishers), two more in 
1978 (furniture and mail order traders), and four further codes in 1979 (photographic 
industry, funeral services, postal services and telecommunications services). Overall then, 
this list of 18 codes represents a key output of the Office in the period, covering a diverse 
range of industries that varied both in size and with respect to the nature of the product. The 
following extract from a 1996 review paper summarises the Office’s early approach to 
these codes:14
Codes of practice were initially promoted as an alternative to legislation and 
adopted in problem sectors, such as travel, electrical goods and the motor trade. It 
was envisaged that all codes would be thoroughly monitored and reviewed every 
alternate year. By 1980, codes had been adopted in most of the problem areas in 
which there was a reasonably effective trade association....
In its 1976 Report, the Office set out the ways in which the monitoring was done. 
One way was to analyse complaints reported to the Office by trade associations and local 
authorities, as well as to scrutinise brochures and advertisements to see whether they 
complied with any relevant provisions of a code. Another way was to commission 
independent surveys -  this was done, for instance, with respect to the code of the 
Association of Manufacturers of Domestic Electrical Appliances. In addition, some codes 
included the requirement for annual reports (in some cases independent), offering a further 
alternative for the Office.15 Such monitoring exercises did sometimes lead to changes, 
although more changes would be evident in the 1980s as the Office concentrated on 
existing codes rather than new codes: the best example of revisions to a code agreed in the 
1970s were those made to the ABTA code in 1975.16
14 Office of Fair Trading (1996: 5) at §2.3
15 see, for instance, the Code of Practice of the Mail Order Publishers’ Authority
16 As the majority of holiday complaints were found to relate to problems of hotel overbooking and 
surcharges, ABTA introduced specific amendments in order to minimise the possibility of this type of 
complaint arising in the future.
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Whilst it is true that the content of these codes were negotiated, an important 
question is the degree to which they were being negotiated from a position of strength, and 
the extent to which the OFT retained a measure of control over them once implemented. In 
other words, what kind of self-regulation was this?17 After all, such codes were often very 
much in the interests of trade associations, not only as a means of deterring new entrants to 
the markets (see above), but also to raise a trade’s public image (Ramsay 1987: 191). The 
answer to both questions would seem to be that even in this early period, when potential 
references to the CPAC were still plausible, the Office only had a limited amount of 
bargaining power. In an economic climate of growing industrial unrest and recession, 
legislation to control specific sectors was unlikely,18 and in any case it was not open to the 
Office to threaten legislation directly.19 The limitations of the Office’s position were well- 
illustrated by how its reservations with particular elements of the ABTA code were not 
heeded -  beyond simply withdrawing its support altogether, there seems to have been little 
that the Office could do.20 This for a code that was later considered by the Office to be the 
biggest success of all.
As far as some of the other questions raised at the beginning of this section are 
concerned, there is little evidence of juridification through these codes of practice during 
this period. There was little if any standardisation of the codes: each code was negotiated 
individually and codes varied widely in a number of aspects: the dispute resolution 
established (if indeed one was established at all), the extent to which the code was 
mandatory for traders within the industry, the use of reporting, and the sanctions available 
for non-compliance. Black also points to variations in the quality of the rules in such codes, 
which were capable of being “general or specific, vague or precise, simple or complex” 
(Black 1996: 28). In terms of the legal effect of such codes, Methven wrote that it was an 
early objective for the OFT to encourage the courts to refer to the relevant codes of practice 
when considering whether a business had fulfilled a consumer contract (Methven 1975). An
17 See especially Ogus (1995)
18 The one major exception was the Estate Agents Act 1979.
19 I.e. because the OFT was a non-ministerial government department.
20 For instance, in its 1974 Annual Report (at p24), it is written that “The Director General made one 
reservation in welcoming the code. This was that the cost of arbitration could involve a family of two adults 
and two children with a maximum bill of £32 if the case goes against them. This point was discussed at length 
with ABTA and it is unfortunate that the Association felt unable to reduce the amount”.
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1example of such a case was Woodman v Photo Trade Processing Ltd.. in which the 
defendant lost the plaintifFs wedding photo negatives and wanted to rely on a clause 
limiting its liability to the cost of the negatives. In reaching his conclusion, the judge 
explicitly took into account the code of practice negotiated between the photographic 
industry and the OFT. The code envisaged the possibility of ‘two-tiered service’, where the 
consumer is given a choice between a cheaper service with limited liability and a service at 
a higher charge with full liability. Partly because no such choice was offered in this 
particular case, the judge ruled that the limitation clause was unreasonable and thus void 
under the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977. In general, however, the codes were considered 
more of a substitute for hard law than as an additional source of it. Overall then, the 
conclusion is that at this stage there was little evidence of juridification occurring through 
the promulgation of codes of practice, that on the contrary, such codes were primarily 
adopted because of their extra-legal qualities, and that the Office’s preference for such 
codes is significant evidence of its preference for non-legal, informal relationships with its 
regulatees.
• Other areas of the Office’s consumer protection work 1974-9
In this section, we will deal with the two main remaining consumer protection 
powers of the Office: the Part III powers to seek assurances from individual rogue traders 
and actions under the Consumer Credit Act 1974 to refuse or revoke licences for particular 
traders. It will be seen how its approach towards these enforcement powers indicate that 
any action taken was the exception that proved the rule: such formal action was used only 
in extreme cases, thus confirming the general picture of informal and consensual relations 
between regulator and regulatee.
Part III of the Fair Trading Act enabled the Office to take action against traders or 
individual companies persisting in a course of conduct detrimental to the interests of 
consumers by breaking the civil or criminal law. The rationale for the power was that few 
consumers bring civil cases, and that even when such cases are brought, this may not deter
21 Exeter County Court, Judge P.H.F. Clarke, May 7* 1981, unreported. Brought by Borrie in the first of his 
Hamlyn Lectures (1984: 14).
22 See Scott & Black 2000:44-5.
23 For examples of cases where codes were not working -  see Borrie (1984: 63), and later on in this chapter.
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traders who regularly get benefit from breaching civil and criminal law. In his 1982 Report, 
the Director General argued that the aim of the provisions was “not to punish, but rather to 
bring about, wherever possible, improvements in trading standards” (AR 1982: 10), thereby 
echoing the judgment of Donaldson U  in the previous year.24 If such a course of conduct 
was identified, the Director General had the duty to ‘use his best endeavours* to obtain an 
assurance from the relevant trader that he would refrain from the conduct. If an assurance 
was refused or subsequently broken then he had the power to obtain a court order, the 
breach of which would be a contempt of court. From the beginning, publicity was also 
given to this procedure, providing an additional deterrent.
By the end of 1979, the Office had obtained 170 assurances. A subsequent court 
order was necessary in 20 cases and there had not yet been a prosecution for contempt of 
court. In exercising this power, the Office was dependent on information provided by local 
Trading Standards Departments to such an extent that the increased number of assurances 
in the late 1970s was attributed almost totally to “the increased willingness of local 
authorities and Citizens Advice Bureaux to devote scarce staff time and effort to investigate 
complaints and prepare evidence” (AR 1978:19). It did not reflect therefore a change of 
policy or attitude within the Office towards persistent offenders. Instead, the Office was 
consistent during this period in distinguishing between the minority of rogue traders and the 
rest. Hence, from an early stage the Director General was writing as follows (AR 1975:10):
I have always thought, and the past year’s work has strengthened this conviction, 
that the vast majority of traders and shoppers wish to deal fairly with each other.
It is the people operating on the fringe whose methods must be changed and in 
my view it would be quite wrong to propose changes in the law (notoriously a 
blunt instrument) when the number of people I wish to control is relatively small.
Fortunately the Fair Trading Act has given me a variety of tools with which to do 
my job. For example under Part HI of the Act...
This power was thus seen as a relatively extreme measure to be used only against 
persistent offenders, which in practice was taken as traders against whom there had been 
ten to fifteen well-documented complaints for small traders, and over thirty for large traders 
about a similar kind of misconduct over about a year (OFT 1985: 9). And just as the 
seeking of assurances was used sparingly, so was the commencement of legal proceedings,
24 R v DGFT. ex parte F.H. Tavlor & Co Ltd. (198 H ICR 292
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described in the 1977 Report as “a last resort to be used only in cases where there is a clear 
breach of an assurance or a refusal to give an assurance” (AR 1977:14). Put together, this 
falls a long way short of an enforcement strategy which is capable of being described as 
legalistic or juridified. On the contrary, it is far closer to Braithwaite’s notion of an 
enforcement pyramid in which informal action characterises the vast bulk of the contact 
between regulator and regulatees, with formal action being used only against a small 
minority.25
A very similar story can be told with respect to licensing under the Consumer 
Credit Act 1974. The Act is extremely complicated, its details fleshed out mainly through 
statutory instruments. Its aim was to control all traders involved in credit and hire through 
licences, which were issued by the Office. The primary sanction available to the Office was 
thus the power to refuse an application, or to revoke an existing licence. There were several 
similarities between the Office’s approach towards this power and its approach towards its 
powers under Part III of the Fair Trading Act 1973. Firstly, it was similarly reliant on 
information from local sources such as local authority Trading Standards Departments. 
Secondly, the power to refuse or revoke licences was used sparingly: “the Director General 
is determined to weed out from the credit and hire industry those who are manifestly unfit to 
be in it” (AR 1975:16, emphasis added). Sir Gordon Borrie (1984: 88) provided an 
impression of what was meant by this phrase:
After consideration of all the available material, some applications on which there 
is adverse information are granted on the basis that the material is not sufficient, 
or too old, to warrant refusal of the application. In other cases, a licence may be 
granted but a letter is sent warning the applicant that because of past 
misbehaviour he is in effect on probation and repetition of past misbehaviour is 
likely to lead to the institution of revocation procedures. Where material is 
sufficiently serious and up to date, a ‘minded to refuse’ notice will be issued.
By the end of 1979, there had been only 72 cases in which the Office had decided to refuse
04\or revoke a licence out of over 85,000 licences that had been issued, or less than 0.1%. 
Thirdly, even the procedure to revoke or refuse a licence was largely non-confrontational in
25 See Braithwaite (1985), Ayres and Braithwaite (1992).
26 See AR 1979: 23, 76. Refusal or revocation tended to be based on breaches of the Consumer Credit Act, 
such as convictions under the Act for issuing unsolicited credit cards to consumers, or on convictions under
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nature. Its first stage was the issuing of a “minded to refuse or revoke notice”, at which 
point the applicant was given the opportunity to make oral or written representations. 
Quite often in the course of this process, the applicant undertook to change various 
practices that had been giving the Office cause for concern. Hence out of 290 ‘minded’
notices, 135 resulted in favourable determinations, and there were 80 withdrawals.
•  •  28 Applicants then had the right to appeal adverse decisions to the Secretary of State and
only after a further adverse decision from this political source did they have the right to
appeal this decision in the High Court.29 In short, the procedure was not highly legalised,
and formal action was taken as a last resort. There had been no appeals to the High Court at
all by the end of 1979.
Change and continuity under Sir Gordon Borrie: 1980-1992 
• Overview
What was the context of the Office’s work in the 1980s? It was a period of 
continuity, both in terms of there being only one Director General, Sir Gordon Borrie, 
reappointed twice in 1981 and 1986, and in terms of there being only one government -  the 
Conservative government that was re-elected in 1983 and 1987. There was a degree of 
incremental change in competition and consumer protection policy, and no major changes 
in the structure of policy or in the Office’s major tasks. Then there were some major 
changes: the increasing importance of the European Commission both as a source of policy 
initiatives and as a regulator, the privatisation initiatives of the mid and late 1980s giving 
the Office a new set of responsibilities, major changes in the financial services sector and 
the beginning of ‘mega-mergers’, which highlighted and exacerbated the trend of 
increasing concentration of firms that had been occurring for decades. Finally, this was a
other Acts which indicated the trader’s likely general behaviour (e.g. the falsification of mileage on used 
cars).
27 During 1976, the procedure for such representations were agreed with the Council on Tribunals and the 
implemented through statutory instrument - the Consumer Credit Licensing (Representations) Order 1976.
28 By the end of 1979, there had been a total of 25 appeals of which only 3 were upheld, with 6 still under 
consideration. The total of 25 thus represented about one-third of the total of adverse decisions, and the 3 
successful appeals only 4% of the total.
29 This appeal was on points of law only
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period of severe public sector cutbacks, accompanied by imposed public management 
reforms, from which the Office was not exempt. The difficulties of resource allocation were 
a repeated theme in the Annual Reports of the period until the government finally relented 
and gave the Office budget and staff increases in 1987.
With the Part II law-making powers having fallen into disuse, the Office of Fair 
Trading concentrated on its other powers: the supervision of existing codes of practice 
(although not so much the negotiation of new ones), the reviewing of various industries, 
credit licensing, the securing of undertakings against rogue traders, the registration of 
restrictive trade practice agreements, its powers of reference to the MMC and its new 
powers of investigation under the Competition Act 1980. Of these, the processing of credit 
licensing was occupying an increasingly high proportion of its time and budget. This, 
along with some of its other roles, meant that much of the Office’s time and money had to 
be spent performing tasks which were essentially administrative or bureaucratic in nature: 
the processing of complaints, applications or agreements. This left few resources for its 
enforcement functions (despite the comments of the Director General in his 1986 Annual 
Report31), a difficulty exacerbated as weaknesses in the relevant legislation became 
increasingly apparent. Meanwhile, the difference made by the abandonment of its law­
making powers was well-illustrated by the Office’s response to the continuing practice of 
using exclusion clauses made void under the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977. Five years 
earlier, the Office would probably have made a reference to the CPAC.32 Its action in 1982 
was simply to write to around 50 individual firms and several trade associations, asking 
them to stop the practice.33
30 Also time-consuming was its work under the Estate Agents Act 1979, which came into force in 1982. This 
chapter does not deal with this function at all.
31 “When choices have to be made among competing priorities, I attach particular weight to the first role [i.e. 
the regulatory one] and the responsibilities which I have for directly regulating the consumer market-place” 
(AR 1986: 10).
32 After all, a reference to the CPAC had already been made in this area: the very first reference that yielded 
the Consumer Transactions (Restrictions on Statements) Order 1976. Howells & Weatherill (1995: 505-6) 
write “The failings of such specific interventions are shown up by the anomaly that the Order does not apply 
to the wider range of terms made void by the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977. It is interesting to note that the 
Director General preferred to tackle this new problem by voluntary persuasion and the use of his other 
regulatory powers, such as his licensing powers, rather than invoke Part H procedures again”.
33 To a certain extent, it was also able to insist on the removal of these terms where they appeared in 
registrable agreements under the Restrictive Trade Act 1976, such as when a trade association was using a 
standard form contract.
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In many respects then, the approach of the Office towards its regulatees changed 
little during the 1980s. This is subject to one qualification: there was a trend of regulatees 
making greater use of legal rights and, in some respects, traders were beginning to become 
more adversarial in their dealings with the Office. Even so, the Office was still consistently 
preferring informal to formal approaches. It is enough just to glance through the Director 
General’s introductions to his annual reports to see how big an emphasis was placed on 
this. Hence, in his 1985 report, Sir Gordon Borrie observed as follows (AR 1985: 11):
Competition law in the UK has of course always been implemented in a 
pragmatic way. To some commentators, pragmatism is a term of abuse indicating 
lack of clarity and direction. But in my view, competition policy cannot be 
administered by reference to rigid rules or criteria; it must evolve to meet 
changing economic circumstances and to deal with new problems and 
situations...
And with respect to codes of practice, he observed in 1984 that:
if a trade sector is willing... to ‘do its own thing’ for customers in the right way 
with some guidance and encouragement from my staff, I regard it as being 
worthwhile and cost-effective for the future to supply that back-up.
Time after time, the same backing to negotiation and bargaining over prosecution 
and legal measures is given, and it is this that continued to characterise the relationship 
between the Office and the vast majority of its regulatees throughout the 1980s. In his last 
Annual Report, Sir Gordon Borrie gave his final words of approval to a regulatory style 
which was flexible and pragmatic in nature, indicating also the popularity of this approach 
with business (AR 1991: 10):
For lawyers and others seeking to know how the law is developing and what 
precedents are being created, there are disadvantages in behind-the-scenes 
negotiations as distinct from reported court cases, or for that matter published 
reports of the MMC, but I have observed time and again the preference and often 
keenness of businessmen to put their cards on the table, to negotiate and discuss 
round the table, to try and find a solution, rather than to undergo the full panoply 
of more formal hearings, whether adversarial or otherwise...
• Codes of practice and general law reform activity
In his 1982 Annual Report, for the first time, the Director General of Fair Trading 
wrote explicitly about the limitations of codes of practice. Whilst generally the twenty
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codes negotiated up to that point had been useful, they had two principal weaknesses: they 
were unenforceable against non-members, putting member firms at a competitive 
disadvantage, and they were difficult to enforce -  even against members (AR 1982: 11). 
The comments were made following two major reviews of codes of practice begun in 1980. 
The first concerned the scope and operation of existing codes to see how the aims of the 
Office might be realised, focusing especially on the adequate identification of problem 
areas, provisions to be sought in future codes, and generally, the most effective use of 
resources. The second dealt with conciliation and arbitration procedures which were an 
important feature of most codes.34 The results of the surveys led to a change of approach 
within the Office, with greater emphasis being placed on the monitoring and reviewing of 
existing codes than on the negotiation of new ones -  indeed, only one new code was agreed 
in the course of the next five years.
A good example of the way in which continuing negotiations could work is the 
contact between the Office and the Association of British Travel Agents. A review of the 
ABTA code of practice in 1988 led to a revised draft code being published in July 1989. 
While this did not go as far as the Office would have liked, it was considered broadly 
acceptable. Following consultations between ABTA and its membership, a number of 
amendments were then made to the draft code leading to further negotiations between 
Office and ABTA which lasted into 1990. In May, ABTA published revised set of codes 
for both tour operators and travel agents, incorporating all the major recommendations that 
had been made in 1988 report (AR 1990: 24).36
There are several counter-examples though -  cases where the ability of the Office 
to effect change was limited, despite lengthy processes of negotiation. Consider, for
34 The report concluded that arbitration that was offered to consumers by many codes constituted a valuable 
alternative to court action but that both conciliation and arbitration procedures could be made more effective. 
It recommended that arbitration should be conducted without personal hearings, arbitrators should always 
give reasons for decisions and that there should be target times for completion.
35 This was the code for the motorcycle industiy. In the latter part of the decade, some new codes were agreed: 
two with the holiday caravan industry and three relating to consumer credit (thus backing up the legislation in 
the area).
36 Consider also the Office’s dealings with the furniture industry. A lengthy study by the Office led to the 
report being published in February 1990, identifying five main areas of concern, making 31 recommendations 
and warning that, if no progress was made within six months, “the Director General would be prepared to use 
whatever powers he had to enforce changes (including, if necessary, recommending legislation)” (AR 1990: 
24). The threat seemed to carry some weight as by August the industry had formed an action group and 
presented its interim response, including a new code of practice. See also AR 1991: 21.
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instance, the Office’s experience with the motor industry.37 In 1980, two surveys to monitor 
operation of Code of Practice for the Motor Industry were concluded, revealing that the 
general performance was disappointing. Discussions with the relevant motor trade 
associations led to a revised code being agreed in 1981, although there was evidence that 
compliance with the new provisions was not yet satisfactory (AR 1981: 15). The problem 
was that, despite strenuous efforts by staff of Motor Agents Association, only a minority of 
members were willing to comply, mainly because they felt that compliance would leave 
them in an unfair competitive position vis-a-vis non-members. Hence, the Director General 
argued that (AR 1982: 11):
“It seems to me in this instance that self-regulation is not an effective substitute 
for law and that if, as I believe, there is a strong case for consumers to be given a 
more detailed written description of a used car at the point of sale than is 
common now, it must be done by law, and thereby be enforceable against all used 
car dealers...”
In its 1984 Annual Report, the Office noted that despite continuing to call for 
improvements in the protection available for purchasers of used cars, “little progress was 
made on implementation of the recommendations in its 1980 report” (AR 1984: 15). By 
1989, the Director General was still expressing his disappointment at the lack of progress 
and no agreement on amendments to the code had yet been reached. Finally in July 1990, 
the Retail Motor Industry Federation (RMI) introduced new standards, some of which “in 
effect” modified the motor code. The Director General told the RMI that he was prepared to 
continue his association with the code, subject to a review in a year’s time. Ultimately 
though, these limited modifications could not make any impression on the principal 
problem, which was non-compliance with the code. In all, despite over ten years of 
negotiations, complaints relating to used cars “continued to feature strongly in the returns 
the Office receives from trading standards departments and citizens’ advice bureaux” (AR
37 This was a high priority for the Consumer Affairs Division as it consistently generated a disproportionately 
large number of complaints from consumers.
38 Revisions were made, however, to the code on vehicle repairs, including the extension from six to twelve 
months of the minimum warrantee granted by member firms for repair work.
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1992: 12). In the absence of legislation, or specific evidence of anti-competitive practices 
however, there was little else that the Office could do.39
All these examples point to the overriding theme of the Office’s general consumer 
protection work: it was not an area where the use of law was all that important. On the 
contrary, the Office’s work tended to be done behind the scenes, based on strategies of 
negotiation and bargaining. This does not mean, however, that the Office was always 
satisfied with this state of affairs. Sometimes it did push for new legislation that would alter 
the nature of its relationship with particular sectors of industry, although as the following 
table indicates, that this was done relatively infrequently and with only limited success:
1981 Bargain-offer claims -  new general prohibition of misleading 
price statements (AR 1981: 17)
Eventually became law through the 
Consumer Protection Act 1987
1982 Used cars -  consumers to be given a more detailed written 
description of a used car at the point of sale.
no
1983 Home improvements -  new requirement of written evidence 
of contract + cooling-off period when signed at home (AR 
1983: 12)
no
1985 Household insurance -  legislation to deal with problems o f  
tenants who frequently did not have the right to make sure that 
their landlords had insured their homes adequately.
no
1985 Resale of electricity by landlords -  new offence to charge 
more for electricity, resold for domestic use, than the 
maximum charge published by the appropriate electricity 
board (AR 1985: 14)
Problems would be dealt with in 
proposed legislation on misleading 
price indications, not by making 
overcharging a criminal offence 
became the Consumer Protection 
Act 1987.
1987 Banking services -  statutory code of practice to cover 
relations between banks and their customers (AR 1987: 17)
Voluntary code of practice -  no 
legislation.
1990 Timeshares -  legislation to require full disclosure of 
information about timeshare resorts and a cooling-off period.
Timeshare Act 1992
In a recent interview,40 one of the reasons for the infrequency o f legislative 
proposals was given by Lord Borrie: there was an extremely high turnover of Ministers for 
Trade and Industry during this period -  indeed, during his Directorship, he dealt with about
39 Another example was a review of the code of practice for funerals that had suggested that it was working 
poorly. Negotiations with National Association of Funeral Directors (NAFD) led to a revised code being 
agreed in May 1990, but this did not include one of the Office’s key recommendations that, in customer 
accounts, funeral directors should be required to itemise funeral’s component costs.
40 Interview, 21st January 2003.
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a dozen different ministers. The result was that it was difficult to form effective 
relationships. Where a Minister did remain in the post for a longer period, then it was 
sometimes possible for a recommendation to be made as to the areas in which legislation 
would be beneficial (and also in the interests of Government). More generally, it might be 
suggested that securing new legislation was always likely to be difficult for the Office. It 
had a series of obstacles with which to contend: governmental will, the strength of 
opposition, space in the Parliamentary timetable and being one step removed from direct 
influence around the cabinet table.
In the rest of this subsection, some further reasons will be suggested through 
detailed examples. The examples also serve to provide further evidence of the nature of the 
relationships between the Office and its regulatees on the consumer protection side.
The difficulties faced by the Office are well-illustrated by its attempts to tackle 
unscrupulous used car dealers. A particular problem was the practice of ‘clocking* -  the 
deliberate turning back of car odometers to mislead buyers as to the true age of the car. 
Whilst the practice was illegal,41 it was extremely difficult to detect. The Office set about 
trying to find ways of tackling it, making suggestions throughout the 1980s, and pressing 
for a variety of measures both to motoring associations and to the government. Eventually, 
a “working party*’ was set up, consisting of 16 bodies representing consumers, motoring 
organisations, the motor trade and local authority Trading Standards Departments. In 1988, 
the Director General wrote on behalf of this working party to the Minister for Roads and 
Traffic with a proposal. The Minister responded in March 1989, arguing that the proposed 
scheme would be too expensive and that there might be more accurately targeted alternative 
methods which could tackle the problem more effectively. In July, the Director General 
wrote back saying that the Minister’s counter-proposals were not likely to be effective. No 
agreement had been reached by end of year.42 In 1990, another proposal came -  this time 
from HP Information pic. The Secretary of State responded that he was anxious to find a 
practical solution to the problem, although the Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency 
(DVLA) did not want to proceed with any scheme which the working party did not find
41 As such, persistent offenders could be dealt with by the Office under its Part in and consumer credit 
licensing powers.
42 Proposals to enable Trading Standards Officers to enter garage forecourts to inspect cars for roadworthiness 
had also not been agreed.
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acceptable (AR 1990: 25). Finally, in March 1992, the Government announced that the 
DVLA would be taking steps to combat the practice by revising vehicle registration 
documents to allow buyers and sellers to note a vehicle’s mileage on change of ownership, 
although there would be no mandatory requirement to do so. Whilst welcoming the scheme, 
the Director General said that he was concerned that the effect of the proposals might prove 
small: a voluntary scheme was likely to be of only limited deterrence to determined 
‘dockers’.43 But with the Minister saying that he wanted to see how the proposals 
progressed before considering alternatives, all the Office could do was to continue to 
monitor the area closely. The blocking effects of a government with other spending 
priorities is thus clearly in evidence here.
There are several other examples where the Office was pushing for legislation 
unsuccessfully: its recommendations with respect to home improvements and household 
insurance for instance. The reason that this is significant for our purposes is not only that 
these are further examples of the continuing informal relationships between the Office and 
many industry associations, but also that they point to a prominent reason why this was the 
case: in short, the Office frequently had little other option.
The point can be highlighted by contrasting the above cases with an example of an 
occasion where legislation was introduced, and relatively speedily. At the end of the 1980s, 
the Office was considering a review of the timeshare industry. This was brought forward, 
however, on the request of the Consumer Affairs Minister. The Director General began the 
review in July 1989, inviting comments and suggestions from interested parties. There was 
a large response from public, and the report was published in July 1990. Its conclusion was 
that although there were many satisfied consumers, there were several problems in the 
market.44 The Director General therefore recommended legislation requiring a cooling-off 
period, clear prospectuses outlining details of agreements and several other measures (AR 
1991: 19). The response was swift: in February 1991, the Consumer Affairs Minister 
accepted the report’s key recommendations and sought to implement them through the
43 A mandatory scheme was finally introduced in 1999 (AR 1999: 21).
44 For instance, unexpected increases in maintenance charges and lack of fully-developed resale market were 
frequently mentioned.
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EC.45 He also accepted some other changes suggested to the Trade Descriptions Act, and in 
March 1991 the Timeshare Act 1992 was passed, providing for a 14-day cooling-off period 
for timeshare contracts. The differences between this case and the motor industry are fairly 
stark: here it was the government which started off the process of reform, there was large 
public interest, and little opposition from the industry involved.46 Political will then was 
essential to the Office’s chances of success.
In a couple of cases, the reason for lack of progress had nothing to do with 
political will, however, but was more technical in nature. One such case was the idea of a 
general statutory duty to trade fairly.47 Such a duty was intended to supplement the Office’s 
existing powers -  especially its Part HI powers to secure undertakings from persistent 
offenders. Following a series of seminars attended by academics and lawyers, a discussion 
paper was discussed in 1986. In the end though, the Office decided not to pursue the 
proposal in its original form: “it was felt that the original objectives were probably over- 
ambitious in attempting to address perceived deficiencies in existing criminal law, civil law 
and self regulation at the same time as seeking to improve consumer redress arrangements” 
(AR 1989: 25). A second example was the attempt to produce a standard form contract 
following a 1988 Department of Environment report entitled ‘Beat the Cowboys’. A 
working party recommended that a model ‘fair-deal’ contract for small building work 
should be developed for use by consumers and building contractors. Law academics were 
commissioned to prepare the first draft of such a contract. Their proposals were submitted 
to the Office and a meeting arranged for 1990 to discuss terms with relevant trade 
organisations. Opinion was divided, however, as to the content of such a contract and how 
to promote its use. It became clear that certain points of detail needed to be considered 
further before widely acceptable form of contract could be devised. The consultants were 
therefore commissioned to produce a revised draft. After further consultations, the Office
45 The reason was that as most timeshare properties were purchased by UK residents were in developments 
abroad, UK legislation could not on its own provide effective protection.
46 A comparable example occurred in 1981, when the Minister of State for Consumer Affairs requested that 
Office looked at complaints about marriage bureaux and dating agencies. The Office found widespread 
concern about the suitability and number of introductions provided, and a general lack of information about 
the services on offer. The Director General subsequently urged bureaux to adopt code of practice covering 
these and a number of other issues, indicating that he might have to recommend legislation if trading practices 
did not improve (AR 1981: 15-16). Such a threat had greater weight due to the fact that the Minister had 
initiated proceedings.
47 See AR 1983.
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“concluded that the original aim of producing an all-purpose model contract that would be 
perceived by consumers and contractors as clear, comprehensive, fair and balanced, and
A O
which would be widely used, is unattainable”, and work on it was abandoned. It was 
decided to concentrate on publicity instead. In both cases, what could be seen as attempts 
by the Office to juridify an area of policy so as to increase its ability to deal with certain 
problem situations failed for technical reasons.
Finally, in some cases, more formal action was not pursued simply because the 
Office could not commit its limited resources to the area. Its relationship with the footwear 
industry provides a particularly striking example. In 1985, the Office decided to begin 
monitoring the operation of its code of practice, leading to a report in 1987. The surveys 
found that there had been some falling off in certain areas of service and the provision of 
information by retailers since a previous survey in 1980. It was also found that only 10% of 
consumers were aware of the code. The 1988 Annual Report provides details of the 
pursuant contacts between the Office and the relevant trade associations (AR 1988: 24-5):
The sponsoring trade associations were asked to bring about improvements.
While they were willing to seek better performance from their members in certain 
respects... the trade associations made it clear that general promotion of the code 
would need substantial expenditure which the trade was unwilling to commit The 
Office regarded this response as inadequate. I t  too, has limited resources and in 
all the circumstances concluded that it was unable to pursue the matter further 
with the footwear trade associations for the time being and would not publish a 
report on the monitoring survey.
Priority-setting is an inevitable part of the work of any regulatory agency, although in this 
case it seems strange that, having devoted resources for the surveys to begin with, the 
Office decided not to publish the report which at least might have had some effect in 
putting pressure on the relevant trade associations and in publicising a code which was so 
little-known. The answer may well lie in the massively increased proportion of the budget 
that was being spent on credit licensing processing, so that despite a general increase in the 
budget, only £1.32 million was spent on other consumer protection work in 1988 compared 
to £2.2 million in 1987.
The approach of the Office towards the footwear industry reflected a changing 
attitude towards codes of practice in general. A policy review in 1987 highlighted this
48 See AR 1991: 21
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growing disillusionment within the OFT. Its new approach was to put forward guidelines 
and offer a degree of endorsement, but to leave implementation, publicity and monitoring 
to the relevant associations. The problems identified by the review were manifold. Amongst 
other factors, negotiating, monitoring and revising codes was putting a heavy strain upon 
the Office’s limited resources; codes appeared to be held in low regard by many other 
consumer protection bodies; there was a large amount of ignorance and apathy amongst 
both traders and consumers; there was an inherent conflict within codes, which expected 
traders to do voluntarily things which they would not necessarily see as being in their own 
commercial interests; there was too much divergence of substance and style amongst 
various codes and no obvious overall OFT coherence of approach; and there were few 
remaining trade associations with adequate membership and clout with whom it might have 
been worth developing new codes.49
These difficulties and others, led to new guidelines for the support of individual 
codes being published in 1991. Essentially, these guidelines meant that a degree of 
standardisation was being introduced by the Office for the first time: Scott and Black 
(2000: 43) describe it as “in effect, giving a blueprint for those drafting codes...”. For a 
code to be accepted, it had to be mandatory on members of the trade association and that 
association had to have the resources and disciplinary sanctions available to deal effectively 
with cases of non-compliance. The trade association also had to be able to demonstrate that 
its members were prepared to observe its provisions, consumer organisations had to have 
been adequately consulted in the preparation of the code, and the Office’s competition 
policy division must have been consulted before an application for support was received. 
The content of the code had to offer “specific and worthwhile benefits beyond those which 
might be expected as a result of legal requirements and normal practice in the industry”, 
and the guidelines then set out the specific areas which a prospective code ought to address 
- including an appropriate complaints mechanism. Finally, for a code to be accepted by the 
Office, the trade association had to publish an annual report on the operation of the code, 
with a copy provided to the OFT. It also had to be adequately publicised.50 It might be 
argued that the introduction of these guidelines constitutes limited evidence of
49 See Office of Fair Trading 1996 -  Voluntary Codes ofPractice: A consultation paper, especially §2.6-2.8.
50 Office of Fair Trading 1991 -  Guidelines for Support o f Individual Codes.
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juridification, as the attempt to make codes of practice look more like legal instruments 
indicates a certain preference for this form. However, this overlooks the voluntary nature of 
codes of practice, and the fact that they were used in place of more formal regimes 
governed by legal rules.51 Nor did these new guidelines threaten the central place of 
negotiations in determining the contents of codes. In short, the importance of codes of 
practice in the work of the Office of Fair Trading continued to indicate an absence of 
juridification in this area.
As well as monitoring existing codes of practice, the Office also devoted much 
attention to other areas of concern to consumers. Its extended study of home improvements 
lasted for most of the decade. Towards the end of the 1980s, it also started to agree a 
number of new codes of practice.52 Perhaps most importantly though, the Office began to 
focus more of its attention on consumer information. In 1987, the Office spent over half a 
million pounds on publications -  double the previous year; and in 1991, this jumped further 
to a massive £1,593,000 -  17.5% of the total budget. The implication is that the Office was 
coming to the view that it was more economical to concentrate on enabling consumers to 
help themselves than to intervene through regulation - in any case, such a move can be 
taken as further evidence that it did not perceive a legalistic enforcement policy to be the 
most effective way of achieving change.
• The use of Part III enforcement powers
In 1980, the Director General faced his first judicial review challenge in R v 
Director General of Fair Trading, ex parte FH Tavlor & Co Ltd.53 T Ltd were the importer 
of toys and electrical equipment and had been convicted on 13 occasions under the 
Consumer Protection Act 1961. They gave a written assurance to the Director that they 
would refrain from continuing its unlawful conduct. The Director General issued a press 
release recording that T Ltd had only given the assurances after being warned that 
proceedings would be begun and the number and nature of the convictions including the
51 Compare, for instance, all the industries governed by codes of practice with the financial services sector, 
which Vogel (1996) concluded had become significantly juridified. However much these codes conformed to 
guidelines recommended by the Office, they were still ultimately a way in which trade associations and 
companies within a particular sector could avoid being governed by highly legalised external regulation.
52 These included a new code on mail order protection schemes, a mechanical breakdown insurance code,
codes relating to the holiday caravan industry and a code of banking practice.
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fines and costs to be paid. T Ltd complained that when asked to give the assurances they 
were not warned that the Director General would make their compliance the subject of a 
press release, and the press release involved an abuse of the Director’s powers under s i24 
(publication of information and advice) and a breach of s i33 (general restrictions on 
disclosure of information). The complaint was dismissed, however: if a press release was 
justifiable, there was no reason why the Director General should have warned T Ltd. In 
order to make good the complaint, T Ltd should have alleged that they were in some way 
misled into giving assurances. T had been given an opportunity to make amendments to the 
draft press release but had not done so, nor did they suggest limiting its circulation. The 
court did, however, raise some questions which the Director might wish to consider in 
framing press releases on assurances. For most of the rest of the decade, the Office 
expressed its caution by giving little publicity to assurances.54
Such a case represented the exception rather than the rule. Very few Part III 
actions were ending up in the courts although it will be seen shortly that the perceived 
threat of legal challenges by regulatees did increase. On its part, however, the Office’s 
policy continued to be to use its Part III powers in exceptional circumstances, and to take 
legal proceedings only where assurances were refused or where there had been a breach of 
existing assurances. Such proceedings included contempt of court cases, where an 
undertaking to court had been breached. The first such action occurred in 1982, when the 
court accepted an undertaking from the trader concerned. Within months however, he had 
been successfully sued by a consumer for failing to carry out work as promised and for 
failing to return the consumer’s money. This was a breach of his undertaking and following 
an application by the Director General, he was sent to prison for 14 days with the warning 
that any continuation of his conduct would lead to lengthy imprisonment. Contempt cases 
were rare: in all, there were nine contempt cases in the 1980s including one in 1989 in 
which the company was fined £50,000, and two of its directors were fined £10,000 and 
sentenced to three months imprisonment, suspended for two years.
The below table and graph charts the use of the Part III powers. It is difficult to see 
any real trends, except that the proportion of action in the court compared to the total
53 [1981] ICR 292
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number of formal Part III action against traders remained low throughout, and that the use 
of the power began to decline in the latter part of the 1980s into the 1990s.
1974 1
1975 18
1976 17
1977 40 3
1978 50 12
1979 44 1 5
1980 54 6 1
1981 48
1982 54 2 1
1983 47 5 1
1984 66 2 1
1985 39 4 2 1
1986 30 2 1
1987 42 2 2
1988 44 2 1 2
1989 34 1 4 5
1990 15 1 4
1991 7 1 5
TOTAL 650 24 47 9
54 See especially the 1985 guide which specifically stated that press enquiries would be met with a firm “no 
comment”.
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In 1985, the Office published its first guide of how it approached the po\ 
intended specifically for the benefit o f Trading Standards Departments. In the guide, s< 
of the reasons for the low number of prosecutions under Part III of the Act beer 
apparent. In particular, two statutory requirements mitigated against speedy action: 
“best endeavours” requirement, and the “persisted in a course of conduct” requirerr 
Each of these will now be considered in turn.
Under s34(l) of the Fair Trading Act, the Office had to use its “best endeavo 
to seek an assurance before any formal legal action could be taken. In practice, this m 
not only the original “package”55 being sent to the trader in question, and the chasing u 
any initial problems,56 but also -  depending on the specific circumstances o f the case - 
to two written reminders, a possible personal approach to the trader, and occasioi
55 This consisted of a letter to the trader, the particulars of the alleged course of conduct, draft assurano 
signature and return by the trader, draft assurances to be retained by the trader, a cross-reference betwee 
particulars of the alleged course of conduct and the paragraph of the draft assurances they support to e 
the trader to see exactly which item in the particulars supports each paragraph o f the draft assurances, a 
extract from Part III o f the Fair Trading Act 1973.
56 Such as when the trader has moved address, or if  the trader refuses the approach documents, in whicl 
they are delivered by hand.
extensive and detailed legal discussions if the trader contested the particulars of the conduct 
specified or the wording of the assurance.57 The Office made the following comment about 
its policy of what constituted “best endeavours”:58
In determining his policy of what constitutes “best endeavours” the DGFT is 
bound by the Act, the requirements of natural justice, the possibility that his 
actions will be subjected to judicial review, and the possibility of a referral to the 
Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration.
Other details of the legislation also mitigated against quick action. In particular, 
the need to show that a trader “persisted in a course of conduct” required a careful case to 
be prepared before an approach was made. In the 1985 guide, the quality of evidence 
necessary for successful Part III action to be taken was set out: in the case of a small trader, 
with well-documented evidence, over a short period of time, with deliberate behaviour 
concerning serious breaches of the same aspect of the law -  about 3 or 4 incidents; where 
the case was not strong, at least 10 incidents; and in a less well-documented case, over a 
long period of time, with deliberate behaviour and serious breaches of the same aspect of 
the law -  20-30 incidents. In the case of a larger trader, there might need to be evidence of 
up to 50 incidents before an approach could be made. Overall, even though these 
approaches were frequently described by the Office as “informal”, their policy was that 
“approaches under section 34 of the Act to a trader must always be made with the 
possibility of later court action in mind”. In the event of an assurance not being given, the 
Office would then take two factors into account when deciding whether or not to initiate 
court action: firstly, whether it was still felt after discussions that the trader had persisted in 
a course of conduct under the meaning of the Act and that, without court action, it was 
likely that the conduct would continue; and secondly, whether the available evidence would 
satisfy a court.
The concern of the Office to avoid possible legal challenges is strongly evident in 
these guidelines. In an interview, Lord Borrie confirmed that there was an increasing 
concern within the Office about the risk of legal action -  especially due to the need to 
establish a persistent course of conduct. The aversion to legal action was based on at least
57 OFT (1985:40) at §13.12.
58 OFT (1985: 41) at §14.2.
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three elements: firstly, there was a degree of general embarrassment in losing a court case, 
damaging the credibility of the Office; secondly, it could force a change of policy -  in the 
case of the Part ID powers, it was feared that a judicial attack could make the power 
useless; and thirdly, it could lead to criticism from the DTI and also the Treasury -  after all, 
cases were expensive to fight. It was conceded that such concerns had made staff within the 
Office more cautious and defensive, and later we will see the same phenomenon with 
respect to its credit licensing powers.59
The contents of these guidelines thus do indicate a degree of juridification: 
perceiving an increased threat of legal challenges, the Office begun to base its approach on 
legal considerations. The irony, however, is that in doing so, many traders who might have 
been approached formally were left alone. As the Office continued to prefer strategies of 
persuasion, using its Part III powers only as a last resort, it is difficult to reach any firm 
conclusion of juridification in this area. Moreover, it is going too far to claim that the mere 
fact that the guidelines were produced is itself evidence of juridification. Whilst they did 
point to policy, they were essentially an administrative rather than legal measure, designed 
to enable local Trading Standards Departments to work better with the Office.60
• Licensing under the Consumer Credit Act 1974
It will be recalled that the Office had some ex ante powers to control traders 
offering consumer credit under the Consumer Credit Act 1974. The following table and 
graph indicates how the Office used its powers to refuse or revoke credit licences up to 
1991 and the number of subsequent appeals by licensees.
59 Interview with Lord Borrie, 21st January, 2003
60 Ramsay (1987: 195) commented as follows: “These guidelines are merely one example of the pervasive 
need which all bureaucracies have to clarify broad discretionary mandates by creating concrete rules which 
can be understood and administered with relative ease. If the Office is effectively adopting a selective 
enforcement policy then ought the guidelines to be set out in a formal instrument and consequently give rise 
to justiciable issues in a court of law?...” It can be suggested that it is precisely because the Office wanted to 
retain flexibility that it did not do so -  these guidelines were specifically not meant to be legal in nature, and 
indeed Trading Standards Departments were told to keep their contents confidential.
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1976 12,559 0 0 0 0
1977 23,204 14 2 0 0
1978 27,134 50 20 16 0
1979 23,261 216 52 10 5
1980 17,221 178 48 12 1
1981 12,282 107 57 14 0
1982 13,531 202 52 7 0
1983 16,815 250 114 10 0
1984 16,683 313 145 19 0
1985 17,756 270 160 16 0
1986 17,287 270 152 21 3
1987 20,645 217 96 10 2
1988 22,198 196 79 11 0
1989 25,167 261 120 27 0
1990 25,367 267 124 20 0
1991 24,136 220 91 11 0
TOTAL 315,246 3031 1312 204 11
The OFT and consumer credit
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retain flexibility that it did not do so -  these guidelines were specifically not meant to be legal in nature, anc 
indeed Trading Standards Departments were told to keep their contents confidential.
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The figures confirm that the Office’s use of its licence revocation or refusal 
powers mirrored its use of Part III powers against ‘rogue’ traders as a power of last resort. 
This expressed itself in three ways. Firstly, in comparison with the total number of licences 
issued by the Office, the number of licences refused or revoked remained very small. 
Overall, fewer than 1% of licensees or potential licensees even received an MTR notice. 
Secondly, even amongst those companies which did receive an MTR notice, almost two- 
thirds were subsequently either given a favourable determination by the Office or chose to 
withdraw the application themselves. Thirdly, of those companies which did have a licence 
refused by the Office, fewer than one in six chose to appeal to the Secretary of State, and 
very few indeed ended up appealing to the High Court. This was not an area in which the 
courts had much role.
Over the period as a whole, it is possible to detect two main trends: one which 
impacted on the Office’s general regulatory strategy, another which reflected it. The first 
trend is the steady rise of applications throughout the 1980s following the initial drive with 
the legislation first coming into force. This rise, accompanied by an increase in work 
connected with existing licence-holders was to put a large strain on the Office’s resources 
reaching a peak of 54% of the total in 1988.61 As the vast majority of this time and money 
was spent on processing acceptable applications, the ability of the Office to pursue a more
(s)forceful regulatory role in other areas was constrained by this. The second trend is that 
during the first half of the 1980s, there was a sharp rise in the number of MTR notices and a 
parallel increase in the number of adverse determinations made by the Office, indicating 
perhaps a greater interest by the Office in the day-to-day conduct of business by licensees, 
but also the growing realisation that the licensing provisions could become important in 
correcting unfair practices and raising trading standards generally (AR 1979: 29). In other 
words, the licensing powers were starting to be seen as a substitute for Part III actions -  a 
contention that is supported by the fact that the Consumer Affairs Division and the
61 It was not normally quite as high as this: the additional expenditure in 1988 and 1989 was due to the one- 
off costs of computerisation. But it still regularly used up over 35% of the budget in other years.
62 Above it was suggested that this might have affected the Office’s ability to follow up a monitoring exercise 
of an existing code of practice.
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Consumer Credit Division were merged in 1980, alluded to in the 1982 Annual Report,63 
and expressly stated in the 1985 guide on its Part III powers.64 The usefulness of this power 
as part of a more general regulatory strategy against traders adopting unconscionable 
practices was shown up in 1989 when a ‘minded to revoke* notice was issued to Allied 
Collection Agencies Ltd. Enquiries by the Office followed a number of complaints alleging 
that the group’s employees had used various improper methods to collect debts. The 
complaints were well-founded and the subsequent decision not to revoke licences was taken 
only in light of a thorough review by the Allied management of training and collection 
procedures, backed up by 17 written undertakings (AR 1989: 31).
The suggestion that the Office saw formal action as a last resort is backed up well 
by its approach towards actual hearings, the right to which was increasingly being taken up 
by creditors facing the possibility of losing their licence (AR 1993: 15):
When a notice is issued, the Adjudicating Officer’s preliminary view is based 
only on the case against a trader. The legislation requires that recipients of notices 
must have an opportunity to submit through written and/or oral representations, 
their side of the story. Oral hearings are held in private and are as informal as 
possible. No one is sworn or cross-examined, and questioning is restricted to 
what is necessary to clarify the facts and to exclude irrelevant material. If new 
matters come up, the hearing can, if the trader wishes, be adjourned and 
reasonable notice given of any fresh matters which the Adjudicating Officer may 
propose to take into account...
Mr Anthony Inglese adds that the Office did not usually turn to its in-house 
lawyers unless particularly complex issues were raised, and that usually the hearings 
centred on the facts of a case (and especially the attitude of the trader concerned) rather 
than technical legal issues.65 Meanwhile, the Office also spelt out what it saw as the 
objective of its regulatory functions under the Act (AR 1993: 15):
The objective, under the law, is not to punish past misdeeds, but to judge 
impartially the current fitness of those concerned in relation to their activities, 
and to decide whether there is an ongoing risk of detriment to consumers. In one
63 The Report recognises that powers under Consumer Credit Act to revoke consumer credit licence and 
revocation may, depending on nature of business, have the effect of stopping the firm from trading or impose 
serious restrictions on future trading.
64 See §4.8: “When a submission is made to the OFT that a Part HI assurance should be sought, one of the 
first checks that OFT carries out is whether or not the trader is licensed under the Consumer Credit Act 1974. 
If he is, consideration is given as to whether action should be taken under that Act, instead of, or as well as, 
under Part HI....”
65 Interview, 13* February, 2003.
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early appeal case, the appeal tribunal held that a system of licensing is effective 
not only when a licence is revoked, but when remediable defects are brought to 
light and are remedied. An Adjudicating Officer will of course weigh very 
carefully any claims that a trader with a record of malpractice has reformed. If, 
however, he considers that such claims are well-founded (for example, if a 
company has passed into new hands), then the right decision within the law will 
be to determine in favour of the trader.
This was an approach far-removed from rigid legalism.66 It was motivated, in the main, by 
the recognition that for a trader to lose his credit license was effectively to put him out of 
business. Such a blunt tool was seen as inappropriate for all but the most clear-cut of
67cases.
The OFT in the 1990s
• Anticipating legislative reform
The 1990s were an extremely unsettling period for the Office. It was marked by a 
succession of Directors General, and a long, frustrating wait for legislative reform in key 
areas. During the course of the 1980s, the Office had criticised the existing systems with 
respect to codes of practice, its Part III powers and restrictive practices, not to mention its 
calls for legislation in more specific sectors. During the 1990s, these calls continued with 
reviews of credit licences and constant calls for reforms to the competition regulatory 
regime, including an extraordinary appeal for an institutional merger between the OFT and 
the MMC by Sir Bryan Carsberg.68 Despite reviews, Green and White Papers,69 and
70promises of space being made in the legislative timetable, however, no major changes 
actually occurred until the new Labour government came to power. In terms of competition 
policy, the reform process thus took an extraordinary fifteen years in total, as documented 
in almost painful detail by Wilks (1999).
66 One area where the Office was less flexible was its attitude towards unlicensed credit lending, which nearly 
always resulted in prosecution. The prosecutions normally resulted in convictions, so that, for instance, out of 
32 traders prosecuted in 1985,29 were convicted.
67 Interview with Lord Borrie, 21“ January, 2003.
68 See Wilks (1999:313)
69 For instance, a Green Paper on restrictive trade practices was published in 1988, followed by a White Paper 
a year later, then in 1992, a Green Paper was published on abuse of market power.
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Having pointed to the shortcomings in its powers under Part III of the Fair Trading 
Act again in a 1993 report, the Office turned its attention to the complexities of the 
Consumer Credit Act -  deemed an appropriate target particularly in light of the 
government’s deregulation initiative. A series of recommendations was published in a 
report in June 1994, which were broadly accepted by the government but, in the absence of 
legislative time, not acted upon. Meanwhile, the Office had been looking inwards at its own 
procedures. A process of restructuring, begun in 1991 and completed in 1993, meant that 
all the regulatory work of the Consumer Affairs Division were now combined in a single 
Regulatory Section. The Section had six regional teams with contacts to local trading 
standards departments, and dealt with the Office’s responsibilities under Part III of the Fair 
Trading Act 1973, and the regulatory work under the Consumer Credit Act 1974, the Estate 
Agents Act 1979 and the Advertising Regulations 1988.
In 1994, the new Regulatory Section referred to difficulties in both its credit 
licensing function and its Part III powers suggesting a continuing degree of juridification. 
In terms of its approach towards licensing, the Section had begun to issue more warning 
letters as opposed to Minded to Refuse or Revoke (MTR) notices, and the 172 notices 
issued in 1992 compared to 220 in 1991 (AR 1992: 18). Where notices were issued, 
however, the Office noted the following trend (AR 1994: 28):71
The proportion of traders making representations has now been rising for several 
years, and the complexity of representations also seems to be increasing. On 
some occasions they can take several days, and may involve legal representatives, 
including Queen’s Counsel.
This was not reflected, however, in High Court appeals which remained very rare. In the 
period 1992-2000, there were a total of only two such appeals.72
70 See for instance AR 1993: 11 on powers to deal with problem traders and AR 1995: 12 for the 
Government’s intention to review the need for competition law reform.
71 Lord Borrie confirmed that this was a trend that he had noticed during his time as Director General also 
(Interview, 21st January, 2003).
72 Mr Anthony Inglese observed that an unhelpful approach by licensees would often do them little good. He 
recalled one case in which the licensee attended the hearing but did not say a single word, evidently advised 
by his lawyer not to speak. However, as the decision to take a licence away was not punitive but based on the 
need to protect the public in future, this was very counter-productive, merely creating a bad impression. 
(Interview, 13* February, 2003)
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Meanwhile, it also noted how the increasing complexity of Part III cases was 
slowing down the process of obtaining assurances and orders. Then in 1996, a clearly 
frustrated Office referred again to the difficulties of establishing ‘persistence’ in using its 
Part III powers. The remarks followed a county court case in which the judge ruled that 20 
repetitions of an unfair trading practice was insufficient. The decision was then upheld by 
the Court of Appeal.73 The decision “reinforced the OFT’s long-held view that Part III of 
the Fair Trading Act provides an inadequate means to achieve the objective of countering 
traders who pursue unfair or improper business practices but whose behaviour, in itself, is 
not unlawful” (AR 1996: 29). Moreover, the weaknesses in the legislation were having a 
knock-on effect, so that staff in local Trading Standards Departments often would not refer 
a case to the Office, thinking that the extra work to which they would be put would not be 
justified by a sufficient prospect of success. In both areas then, there was limited evidence 
of juridification: increased complexity of cases, increased presence of lawyers, some legal 
appeals. The evidence has to be set against the continuing informal style of enforcement, 
the fact that formal action remained very rare, and the fact that it was still only a small 
minority of those prosecuted who were pursuing legal avenues. Lord Borrie summed up the 
situation as follows:
It was not a case of there being either more lawyers or behind the scenes 
negotiations -  they were both going on at the same time. Formal challenges were 
used more often, reflecting perhaps a change of culture -  a growing 
“Americanisation” (if I can use that term) in the use of legal advisers and 
litigation. Whereas previously, behind the scenes negotiations tended to take 
place instead of these things, often now both were present.
This is a significant observation, according with the evidence presented and 
amounting to an important challenge to some aspects of the juridification thesis. By 
recognising the possibility of increased litigiousness without an accompanying increase in 
legalism on the part of the regulatory body, the comments highlight the limited value of 
focusing on court cases and legal challenges in the attempt to make out a claim of 
juridification. They also question the proposition that juridification is an inexorable process
73 See Director General of Fair Trading v Diwan [1996] (Unreported). The Court of Appeal actually didn’t 
consider the ‘persistence’ ruling, but focused on whether a failure to pay damages or other redress following a 
breach of contract could itself be described as a breach of contract or other civil duty (so as to fall within the 
scope of section 34(3) of the Fair Trading Act).
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or vicious circle. Instead of a model in which increasing regulatory unreasonableness leads 
to an increased number of legal challenges which leads to increasing focus on law by 
regulators and so on, it might be necessary to consider a model where regulators try to limit 
juridification through informal contacts and regulatees react diversely -  some through their 
lawyers notwithstanding, some without.
On the consumer side, the Office remained heavily involved in pushing for 
reforms in the used car sector, it launched inquiries into the provision of pensions, health 
insurance and care homes for the elderly, and it again began approving new codes of 
practice.75 By December 1996, the Office had negotiated codes of practice with 46 separate 
trade associations in 21 different areas of industry.76 The most important changes, however, 
came through directives from Europe, and it is to these that we now turn.
• The impact of European directives
In his final Annual Report, Sir Gordon Borrie commented that the biggest change 
there had been during the time he had spent at the Office was the new European dimension 
to his work. The most obvious aspect to this was in the competition side of the Office’s 
work, with many competition cases having a European aspect to them. However, there were 
also a number of significant European initiatives on the consumer protection side that not 
only had the effect of expanding the role of the OFT but also contained the potential to 
change the nature of its relationships with some regulatees. These directives dealt with a 
variety of matters including misleading advertisements,77 doorstep selling,78 unfair contract
*70 fin  ft iterms and distance selling, and a variety of specific areas such as timeshares, package 
holidays82 and medical products.83 In many of these areas, the Office was given a key 
enforcement role -  for instance, the Control of Misleading Advertisements Regulations
74 Interview, 21st January, 2003.
75 See generally the OFT Annual Reports of this period.
76 As listed in OFT 1996: Voluntary Codes o f Practice -  a consultation paper
77 Control of Misleading Advertisements Regulations 1988
78 Consumer Protection (Cancellation of Contracts Concluded Away From Business Premises) Regulations 
1987
79 Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1995
80 Consumer Protection (Distance Selling) Regulations 2000
81 the Timeshare Act 1992
82 the Package Travel, Package Holidays and Package Tours Regulations 1992
83 Medicines (Advertising) Regulations 1994
187
1988 gave the Office the power to apply to the High Court for an injunction against 
companies breaching the regulations, although this was only once other bodies had tried to 
stop the advertisements outside the courts.84 In practice, most complaints which reached the 
Office were either referred to one of these bodies or dealt with outside the courts through 
informal assurances or written undertakings.85 In this section though, we focus on the two 
directives which had the most impact on the Office’s relationships with its regulatees: the 
Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 199586 and the Stop Now Orders (EC 
Directive) Regulations 2001.
Lying at the centre of the EC Directive on Unfair Contract Terms is Article 3, 
reproduced exactly in the UK Regulations. It consists of two provisions, as follows:
1. A contractual term which has not been individually negotiated shall be 
regarded as unfair if, contrary to the requirement of good faith, it causes a 
significant imbalance in the parties' rights and obligations arising under the 
contract, to the detriment of the consumer.
2. A term shall always be regarded as not individually negotiated where it has 
been drafted in advance and the consumer has therefore not been able to influence 
the substance of the term, particularly in the context of a pre-formulated standard 
contract.
Article 5 adds a requirement for consumer contracts to be drafted in “plain, intelligible 
language”, and a lengthy Annexe provides a non-exhaustible “grey-list” of examples of 
terms that would be in breach of the Directive.87
In the UK, the enforcement of these regulations was given to the OFT. The Office 
was given the duty to consider all consumer complaints relating to contract terms and take 
measures to ensure that any unfair terms were changed. If necessary, it could apply to the 
courts for an injunction to prevent the terms being used. In the first Unfair Contract Terms
QO
bulletin, the Office described this power as “a last resort, but where it does prove 
necessary to warn suppliers that proceedings will be started, that warning will invariably be 
followed through.” The next paragraph then goes into further detail:
84 The main bodies were the Advertising Standards Authority and local Trading Standards Departments
85 See also the Consumer Protection (Distance Selling) Regulations
86 These implemented the 1993 EC Directive on Unfair Contract Terms and have since been replaced by the 
Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999.
87 The reason that the examples are not blacklisted is because much depends on context, such that a term 
which would be unfair within one contract may be fair in another.
88 Unfair Contract Terms bulletin (Issue no 1, May 1996) at p3
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The Director General may ‘have regard’ to undertakings about the use of unfair 
terms. But this does not mean that a supplier with unfair contract terms faces the 
stark choice between formal undertakings or legal proceedings. We seek 
voluntary change. While we aim to be robust in applying the Regulations, we are 
not inflexible in our dealings with suppliers. We pursue a fair administrative 
process of negotiation. We open dialogue with the business involved and only 
when this proves unsuccessful and unconstructive will we move on to the formal 
legal process...
This stated approach has been well borne out by later statistics. Three years after the 
Regulations had come into force, the Office had investigated about 3000 complaints and 
taken action in around 75% of cases leading to the dropping or revision of over 1200 
contract terms, indicating the Regulations’ wide impact. Yet no trader had fought a case all
on
the way to court. The first time this happened (and still the only example to date) was the 
First National Bank90 case a year later, which ultimately went all the way to the House of 
Lords. In its magazine, Fair Trading, the Office pointed to the success of the Regulations, 
before explaining the absence of court appearances as follows:
Results like these have been achieved without resort to court, but not without the 
threat of i t  The OFT’s ability to end the use of terms that confer a real benefit on 
suppliers, such as long cancellation periods in mobile phone contracts, depends 
upon it being seen as willing to use its powers. The fact that cases have ultimately 
been settled is explained partly by the prospect of court costs and attendant bad 
publicity. Probably more fundamental, however, is the risk of terms being 
forbidden altogether rather than rewritten. Unfair terms normally give business a 
benefit that is excessive, rather than wholly unwarranted, and often the firm’s 
underlying interest is a vital one. Suppliers can avoid losing all the protection 
offered by, for instance, a ‘boilerplate’ exclusion clause, by agreeing to narrow it 
and accept liability (as fairness requires) for negligence.
The fact that the Regulations did not lead to court action does not mean, however, 
that they did not lead to a degree of juridification between the Office and its regulatees. It is 
true that they did not lead to Type I juridification, in which regulators and regulatees have 
an adversarial relationship battled out in the courts. However, it seems clear from the 
bulletins that the Regulations did cause Type II juridification, where both parties clearly 
understand the contact to be legal in nature and proceed on that basis. Some evidence for 
this can be found in the nature of the Office’s bulletins themselves -  very explicitly meant
89 See the article in the OFT’s quarterly journal, Fair Trading (Summer issue 1998).
90 Director General of Fair Trading v First National Bank pic (HL) [2002] 1 AC 481. The Director General 
ultimately lost this case, with the House of Lords overturning the Court of Appeal’s ruling.
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as a vehicle through which the cases dealt with by the Office could be published and made 
accessible to other companies, as the following extracts make clear:91
The task currently facing us is more one of education, rather than doing battle in 
the courts, and there is still a long way to go. This Bulletin aims to push the 
process forward by providing an insight into our thinking about what constitutes 
unfairness, and by giving practical examples of terms that traders and their legal 
advisers have themselves devised which we regard as likely to be considered fair.
The OFT believes that publishing information about its enforcement of the 
Regulations is particularly important. Lack of awareness of the legislation and its 
radical impact on contract drafting has made for some difficulties in getting 
contracts improved. It is only fair to say that, in the past, solicitors who have 
wished to draft fairly have had to navigate largely without maps. The OFT has 
been attempting to meet the need for guidance and precedents in various ways, 
for instance by organising two conferences, but chiefly through a series of 
bulletins which explain its approach, report on each case, and provide numerous 
examples of terms considered fair and unfair.
The examples contained within these bulletins thus served as “case law” - this despite the 
note contained at the start of each bulletin that the opinion of the Office as to what 
constitutes an unfair contract term is not binding as this is a decision that ultimately rests 
only with the courts. The technical legal nature of most of the cases cited in the bulletins 
confirms the impression that relationships generated by these Regulations have tended to be 
dominated by legal values and expectations such that they can be accurately described as 
juridified. The fact that, in the main, companies and trade associations have tended to
Q*yaccept that changes have needed to be made does not detract from this.
Quite different in nature from the Unfair Contract Terms Regulations were the 
Stop Now Orders (EC Directive) Regulations 2001. Instead of creating new obligations in a 
particular areas, these Regulations created a new enforcement system under which the 
Office (and other enforcement bodies) had strengthened powers to prevent businesses from 
breaching a wide range of existing UK consumer protection laws -  the ultimate sanction
91 Unfair Contract Terms Bulletin 3 (March 1997), at p5 followed by extract from an article in Fair Trading, 
Summer issue 1998.
92 Ironically, it could be that the action by the OFT under these regulations has decreased the incidence of 
litigation in affected sectors -  see Scott (1998: 51).
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being an injunction from the High Court. In its Guidance, published in December 2002,93 
the Office set out its approach to these new powers:94
2.7 Through this guidance the OFT seeks to ensure that business and all Qualified 
Entities are aware of its own general principles for the enforcement of the 
provisions of the Stop Now Regulations. The principles that the OFT will itself 
apply and will encourage others to follow are that:
• action will only be taken where there is evidence of a breach of the relevant 
consumer protection law and the resulting consumer harm stemming from the 
infringement,
• business will be given a reasonable opportunity to put matters right by 
negotiation,
• wherever possible court action will only be taken after voluntary cessation or 
undertakings have been sought,
• proceedings will be brought by the most appropriate body...
• when the same business activity results in infringements of more than one of the 
pieces of legislation covered by the Stop Now Regulations, the OFT will ensure 
that any action is coordinated so that the business concerned is not subjected to 
unnecessary multiple approaches, and
• in line with the OFT’s general approach to putting information into the public 
domain, publicity on Stop Now cases will be accurate and balanced, fair to the 
trader, and in accordance with the performance of the OFT’s functions.
This approach thus mirrored the previous approach of the Office to its other 
powers, with formal action taken as a last resort.95 Nonetheless, there are two things about 
the Stop Now power that are worth noting. The first is the language of the Office in 
describing this approach -  that of ‘proportionality’.96 As a term taken directly from EC 
jurisprudence, this points to the influence of general European law in the context of specific 
directives. Secondly, it is worth emphasising again the wide application of the Stop Now 
power. As a general power, it quickly became apparent that it was to have a major impact 
on the Office’s general consumer protection work with Stop Now orders or assurances and
93 (OFT 382)
94 See also the comments at the OFT web-site: http://www.oft.gov.uk/Business/Legal+Powers/stop+now+ 
regulations+general+enforcement+approach.htm
95 As of 31st December, 2002, there had only been 8 formal actions by the Office under the new powers, 
resulting in 5 assurances (4 relating to the same matter), 1 undertaking and 2 Stop Now Orders. The figures 
have to be treated with a degree of caution though as other bodies also have the same powers. On its web-site, 
the Office stated that it would generally leave enforcement to other bodies, unless there was the need to 
clarify the law or set a precedent, a business practice extended across more than one economic sector or the 
activities of the business had an international dimension.
96 See for instance http://www.oft.gov.uk/Business/Legal+Powers/Stop+Now+Regulations.htm: “We will try 
to ensure that any action that we or other enforcement partners take is necessary and proportionate to the 
circumstances. The necessity for action will depend on the proof of or potential for harm to consumers, as a 
result of a business's behaviour. Proportionality will be best served by efforts to get a business's voluntary 
agreement that they will put things right before legal action is taken against them.”
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undertakings under the Regulations being used in conjunction with breaches of the Unfair 
Contract Terms Regulations, the Consumer Protection (Distance Selling) Regulations, the 
Control of Misleading Advertisements Regulations 1988, the 1978 Estate Agency Act and 
other areas of civil law. In short (AR 2001: 33):
The introduction of the Stop Now Regulations in June 2001 represents a major 
advance against businesses that engage in unfair trading practices. The Stop Now 
powers provide an effective mechanism to enforce a wide range of consumer 
protection legislation against traders who are harming consumers’ interests. We 
always give businesses a fair chance first to halt unfair trading practices. But if 
they fail to do so, we now have the means to take prompt action to protect 
consumers.
Conclusion
The Office of Fair Trading has been involved in an extraordinary range of policy 
areas in the course of its thirty years. It has had a major role in the reform of influential 
economic sectors including estate agency, financial services, broadcasting and the legal and 
medical professions. It has played a central part in the reform of consumer protection laws, 
including the key area of unfair contract terms.
Overall, the balance of the evidence is against a conclusion that relationships 
between the Office and its regulatees have become juridified. The vast majority of its 
contact with regulatees has been dominated by non-legal considerations such as the impact 
of complaints and public opinion, budgetary constraints, and the influence of central 
government and pressure groups. The Office’s regulatory strategy has been predominately 
persuasive, as reflected in the flexible use of its enforcement powers against individual 
traders, and its keenness to try to effect change without resorting to the formalities of legal 
processes. The demise of the power to create criminal offences through Advisory 
Committee references and the general lack of legislation to redefine the relationships 
between the Office and its regulatees also points against a conclusion of juridification.
There is some evidence of an increasingly adversarial approach on the part of 
regulatees targeted by the Office under Part III of the Fair Trading Act and the Consumer 
Credit Act. Whilst the Office has used both these powers sparingly and in a flexible
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manner, there have been some companies which have responded through lawyers, and 
occasionally the threat of judicial review and appeal. Nonetheless, whilst this may be true, 
the trend does not point to a process of juridification as the Office has not responded 
through more overt legal considerations. Nor have there been many challenges that have 
actually reached court. And even with the recent introduction of the Stop Now Orders, the 
vast majority of contact has remained outside the courts. Instead, the only clear-cut case of 
juridification has been Type II juridification -  evident in the regulation of unfair contract 
terms following the 1995 Regulations.
The following tables use the juridification indicators to highlight these trends.
Type I  juridification between the OFT and its regulatees (consumer protection): 1973-2002
Frequent litigation 
X
No -  although litigation threatened more often in the 
1990s.
Coercive, inflexible regulatory strategy 
X
No -  the exact opposite: the Office was as 
consistently flexible and informal as possible.
Reliance on formal, legal processes 
X
No -  informal processes nearly always preferred.
Frequent prosecutions in response to breach of law 
X
Prosecutions rare, with negotiations preferred. If 
anything, fewer prosecutions relating to rogue 
traders and licensed creditors in 1990s.
High presence / involvement of lawyers 
* X
Lawyers relatively unimportant, and did not occupy 
influential roles in the organisation. However, 
regulatees beginning to make greater use of lawyers 
in the 1990s, and greater role within the OFT in 
relation to unfair contract terms.
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Type II juridification between the OFT and its regulatees (consumer protection): 1973-2002
Explicit legal argument 
✓ X
Became more common during 1990s, not only in the 
context of unfair contract terms, but also in relation 
to problem traders.
Regulatory contact seen as setting legal precedent 
✓ X
Generally not relevant, with the important exception 
of unfair consumer contract terms.
High presence / involvement of lawyers 
✓ X
Lawyers relatively unimportant, and did not occupy 
influential roles in the organisation. However, 
regulatees beginning to make more use of lawyers in 
the 1990s, and greater role within the OFT in 
relation to unfair contract terms.
References to law and legal cases 
✓
Common as a basis for bargaining strategies.
Adoption of overtly legal values 
* X
Preference for more bargaining strategies in the 
shadow of law indicated by demise of Part II power 
and a willingness to reach agreement without 
resorting to prosecution. However, natural justice 
considered important in hearings under Part HI of 
the FTA and under the Consumer Credit Act.
We turn now to see whether the same has been the case on the competition side.
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CHAPTER 5
Keeping Lawyers Out: the OFT and the 
implementation of competition policy 1973-1998
Introduction
Having considered the Office’s approach to consumer protection policy from its 
establishment in 1973 to the passage of the Enterprise Act in 2002, we turn now to the 
competition side of its work. However, this time the analysis ends in 1998, and a separate 
chapter is devoted to the period 1998-2002. This is because the Competition Act 1998 gave 
rise to such a substantial change in the nature of competition policy in the UK that it 
requires separate analysis.
It will be argued in this chapter that many of the same themes found in the 
consumer protection side of the Office -  a preference for negotiation over imposition, for 
informal over formal procedure, and discretionary judgements over legalistic formulae -  
were also to be found in its implementation of competition policy up to 1998. As such, like 
the consumer protection side, the Competition Divisions of the Office hardly ever had to 
prepare for court appearances or legal appeals.
This chapter, like the previous one, is arranged chronologically, with breaks made 
in 1980 -  the year of the passage of a new Competition Act -  and 1992 -  the end of the 
long Directorship of Sir Gordon Borrie and his replacement by Sir Bryan Carsberg. As with 
the last chapter, the breaks are not meant to imply changes in the dependent variable 
(juridification), but are simply made for convenience. Before reviewing the Office’s work 
over this period, however, we begin with a brief background as to the nature of the 
implementation of competition policy in the UK. This is useful not only to provide context 
to the post-Fair Trading Act period, but also to explain many aspects of the approach taken 
by the Office which, after all, inherited staff directly from its predecessors and, in the case 
of restrictive trade practices, simply took over the duties of the Registrar.
195
Background
In Chapter 2, it was noted that in terms of the substance of UK competition policy, 
the Fair Trading Act 1973 was largely a consolidating piece of legislation. Before 
considering the approach of the Office towards the implementation of competition policy, it 
is thus useful to provide at least a sense of the themes that had dominated prior to 1973. To 
begin with, consider Wilks’ comments about the 1948 Act:1
In the 1948 legislation the initial choice was made of an administrative system.
Debate within the Board of Trade during 1944 argued that the proposed Board 
should “avoid legalistic procedure” and proceed in an informal fashion to discuss 
the public interest. This judgmental approach, wary of law and rejecting the 
adversarial implications of a judicial avenue was wholly in keeping with British 
practice. It envisaged a pattern of informal negotiation and self-regulation on the 
part of industry which Vogel’s excellent study has identified as an abiding feature 
of British industrial regulation. Consistent with this approach, the 1948 Act 
embodied virtually no sanctions...
This initial decision had a major effect on the subsequent style of competition 
regulation in the UK. The following examples in each of the areas of monopolies, mergers 
and restrictive trade practices provide a good indication of how this worked in practice.
In the area of monopolies, it became normal procedure to follow up reports of the 
Monopolies Commission by negotiating voluntary undertakings from the companies 
concerned rather than by compelling changes through a Ministerial order. Orders were 
exceedingly rare, and perhaps the most instructive example of this was the case of Hoffman 
La Roche. The investigation related to the pricing of Valium and Librium, and the company 
was uncooperative from the start, with the Monopolies Commission threatening evidence- 
gathering orders -  an exceptionally rare threat in the history of the Commission. In 1973, 
the Commission produced its report, which was damning. Hoffman La Roche responded by 
applying for judicial review, claiming breach of natural justice, and in order to prevent the 
company from securing an advantage whilst the legal challenge was ongoing, the 
government implemented the main recommendations of the Commission through a
1 Wilks (1994: 15)
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statutory order. An application for the appointment of a Select Committee to enquire into 
the Order was rejected, leading Hoffman La Roche to seek judicial review also of the 
government. The following ministerial statement takes up the story:2
In April 1974, out-of-court negotiations began about the price of the drugs in 
question to see whether settlement could be reached. It was desirable to bring 
Roche back into the Voluntary Price Regulation Scheme of the DHSS as early as 
possible. During the course of the negotiations we obtained from the Company a 
great deal more information than they had given to the Monopolies Commission.
I am glad to inform the House that agreement has now been reached as a result of 
which:
1. The Company will repay to the Government the sum of approximately 
£3.75m...;
2. The Company will come back into the VPRS for all its ethical pharmaceutical 
products;
3. The Company have accepted that the new prices of Librium and Valium will 
be put at approximately half the 1970 level...;
4. The Company have informed us that they intend to continue their research 
and investment in the UK and that they plan to spend several million pounds 
on improved research, production and administration facilities...;
5. The Company has undertaken to withdraw its legal action against the Crown 
and the Monopolies Commission together with any allegation of impropriety.
This Agreement is clearly incompatible with the continuance in force of the 
Order and consequentially is subject to its effective revocation...
Even in this case then, where the MC report was particularly critical and where the 
company involved was unusually obstructionist, the government was keen for resolution to 
take place outside the courts, with number 4 on the above list providing a good example of 
the way in which industrial policy was capable of impacting upon competition policy.
With respect to merger control, Freyer (1992: 311) records that of the 350 mergers 
which might have been referred to the Monopolies and Mergers Commission by 1969, the 
Board had referred only 10 -  this despite the intense merger activity of the late 1960s. 
Freyer concludes by quoting Fairbum’s comments approvingly that “relatively few mergers 
were thought to give rise to public interest concerns, and saw the parallel operation of a 
policy clearly antagonistic to merger control”.3 Shortly, we shall see whether the same 
trend was continued after the enactment of the Fair Trading Act.
2 HC Deb. (1975-6) 899, 12 November 1975, c. 1543-1547
3 Fairbum in Faiibum and Kay (1988: 195)
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Finally, in relation to restrictive trade practices, Victor Morgan (1987: 22) 
emphasises the low rate of agreements actually coming to adjudication - an aspect of policy 
that predated the creation of the OFT by over ten years:
By the early 1960s it had become clear that there was little chance of an 
agreement surviving a court action unless the activity concerned had unusual 
features that would help it to pass on the gateways, and was free from any major 
detriments. As a result the vast majority of registered agreements have been 
abandoned (or modified so as to remove restrictions covered by the Acts) either 
before reference to the court or at an early stage of the proceedings.
The words in parentheses point to the practice of the Registrar of Restrictive Trading 
Agreements to try to negotiate the removal of objectionable features from restrictive 
agreements. Once this was done, he could then recommend to the Secretary of State that the 
remaining restrictions did not call for an investigation by the Restrictive Practices Court 
due to the ‘of no significance* clause.4
All these examples point to the overriding themes of UK competition policy prior 
to the creation of the Office -  that it was largely consensual, based on negotiation and 
bargaining rather than prosecution and imposition. The example relating to restrictive trade 
practices is especially instructive: even in the context of a regulatory regime where any 
qualifying agreements had to be placed on the register and taken to a court for adjudication, 
there was still scope for flexibility and this scope was utilised whenever possible. We turn 
now to see whether the Office continued with a similar style of implementation.
The Office and competition policy: 1973-9
• Monopoly control
It is convenient to take the Office’s approach to monopolies first, focusing in 
particular on its two main duties: making references to the MMC and following up the 
MMC reports. From 1974 to the end of 1979, a total of 17 monopoly references were made
4 See OFT Annual Report 1975: 11.
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to the MMC.5 This compares to 79 areas in which monopoly-related complaints were made 
im 1974 alone, implying that the vast majority of complaints did not result in referral to the 
MMC. Sometimes the complaints were found to be unsupported, yet this was not always 
tlhe case. In 1975, for instance, the Office received a number of complaints, both from MPs 
and from members of the public, that building societies were not allowing borrowers a 
choice of insurer with their mortgage. Its response was as follows (AR 1975: 18):
The Director General was concerned that arrangements were unnecessarily 
restrictive and had reason to think that there was a complex monopoly situation in 
relation to the lending activities of building societies. However, he decided that a 
solution lay in direct negotiations with the Building Societies Association.
The result of the negotiations was that borrowers were now to be offered a choice 
o f three insurance companies. The arrangements were voluntary, although it was expected 
that most, if not all, members would follow them. The case illustrates perfectly the Office’s 
general approach to making references: in the words of Wilks (1999: 286), “Methven’s 
approach had displayed a positive commitment towards negotiation in monopoly and 
mergers cases, with a view to avoiding a reference to the MMC where possible”.6 Lord 
Borrie added that a reference would never be made without the Office’s concerns being 
discussed first with the companies involved -  the idea of surprising a monopolist with a 
reference was inconceivable.7
It is clear also that when the Office did decide to make a reference, this was based
o
little on legal considerations. Dr Martin Howe provided the following overview:
When the Office was first set up, it had been hoped that the process would 
become more transparent and the reference criteria more obvious. A database was 
set up to try to analyse the market sector by sector. However, there proved to be 
very few markets that could be picked out just through desk-work, and 
complaints remained a prominent source of investigations. Later, an attempt was 
made to combine the two, through a kind of informal checklist A reference was
5 Wilks (1999: 278-8) characterises the nature of references as follows: that Methven had referred some 
significant intermediate product industries whose efficiency had a potential impact on industrial productivity 
-  such as petrol, bricks and cables, whereas Borrie seemed to display a consumer bias by referring industries 
that supplied the final product with high consumer visibility and potential retail price effects -  such as ice 
cream, credit cards and domestic gas appliances. This was backed up by Dr Howe, arguing that the reliance 
on complaints led to an emphasis on end products (Interview, 12th February, 2003).
6 For a full list of monopoly references made by the Office, see Appendix One.
7 Interview, 21st January, 2003.
8 Interview, 12th February, 2003.
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more likely if it related to a prominent market (in terms of size), if the issue 
would have a wide effect on other sectors, if there was an overlap with other 
areas (such as if there had been a flurry of mergers in that particular sector), and 
if it was likely that a remedy would be available at the end of the process.
Ultimately though, there were very few investigations indeed that did not 
have complaints as a catalyst. This was not because of judicial review worries, 
but just a feeling that to do otherwise would be an unreasonable approach to take.
And, of course, any public agency finds it difficult to ignore complaints because 
of their potential political impact.
Both Lord Borrie and Dr Howe added one further factor: an awareness of the work-load of 
the Monopolies and Mergers Commission. It was seen within the Office almost as its duty 
to supply the MMC with some work, but it also had to be wary of overburdening it. A 
steady supply of about two monopoly references per year was considered about the right 
amount. Together, these things add up to strong evidence that reference policy was based 
upon non-legal considerations: some economic analysis, a notion of what was “reasonable”, 
political and administrative factors.
The Office’s follow-up work had a similar emphasis on negotiation, and statutory 
orders were extremely rare -  thus continuing the trend prior to the Fair Trading Act. The 
first step following an adverse decision by the MMC was normally to negotiate 
undertakings on the request of the Secretary of State. Undertakings tended to relate mainly 
to pricing, although they normally included also the arrangements by which the Office 
could monitor compliance.9 Once undertakings had been secured, the Office played a 
monitoring role, surveying price policies and profit levels.10 In the course of this continued 
monitoring, there were sometimes negotiations to change the terms of the undertaking or to 
review the need for monitoring in response to changed circumstances. There were, 
however, no statutory orders at all made during the 1970s. The first case in which the 
Director General had to report to Ministers that he was unable to obtain satisfactory 
undertakings was in 1980, relating to the supply of architects’ services with reference to
9 Examples included the areas of primary batteries (Ever Ready Ltd. and Mallory Batteries Ltd.), clutch 
mechanisms for road vehicles (the Automotive Products Group) and cinema film
10 Early examples included Procter & Gamble and Unilever, following the Monopolies Commission 1966 
report on household detergents, Automotive Products Group in the area of clutch mechanisms for road 
vehicles, and Kelloggs following the MC’s 1973 report on ready-cooked breakfast cereals.
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scale fees (AR 1980: 40). Here also no order resulted, however. Instead, continuing 
negotiations eventually led to agreement being reached in 1983.11
Why was there so little formal action towards monopolists? Sir Gordon Borrie 
emphasised how the whole structure of monopoly control discouraged formal sanctions 
(Borrie 1981: 306-7):
It is in no way illegal for firms to adopt practices that the Commission has 
condemned time and again. The only deterrent is that predatory conduct may lead 
to a reference of the products affected to the Commission, thus bringing 
considerable trouble and expense to the firms involved. During the inquiry the 
need for a favourable report is likely to moderate the conduct of the firms 
concerned; but the Commission’s recommendations after the inquiry have no 
binding force. Their condemnation merely enables the government to make a 
statutory order forbidding certain types of conduct. Usually no order is made, but 
the firm concerned gives undertakings to the Minister and a long period may 
elapse before the terms of the undertaking are agreed.
Other factors might also be added to this. The Office was unable to make a reference where 
there was no monopoly situation (as defined by statute) even if a dominant firm was
17engaging in anti-competitive practices. The whole process was slow, which must have 
had the effect of discouraging the Office to make references if it was believed progress 
could be made through more informal channels. Next, as was pointed out earlier, the Office 
had to be mindful of how much the MMC could cope with. Too many references would 
lead to administrative gridlock. Finally, it is clear that the institutional fragmentation in this 
area of competition regulation was also significant. Even where the MMC had delivered an 
adverse report, the government of the day still had a key role. Usually, the imposition of a 
confrontational statutory order would be politically less attractive than the option of asking 
the Office to find a mutually acceptable formula.
• Merger references
If monopoly control in the 1970s could be characterised as flexible and non- 
legalistic in nature, merger control was undoubtedly even more so. This was largely
11 See AR 1983: 26, 78-9. The result was that architects’ fee scales were no longer mandatory and that the 
published fee scales of both architects and surveyors carried an indication that they were for guidance only. 
Hence, members of both professions were now free to compete on fees.
12 A good example was the very first reference made by the Office, on the supply and export of insulated 
wires and cables. The MMC report was only completed in 1979 -  five years later.
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because of the main difference between them: that whilst in die case of monopolies the 
Director General had the power to make a reference to the MMC directly, in the case of 
mergers, he could only make recommendations to the Secretary of State who then had the 
final decision of referral. If the main idea behind getting the Director General to initialise 
monopoly references was to take politics out of process (Borrie 1981),13 then the retention 
of ministerial discretion in the case of mergers reflected precisely the opposite. Even 
though, in practice, it was rare for the Secretary of State not to follow the advice of the 
Director General,14 it will be shown that the fact that the Office was providing advice rather 
than itself making references also increased the politicisation of merger control prior to this 
final stage of the process.
Before looking at the approach of the Office towards its regulatees in this area, it is 
worth taking a moment to consider the position of these regulatees. The main point to make 
is that in the area of mergers, it is not possible to lump all regulatees together. Whilst 
prospective bidders would never want the cost and uncertainty of a reference to the MMC, 
in certain circumstances the target company may not share the same view. Frazer (1992: 
72) provides an example:
In addition to formal pre-notification, many firms will voluntarily seek the 
opinion of the OFT on a proposed transaction in order to keep the risks of a 
reference to a minimum. However, in the case of ‘unfriendly’ mergers, the 
attitude of the firms to the prospect of a reference may not be the same. The target 
firm may actively campaign for a reference to be made in order to frustrate or at 
least delay the proposal. Many proposals have been frustrated in this way, even 
where the MMC has ruled in their favour. The delay allows for a ‘white knight’ 
to be found to purchase the target shares in the place of the bidding company, or 
for the bidder to lose interest for some other reason...
The Office’s procedure for deciding whether or not to advise to the Secretary of 
State that a merger or proposed merger should be referred was as follows.15 The first step, 
as soon as a proposed merger within the scope of the Act had come to the attention of the
13 Although as was shown in Chapter 2, even in the area of monopolies, a degree of political involvement was 
deliberately retained by policymakers.
14 By 1980, it had happened only five times. The third time that it happened -  with respect to the take-over of 
J.B. Eastwood by Imperial Tobacco -  Sir Gordon Borrie expressed his annoyance in the Annual Report 
Wilks (1999: 289) comments that this indicated that “the OFT was exhibiting an increased confidence and 
independence”.
15 The source for this section is the 1978 guide published by the Office.
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Office,16 was to approach the financial advisers of the companies concerned, or the
17companies directly, so as to establish the main facts of the case. The Office would then 
make a preliminary assessment as to whether the merger appeared to come within the scope
I Q  | Q
of the Act using two tests: the assets test and the share o f market test. If neither test 
was satisfied, the Office would take no further action. If the merger did fall within the 
scope of the Act, the Office would seek an early meeting with the parties -  separately when
•  2 1  ' i i idealing with a contested merger, but sometimes together in the case of a friendly bid. The 
purpose of the meeting was to enable the parties to put forward their views about the public 
interest implications of the merger. Often, the Office would also receive comments from 
other companies affected by the merger, and sometimes would actively seek out customers, 
suppliers or competitors of the parties as well as relevant trade associations and trade 
unions. Through all of this, confidentiality was emphasised as being of primary importance.
After receiving views, the OFT officials would come to a decision on the public 
interest implications of the merger or proposed merger. The 1978 guide expresses well its 
approach (at ppl3-14):
Each case falling within the scope of the Act is looked at on its own particular 
merits and not in accordance with any fixed rules or assumptions; the aim in each 
case being to assess and balance the advantages and the disadvantages to the 
public interest. Although the maintenance of adequate competition is one of the 
important considerations in selecting mergers for reference, judgements on the
16 Proposed mergers would come to the attention of the Office either directly through the parties themselves 
or through press reports. Companies and their financial advisers did not have the duty to inform the Office, 
but in practice most did so.
17 Later in the 1978 guide, the Office sets out some of the questions it would ask at this stage. Firstly, it would 
ask about the companies involved -  their main operating figures, profits, turnover and so on, their main 
suppliers and customers. It would then find out about the industry or market affected by the merger, before 
turning to the merger itself: what kind of merger it is, the motives behind it, the extent to which the two 
companies supply similar goods or services. It would also ask about the future plans of the companies 
merging, including the implications in terms of redundancies.
18 There is a further criterion which would have to be satisfied: once made public, there is a time limit of six 
months after which time a merger is immune from reference.
19 Section 67 of the Act -  a reference to the gross value of the assets of the target company. According to 
Whish (1993: 682), most mergers references are made on the basis of this test as it is easier to calculate.
20 Section 68 of the Act: the share of market test is only satisfied if the merger itself creates or enhances a 
monopoly situation (defined as a combined share of over 25%).
21 Sometimes, companies would apply to the Office for confidential guidance at an early stage. This would 
often be beneficial, for instance, for companies considering a target and wanting to know whether it is likely 
that a bid would be referred to the MMC. When asked for guidance, the Office would normally try to provide 
it within six weeks, although it would always insist that it could not be bound by the guidance as, due to the 
confidential nature of the approach, it would not yet have been able to gather the views of other interested 
parties.
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competition aspects are made in a practical and not a theoretical way, in the light 
of actual market conditions and expectations; and weight is given also to other 
significant economic and social aspects.
With this approach it is not possible to publish a few simple rules from which 
it can be readily determined whether or not a particular merger is likely to be 
referred... The advantage of having published criteria of this sort would be 
outweighed by the disadvantages of rigidity...
From time to time, in statements in Parliament or in public speeches,
Ministers may wish to stress particular aspects of their approach to this pragmatic 
system of merger control as being particularly apt in the circumstances of the 
time, and to bring it in line with their general industrial policies. And it is for the 
Government of the day to decide how stringently the legislation is to be operated.
When the Director General considers the advice he should give to the Secretary 
of State, he naturally takes account of the Government’s known policies.
This was thus the exact opposite of a juridified approach -  “not in accordance with any
fixed rules or assumptions”, “pragmatic”, and influenced by political statements. And in
the above quotation, it is also possible to find the main reason why juridification was 
deliberately avoided -  so as to avoid “rigidity”. This was to be a recurring theme: the 
flexibility of the mergers regime was put forward as its chief strength in each of the 
following two decades.
The political and discretionary nature of merger control was further both reflected 
in and enhanced by the existence of the Mergers Panel. The Panel pre-existed the Office, 
created following the Monopolies and Mergers Act 1965, although it was not a creature of 
statute. Its main purpose was to enable other government departments with particular 
interest in a merger’s implications to offer their views. Following the creation of the Office, 
the Panel was chaired either by the Director General or, more often, by the Deputy Director 
General. It convened at what was clearly a crucial stage in proceedings: separating the 
preliminary decision of the Office staff from the final advice given to the Secretary of State 
by the Director General (or Deputy Director General on his behalf). Little however is 
known about the operation of the Merger Panel: as Whish (1993: 685) pointed out, “it is not 
publicly accountable and the reasons for its decisions are not disclosed”. Frazer (1992: 73)
22 Indeed, Dr Howe went even further than this, describing the process of merger advice as “more often than 
not, a second guessing exercise” -  Interview, 12* February, 2003. The approach of the Director General was 
criticised by the Trade and Industry Committee, arguing that “by accepting that he does choose to operate 
within stated government policy, Sir Gordon Borrie is, in our view, both limiting his independence and 
compromising the integrity of the advice he gives” -  Trade and Industry Committee, Takeovers and Mergers, 
1990-1 HC 226 xi London, HMSO, para 254.
23 See later sections in this chapter.
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wrote similarly: “[t]his committee is shrouded in mystery, neither its working methods nor 
its recommendations being made public.”24
The following table indicates the number of mergers that were eventually referred 
to the MMC in comparison with the number that were considered by the Office from 1974 
to 1979 (for a full list up to 1997, see Appendix two):25
1974 159 7
1975 157 4
1976 171 4r-ooi-H 8
1978 229 3
1979 257 3
Hence out of a total of 1160 mergers or potential mergers considered, only 29 (or 
2.5%) were referred to the MMC.26 Considering that in some of these cases the judgment of 
the MMC was that they would not be expected to operate against the public interest, these 
figures indicate a remarkably low level of intervention, thus continuing the trend that had 
started with the 1965 Monopolies and Mergers Act. It is necessary to be a little cautious: it 
could be that unfavourable confidential guidance led to the abandonment of several 
potential bids that otherwise would have been referred -  even so, the figures well-support 
Fairbum’s comment quoted above that “relatively few mergers were thought to give rise to 
public interest concerns”. Whish (1993: 679) stated it equally succinctly: “the system of 
control is benign and is essentially predisposed in favour of mergers”. In 1980, the 
minimum threshold for qualifying mergers was raised from £5 million to £15 million gross 
assets, thereby excluding a still greater number of mergers from direct control.27
24 Indeed, for a while, OFT officials were not even allowed to admit that the Mergers Panel existed -  if asked, 
they were told to deny any knowledge of it (Interview, Dr Martin Howe, 12* February, 2003).
25 It is slightly misleading to compare the number of mergers considered by the Office year-by-year, as the 
effect of inflation of the assets acquired criterion of £5 million or more meant that over time the legislation 
was impinging on an increasing proportion of the total number of mergers taking place in the economy. The 
threshold was subsequently raised to £15 million in 1980 and again to £30 million in 1984.
26 N.B. the figures exclude newspaper mergers. For an account of the policy and practice of newspaper merger 
control, see Whish 1993: 672-8
27 Subsequently increased to £30 million in 1984. It should be noted that in focusing on regulatory 
relationships, this thesis excludes other areas where juridification might have occurred. Although he does not 
use the term, Freyer (1992) does provide a more general consideration of juridification in the area of merger 
control, describing amongst other things the increasing use of the legal profession in an advisory role.
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• Restrictive trade practices
If we turn finally to restrictive practices, it is clear that even in this area there was 
room for flexibility and this was used by the Office as much as possible. In particular, the 
power of the Office to apply to the Secretary of State for exemptions on the basis that the 
agreement concerned did not raise sufficient public interest grounds was used extensively. 
Indeed, John Methven made his intentions clear in his very first Annual Report (AR 1974: 
11): “I intend to use this power as widely as is consistent under the terms of section 9(2).”28 
By the end of 1980, 345 representations had been made to the Secretary of State by the two 
Directors General and directions had been given in respect of 335 of them. This compares 
with 32 cases which actually went to the Restrictive Practices Court between June 1972 and 
the end of 1978. And most of these were not defended as they had been secret agreements -  
kept secret precisely because they were known to be unlawful under the Act.
The ability of the Office to exempt agreements from reference to the Restrictive 
Practices Court was a useful bargaining tool. By stating to parties that an agreement was 
currently of too much ‘significance’ for any exemption, the Office could negotiate for 
agreements to be modified in return for a representation being made. This was a power 
underlined by the large degree of discretion that lay in the interpretation of the word 
‘significance’, and there is little evidence that the Office tried to temper this discretion by 
adopting clear guidelines. On the contrary: the Office insisted that each agreement was 
considered on its merits, and that its approach was pragmatic (AR 1980: 50).
It is arguable that some of the judgements that the use of this power entailed meant 
that the Office was making the kind of complex calculations that were supposed to be the
<1A
province of the Restrictive Practices Court. It has already been seen in the previous 
chapter how approved codes of practice would be exempted from reference to the court. 
The following indicates the Office’s approach towards one further type of agreement (AR 
1980: 51):
28 This subsequently became section 21(2) of the Restrictive Trade Practices Act 1976.
29 The Act provides for the Secretary of State to give directions to the Director General, on his representation, 
discharging him from taking proceedings in the Restrictive Practices Court in respect of an agreement on the 
grounds that the restrictions in it are not of such significance as to call for investigation by the Court.
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The recommendation by trade associations of standard terms and conditions for 
the supply or acquisition of goods and services is a common practice. Standard 
terms and conditions may often be desirable in the interests of both supplier and 
customer, especially where comparatively small firms with little or no legal 
expertise are concerned, as otherwise many contracts might be entered into which 
are not enforceable at law. The 1979 report stated that the recommendation of 
standard terms and conditions by an association is not regarded as necessarily 
having a significant effect on competition but, to ensure there is no likely 
detriment, the terms should be fair and reasonable to all concerned, not likely to 
mislead those who will use them, and not unnecessarily exclude variation to meet 
special circumstances and requirements. The benefit to customers of having 
standard conditions must be balanced against any detriment to them of being 
deprived of the freedom to secure more favourable terms than those likely to 
result from the restrictions imposed by them. In general, mandatory standard 
terms and conditions are not regarded as suitable for section 21(2) since they are 
not variable to meet special circumstances. In all cases the recommended terms 
and conditions are looked at clause by clause.
There is clear indication here that, despite some protestations to the contrary, the 
Office was not always restricting the scope of the term ‘significance* to the effect on 
competition.
Thus within the context of an apparently inflexible regulatory regime, the Office 
still aimed to retain as much flexibility as possible. Its relationships with parties to a 
registrable agreement were further characterised by discussion and advice rather than 
formalism, as indicated by the following extract (AR 1978: 9):
In many cases the parties to these agreements have preferred, after discussions 
with my staff, to abandon or modify significant restrictions rather than defend 
them before the Restrictive Practices Court. Reference to the Court can be a 
lengthy proceeding -  with good reason, since both sides (the parties and my 
Office) must be allowed reasonable time to do full justice to them. The 
alternatives however -  abandonment or modification of restrictions so that I can 
invite the Secretary of State in a particular case to relieve me of my statutory duty 
to refer an agreement to the Court -  can themselves also be time consuming. 
Particularly when long-standing practices are at stake, the parties to an agreement 
need to think through the consequences of giving up restrictions. This calls for 
much patient discussion between the parties and my staff, and a readiness to 
understand our respective positions -  which I am glad to say is commonly the 
case.
30 When presented with this suggestion, Lord Borrie thought that it was probably true but added that, rightly 
or wrongly, businesses were only too glad for matters to be resolved this way if it meant that they avoided an 
appearance in the Restrictive Practices Court (Interview, 21st January, 2003).
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Such discussions occupied most of the Office’s time in this area, and suggests that 
overall, there is a need to separate the context of the restrictive practices regulatory regime 
from the Office’s relationship with its regulatees under the Act. Whereas the former was 
. both formalistic and legalistic, the latter was neither. This is highlighted by the fact that the 
vast majority of work under the Restrictive Trade Practices Act 1976 was handled not by 
lawyers, but by administrative staff within the Office.31
The OFT’s approach to the Competition Act 1980
In 1980, a new Competition Act was passed in Parliament. It came in the wake of 
the Liesner Green Papers, in which attention was drawn to the types of practice typically 
criticised in MMC reports and proposals made to strengthen the existing competition policy 
regime. Frazer (1992: 194) explains why this was necessary:
The regulation of anti-competitive practices cannot be undertaken solely through 
monopoly control or the control of restrictive trade agreements. Both policies 
have limitations which may make them unable to cope with certain commercial 
behaviour which damages the competitive equilibrium. In monopoly policy, there 
is the need to show the existence of a dominant position, in either structural or 
effective terms. In the control of restrictive trade practices, there is the need to 
show the existence of an agreement, even though the concept of agreement is 
loosely defined. In UK and US policy there is therefore legislation which fills in 
the gaps left by other aspects of competition law...
From the point of view of the Office, the most important aspect of the Act was the 
introduction of a new procedure for control of anti-competitive practices. Under s3, the 
Director General had the power to carry out an investigation where it appeared to him that 
any person had been or was following a course of conduct which may amount to an anti­
competitive practice. Most cases originated from complaints.33 Where a complaint was
31 Interview with Mr Anthony Inglese, 13th February, 2003.
32 Although undoubtedly there was a degree of overlap between this Act and the Fair Trading Act 1973 -  a 
matter considered by Whish (1993: 119-20). He argues that the monopoly provisions of the Fair Trading Act 
tended to be used by the Office for industry-wide problems, whilst Competition Act investigations tended to 
be used for local cases or in cases where the issue was specifically the conduct pursued by the company 
concerned.
33 The reliance on complaints in a number of areas is problematic, as several commentators have pointed out: 
it is reactive, and it runs the risk of ignoring vulnerable groups which are less likely to make a complaint. A
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received, it was not always clear which of the Director General’s competition powers 
represented the most appropriate response to the particular problem, so preliminary 
enquiries had to be made of the persons concerned and sometimes with other interested 
parties. If the Director General decided to make use of Competition Act powers to initiate a 
formal investigation, he had to serve notice on the person to be investigated and on the 
Secretary of State. There was no time limit and a report was published at the end of it. 
Where anti-competitive practices were found, the report also had to state whether it was 
appropriate for the company to be referred to the MMC. In other words, the OFT 
investigation was only concerned with whether a practice existed and whether it was anti­
competitive -  it was then for the MMC to decide whether this was against public interest.
Faced with an incremental change in UK competition policy, the Office pursued 
an approach to this power of investigation that was similar to its other competition powers. 
This was highlighted at an early stage when the Director General emphasised two 
instances34 where he was able to resolve difficulties without having to launch an 
investigation (AR 1980: 12):35
I was content to accept assurances from the organisations that they would be 
instituting early changes to obviate the cause of discontent... This informal 
method of removing bars to proper competition seems to me to have the twin 
virtues of effecting speedy removal of uncompetitive practices without the 
necessity of a formal investigation by my Office and, perhaps, a subsequent 
inquiry by the MMC.
The first stage therefore, once the Office had decided that that the complaint 
received was important enough to justify further action,36 and once it had established that
1984 survey by the Office attempting to find out whether the complaints statistics received were 
representative of consumer dissatisfaction generally, suggested that the TSD/CAB returns were a fairly 
reliable guide to the relative importance, as cause of complaint, of different categories of goods and services 
(AR 1984: 16).
34 One concerned soda ash contracts of Imperial Chemical Industries (ICI), the other concerned the refusal of 
the BBC and Independent Television Publications Ltd to supply details of television programmes to free 
newspapers. The latter was however subject to a formal investigation, with the report published in 1984.
35 This is comparable to the Office’s approach to the Resale Prices Act 1976, not dealt with in this chapter. In 
1980, constructive contacts between the Office and companies also resulted in undertakings given concerning 
resale price maintenance by 3 manufacturers of toilet preparations -  Shulton (GB) Ltd., Revlon International 
Corporation and Lanvin Parfums Ltd (1980: 13). According to Dr Howe, this policy of avoiding prosecution 
was controversial within the Office, with some officials preferring a more deterrence-based approach.
36 The power was thus used responsively by the Office, rather than as part of some general strategy to increase 
competition.
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the complaint had substance to it,37 was to try to negotiate matters with the company
38concerned. Often agreement was reached successfully, with companies preferring to cease 
the anti-competitive practice rather than go through the expense and potential 
embarrassment of an investigation. On other occasions, however, companies either disputed 
the facts in the complaint or disputed that these practices could be interpreted as ‘anti­
competitive’. On this basis, the Office would then proceed with the investigation.
How juridified were these investigations? Certainly, there is virtually no evidence 
at all of Type I juridification. Companies were very rarely obstructive or confrontational, 
and indeed, it was the practice of the Director General to express his appreciation of the 
companies involved in the investigation reports.39 It is also worth noting that there was only 
one judicial review challenge in the eighteen years in which the Act was in force, a 
technical case relating to the Office’s terms of reference which had minimal impact on the 
Office’s procedures. Nor were the Office’s procedures adversarial: on the contrary, 
investigations were described as largely informal in nature, not dissimilar from Fair 
Trading Act investigations. Indeed, internally there was almost no difference: it was “the 
same sort of officials doing the same sort of interviews in the same sort of way”.40
There is some evidence that might be taken to suggest the existence of Type II 
juridification. Firstly, the Director General stressed that “in procedural terms, my Office 
should always be beyond criticism”, perhaps with the natural justice requirements of public 
law at least partially in mind. Secondly, the following comments from the Director General, 
made when the Act first came into force, indicates the original importance he attached to 
the value of precedent (AR 1980: 13):
It is also worth pointing out that no law can be effective, or understood by those it 
affects, if it is enforced in secret. If the practice of a company in a particular 
sector is found to be anti-competitive, others in the same sector are entitled to 
know. Over the course of time, a body of Competition Act ‘case law’ will be built
37 Before an investigation was started, the Office staff always made preliminary enquiries with the people or 
firm concerned to check that the complaint was factually correct and to give them the opportunity to put their 
side of the story. There was no requirement in the Competition Act 1980 to do this.
38 Many examples are listed in the Annual Reports, including Grey-Green Coaches’ decision to withdraw a 
free travel offer which might have had the effect of eliminating new competition; the British Gas 
Corporation’s agreement to provide more published information about the operation of its central heating 
activities; and the agreement by Halifax in response to general complaints about the practice of arranging 
their mortgagors’ insurance cover on mortgaged property. The majority of other societies then followed suit.
39 Every report issued by the Office contains this kind of statement normally within the first page or two.
40 Interview, Dr Martin Howe, 12th February, 2003.
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up by successive reports from my Office and the Commission and by 
undertakings given by companies, so that firms will be able to see what practices 
have been found to be unacceptable and to review their existing methods of 
business to avoid the possibility of investigation for a possible anti-competitive 
practice.
This has distinct parallels with the CRE’s notion that formal investigations could 
establish on the ground the types of cases that constituted indirect discrimination. Finally, 
in at least one case -  the Ford Motors investigation - some legal considerations did appear. 
Ford had patented the design to the replacement body parts on its motor vehicles and 
argued that this should override the anti-competitive effects of enforcing the patent so as to 
exclude independent manufacturers from reproducing these parts. The Office argued in 
particular that as there was a way in which Ford could get compensation for the investment 
put into the designs (i.e. by charging independent manufacturers for use of the designs), the 
refusal of Ford to allow any competition in this area was unjustified -  an argument 
ultimately accepted by the MMC. Following this decision, Ford finally reached an 
agreement, although it continued to press its claims in court ultimately up until a House of 
Lords ruling that it did not have design rights in the various body parts (at which point the 
Director General also released the company from its undertakings).41 Thus competition and 
intellectual property laws collided and it was up to the courts to find a path between them.
This case proved to be the exception rather than the rule, however, and ultimately, 
the balance of evidence points against any conclusion of juridification. Indeed, on closer 
inspection, each of the above points turns out to be positively misleading. Firstly, whilst it 
is true that the Director General referred to the need for procedural propriety, investigations 
(as noted above) tended to be carried out informally and were certainly not adversarial or 
court-like in nature. Thus the intent to be “beyond criticism” can be seen simply as 
reflecting a desire for good administrative practice as opposed to the prominence of legal 
considerations. Secondly, the notion that investigations under the Act might act as case-law 
was somewhat undermined by subsequent claims that each case was decided on a
41 Actually it was another case: British Levland Motor Corporation Limited v Armstrong Patents Company 
Limited [1984] FSR 591 that decided the matter. The Ford Motor action against Erik Veng (UK) Ltd was 
stayed whilst that case was decided, and following the House of Lords decision, the case was discontinued. 
See Ford Motor Company Limited v Erik Yens (UK) Limited and another. 6* May 1986, Chancery Division 
(unreported).
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pragmatic basis,42 and also by the unsystematic way in which cases were selected for 
Competition Act investigations.43 It is further undermined by the fact that very few reports 
of investigations refer to previous decisions — to be precise, four in the first twelve years of 
the Act.44 Even in these cases, reference to previous investigations serve as a statement of 
policy rather than as a commitment to binding precedent. And looking back on it, Lord 
Borrie seriously doubted that a body of case law was ever actually achieved, although Dr 
Howe was slightly less negative.45 Finally, on closer inspection, even the Ford Motor case 
was dominated largely by economic rather than legal discussion. The legal cases that are 
quoted are merely to give a background to the intellectual property background to the 
claims made by Ford. But this law is effectively excluded by the Office, insisting instead 
that its only task is to decide whether Ford’s behaviour is anti-competitive under the Act. 
And in making this decision, there is no reliance on legal cases at all.
All the remaining evidence confirms this lack of juridification in the relationships 
between the Office and its investigatees under the Competition Act. Even though 
investigatees quite frequently turned to lawyers for advice, the arguments put forward were 
rarely legal in nature. Rather, competition lawyers became familiar with the jargon of 
economics, and were used more for their general expertise than their specifically legal 
knowledge.46 On the side of the Office, a glance through the reports of the investigations 
reveals that, the Ford Motor case apart, not a single legal case is quoted -  there is not even 
reference to European case law. When asked whether its approach was characterised by 
economic rather than legal considerations, Dr Martin Howe replied, “Absolutely”.47 Put 
another way, the key question for the Office under the Act was as follows: as all firms aim
42 See, for instance, AR 1985: 11
43 See Utton (1993), who criticised the Office’s choice of cases as follows: “Approximately half of the cases 
involved ‘local’ or ‘regional’ markets rather than ‘national’. While some of these are important and may raise 
questions of wide applicability (e.g. competition in local bus services following deregulation) others have 
involved very small markets and appear to have little general importance for competitive issues (e.g. British 
Railways Board). Where resources devoted to competition policy are limited it can be aigued that they should 
be deployed in those areas where the gains to consumers are potentially the largest. Judging by the size of 
some of the markets involved in the anti-competitive practice enquiries it is not clear that such considerations 
have played a prominent part in the selection process.”
^  These were: Highland Scottish Omnibus Ltd, Southern Vectis Omnibus Co. Ltd, Kingston upon Hull City 
Transport Ltd and South Yorkshire Transport.
45 Dr Howe pointed to the Ford Motors and Black and Decker cases as examples of investigations which had 
the effect of developing the law.
46 Interview, Dr Martin Howe, 12* February, 2003.
47 Interview, 12th February, 2003.
212
to improve their competitive position, at what point does legitimate practice become ‘anti­
competitive’ practice? This is a matter of judgement and the Office could have treated it as 
a legal question, but never did so.
Finally, it is worth noting that, whatever the conduct of individual investigations, it 
is clear that the Competition Act 1980 had only a peripheral impact on competition policy 
as a whole. The following table indicates the investigations launched by the Office during 
the 1980s and their outcomes:
— B
TI Raleigh Industries Ltd Yes Yes
1980 Petter Refrigeration Ltd Yes No
Arthur Sanderson & Sons Ltd No No
1981 Sheffield Newspapers Yes Yes
1981 London Electricity Board Yes Yes
1981 W M Still & Sons Ltd Yes No
1981 British Railways Board Yes No
1982 Scottish and Universal Newspapers Ltd Yes No
1982 British Railways Board Yes No
1983 Essex County Newspapers Ltd Yes No
1983 Thames Television Ltd No No
1983 Ford Motor Company Yes Yes
1983 British Airways Authority Yes No
1984 BBC Yes Yes
1984 BT No No
1984 Independent Television Publications Ltd Yes Yes
1985 Holmes McDougall Ltd Yes No
1986 The World’s Fair Ltd and Marcus 
Publishing pic
Yes No
1986 Sealink Harbours Ltd Yes No
1987 Southern Vectis Omnibus Co. Ltd Yes No
1987 Becton Dickinson UK Ltd No No
1988 W Stevenson and Sons Yes No
1988 UniChem Ltd Yes Yes
1988 South Yorkshire Transport Ltd Yes No
1988 West Yorkshire Road Car Company Ltd No No
1988 Black and Decker Yes Yes
1989 Highland Scottish Omnibuses Ltd Yes Yes
1989 Kingston-upon-Hull City Transport Ltd No No
1989 Oracle Teletext Ltd No No
1989 Wales Tourist Board No No
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1990 British Coal Corporation No No
1991 none - -
To sum up: in the first twelve years following the coming into force of the 
Competition Act 1980, the Office launched 31 investigations, in which 22 uncovered anti­
competitive practices, and in only 9 of these cases was there a subsequent referral to the 
MMC. Normally, where a referral was not made, this was because an undertaking was 
accepted instead. In any case, this figure of nine MMC references in ten years compares 
to the figure of around 1000 complaints about anti-competitive behaviour received by the 
Office each year. Frazer (1992: 198-9) speculates as follows:
This low number may indicate that the earlier [Competition Act] reports have had 
a modifying effect on the behaviour of UK firms, or that informal processes are 
proving successful. It may equally be a reflection of choice with respect to 
resource allocation within the OFT generally.
Whish (1993: 114-5) does not consider the first (rather optimistic) possibility, but he does
pick up on the other two and offers some suggestions of his own: caution following on
from initial criticism of early reports, a limited number of complaints from the public, a 
lack of guidance from the MMC as to the behaviour which was to be considered anti­
competitive, and the impact of Article 86.49 Of these explanations, the one based on a 
limited number of complaints seems slightly implausible given that the Office was 
receiving over 1000 complaints per year (albeit that many of these may have not related to 
the type of behaviour outlawed in the Act). The impact of initial criticism of early reports is 
also open to question, given that even in the first few years of the new regime, the Office 
never launched more than four investigations per year. The most plausible explanations 
therefore are the two upon which both commentators are agreed: administrative resources 
and the reliance on informal processes. This proposition is reinforced by the fact that both
48 This happened in nine cases. Out of the remaining four, two were thought to have an insignificant effect on 
competition, in one the practice had ended, and in the other one, other companies were pursuing the same 
course of conduct.
49 Whish makes two arguments here: firstly that as Article 86 included sanctions for the abuse o f a dominant 
position, many firms would try to comply with its provisions -  thereby incidentally complying with the 
Competition Act 1980; secondly, that for the same reasons, victims of an abuse of dominant position would 
be more likely to bring an action based on Article 86 than to campaign for the Director General to launch a 
Competition Act investigation.
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of these very much fit with the general pattern of competition regulation pursued by the 
Office. It is worth recording what Whish (1993: 114) writes in relation to these two factors:
The DGFT is often able to effect quick informal settlements of disputes without 
launching a formal investigation; as already noted, several examples of this 
having happened are given in his Annual Reports, and one can only guess how 
many potential investigations have been rendered unnecessary by a stem letter or 
an appropriate telephone conversation... [In addition,] there is the important 
point that investigations of anti-competitive practices involve a considerable 
administrative burden and both the OFT and the MMC are handicapped by a lack 
of resources....50
Due largely to both these factors therefore, the Act did not lead to juridification: it 
was rare for the Office to utilise its powers under it, and it still relied predominately on 
informal approaches to achieve its policy goals. The actual conduct of investigations was 
dominated completely by non-legal values and considerations. Ultimately, the Competition 
Act 1980 was a disappointment to the Office. Enormous amounts of resources were spent 
on potential cases that were never followed through, and it quickly became clear that the 
Act had done little to solve the problems identified in the 1978 Liesner Report.51
Monopolies and mergers 1980-1991
Despite broader macro-economic changes, in terms of the Office’s approach to 
monopolies and mergers during this period, little changed from the 1970s. The Office 
continued to make or advise references sparingly in both monopoly and merger cases, and 
its follow-up work continued to be based on securing appropriate undertakings, even if an 
agreement took several years to reach.52 In the case of mergers, this continuity of approach 
occurred despite the appearance of mega-mergers and the ‘merger-mania’ that accompanied 
them. The response of the Director General was that “the fact that the assets of a target
50 The Deregulation and Contracting Out Act 1994 attempted to address the problem of lengthy procedures by 
enabling binding undertakings to be accepted by the Secretary of State in lieu of an MMC monopoly 
reference. The Act did not, however, increase the Office’s powers of investigation, nor did it increase the 
deterrent effect of existing legislation. And the undertakings, once agreed, could not quickly be reopened in 
the light of subsequent experience of their effect. In practice, therefore, these powers were not exercised. See 
AR (1997: 11)
51 Interview with Lord Borrie, 21st January, 2003.
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company amounted to more than a billion pounds was almost irrelevant — what was more to 
the point was whether a merger might have adverse effects on the public interest and, in 
assessing the public interest, my primary concern.. .has been whether competition would be 
adversely affected” (AR 1985: 12). Meanwhile, the low level of intervention continued -  a 
feature of merger control that was very much Government policy, as the 1988 DTI report or 
so-called “Blue Paper” made clear.53
As such, it is proposed not to devote further space to the Office’s monopolies and 
mergers work in the 1980s except to make the following four points. The first is the way in 
which the Office increasingly was able to secure change informally by threatening a 
reference to the MMC. A good example of this was the reviews of restrictions in various 
professions which had been announced by Minister of Corporate and Consumer Affairs in 
1985. Four reports were then published in 1986. The Minister welcomed the reports and 
asked the Director General to discuss the recommended changes to the rules with the 
relevant professional bodies concerned. Such discussion closely resembled the contacts 
between the Office and various trade associations in its consumer protection work, the 
major difference being perhaps the ability of the Office to use a reference to the MMC as a 
bargaining counter. Indeed, with two of the professional bodies -  the bodies representing 
osteopaths and consulting civil engineers, a reference was the eventual outcome. Bodies 
representing chiropodists and physiotherapists, however, did agree to relax their rules in 
accordance with the Director General’s recommendations. In related work concerning 
advertising restrictions, the General Dental Council agreed to amend its rules, whilst the 
General Medical Council refused and was thus also referred to the Commission. Such 
contact indicates well how the Competition Division shared the same basic approach to its 
contact with regulatees as the Consumer Protection Division.
The second is the following practice that developed with respect of prospective 
mergers, as described by Whish (2001:815-6):
A practice grew over a number of years of companies negotiating undertakings
with the DGFT to remedy any possible detriments to the public interest, in
52 A full list of the Office’s monopoly references can be found in Appendix I.
53 See e.g. at p6 -  “intervention by public authorities in lawful commercial transactions should be kept to a 
minimum, since broadly speaking the free commercial decisions of private decision-makers in competitive 
markets result in the most desirable outcomes for the economy as a whole.”
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consequence of which a recommendation would be made to the Secretary of State 
to refrain from referring the merger to the Commission. This ‘plea-bargaining’ or 
‘fix-it-first’ approach to merger control had no statutory basis, but this was 
provided by sections 75G to K of the FTA, introduced by section 147 of the 
Companies Act 1989 and amended by section 9 of the Deregulation and 
Contracting Out Act 1994. These provisions enable the Secretary of State to 
accept binding undertakings in lieu of making a reference to the Commission.
The Companies Act 1989 provides for the possibility of structural undertakings, 
and the 1994 Act for behavioural ones. Undertakings in lieu of a reference can be 
used only where the DGFT has recommended that a merger should be referred to 
the Commission, and only to remedy or prevent the adverse effects that he has 
identified.
The irony in this informal practice subsequently being crystallised in legislation54 
should not obscure the fact that it is yet another good example of the generally non- 
legalistic and flexible nature of the relationship between the Office and its regulatees in this
Thirdly, it is worth noting that in the 1988 DTI report on mergers, the Government 
explicitly responded to criticisms from some companies about the vagaries of the reference 
process. It had been argued that there was a “lack of clarity and predictability in reference 
decisions” and thus that there should be published guidelines explaining in what 
circumstances a merger was likely to be challenged. The arguments were rejected, however 
on the following basis (DTI 1988: 6-7):
It is not possible to set out rules of thumb which can be straightforwardly or 
mechanically applied to all cases: there is an irreducible element of judgement 
involved in assessing the likely effect of a merger on competition, which cannot 
be captured in formulae or statistics, and flexibility is essential in dealing with the 
unique circumstances of each case.
For the time being at least then, there were to be no guidelines on what would 
prompt the Office to advise in favour of a merger reference. This was subsequently backed
54 As a result of the 1988 Review. It was made so largely because under the law as it stood, if a company then 
went back on an undertaking, the only thing that the Secretary of State could do was to withdraw his 
clearance on the merger and make a reference after all. However, this was a “cumbersome” procedure: “it is 
always better to remove the objectionable features of a merger from the start than to unscramble the merger 
after the event because it is unacceptable”. The legislation also gave the Director General the ability to initiate 
the proposals for structural change rather than just respond to the proposals of prospective bidders. See DTI 
(1988: 16-17)
55 The other main recommendation made in this paper was for there to be a system of voluntary pre- 
notification of mergers to the Office. By 1991, Sir Gordon Borrie was reporting that 20% of referable mergers 
were being voluntarily pre-notified to the OFT under this new law.
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up in a 1991 Trade and Industry Committee report,56 in which it was acknowledged by DTI 
officials that there was “a long-standing debate between the relative advantages of 
predictability and flexibility in any competition or anti-trust system”, but concluded that 
“the remaining flexibility of the system [was] very much to everyone’s advantage, rather 
than having a mechanistic system which could lead to unnecessary references at enormous 
burden to industry as well as to the authorities concerned”.57
The final point to make is that as with some aspects of its consumer protection 
work, the Office did perceive an increasing threat of legal challenges by its regulatees 
during this period.58 It is important though not to exaggerate the level of this threat. The 
only actual judicial review application during the 1980s was the Lonrho case,59 in which a 
rival bidder for the House of Frazer attempted to influence the reference process. The 
attempt was unsuccessful, however, and appears to have been used more as a delaying 
tactic than as part of a genuinely adversarial legal relationship with the Office. More 
generally, the failure of this application reflected closely the fate of all the other judicial 
review applications in the field of competition policy, whether directed against the DGFT, 
the Secretary of State or, most commonly, the MMC. In the end, the discretionary and non- 
legal structure of the reference process was such as to make it virtually immune from 
successful legal challenge, and this knowledge on the part of OFT officials meant that 
worries of judicial review played little role in their decision-making.
Tackling restrictive practices: the move towards legislative reform
In the previous section on the Office’s approach to restrictive agreements, it was 
pointed out that the Office was prepared to be as flexible as the legislation allowed. This 
manifested itself in the extensive use of its power to ask the Secretary of State for a
56 Trade and Industry Committee, First Report on Take-overs and Mergers, HC Paper 90, Session 1991-92, 
§90
57 In the same report (§77), the evidence of OFT officials was recorded as follows: “The Office of Fair 
Trading has told us ‘the UK system is... an administrative one with a considerable degree of discretion for the 
DGFT, the MMC and the Secretary of State’...”
58 Interviews with Lord Borrie, Dr Howe and Mr Inglese bore this out.
59 Lonrho pic v DGFT [1986] ICR 550
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direction to discharge him from its duty to refer all restrictive agreements to the Restrictive 
Practices Court. During the 1980s, this trend continued. In the 1986 Annual Report, it was 
indicated that normally an offer was made to discuss with the parties to an agreement how 
restrictions could be modified to allow this course of action to be taken, and that “in 
practice, most agreements are dealt with this way” (AR 1986: 29).60
Occasionally, it was not the flexibility of the Office so much as politics that got in 
the way of an agreement reaching the Restrictive Practices Court. The most striking 
example was the government decision to exempt the Stock Exchange from the Restrictive 
Practices legislation in 1983, thus bringing to a premature end preparation for the case that 
had been ongoing since 1979. The reaction of the Office was initially one of extreme 
disappointment (AR 1983: 9-10):
I cannot pretend that the Government’s decision to relieve me of my duty to bring 
the case to court was not a blow to the Office. The views of a wide range of other 
financial institutions, industiy and investors had been sought... The court 
hearing... would have brought out all the various public interest issues -  the 
advantages of competition, the needs of investor protection, the imperatives of 
international competitiveness and so on. The court’s considered judgment would 
have provided a highly informed basis for the future organisation of the Stock 
Exchange.
However, it soon became clear that most of the existing restrictions would go 
anyway in continuing political contact, to the extent that the Office was able to point to the 
loosening of restrictions on competition taking place in the Stock Exchange as “a telling 
example of what my Office has been achieving -  and will continue to seek -  in 
manufacturing and service industries generally” {ibid.).
This aside, the Office continued to show a great deal of willingness to exploit any 
flexibility in the restrictive practices legislation so that registered agreements could be 
modified through negotiation rather than through the Restrictive Practices Court. Such an 
approach stood in contrast, however, to its attitude towards unregistered agreements or 
secret cartels. As this is something that came increasingly to the fore towards the end of the 
1980s, we will focus on its approach to such agreements in this section.
60 Whilst this does point to the degree of flexibility of the Office, it also points to the how the restrictive 
practices legislation was not targeting the agreements that it needed to target. Too much of the Office’s time 
was spent processing agreements which had been registered but were of little significance. For more on this, 
see below.
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Essentially, the Office only had limited powers in respect of unregistered 
agreements. Normally, the catalyst for any investigatory work was a complaint. Its first 
available step, if it was suspected that an unregistered agreement might be operating was to 
issue a Statutory Notice under s36 of the Restrictive Trade Practices Act 1976, requiring 
that the particulars of the agreement be furnished. It could also make an Order under s35(3) 
of the Act, restraining the parties from giving effect to the agreement without first 
submitting particulars for registration. Breach of this order constituted a contempt of court, 
and the first such contempt finding was reached in 1980 against four suppliers of concrete 
pipes, with fines totalling £185,000. One of these suppliers then had an appeal dismissed by 
the Court of Appeal.61 This is what Sir Gordon Borrie thought about these procedures (AR 
1986: 12-3):
The current restrictive practices law dates back to 1956. It has some serious 
shortcomings, which are inherent in the legislation. Its procedures are complex, 
cumbersome and time-consuming. In some respects the legislation is also less 
effective than I would like. There are no penalties proscribed for those who 
ignore the law’s requirement that I should be notified of restrictive agreements: it 
is not uncommon for me to find that such agreements have been quietly practised 
for years. My powers to investigate suspected price-fixing or market-sharing 
cartels are, to say the least, modest. With almost Gilbertian absurdity, I find 
myself having to possess sufficient evidence of a cartel’s existence to convince a 
court before I can issue a formal notice to the parties enquiring if they have cartel 
agreement between them. The procedure for remitting a cartel to the Restrictive 
Practices Court is slow, stately and expensive for all concerned. The court’s 
powers (unless contempt of court has been committed by the breach of earlier 
orders) are confined to a judicial ‘Don’t do it again’.
Such concerns led to a review of policy being announced by the Secretary of State 
for Trade and Industry, Paul Channon, in 1986, and resulting Green and White Papers 
being published in 1988 and 1989 respectively. The papers proposed that the existing 
registration requirement should be abolished, and that instead, agreements and concerted 
practices with anti-competitive effects or objects would be prohibited, but with provision 
for exemption of agreements which would improve efficiency, technical or economic 
progress. These proposals were accompanied by calls for fines to be levied on both 
organisations and individuals who infringed the prohibitions. The proposals were not
61 This was not the only case that would come to court regarding concrete. Action against suppliers of ready- 
mixed concrete also resulted in contempt rulings and a series of subsequent appeals in the higher courts in the
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accompanied by a legislative timetable, however, and ultimately the Office had to wait until 
1998 for the reforms to be enacted. Its frustration was increased with a Court of Appeal 
ruling, striking down a contempt of court decision. In DGFT v Smiths Concrete Ltd..62 it 
was held that Smiths had not been party to the Bicester agreement subject to a previous 
order from the Restrictive Practices Court, that the company had taken all reasonable steps 
to prevent its employees from making such unlawful agreements and that its local manager 
had acted outside the scope of his authority. The Director’s reaction to the decision was as 
follows (AR 1991: 16):
Consequently, as things now stand, the law has the effect of requiring the Office 
to establish not only that individual employees have participated in a registrable 
agreement -  often difficult enough in itself -  but also that, in so doing, they were 
acting within the scope of their authority. That is bound to depend largely on 
what arrangements a company makes to secure compliance with the Restrictive 
Trade Practices Act 1976. The judgment makes even more urgent the need to 
reform and strengthen UK restrictive practices legislation.
Despite the Director General’s opinion of his powers to deal with secret cartels, he 
was increasingly willing to use them. The following table indicates the increase in the 
number of statutory notices issued under s36 of the Act from 1980 up to 1991, although the 
figures are a little deceptive as often several notices would relate to a single agreement:
1980 19
1981 22
1982 -
1983 20
1984 8
1985 28
1986 55
1987 22
1988 97
1989 32
1990 72
1991 71
early 1990s. The appeals were based on the decision of the Director General to prosecute for contempt not 
just the company but also some of its employees.
62 [1991] 4 All ER 150
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The figures perhaps mask the true level of increase in the Office’s investigatory 
work which resulted in an unprecedented 62 new investigations being launched in 1991 -  
twice as many as in the previous year. The increase was partially the result of a conscious 
decision within the Office to divert its resources away from section 21(2) work. Unlike 
section 21(2) agreements, cartels had “no redeeming features” -  there was no question 
normally of there being any justifications that could be raised in the Restrictive Practices 
Court.63 Moreover, it was felt within the Office that as the law was not backed up with a 
financial penalty, there were good reasons for believing that cartelisation was widespread.64 
Meanwhile, its ability to focus on unregistered agreements had been aided by the 
implementation of the Restrictive Trade Practices (Sale and Purchase and Share 
Subscription Agreements) Orders in 1989 which aimed to remove from the scope of the Act 
certain agreements that had no significant effect on competition.65 The effect o f the Orders 
was to reduce the number of agreements sent to the Office by 28% from 1989 to 1990, in 
the backdrop of a previously steady growth in the number of agreements being sent to the 
Office. This, accompanied with some streamlining of its internal procedures, increased the
63 However, Dr Howe would not go so far as to say that there was a “moral dimension” to the prosecution of 
secret cartels -  rather, he preferred to say that there was “no social justification”.
64 Interview with Dr Martin Howe, 12th February, 2003.
65 In particular, they excluded agreements for buying a business or more than 50% of a company’s shares, or 
which provided for share subscriptions in an issuing company, from registrability.
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ability of the Office to concentrate on agreements with potentially significant effects on 
competition.
The increase in investigatory work was accompanied by an increase in 
prosecutions, so that the same flexibility shown by the Office towards companies which 
registered agreements was not being shown towards companies which kept agreements 
secret. Discovery of covert cartels through complaints or MMC investigations nearly 
always resulted in the Office issuing an interim order under s35(3) of the Act, and making a 
subsequent referral to the Restrictive Practices Court. In nearly all of these cases, the 
referral in the Restrictive Practices Court was undefended -  not surprisingly, as usually the 
agreements were being kept secret in the first place precisely because they were known to 
be unlawful under the Act. In 1990, the Office’s hardening line resulted in four contempt 
orders against ready-mixed concrete suppliers,66 a mixture of court orders against and 
undertakings from 41 companies involved in price-fixing agreements in the glass 
manufacturing and distribution industries, a section 3 interim order (used for the first time) 
to prevent the Institute of Insurance Brokers from giving effect to the restrictions in an 
agreement until a full hearing could be arranged,67 and undertakings from eight 
manufacturers of steel reinforcing bars who had admitted to a price-fixing agreement. The 
Office was also preparing seven further court cases with respect to suspected unlawful 
agreements. This was a significant expansion in the Office’s enforcement action, and was 
legalistic in style, based around court appearances and legal argument.
The decision of the Office to allocate greater resources to the investigation and 
prosecution of secret cartels thus led to a corresponding increase in juridification. The 
legislation was unchanged and the Office’s attitude towards unregistered agreements was 
unchanged. But more resources meant the possibility of more prosecutions, and thus an 
increase in relationships governed by law and legal considerations. It should be emphasised 
though that this approach continued to stand in contrast to the Office’s attitude towards the
66 In re Supply of Ready Mixed Concrete [1991] ICR 52. Out of these four suppliers, three were advised that 
they were liable for the actions of their employees and admitted contempt. The fourth -  Smiths Concrete Ltd - 
appealed against the order in a case referred to above (Smiths v DGFT [1992]). The case was subsequently 
appealed by the Director General and is described later in the chapter.
6 In re Agreement between members of the Institute of Independent Insurance Brokers: Director General of 
Fair Trading v Institute of Independent Insurance Brokers and others [1991] ICR 822.
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vast majority of restrictive agreements that had been registered: juridification within this 
area of regulation remained the exception rather than the rule.
The build-up to the Competition Act 1998
The arrival of Sir Bryan Carsberg, previously the Director General of OFTEL, was 
marked by an immediate emphasis on the central importance of competition policy. In his 
first year in office, both the number of monopoly references and the proportion of mergers 
referred to the MMC (out of the total number considered) were the highest on record.68 The 
Office also launched 50 new investigations into suspected cartels. With his successor, John 
Bridgeman, also stressing the virtues of competition (and especially the need for the 
elimination of cartels -  described as the “number one priority”),69 the whole period up to 
the passage of the Competition Act 1998 saw a steady increase in the proportion of work 
undertaken by the Competition Division to the extent that in 1997, for the first time, it was 
allocated a higher proportion of the overall budget than the Consumer Affairs Division.
The increased focus on competition policy was accompanied by the first ever 
judicial review case actually to be heard70 against the Office in its competition work.71 The 
application was made by Southdown bus services, following a Competition Act 
investigation and a subsequent referral to the MMC. Southdown argued that the terms of 
reference were too wide in that they extended beyond the two routes specified in the 
Director General’s initial report. Its argument was accepted by the court and the reference 
to the MMC was modified accordingly. The case came soon after an unsuccessful judicial 
review attempt by two of British Airways’ competitors. In accordance with advice from the 
Director General, the Secretary of State had decided not to refer the British Airways bid for
68 In terms of monopoly reference, there were 3 main types under Sir Bryan Carsberg: competition in the 
recently liberalised bus industry, vertical restraints, and intellectual property cases. All of these areas tested 
controversial areas in competition law and policy.
69 The new emphasis was underlined by the establishment of the OFT Cartels Task Force in 1994, the main 
aims of which were to raise awareness of the pernicious effects of secret price-fixing and market-sharing 
agreements on business and consumers, and to encourage people to inform the OFT about existing 
agreements.
70 I.e. to clear the hurdle of leave being granted. In Lonrho nlc v DGFT [1986] ICR 550, referred to above,
leave was refused.
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Dan Air. The applicants argued that the merger raised issues in the UK under Article 86 of 
the Treaty of Rome which the Office had failed to address in its consideration of the case, 
but the application for leave was successfully contested - both at first instance and appeal.72 
In response to the cases, the following comment was made in the Annual Report (AR 1992: 
24):
Only time will show whether the Office is seeing the start of a new tendency 
towards the use of litigation under judicial review procedures, a trend with which 
other government departments have already become familiar. It should be said, 
however, that the Office acts on the basis that a great deal of what it does 
necessarily lies within the field of judicial review, and it has always paid 
particular attention to this consideration in its decision making.
The reference to the effect of the threat of judicial review is interesting, but the 
challenges of 1992 were not to be repeated. The 10% of the overall budget spent on legal 
services in that year was not matched in subsequent years (it fell to 6% a year later), and 
there were no further judicial review cases up to the passage of the Competition Act 1998. 
Moreover, the number of legal advisers working in the Office remained constant at twelve 
for the next four years, out of a total staff of over 400.73 In many respects, these figures are 
extraordinary. Consider, for instance, the increased volume and complexity of merger 
activity during the period, a complexity that for the Office was added to further by the 
Deregulation and Contracting Out Act 1994 which -  by allowing for the possibility of 
behavioural as well as structural undertakings being given in lieu of a reference to the 
MMC -  effectively transferred a great deal of decision-making to the Office. Consider also 
the increased number of investigations into unregistered restrictive agreements, as well as 
all the Office’s consumer protection work, including the new work under the Unfair Terms 
in Consumer Contracts Regulations. It is remarkable under these circumstances that the 
number of legal advisers employed by the Office remained constant, and the statistic 
supports the contention that the Office’s approach was far more administrative than it was 
legal.
71 R v Director General of Fair Trading and Others [1993] 12 TrLaw 90
72 R v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, ex parte Airlines of Britain Holdings Pic and Another [1992] 
The Times 10 December 1992. Mr Anthony Inglese described the case as a good example of law being 
resorted to as a tactic (Interview, 13th February, 2003).
73 The total level of staff was gradually declining during this period: in 1993 there was a total staff of 428, in 
1994 -  420; 1995 -  410 and 1996 -  402, after which the numbers started to rise again.
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Mr Anthony Inglese, legal director of the OFT during the 1990s, backs up this 
observation with a few additional comments about the role of law and lawyers within the 
Office. Lawyers had little impact on policy development within the Office - indeed several 
thought that they should have more influence, especially in relation to consumer protection 
policy. Their role therefore was largely to provide legal support to the administrative work 
of the Office staff. In 1992, for the first time, some legal training was introduced for Office 
staff. However, this did not reflect a growing prominence given to law and legal 
considerations -  rather, it was designed to ensure that Office staff knew when they needed 
to turn to the lawyers and, just as importantly, when they did not need to do so. It was felt 
that occasionally there had been a degree of sloppiness in passing work to the Legal 
Division which should have been dealt with elsewhere. The training itself was short,74 and 
not designed to turn the administrators into lawyers, but simply to enable them to know 
when and how to work with lawyers. Finally, in terms of court appearances, Mr Inglese 
confirmed that the Office would never try to take a case to court in order to test a legal 
position: this way of using the law simply was not considered an option.
This does not mean that there was no action taking place in the courts. The legal 
battle over the Bicester ready-made concrete cartel dragged on and on, for instance. 
Eventually, in DGFT v Pioneer Concrete (UK) Ltd. and another.75 the Lords overturned the 
Court of Appeal’s decision,76 ruling that companies are indeed legally responsible if their 
employees participate in unlawful secret cartels in the course of their employment, whether 
or not these companies forbid their employees to enter into such agreements. This was a 
victory for the Office, which commented that the decision “served to strengthen the hand of 
the OFT in renewing its efforts to uncover and deal with secret price-fixing or market- 
sharing cartels”.77 Meanwhile, occasional contempt cases continued to be brought to the 
Restrictive Practices Court, one of the most dramatic again relating to ready-made concrete 
agreements. In imposing record fines totalling £8,375,000 on 17 companies, the President 
of the Restrictive Practices Court, Mr Justice Buckley, said “Such behaviour is intolerable. 
This blatant disregard of court orders strikes at the rule of law and public interest”. Five
74 The governmental guide “The Judge Over Your Shoulder” was there for people who wanted to read it, but 
the training itself was only a couple of pages of material.
75 [1994] 3 WLR 1249
76 DGFT v Smiths Concrete Ltd [1992] -  see above.
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individual directors of the companies left with further fines and warnings of custodial 
sentences if the collusion continued (AR 1995: 11). Thus marked the culmination of almost 
twenty years of the Office chasing price agreements relating to concrete.78
These cases and some important legal work under the Resale Prices Act apart
7 0though, there was extremely little evidence of juridification prior to the passage of the 
Competition Act 1998. The vast majority of the competition work of the Office was being 
done by non-lawyers, without recourse to the courts, and influenced by non-legal factors. 
Thus in overseeing changes in the milk market and in the financial services sector, in its 
heavy involvement with the restructuring of the broadcasting industry,80 and in its 
consideration of high-profile bids and acquisitions, the contacts between the Office and its 
regulatees remained non-legalistic and based around negotiations and informal contacts. At 
the time of the debates over the contents of the new Competition Bill in the two Houses of 
Parliament, this was the overriding theme.
Conclusion
Up until 1998, the evidence overwhelmingly points to an absence of juridification 
between the Office and its regulatees in the field of competition policy. In the area of 
monopolies and mergers, original choices made as far back as 1948 in favour of an 
administrative rather than legal style of enforcement were still heavily influential. In many 
ways little had changed since then. The Competition Act 1980 also failed to lead to 
juridification, despite the hope that it might lead to a body of case law. Even restrictive 
trade practices were largely dealt with through administrative means. A legalistic, 
formalistic system was interpreted as flexibly as possible by an Office keen to avoid
77 See AR 1994: 34.
78 The concrete cartels became Lord Borrie’s favourite examples when referring to the weaknesses of the 
competition regime in the course of the debate on the Competition Bill 1998.
79 In particular, the Office succeeded in striking down the Net Book Agreement by which publishers had been 
able to set the minimum price for retailers, and later it also succeeded in getting the 1970 Court Order which 
had allowed resale price maintenance on branded over-the-counter medicines discharged by the Restrictive 
Practices Court.
80 This included working closely with BSkyB as the competition implications of cable and satellite became 
apparent
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confrontational relationships with its regulatees. On the part of regulatees, there were very 
few legal challenges and only one successful challenge against the Director General in 25 
years -  a telling statistic. The following tables sum up this lack of juridification on the 
competition side of the Office’s work.
Type I juridification between the OFT and its regulatees (competition): 1973-1998
Frequent litigation 
X
No -  extremely little litigation over this period.
Coercive, inflexible regulatory strategy 
X
No -  the exact opposite: the Office was as 
consistently flexible and informal as possible.
Reliance on formal, legal processes 
X
No -  informal processes nearly always preferred.
Frequent prosecutions in response to breach of law 
X
No, although secret cartels prosecuted more 
frequently in the 1990s.
High presence / involvement of lawyers 
X
No -  at least not on OFT side.
Type II juridification between the OFT and its regulatees (competition): 1973-1998
Explicit legal argument 
X
Generally unimportant.
Regulatory contact seen as setting legal precedent 
X
Generally not relevant. Hope expressed that this 
would happen in the implementation of the 
Competition Act 1980, but not done in practice.
High presence / involvement of lawyers 
X
No -  at least not on the OFT side.
References to law and legal cases 
X
Not used as structure of monopoly, merger and 
restrictive practices control non-legalised.
Adoption of overtly legal values 
X
No -  for instance, in relation to merger controls, 
option of introducing guidelines resisted.
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Things were, however, about to change. In October 1995, John Bridgeman took 
over from Sir Bryan Carsberg.81 In his first Annual Report, he stressed that “education goes 
hand in hand with regulation. The most responsible piece of legislation is worthless if 
nobody knows about it”. It was with this adage in mind perhaps that he supervised a mass 
of promotional activity from the passage of the Competition Act 1998 until it came into 
force in March 2000 -  a necessary step since the new Act was to give effect to the biggest 
change in UK competition policy since the Second World War.
Nor did the Competition Act 1998 only change the substance of UK competition 
policy. As we shall see in the next chapter, the 1998 Act was also to have a decisive impact 
on the style of its enforcement, and by extension on the nature of the relationship between 
the Office and its regulatees.
81 Sir Bryan resigned in May 1995 to take up the post of Secretaiy-General to the International Accounting 
Standards Committee.
Appendix one: monopoly references and outcomes 1974-9
1974 Supply and export of 
insulated wires and 
cables
Report published August 1979. Investigation uncovered 
unregistered agreements, leading to four cable-makers agreeing to 
repay £9 million to the Post Office.
1974 supply of ‘diazo’ 
sensitised copying 
materials
No adverse public interest findings (report published March 1977)
1975 pet foods No adverse public interest findings (report published July 1977)
1975 ceramic sanitary­
ware
No adverse public interest findings (report published August 1978)
1976 wholesale supply of 
petrol
No adverse public interest findings (report published January 
1979). However, review suggested of extent to which oil companies 
are owners of retail petrol outlets so as to determine whether future 
reference would be appropriate. Disappointment expressed by 
DGFT as to MMC’s narrow interpretation of terms of reference.
1976 wholesale supply of 
national newspapers 
(England)
No adverse public interest findings (report published June 1978)
1976 wholesale supply of 
national newspapers 
(Scotland)
No adverse public interest findings (report published June 1978)
1976 ice cream Report published August 1979. Found that complex monopoly 
existed operating against the public interest. Discussions between 
the Office and 26 monopolists resulted in undertakings being 
announced in 1982.
1976 metal fasteners No report published -  time extension not granted by Secretary of 
State and reference ceased to have effect.
1977 supply and export of 
electricity supply 
meters
Report published August 1979. Existence of price notification 
agreement between manufacturers found to operate against public 
interest. Commission also considered that buying policies of area 
electricity boards could usefully be reviewed to inspire a more 
competitive atmosphere in the supply of meters. At request of 
Secretary of State, Office entered into discussions with parties 
concerned as to what action should be taken to implement MMC’s
findings.
1977 supply of credit card 
franchise services
Report published September 1980. Found that ‘no discrimination’ 
policy operated against the public interest. Undertakings agreed 
with credit card companies over provision of information so that 
DGFT could keep market under review.
1977 supply of domestic 
gas appliances
Report published July 1980. Found that gas appliance retailing 
monopoly of the British Gas Corporation operated against the 
public interest. Government decided that British Gas would be 
required to cease selling domestic appliances and dispose of their 
showrooms over a five-year period and that legislation to enforce 
this would be introduced if necessary.
1977 supply of trading 
check franchise 
services + trading 
check financial 
services
Report published December 1981. Provident Financial Group pic 
gave undertakings that, with certain exceptions, it would not 
preclude any retailer trading with the Group’s subsidiaries from 
acquiring such services elsewhere.
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1978 supply of roadside 
advertising services
Report published July 1981. British Posters Ltd gave undertakings 
to cease trading, and the two trade associations gave undertakings 
to delete clauses precluding a member from bidding for sites 
occupied by a fellow member of either association.
1979 supply of tampons Report published October 1980. Held that pricing policies of 
Tampax Ltd and Southalls (Birmingham) Ltd operated against the 
public interest. Undertakings agreed over provision of information 
as third company entered the market.
1979 supply of concrete 
roofing tiles
Report published November 1981. Held that scale monopolies 
operated against the public interest. Long negotiations led to 
undertakings being agreed in 1984, largely relating to the provision 
of information.
1979 supply of ready- 
mixed concrete
No adverse public interest findings (report published September
1981)
231
Appendix two: merger references
1974 159 7
1975 157 4
1976 171 4
1977 187 8
1978 229 3
1979 257 3
1980 182 5
1981 164 8
1982 190 10
1983 192 9
1984 259 4
1985 192 6
1986 313 13
1987 321 6
1988 306 11
1989 281 14
1990 261 25
1991 183 7
1992 125 10
1993 197 3
1994 238 8
1995 274 8
1996 276 11
1997 229 10
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CHAPTER 6
The OFT and the regulation of competition since the 
Competition Act 1998: juridification imposed by
legislation
Introduction
In Chapters 4 and 5, it has been argued that the Office’s approach to the regulation 
of competition and consumer protection remained largely non-legalistic over a substantial 
period of time from its establishment in 1973. Far from exhibiting signs of juridification, 
the regulation of competition and consumer protection was largely persuasive in nature, and 
dominated by non-legal considerations.
In 1998, however, Parliament passed a new Competition Act: a statute which not 
only changed the substance of competition law and policy, but which also changed 
dramatically the style of its enforcement. The Act was modelled upon existing European 
law, primarily to ensure consistency between overlapping competition regimes. Maher 
(2000) argued that the changes introduced a “process of juridification”, largely because the 
interpretation of the Act relied on European competition law, and thus the OFT’s detailed 
guidelines to the Act drew on and necessarily cited case law and decisions of the European 
Courts and Commission. However, Maher’s article was written before the Act had come 
into force and thus before the Office had launched investigations. Moreover, its focus is not 
on juridification as such (which, incidentally, is left undefined), but on the details of the 
legal provisions of the Act. Therefore, in this chapter, Maher’s account is both updated and 
focused more specifically on the question of whether the Act has led to juridification 
between the Office and its regulatees in the field of competition.
This chapter is divided into three main sections. In the first section, some of the 
main features of the Competition Act 1998 are set out, so as to provide a sense of the extent
235
of the changes that have been made to UK competition policy.1 Also considered in this 
section is the extent to which the Office of Fair Trading, as the body with primary 
responsibility for enforcement of the new regime, is given discretion within the Act. In the 
second section, the approach taken by the Office of Fair Trading to the interpretation of 
these provisions is described, with evidence taken first from the guidelines published by the 
Office and then from the Director General’s procedural rules. In the third section, an 
assessment is made as to the extent to which the Act has led to juridification of the 
relationship between the Office and its regulatees in the field of competition policy. The 
section begins by focusing on a specific case study in detail, before looking generally at the 
Office’s enforcement of the Act since it came into force.
An outline o f the Competition Act 1998
• Key features of the Act
Perhaps the best way to appreciate the changes introduced by the Competition Act 
1998 is to recall the main aspects of the previous regime. Neither anti-competitive 
behaviour by individual companies, nor anti-competitive agreements between companies, 
were offences. Indeed in both cases, there was quite a lengthy process before even the 
possibility of punishment arose. In the case of anti-competitive behaviour, it would have 
been necessary for there to have been a preliminary investigation by the Office, a full 
investigation by the MMC, and subsequent action by the Office with the agreement of an 
appropriate undertaking or imposition of a statutory order. Meanwhile, in the case of secret 
cartels (registrable agreements that had failed to be registered with the Restrictive Practices 
Court), the Office would have had to have reasonable suspicion that a registrable agreement 
was operating, so as to be able to furnish a statutory notice requiring that the details of the 
agreement be registered and an order restraining the parties from giving effect to the 
agreement without first submitting particulars for registration. In both cases, breach of the 
order or undertaking constituted a contempt of court, which could lead to a fine or even
1 Fuller expositions can be found in competition textbooks such as Whish (2001) and Rodger (1999).
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imprisonment. Even so, anti-competitive behaviour per se was neither illegal nor 
punishable.
Compare this state of affairs with the Competition Act 1998. The Act states that 
both anti-competitive behaviour by companies and anti-competitive agreements between 
companies are offences, punishable by heavy fines. The key ingredients of each offence 
were taken from Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty of Rome,2 and are worded as follows:
2(1) ...[A]greements between undertakings, decisions by associations of 
undertakings or concerted practices which -
a) may affect trade within the United Kingdom, and
b) have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of 
competition within the United Kingdom,
are prohibited...
18(1) ...any conduct on the part of one or more undertakings which amounts to 
the abuse of a dominant position in a market is prohibited if it may affect trade 
within the United Kingdom.
The offence set out in section 2 is known as “the Chapter I prohibition”, and that of 
s i8, “the Chapter II prohibition”, the names reflecting their EC law parallels.3 Examples of 
agreements that would breach the Chapter I prohibition (provided in s2(2) of the Act) 
include agreements to fix prices, to limit or control production and to apply dissimilar 
conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties. Examples of conduct that 
would breach the Chapter II prohibition (si 8(2) of the Act) include the imposing of unfair 
prices, limiting production to the prejudice of consumers and adding terms to contracts 
which have no connection with the subject of the contracts.
The Act places primary responsibility for enforcement of the new competition 
regime on the Office of Fair Trading.4 Although, there is no requirement for parties to 
notify the Office about agreements or conduct, the Act does provide certain incentives to do 
so.5 Thus, notification provides parties with provisional immunity from financial penalty 
from the time of notification until the guidance or decision has been given.6 The guidance
2 These have since been renumbered Articles 81 and 82 under the Treaty of Amsterdam.
3 The names are actually contained in the Act itself -  in sections 2(8) and 18(4) respectively.
4 This although the Office itself does not actually appear in the Act -  formally, it is the Director General of 
Fair Trading who has the powers and duties of the Act.
5 The Office has provided further incentives through its “leniency programme”. See below at X.
6 The parties can apply for either. The main differences between them are that decisions are published, and 
that with respect to favourable guidance, the Director General can take further action if a complaint is made
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or decision may indicate whether or not the agreement or conduct would be likely to 
infringe the relevant prohibition,7 with favourable guidance or decisions providing 
subsequent immunity from any financial penalty.8 Moreover, once the favourable guidance 
or decision has been given, the case cannot be reopened unless certain conditions are met.9
The increase of powers given to the Office only become apparent, however, with 
respect to undisclosed agreements or conduct. Subject to having reasonable grounds for 
suspecting that an undertaking10 is infringing either of the prohibitions, the Office has the 
power to require the production of any specified documents or information, at a time and 
place, and in the manner or form specified, take copies of any documents produced and 
require explanation of such documents.11 In certain circumstances, it is also empowered to 
enter the premises without a warrant and require production of any relevant documents.12 
Furthermore, for those cases where it is suspected that relevant documents would likely be 
concealed, removed, tampered with or destroyed, the Office has the power to seek a High 
Court warrant and subsequently enter and search the premises without notice, using such 
force as reasonably necessary.13 The Act also makes any interference with an investigation 
and failure to comply with any requirement imposed under investigatory powers an 
offence, punishable by a fine or even imprisonment in some cases.14
by a third party about the agreement or conduct in question. See generally sections 12 to 16 (agreements) and 
sections 20 to 24 (conduct).
7 Section 13(2) for guidance and 14(2) for a decision.
8 Sections 13(4) and 14(4) respectively. This is unless and until the Director General has reasonable suspicion 
that there has been a subsequent change of circumstances, and financial penalty can also be imposed 
retrospectively if it is later found that the original information was incomplete, false or misleading.
9 There has to be a reasonable suspicion either of a material change of circumstances or that the guidance or 
decision was based on incomplete, false or misleading information. As pointed out above, in the case of 
favourable guidance, the case can also be reopened if a complaint about the agreement or conduct is made by 
a third party. Moreover, for an agreement, the case can also be reopened if one of the other parties to the 
agreement subsequently applies to the Director General for a decision.
10 This is a term imported directly from European law, and is more precise than “company” as it has been 
defined by the ECJ in a number of cases. The effect of this was apparent recently, when a complainant 
appealed the Office of Fair Trading’s decision that it could not investigate the behaviour of a local authority 
as it was not an “undertaking” within the meaning of the Act. This decision was overturned by the 
Competition Commission Appeal Tribunal.
11 Section 26. This power is an extensive one, applying to any document relevant to the investigation and thus 
not necessarily only directed towards the party (or parties) suspected of having infringed one of the 
prohibitions.
Section 27. Two days written notice is required when the occupier of premises is not party to the agreement 
or conduct under investigation.
13 Section 28. Force may not be used against any person -  the intention behind this section was to enable 
officers to break padlocks and so on in order to access relevant buildings and files.
14 Sections 42 to 44.
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If the Office finds that a breach of either prohibition has occurred, it may give a 
direction to the parties concerned to bring the infringement to an end -  including a direction 
to modify or terminate the agreement or conduct.15 Subsequent failure to comply can then 
lead to a court order to enforce the direction,16 a breach of which would be punishable as 
contempt of court. Meanwhile, financial penalties of up to 10% of the UK turnover of an 
undertaking can be imposed for intentional or negligent infringement of either of the
•  •  •  17 • •prohibitions. Finally, investigatees are able to appeal an adverse decision in the 
Competition Commission Appeals Tribunal, with appeals possible on both the substance of 
decisions and on any penalties imposed.18 Decisions of the Competition Commission can 
be appealed with leave to the Court of Appeal on points of law and levels of penalty only.19
The following diagram sums up the structure of Act as described thus far:
Anti-competitive agreement
Chapter I
Abuse of dominant position
Chapter II
1........... . Notified to OFT?
Yes*-------------------
------
---------------------► No
Provisional immunity from financial penalty
OFT decision or guidance depending what is 
applied for. If decision...
I--------------- ► OFT decision *
If OFT has reasonable grounds for suspecting 
infringement 
OFT investigation, with strong powers of disclosure
I
If unfavourable decision, possibility of...
Fine -  up to 10% of turnover (if intentional/negligent infringement) 
Direction to bring conduct to an end 
[Court order if direction not adhered to, contempt of court if court order breached] 
_________ Appeal to the Competition Commission Appeals Tribunal_________
15 Sections 32 and 33.
16 Section 34.
17 Section 36. Under section 38, the Director General must prepare and publish guidance as to the appropriate 
amount of any penalty under the Act, and must refer to this guidance when setting a penalty. The Secretary of 
State’s approval is needed before the guidelines are published or modified.
18 Section 46. Under section 47, third parties can also appeal a decision.
19 Section 49.
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It was noted above that the main provisions of the Act were taken straight from EC 
law. The Act goes further, however, with section 60 reading as follows:
(1) The purpose of this section is to ensure that so far as is possible (having 
regard to any relevant differences between the provisions concerned), questions 
arising under this Part in relation to competition within the United Kingdom are 
dealt with in a manner which is consistent with the treatment of corresponding 
questions arising in Community law in relation to competition within the 
Community.
(2) At any time when the court determines a question arising under this Part, it 
must act (so far as is compatible with the provisions of this Part and whether or 
not it would otherwise be required to do so) with a view to securing that there is 
no inconsistency between -
a) the principles applied, and the decision reached, by the court in 
determining that question; and
b) the principles laid down by the Treaty and the European Court, and any 
relevant decision of that Court, as applicable at that time in determining any 
corresponding question arising in Community law.
(3) The court must, in addition have regard to any relevant decision or statement 
of the Commission.
(4) Subsections (2) and (3) also apply to -
a) the Director, and
b) any person acting on behalf of the Director, in connection with any matter 
arising under this Act.
Hence, the Act directly places a responsibility on the OFT to operate its powers in 
as compatible a way as possible with the EC competition regime. It is important to bear this 
in mind as we now consider the extent to which the Act leaves areas of discretion to the 
Office.
• Areas of discretion left bv the Act
The question of how much discretion is given to the Office under the Act is 
important for one main reason. This is that it allows us to separate between those aspects of 
the Office’s approach towards the interpretation and enforcement of the Act that are forced 
upon it by the Act and those aspects that are the result of other factors. It will be argued in 
this section that the Act imposes certain requirements on the Office that very significantly 
reduce its discretion to determine its style of enforcement. In particular, there are provisions 
within the Act that make juridification of the relationship between the Office and its 
regulatees not only likely, but perhaps even inevitable.
This does not mean that the Act does not leave significant discretion to the Office. 
Indeed, many areas of discretion have been left to the Office without specifically being
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mentioned. Thus, as with any enforcement agency, it ultimately falls to the Office to decide 
which information is acted upon and which allegations are pursued -  in short, how vigorous 
an enforcement policy to pursue. As section 25 of the Act states, the Office has power of 
investigation if there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the Chapter I or Chapter II 
prohibitions have been infringed -  note then, this is a power not a duty to investigate. There 
is further discretion inherent in the enforcement powers of the Office: discretion as to 
whether or not to impose a fine or directions, discretion as to whether to follow up non- 
compliance with a court order, and discretion as to whether to give directions before the 
investigation is completed in those cases where it is considered a matter of urgency for the 
conduct or agreement to cease. From a legal perspective, all these aspects of discretion stem 
from the fact that the Act provides the Office with powers rather than duties. From a 
political science viewpoint, however, such discretion is the only solution to limited 
resources of budget, staffing and time, enabling what would in any case have been 
essential: the setting of priorities.
Furthermore, there are some areas of discretion that are more specifically granted by 
the Act. Probably the most important of these is set out in section 4. The section empowers 
the Director General to exempt agreements from the Chapter I prohibition, with such 
conditions or obligations as he considers it appropriate to impose.20 These are called 
‘individual exemptions’, to be contrasted with ‘block’21 and ‘parallel’22 exemptions. 
Section 9 of the Act limits this discretion somewhat by detailing the criteria which need to 
be fulfilled for individual exemptions to be granted. Exemptions can be made for any 
agreement which contributes to improving production or distribution or promoting 
technical or economic progress while allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting 
benefit. However, the agreement also has to be examined to ensure that it does not impose 
restrictions which are not indispensable to the attainment of these objectives, and the 
Director General further has to be satisfied that the agreement will not give the participating 
undertakings the possibility of eliminating competition in respect of a substantial part of the
20 He further has the power to cancel an individual exemption he has granted, to vary or remove any of its 
conditions or obligations, or to impose additional conditions or obligations (s5).
21 which can be made by the Secretary of State following a recommendation by the Director General.
22 Le. parallel to exemptions within EC competition law made by the European Commission.
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products in question. Even so, the power to make exemptions enables the Office to make 
the sort of judgments which had previously been made by the Restrictive Practices Court.23
Yet at the same time as the Act increases the ability of the Office to make important 
judgements about the enforcement of competition policy, it also imposes constraints on 
both the process and the style by which these decisions are made. At first glance, section 51 
of the Act, providing the Director General with the power to make rules about “procedural 
and other matters” in connection with the Act might appear to be an important area of 
discretion:
(1) The Director may make such rules about procedural and other matters in 
connection with the carrying into effect of the provisions of this Part as he 
considers appropriate.
(2) Schedule 9 makes further provision about rules made under this section but 
is not to be taken as restricting the Director’s powers under this section.
Even without subsection 2, Schedule 9 would have suggested that there is a wide scope for 
such rules. Rules can be made specifying the form and manner in which notice of any 
decision is to be given, the procedure to be followed if the Director General takes further 
action with respect to an agreement or conduct after having decided that it does not infringe 
the Chapter I or II prohibitions, the circumstances under which the Director General will 
consider an extension to an individual exemption and the manner in which an application to 
do so is to be made, the circumstances in which the Director is required to give notice
before disclosing information given to him by a third party and the procedure to be
followed when the Director takes enforcement action under the Act. In total, Schedule 9 
sets out 14 aspects of the Act about which the Office has the power to make rules.
On closer inspection, however, it becomes apparent that section 51 is more
accurately interpreted as fettering the Office’s discretion than as adding to it. This is for two 
main reasons. Firstly, the rule-making powers themselves are subject to certain restrictions. 
The Director General has the duty to consult “such persons as he considers appropriate”, 
and no rule can come into operation until it has been approved by an order made by the
23 In fact, even before considering whether an individual exemption should be granted, the Office has a further 
area of discretion -  it has to decide whether the effect on competition is “appreciable”. Although this is not 
contained within the Act, it is an important principle of EC competition law, and in practice, this excludes far 
more agreements from the scope of the Act than the power to make exemptions. See below, the section on the 
Chapter I prohibition.
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Secretary of State.24 Moreover, the Secretary of State is specifically empowered to modify 
any rules submitted, although he does have to inform the Director General and to take into 
account any comments made. And if the Director General wants to make any changes to the 
rules, he has to go through the same process all over again. Thus there are political controls 
curtailing the freedom of the Director General to determine the contents of these rules. 
Secondly, and more importantly though, by recommending that procedural and other 
matters are formalised in rule-form and turned into legal rules through the use of secondary 
legislation, section 51 in effect serves to juridify all these aspects of the Office’s policies, 
significantly reducing its flexibility to deal with them on a case-by-case basis. Indeed, the 
Act does more than recommend the creation of such rules. Schedules 5 and 6 specify areas 
where the Director General has to refer to his rules, such that, for instance, “an application 
must be made in accordance with rules”,25 and that “when making a provisional decision, 
the Director must follow such procedure as may be specified”,26 and that “if the Director 
determines an application for a decision he must publish his decision, together with his 
reasons for making it, in such manner as may be specified”.27 Thus what appears from 
section 51 to be a power, emerges from Schedules 5 and 6 as an important duty
The juridification implied within section 51 of the Competition Act is, in any case, 
greatly increased by section 60 which, it will be recalled, establishes a duty for the Director 
General to exercise his powers in a manner consistent with European competition law.28 In 
terms of his approach towards the substantive provisions of the Act, the effect of this 
section must be dramatic. A glance through any competition law textbook reveals that 
European case law has interpreted virtually every major term contained in the Act. Hence, 
just with respect to the Chapter I prohibition, there is European case law on the meaning ol
24 See sections 51(3) and 51(5).
25 Schedule 5, section 2(1)
26 Schedule 5, section 3(3)
27 Schedule 5, section 6. It is worth noting also that some procedural requirements are already specificall) 
mentioned in the Act itself -  such as the requirement for the Director General to give written notice to the 
people likely to be affected by any proposed decision and to give those people an opportunity to make 
representations.
28 Lord Simon explained the purpose of section 60 as follows: “to ensure as far as possible that the UK and 
EC prohibitions are interpreted and develop consistently with the EC competition law system. This is oi 
critical importance in minimising burdens on business. The problems for business in having two similar, bui 
in their detail different, prohibitions interpreted according to two different bodies of case law could be very 
burdensome.”
29 See, for instance, Whish (2001), Korah (2001), Korah (2000).
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“undertaking”, “object and effect”, “prevention, restriction or distortion of competition”, 
‘participating undertaking”, “agreement” and “concerted practice”. Moreover, the 
European Court has also looked at types of agreements specifically mentioned in the Act: 
agreements to share markets, to limit production, to limit or co-ordinate investment, bid 
rigging agreements, information sharing agreements, and the scope of the exemption of 
agreements which “contribute to improving production or distribution, or promoting 
technical or economic progress”. At the very least then, section 60 requires the Office to be 
cognisant of European law and to seek an authoritative legal interpretation of the provisions 
of the Act.
Whilst consistency with EC law may seem like a straightforward enough principle, 
section 60 has already excited a great deal of debate. Willis (1999: 314) writes the 
following:
It is clear what section 60 is intended to achieve, namely consistency with EC 
case law, but its detailed application in practice promises to raise almost as many 
questions as answers; so much so that it has been dubbed the “Klondike clause”, 
in an allusion to the rich pickings predicted for lawyers.
The notion that legal complexity is one cause of litigation (and, by extension, Type 
I juridification) is intuitive, and has long been noted by theorists.31 Put simply, where the 
law is settled and its meaning clear, there is less likelihood of a dispute reaching the courts. 
Litigation is normally pursued only when the outcome is uncertain. Section 60 thus implies 
more for the Office than just the need to interpret clauses in line with EC law - it also 
implies that the Office might need to justify its interpretation of these clauses in the courts.
One of the main ambiguities in section 60 is that its true scope is uncertain. Does it 
apply just to substantive competition law issues, or does it extend to the Office’s 
procedures? There is already quite a substantial literature on this question, with the 
answer largely depending on how widely the phrase “in relation to competition” is
30 The Klondike was the name given to the American gold fields that were the location of last great gold rush 
in the 19* century.
31 See Posner’s cyclical model of litigation whereby legal uncertainty gives rise to a rash of lawsuits, the 
outcomes of which then clarify the legal position thereby stopping the flow of cases, before a change in 
environment begins the process again, [reference unknown]
32 E.g. Willis (1999), Goodman (1999), Maher (2000).
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interpreted.33 The question is further complicated by the fact that the European 
Commission’s procedures are in a state of flux.34
In the introduction to its draft procedural rules (made under s51), the Office wrote 
as follows:
The obligation to ensure consistency only reaches to the extent that this is 
possible having regard to any relevant differences. Section 60 does not require 
the UK authorities to follow the procedural practices of the EC Commission. The 
DGFT’s procedural rules therefore do not need to be consistent with the 
procedural practices of the EC Commission.
This reflected a statement of Lord Simon in the House of Lords that “in making the 
procedural rules, the DGFT is not obliged to secure that there is no inconsistency with EC 
procedural law since he will not be “determining a question” under Part I...”.35 However, 
certain ambiguities remained, partially because in another statement36 Lord Simon made 
clear that section 60 had deliberately not been limited purely to the meaning of Articles 85 
and 86 in isolation, so as to include “high level principles” of EC law.37 Willis (1999: 315) 
sets out the nature of the problem as follows:
It is clear that section 60 imports the “high level principles”, or basic procedural 
safeguards, but not necessarily the Commission’s procedural rules. The DGFT is 
therefore not required to adopt procedures identical to those laid down in 
Regulation 17... But it is not so clear whether the high level principles” imported 
under section 60 merely fill any gaps in the DGFT procedural rules, or impose an 
irreducible template for the rules.
In the next section, we will see how the Office has answered this question. Willis 
himself argues for the latter possibility. In any case though, the key point to be made here is 
that the question is a legal question, and therefore that the answer depends on legal 
considerations. This further points to the limits of the Office’s discretion in enforcing the 
Act in a non-legal, behind-the-scenes and flexible manner.
33 Due to the principle established in Pepper v Hart, the answer also depends on how a statement on the 
subject given by Lord Simon of Highbury in the House of Lords is interpreted. This idea is explained and 
more fully explored below at p i3.
34 See Korah (2001), chapter 5.
35 25 November, 1997, Col. 961. More of his statement is quoted below at pl5.
3615 March, 1998, Col. 1363/1364.
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The OFT’s approach to the Competition Act
• The evidence of OFT guidelines
Section 52 of the Act imposes a duty upon the Office to “prepare and publish 
general advice and information” about the application of the Chapter I and Chapter II 
prohibitions and the enforcement of those provisions as soon as was “reasonably 
practicable” after the passing of the Act. The obligation to produce these guidelines can be 
interpreted in a number of not necessarily incompatible ways: as a way of easing the 
regulatory burden on the regulatees affected by the Act, of increasing compliance by setting 
out in clear terms the demands of the Act, or as a means of increasing the Office’s bottom- 
up accountability to its regulatees through greater transparency. In any case though, it will 
be shown that the guidelines do more than merely summarise the provisions of the Act.
The Office has now published some 22 guidelines, most of which were completed 
before the Competition Act came into force.38 A consideration of all these would not be 
useful here -  instead, two examples will be taken as representative. With each of these, we 
are in search of the same thing: evidence that the Office’s approach to the Act has been 
informed by legal values and expectations. The two examples to be taken are the guidelines 
on the Chapter I prohibition and the Office’s powers of investigation -  the former because 
it is typical of the approach of the Office towards substantive provisions of the Act, the 
latter because it relates directly to how the Office would deal with its regulatees. After 
looking at these guidelines, we will consider the Director General’s procedural rules which 
came into force with the Act on 1st March 2000.
a) Guideline on the Chapter I  prohibition
37 Examples given of such “high-level principles” included the principle of legal certainty and the principle of 
fairness in administrative action.
38 These are: Major Provisions, Chapter I prohibition, Chapter II prohibition, Market definition, Powers of 
investigation, Concurrent application to regulated industries, Transitional arrangements, Enforcement, Trade 
associations, professional bodies and self-regulatory organisations, Assessment of individual agreements and 
conduct, Assessment of market power, Exclusion of mergers and ancillary restrictions, Telecommunications 
sector, Vertical agreements and restraints, Land agreements, Water and sewerage sectors, Guidance as to 
appropriate amount of penalty, Energy sector, Railway services, Guidance notes on completing Form N, 
Northern Ireland energy sectors
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After some introductory remarks, and having set out the definition of the Chapter I 
prohibition, paragraph 2.2 of the guideline says the following:
To be caught by the prohibition, although it is not expressly stated in the Act, an 
agreement must be implemented within the UK and it must have ‘an appreciable 
effect on competition’, because of the principle established by the European 
Court of Justice in the case of Volk v Vervaecke that “an agreement falls outside 
the prohibition where it has only an insignificant effect on the market”.. .
The paragraph makes clear the degree to which the Competition Act 1998 simply 
cannot be understood without reference to EC law. The duty imposed by section 60 
(explicitly set out in paragraphs 3.1 and 3.2 of this guideline) informs the Office’s entire 
interpretation of the Act. Moreover, it is clear from the Hansard debates during the passage 
of the Act that this was very much intended by government. There are several examples of 
proposed amendments being left out, deemed unnecessary as the point was already covered 
by EC law.39 In terms of the particular content of paragraph 2.2, the following observation 
can be made. It was noted in Chapter 5 that:
[t]he ability of the Office to exempt agreements from reference to the Restrictive 
Practices Court was a useful bargaining tool. By stating to parties that an 
agreement was currently of too much ‘significance’ for any exemption, the Office 
could negotiate for agreements to be modified in return for a representation being 
made. This was a power underlined by the large degree of discretion that lay in 
the interpretation of the word ‘significance’, and there is little evidence that the 
Office tried to temper this discretion by adopting clear guidelines. On the 
contrary: the Office insisted that each agreement was considered on its merits, 
and that its approach was pragmatic...
Now, however, the Office’s approach to essentially the same question had to be informed 
by European case law. Whereas the “significance” of an agreement had been judged on a 
pragmatic basis, the decision as to whether an agreement had an “appreciable effect on 
competition” was from the beginning treated as a legal question, and the decision made on 
legal grounds. The test, laid out in the third section of the guidelines, therefore reads like a 
series of legal tests: does it satisfy the market share criterion?, what is the nature of the 
agreement?, does it qualify for exemption?, is it specifically excluded by the Act? For all of
39 A good example is the government’s argument that it was unnecessary to define “abuse of dominant 
position” in the Act as this was covered by European case law. See generally Bonie (1999).
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these questions, it is the approach of the European Commission and courts that guides the 
Director General’s decision in any particular case.
The rest of the guideline is divided into several sections with subheadings as 
follows: terms used in the prohibition, the scope of the prohibition, examples of anti­
competitive agreements, exemptions, and the relationship between the Chapter I prohibition 
and Article 85.40 Every one of these sections is littered with references to decisions of the 
ECJ or the CFI and sometimes also relevant statements or decisions of the European 
Commission. In total, the guideline contains 23 footnotes. All of them provide either a case 
citation or the reference for a Commission statement.
b) Guideline on the OFT’s powers o f investigation
In the course of looking at this guideline, two things can be emphasised: firstly, as 
with the guideline on the Chapter I prohibition, the influence of EC law; secondly, the 
importance of the Pepper v Hart41 judgment. The latter needs some elucidation: essentially, 
the judgment established the principle that where the meaning of a particular statutory 
provision is ambiguous, the courts are entitled to look at the Parliamentary debates in the 
course of the passage of the Act so as to establish its intended meaning. Maher (2000: 552) 
points out the effect that this judgment had on the nature of the Parliamentary debates 
themselves, with questions sometimes asked specifically to try to pin down a certain 
interpretation of the Act. It will be shown how the judgment has also affected the Office’s 
approach to the Act.
The guideline on the Office’s powers of investigation is partially a summary, 
partially an interpretation of sections 25 to 29 of the Act. Here, we consider two examples 
of the latter: how the Office understands what constitutes “reasonable grounds for 
suspicion” and the scope of exclusions from these powers.
The requirement for there to be reasonable grounds for suspecting that either of the 
two prohibitions have been infringed is contained in section 25 of the Act. Paragraph 2.1 
sets out how the Office interprets this requirement:
40 As it was then (now Article 81)
41 [1993] 1 A11ER42(HL)
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The Director can carry out an investigation if there are reasonable grounds for 
suspecting that either the Chapter I prohibition or the Chapter II prohibition has 
been infringed. The formal powers of investigation cannot be used unless this 
requirement is met. Whether there are reasonable grounds for suspicion will 
depend on the information available and the judgment of the Director. Examples 
of information that are sources of reasonable grounds for suspicion include: 
copies of secret agreements provided by disaffected members of a cartel; 
statements from employees or ex-employees; a substantiated complaint; and 
economic evidence demonstrating that prices have moved in a particular way. A 
reference to anti-competitive behaviour in a newspaper alone is not sufficient to 
satisfy this requirement.
On its own, this may seem unremarkable. On closer examination, however, it 
transpires that virtually every phrase is taken from the Parliamentary debate on the issue. 
The debate concerned a proposed amendment moved by Lord Kingsland that “reasonable 
grounds for suspicion” should be replaced with “reasonable grounds for belief’ -  a stiffer 
test. In the end, the amendment was rejected,42 but not before Lord Simon had been urged 
to clarify the precise meaning of the phrase. He responded with the following:
What is reasonable cause to believe? What is reasonable cause to have suspicion?
It is the reasonableness and the nature of the data that are pertinent. In general 
terms those are matters of judgment for the Director. We will never be able to be 
absolutely certain as to precisely where lines of judgment are drawn. They are 
lines of judgment. But the following areas have had common currency of sources 
of reasonable grounds for suspicion: copies of agreements which are usually 
supplied secretly by people who have been members of cartels who are 
disaffected and who have grounds for wanting to pass on confidential 
information; statements from employees or ex-employees, the so-called “whistle­
blowing test” with which we are all coming to terms in industry; a substantial 
complaint by a competitor who has been refused entry into a cartel; and perhaps 
economic evidence of prices moving in a specific way. All those in the past have 
existed and had judgments taken about them as being reasonable grounds. The 
one I find least convincing is, “My Lord, I read it in a newspaper”.
Thus we see that every one of the examples presented in the guideline is taken from 
Hansard which, in light of Pepper v Hart, itself becomes part of the legal definition of 
“reasonable grounds for suspicion”. Moreover, it is clear that members of Parliament were 
themselves aware of this when discussing particular clauses of the Bill. In the course of this 
debate, for instance, Lord Peston expressed his scepticism that the proposed amendment 
was genuine rather than simply being a method “to make clearer than might otherwise be
42 Apparently, the Director General had lobbied for this amendment not to go through -  see Hansard 19th 
February 1998, Column 332 (Lord Haskell).
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the case why the Bill is drafted in its present form”.43 There is thus a clear reference here to 
the influence of the Pepper v Hart judgment in the process of drafting the Bill in 
Parliament, and this was repeated in other contexts within the debate.44
The use of authoritative legal interpretation is equally clear in another part of the 
OFT guideline, dealing with limitations on the use of its powers of investigation. After 
noting section 30 (excluding privileged documents from the power), the guideline states the 
following:
§6.2 - The category of communication which attract privilege under the Act is 
wider than the category of communication that the European Court of Justice has 
recognised as being privileged. The definition in the Act refers to ‘a professional 
legal adviser’, which has been interpreted by the UK courts as including ‘in- 
house’ lawyers as well as lawyers in private practice. When the powers of 
investigation set out in the Act are used to investigate suspected infringements of 
the Chapter I and Chapter II prohibitions the interpretation of privileged 
information under EC law will not apply.
§6.3 - The defence against self-incrimination which has been recognised under 
EC jurisprudence will apply. Applying EC jurisprudence, the Director may 
compel an undertaking to provide specified documents or specified information 
but cannot compel the provision of answers which might involve an admission on 
its part of the existence of an infringement which it is incumbent upon the 
Director to prove. The Director will request documents or information relating to 
facts, for example, whether a particular employee attended a particular meeting.
Again, the importance of EC law is clearly visible here. The second paragraph, in 
particular, supports Willis’ claim that section 60 imports “high-level principles” as a 
template for the Director’s procedures. But also in the first paragraph, clearly EC law is still 
the Office’s initial point of reference even if only to make distinction from it. Again 
though, it is the influence of Hansard that is more striking. Compare the wording above to 
an answer given by Lord Simon in relation to the scope of section 60 of the Act:45
The clause will, subject to one qualification I shall discuss further, require those 
determining questions under Part I to avoid inconsistency with Community law. 
They are also to have regard to the decisions and statements of the Commission. 
This will also apply to interpretation of the rules made by the DGFT under Clause 
49.46 This importation extends not only to the substantive law but also to the 
general procedural safeguards developed under EC law; for example, the right 
against self-incrimination. That right developed by the European Court of Justice
4317 November 1997, Col. 369
44 See, for example, Lord Simon HL Deb 9 February, 1998, Col. 909 -  an example brought by Maher (2000: 
552)
45 25 November, 1997, Col. 960/961
46 In the end, this became section 51 of the Act.
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in Orkem v Commission will be available to individuals who are asked by the 
DGFT for an explanation of a document under the powers in Clauses 26 to 28.
However, this principle of Community law importation will apply only to the 
extent that the provision of Community law in question is not inconsistent with 
the provisions of the Bill or the rules made by the DGFT under Clause 49. Let me 
give an example of a departure on the face of the Bill. Clause 2947 confers a 
greater degree of legal professional privilege against production of documentation 
than exists under EC law. This is deliberate. Indeed, such an approach has a 
wide-ranging support in this House as we debated earlier.
Overall then, at least two conclusions can be drawn from study of this guideline. 
The first is that, even though the guideline does not relate to a substantive aspect of the Act 
(i.e. competition law per se), EC law is still influential. Secondly, the guideline offers 
specific further evidence of juridification in the use of Hansard as a source of authoritative 
legal interpretation. The Office’s approach to interpreting the Act is thus a long way from a 
case-by-case, discretionary, administrative-political approach.
There is one further aspect about the guideline to note though: that it frequently 
refers to the Director General’s own procedural rules, and it is to these that we now turn.
• The Director General’s procedural rules
It will be recalled that section 51 of the Act gave the Director General the power to 
make rules connected with procedural and other aspects of the Act. In fact, the Office 
began work on this very soon after the passage of the Act, sending out draft rules for 
informal consultation on 10th August 1998. The draft rules were then amended to reflect 
comments received before being sent out again, this time for formal consultation so as to 
comply with section 51(3). In February 2000, the final draft of rules was approved and 
crystallised by the Secretary of State in a statutory order,48 and the rules came into force 
with the Act on 1st March 2000. The rules were not debated in Parliament and were 
accepted by the Secretary of State, Kim Howells, without modification.49
As suggested by Schedule 9, the rules cover a wide area. They begin and end with 
Form N -  the form which companies have to fill out when making an application under the 
Act -  including the layout of the form and the documents which need to be enclosed for a 
complete application. In between, they detail aspects of the Director General’s response
47 Now section 30.
48 Competition Act 1998 (Director’s rules) Order 2000 -  SI 2000 No. 293.
49 Recorded in the introduction to the Order.
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(including time limits for processing application), the level of fees for applications,50 
procedural rules in relation to provisional and final decisions and guidance. They also set 
out the duty to consult the public if an exemption is granted and the discretion to do so if a 
decision is made that the Chapter I or II prohibition has not been infringed.
A detailed analysis of many of the draft rules has been done by Willis (1999) and 
will not be repeated here.51 Instead, it is enough to summarise his main points before 
considering more directly the relevance of these rules for a study of juridification.
In his article, Willis puts forward two main arguments. The first is that although 
section 60 does not obligate the Director General to replicate all of the procedures of the 
European Commission, it does require his procedural rules to be compatible with high-level 
EC law principles. This is adduced both from statements made by Lord Simon in the House 
of Lords and the judgment in the Air Inter case,52 supporting the contention that high-level 
principles impose an irreducible template for the rules. Willis’ second main argument is 
that this is indeed the interpretation of the Office, which has taken notice of EC case law in 
drafting its procedural rules, making the same separation between ordinary procedural rules 
(which do not have to be followed) and rules giving practical application to high-level 
principles (which do). Willis also provides evidence in favour of this proposition. For 
instance, applying the high-level principle that defendants in competition cases have the 
right to be heard, the Court of First Instance ruled that the Commission had to issue a 
statement of objections in relation to the conditions attached to an individual exemption.53 
“This principle underlies the extension, in the most recent draft of the DGFT’s rules, of the 
statement of objections procedure in rule 14 to a proposal to grant conditional exemption”, 
Willis writes.54
50 £5000 for guidance under sl3 and s21, £13,000 for a decision under sl4 and s22.
51 There are some minor differences between the draft rules and the final set approved in Parliament, but not 
enough to justify doing a separate analysis.
52 Case T-260/94 Air Inter v Commission [1997] ECR11-997
53 Case 17/74 Transocean Marine Paint Association v Commission [1974] ECR 1063. A statement of 
objections is a statement by which the undertaking is given all the information necessary to enable it to defend 
itself properly before a final decision is adopted.
54 Willis (1999: 318). This was an extension of the original list provided in Article 19 of Regulation 17, and 
the ECJ has also extended the right in other areas, such as a preliminary decision withdrawing the immunity 
from fines conferred by notification. Willis’ reference to rule 14 actually became rule 14(2) when 
implemented. However, a statement of objections issued by the Office is known generally as a “Rule 14 
notice” and often referred to as such in actual decisions.
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Another example provided by Willis is the right of investigatees to have access to 
the file of the case. In Solvay,55 the Court of First Instance made it clear that the right of 
access to the file is a fundamental right and not merely a function of the Commission’s 
procedures -  the right is “thus one of the procedural safeguards intended to protect the right 
of the defence”. As a result, section 60 imports this right into the procedures of the Office, 
and Rules 14 and 18 implement the principle. Rule 14 provides for the DGFT to offer the 
parties a reasonable opportunity to inspect the file, with the exception of confidential 
information and documents internal to the Office.56 Rule 18 gives the same right to parties 
subject to a direction under section 35 under which the Director General can apply for 
interim measures to restrain anti-competitive agreements or conduct whilst an investigation 
is ongoing.
Willis’ arguments help to substantiate the main points made in this chapter. This is 
because they suggest that even in the area of its procedures, the Office has had to have 
technical knowledge of European law and practice and, in many cases, to duplicate it. Put 
another way, as opposed to being based on, for instance, principles of good administration 
or perhaps on previous organisational practices,57 many of its procedural rules have been 
based on principles established in a court of law. This backs up a more basic and obvious 
point: almost every detail that could be contemplated in this area has been crystallised in 
the form of binding legal rules. The effect of sections 51 and 60 combined has thus 
undeniably been to juridify the Office’s procedures.
Juridification in the regulation o f  competition
The Competition Act came into force on 1st March 2000, with a lengthy period 
deliberately left from its passage through Parliament so as to give businesses a chance to 
prepare for the new regulatory regime. In this section, we consider two main sources of
55 Case T-30/91 Solvay v Commission [1995] ECR 11-1775
56 The scope of “internal to the Office” is also informed by European law -  in particular, a European 
Commission Notice “on the internal rules of procedure for processing requests for access to the file pursuant 
to Articles 85 and 86”, which lists documents falling in this category.
57 This is a common argument found within historical institutionalism, based on the notion of path 
dependency.
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evidence to establish the nature of this regime: reports of decisions made under the Act and 
the OFT annual reports of 2000 and 2001. It will be argued that the Competition Act has 
indeed heralded a change in the Office’s enforcement style, and that there is further 
evidence of juridification to be found in its staffing arrangements, the reaction of regulatees 
to adverse decisions and the style of decisions once made.
As it is difficult to appreciate the true nature of the enforcement process in the 
abstract, this section begins by taking a specific example in detail -  the first infringement 
decision made by the Office under the Act, made against Napp Pharmaceuticals. It then 
looks at some general evidence to establish whether or not the evidence that comes out of 
this example is typical of relations generally between the Office and its regulatees under the 
Act.
• The Napp decision
The facts of the case were as follows. Napp was the dominant supplier of sustained 
release morphine, and indeed had held a patent on it from 1980 to 1992. During the 1990s, 
however, faced with competition from alternative suppliers, Napp aggressively reduced its 
prices for the product to the hospital sector to below cost price, offering discounts of well 
over 90 per cent in tendering for hospital contracts. This tactic enabled Napp to retain a 
market share in hospitals of more than 90 per cent, and drove its leading competitor out of 
the market. At the same time, however, Napp was selling the same product to the 
community sector for an amount more than ten times higher than that charged to hospitals. 
Because GPs were rarely cost-conscious in the same way as hospitals, and because GPs’ 
prescriptions tended to be strongly influenced by the brands used in hospitals, Napp was 
able to secure a similarly high share of this sector which in fact was a much larger market.
An investigation was begun into the pricing policies of Napp following a complaint 
in March 2000.58 In May, representatives of Napp attended a meeting at the Office of Fair 
Trading to discuss the market and the allegations made by the complainant and they 
provided additional information at that meeting. A notice under section 26 of the Act was
58 In fact, an enquiry had already been commenced under the Competition Act 1980 in July 1999, with Napp 
providing information in response to requests from the Director in September and October o f that year. The 
investigation was then restarted once the Competition Act 1998 came into force.
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then sent to Napp and to other companies on 7 July 2000.59 On 25 August 2000, a notice 
was issued to Napp under the Act in accordance with rule 14 of the Director’s procedural 
rules. In accordance with the Director’s rules, Napp was given the opportun ity  to submit 
written and oral representations on the Notice to the Director which it did on 16th and 20th 
October respectively. Napp submitted further written representations on 27th October. The 
report of the Director General’s decision then records that “In coming to this decision, the 
Director has given full consideration to these representations.” On 2nd February 2001, a 
supplementary notice was issued to Napp also under rule 14 of the Director’s rules. Napp 
submitted written representations on 6th March and oral representations on 12th March 
respectively. Again, it is stressed that in coming to the final decision, “the Director has also 
given full consideration to these representations on the supplementary Notice.” On 13th 
March 2001, a further supplementary notice was issued to Napp, concerned with directions 
which the Director proposed to make under section 33 of the Act, and once again we are 
told that written representations subsequently made by Napp on 27th March 2001 were 
taken into account in the course of assessing the level of penalty imposed under section 36 
of the Act.
In his judgment, the Director General ruled that Napp had infringed the Chapter II 
prohibition and abused its dominant position. The judgment rested on three main premises, 
as follows:
a. The relevant product market was a narrow one -  oral sustained release morphine 
products only. It was noted that other painkilling products were rarely seen as 
alternatives to this drug -  instead, the specific drug prescribed tended to be on the 
basis of the needs of the particular patient. Cost was rarely a factor in the decision, 
hence substitutability was particularly low in this area.
b. Napp held a dominant position in this market. The main evidence relied on here was a 
market share of over 90%, although there were also significant barriers to entry 
deterring potential competitors from challenging Napp’s market position.
59 The Director also received information from the Department of Health (DoH), NHS Supplies, NHS 
Purchasing and Supplies Agency (NHS PASA), Medicines Control Agency (MCA), the Office of Health 
Economics, clinicians and relevant trade and professional bodies (British Medical Association (BMA), British 
National Formulary (BNF), Medicare Audits).
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c. Napp abused its dominant position not only by pursuing conduct designed to 
eliminate competition in the hospital sector, but also by charging excessive prices in 
the community sector. A number of comparisons were used to reach the verdict that 
the prices were excessive.
Napp was fined £3.21 million, and directed to cease the infringements by reducing 
the price of MST tablets to the community and limiting the degree to which community 
prices could exceed hospital prices. In response, the company decided to appeal the 
decision in the Competition Commission Appeals Tribunal. After three preliminaiy 
hearings,60 the final judgment was given in January 2002. The Tribunal upheld the original 
decision of the Director General, although it reduced the level of the fine by approximately 
one-third, identifying certain mitigating factors. Napp then applied for leave to appeal this 
decision in the Court of Appeal, but was denied twice -  first by the Appeals Tribunal (26 
March), then by the Court of Appeal (8th May).
There are several aspects to the Napp decision that are striking. Firstly, the decision 
is very long -  72 pages in all -  pointing to a general thoroughness, but perhaps also to a 
certain defensiveness faced with the prospect of an appeal. The facts of the case are 
strongly backed up throughout, often with references to academic articles.61 Secondly, it is 
notable how the account of the investigation emphasises the procedural propriety of the 
Office: three times in the course of the description of the investigation, it is insisted that all 
Napp’s representations have been taken into account.62 This is well backed up by the fact 
that virtually all the arguments made by representatives of Napp are responded to 
specifically in the course of the decision. Thirdly, the decision is replete with references to 
EC case law. In the course of defining the relevant market alone, there are references to 
thirteen separate cases. Quotations of Commission statements and Notices and EC case law 
run all the way through the decision. Next, and more generally, the decision reads like a 
legal judgment and especially like a European legal judgment. Aside from the references to 
European case law, and the fact that the main section is entitled “Legal and economic 
assessment”, it is the methodical presentation of the facts, and the application of legal
60 One initial hearing, one asking for extra time, and one asking to strike out part of the defence.
61 For instance, in arguing that other similar products to oral sustained release morphine were in fact not real 
substitutes, seven academic articles were cited, as well as a variety of quotes from the British Medical 
Association and Napp’s own experts.
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principles to those facts that stand out. There is further a specific stylistic resemblance to a 
European judgment through the structuring of the decision in numbered paragraph form.63 
Finally, the fact that Napp chose to appeal the decision further points to the legal nature of 
the process.
Moreover, there is even more striking evidence of juridification in this appeal. The 
actual judgment of the Appeals Tribunal runs to 155 pages -  this not all that much more 
than the combined lengths of the skeleton arguments of Napp and the Director General, 
who provided documents of 80 and 35 pages respectively. The arguments presented by both 
sides are technical and legal in nature, with frequent citing of legal cases. Napp was 
represented by Herbert Smith, a major firm of City solicitors, although its in-house legal 
department had also been involved in preparing the submissions. The Office’s case was 
prepared by its Legal Services Department. In the preparations for the proceedings, there 
appear to have been attempts by Napp’s solicitors to overwhelm the Tribunal with legal 
arguments (pi8, para 76):
On 11 July 2001 the Tribunal returned to Napp a voluminous bundle of 
authorities relating to the Human Rights Act which had been sent by Napp on 2 
July 2001 without any satisfactory accompanying argumentation and without 
having regard to the Practice Direction (Citation o f Authorities) [2001] 1 WLR 
1001.
It seems that this reflected a more general pattern, criticised in the judgment as 
follows (p27, para 88):
We comment, for the benefit of those conducting future appeals, that the 
procedure in this case did not go entirely according to the plan envisaged in the 
Tribunal’s Guide to Appeals under the Competition Act, probably for three 
reasons: the notice of appeal was not as focussed as we would have wished, the 
Director sought to introduce a good deal of material and argument that was not in 
the Decision, and some of the supplementary materials supplied by Napp on such 
matters as the Human Rights Act and PCGs/PCTs were not in a form which we 
could easily absorb. We entirely appreciate the difficulties of the subject matter, 
the pressure of time, and the fact that all concerned are on a learning curve as 
regards the procedures to be followed in appeals under the Act, but we hope that 
the principles of the Guide can be closely followed in future cases.
The proceedings lasted for four days with oral submissions on both sides. Mr John 
Brogden (the Managing Director of Napp) gave evidence on oath and was cross-examined,
62 As noted above.
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as requested by the Director General. Both sides were represented by QCs: Mr Peter Roth 
QC on behalf of the Director General and Mr Nicholas Green QC on behalf of Napp. The 
judgment itself dissects the original decision to the extent that even though it upholds 
virtually all of its main claims, it still sees fit to strike out one paragraph on the basis that 
the claims made in it had not been sufficiently established. This despite the fact that the 
argument made in the paragraph was not material to the overall outcome. There is also 
explicit recognition of the Tribunal’s role in setting precedent, noting that the guidance 
given on penalties would “no doubt” be reflected in the Director’s Guidelines overtime.
Overall then, the Napp case displays all the features of a legal process: investigation 
using the procedural rules under the Act, decision, appeal, lawyers, court appearances, 
applications for further appeals, long legal judgments, frequent legal case citations and 
explicit legal argument. The entire process took just over two years -  nearly three years if 
the pre-Competition Act enquiry is included. In short, there can be no doubt at all that the 
relationship between the Office and Napp was heavily juridified. The question now is 
whether this case is typical or an exception in this respect, and for this purpose we turn now 
to more general evidence.
• General evidence
A convenient place to begin is with the Office’s selection of competition 
investigations. In the previous chapter, it was argued that the Office often negotiated with 
companies so as to make an investigation under the old Competition Act unnecessary. It 
only tended to be when companies disagreed with the Office that their conduct was anti­
competitive, or otherwise refused to modify their behaviour, that the Office sometimes 
launched investigations. With the per se prohibition system introduced by the 1998 Act, 
however, the Office has often launched investigations irrespective of negotiations. The 
Annual Reports of both 2000 and 2001 indicate this change, and also the central role of the 
“reasonable suspicion test”. Here are the relevant sections of each:
During the period from 1 March, there were nearly 40 cases where there were 
reasonable grounds for suspecting an infringement of one or both of the two 
prohibitions in the Act. In these cases, over 300 written notices were issued 
requiring the production of specified documents and infoimation. The on-site
63 This is now also the norm in English legal judgements.
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investigation powers were used in two of them. At the end of the year, over 20 of 
these cases were still under investigation. The others had either been dismissed or 
resolved informally. (AR2000: 23-4)
In 2001, our competition enforcement division opened 1,298 complaint cases. Of 
these, 63 gave us reasonable grounds to suspect an infringement of the Act had 
taken place, leading to a formal section 25 investigation. At the end of the year,
44 such cases were under active consideration (including one case under the Fair 
Trading Act’s monopoly provisions). We estimate that around a quarter of these 
will result in formal decisions. (AR 2001: 46)
Thus we see how the “reasonable suspicion” test has had to be satisfied before an 
investigation could be launched -  a legal test that effectively has been responsible for 
excluding 95% of complaints from the ambit of the Act. Still, the above figures mean that 
in the first two years of the new regime there have been nearly three and a half times more 
investigations than there had been in the first twelve years of the old Competition Act. Once 
the threshold has been satisfied, however, non-legal considerations can become important. 
In another context, it is reported that the Office from the start has tried to discourage 
notifications by companies worried that they might fall within the Act, so as to allow its 
resources to be focused “on more serious cases of actual or suspected infringements” (AR 
2001: 47).64 This provides some indication that its resources might not allow an 
investigation in every case where there is reasonable suspicion that an infringement has 
taken place, and it will be recalled that the Office has a power not a duty to launch an 
investigation.
Once an investigation has been initiated, it appears that the Office has made 
extensive use of its array of investigatory powers. During the course of 2001, for instance, 
1040 section 26 notices were issued, and 15 “raids” conducted (involving the use of both 
section 27 and 28 powers).65 Some of these raids covered multiple sites though, so that in 
all, the Office visited 27 sites using its powers under s27 and 37 sites with High Court 
warrants under s28.66 Meanwhile, whether or not a raid has been carried out, lawyers have
64 The success of the policy can be gauged by the fact that the Office only received 3 notifications in 2001. 
The policy was most likely influenced by the experience of the European Commission which was 
overwhelmed by requests for so-called “comfort letters”. The Office has also had an open door however, 
under which companies worried about falling within the ambit of the Act can come to the Office for informal 
advice.
65 Section 26 enables the Office to require the production of specified documents or information, section 27 
empowers the Office to enter premises without a warrant and to require the production of documents, section 
28 authorises the Office to enter and search premises with a warrant.
66 AR (2001:47)
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tended to be heavily involved in the actual conduct of investigations. Once an investigation 
is under way, competition lawyers advise case officers on the strength of the evidence 
gathered and what else might be required to prove wrongdoing, and they also help to 
present the case to the company concerned. Then, if the case progresses beyond a decision 
to an appeal, they instruct barristers to act on the OFT’s behalf and provide ongoing advice 
right through to the final conclusion of the case.67
Since the Act came into force, the Office has published twenty formal decisions.68 
Of these, thirteen have been non-infringement decisions,69 five have been infringement 
decisions with fines imposed, and in the other two, individual exemptions were granted 
(one subject to conditions and obligations). Ten of these decisions were made in 2001, ten 
more were made in 2002. The decisions are fisted in Appendix 1 below.
It might be thought that some counter-evidence of juridification can be found in the 
Office’s “leniency programme”. Under this programme, members of an illegal cartel who 
admit to the agreement and provide information about it (“whistle-blowers”) may be 
granted total im m unity  from financial penalty (if this company is the first to come forward) 
or have the penalty significantly reduced. In 2001, the Office received 13 applications for 
leniency in 2001 and agreed to leniency in 6 cases, with the other investigations still 
outstanding by the end of the year. However, whilst this programme might seem to suggest 
a degree of flexibility in the way in which the Office has dealt with its regulatees, it would 
be misleading to see it this way. This is because of the nature of the decision as to what 
penalty to impose: under s38(8) of the Act, the Director General must refer to the guidance 
in force when setting the amount of the penalty - guidance which must previously have 
been approved by the Secretary of State (s38(4)). In this way, the Guideline on Penalties 
must itself be seen as a source of law,70 and the leniency programme is precisely laid out in 
it.
Already, legal challenges under the Act have been commonplace. O f the five 
infringement decisions, two have been appealed.71 O f the other three, one was a remitted
67 See the March 2002 edition of the Fair Trading magazine.
68 Correct as on 27* October 2002.
69 In one of these, amendments were agreed to an agreement so as to prevent an infringement decision.
70 Failure to follow the rules laid down in it would thus be grounds for appeal to the Competition Commission 
Appeals Tribunal.
71 The Napp and Aberdeen Journals decision.
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decision,72 in another the companies benefited from the leniency programme,73 and the 
other decision related to a price-fixing agreement for which the evidence was clear-cut.74 
There have also been two further appeals to the Competition Commission Appeals 
Tribunal: one by third parties objecting to a non-infringement decision,75 the other by the 
original complainant also unhappy with an OFT decision -  this time that the entity 
concerned was not an “undertaking” within the meaning of the Act.76 Furthermore, each 
appeal has tended to be accompanied by a number of surrounding hearings, such that the 
Appeals Tribunal has actually given a total of 13 judgments to date. The result of one of 
these preliminary hearings in particular -  the Bettercare judgment77 -  has made future 
appeals more likely by ruling that a letter from the Office to complainants advising that the 
Office will not go through with an investigation counts as a “decision” under the Act and is 
thus appealable. The Office had argued that the rejection of a complaint is not an 
appealable decision under section 47 of the Act, but merely notification to the complainant 
that the Director does not deem it appropriate to proceed to a decision as to whether there 
has been an infringement.78 This admissibility judgment must have been a bigger blow to 
the Office than the subsequent hearing, which it also lost,79 as it increased the likelihood of 
complainants -  having been informed by the Office that their complaint would not be 
investigated -  taking their case to the Appeals Tribunal.80 It also meant that some letters 
sent to complainants explaining why the Office was not going to proceed with an
O 1
investigation under the Act were subsequently published as “decisions”.
In light of all the information brought in this chapter thus far, it would be surprising 
if the Office had not changed its staffing arrangements since the passage of the Act. It will
72 The second Aberdeen Journals decision.
73 The Arriva and First Group decision.
74 The John Bruce decision.
75 The General Insurance Standards Council decision.
76 The Bettercare case.
77 Bettercare Group Ltd v DGFT [2002] CAT 6
78 As such, it was argued that whilst a rejection may have given grounds for seeking judicial review, it was 
not appealable under section 47.
79 The Tribunal ruled that a local authority as a purchaser of care homes was an “undertaking” within the 
meaning of the Act, overruling the Director’s submission that it was not engaging in economic or commercial 
activity. The judgment meant that the case was handed back to the Office for investigation.
80 Indeed, one of the arguments put forward by the Office was the “floodgates” argument — familiar to lawyers 
— that if this appeal was allowed, it would open up the floodgates to many other complainants, and both the 
Tribunal and the Office would be swamped in the process.
81 E.g. the Harwood Park Crematorium decision -  consisting of a two-page letter.
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be recalled that in 1996, there were still only 12 lawyers working for the Office (out of a 
total of 402 staff). This increased to 15 in 1997 and to 19 in 1998. In 1999, the number of 
lawyers was marked down as 16, but there were also 14 professionally qualified staff 
appointed as Case Officers or Assistant Case Officers in the Competition policy Division. 
In 2000, there were 21 lawyers and 20 legally qualified staff,82 whilst by the end of 2001, 
the overall figure had jumped to 50 (out of a total of 493).83 In addition, it is reported that 
(AR 2001: 89):
Around 70 staff from our competition enforcement division began a distance- 
learning course on the Competition Act and its application. Developed in 
conjunction with Nottingham Trent University, the course leads to a postgraduate 
certificate in competition policy. Ninety-seven OFT staff now hold this 
qualification.
Moreover, not only have several important positions within the Office been 
occupied by lawyers,84 but the organisational structure is such as to emphasise the 
importance of legal issues -  with the main divisions (Competition Enforcement and 
Consumer Regulation Divisions) having two legal directors each specifically to oversee the 
legal dimensions of their work. This in addition to the separate Legal Services Division.
Overall then, there is substantial evidence of juridification in the manner in which 
the Act has been enforced, although not all the features of the Napp case have been 
common to other investigations. There have not always been appeals, for instance. Nor 
have all the decisions been as lengthy -  they have varied in length depending on the 
complexity of the issue involved and the clarity of the evidence. However, all the cases 
have had frequent legal case citations and explicit legal argument in common, there have 
been frequent investigations using the procedural rules under the Act, and further evidence 
of juridification has been found in the role of the ‘reasonable suspicion’ test as well as the 
growth in both number and importance of lawyers working at the Office.
82 The distinction here is between lawyers working in the Legal Services Division and lawyers working in the 
Competition Policy Division.
83 It is impossible to record accurately the percentage of resources spent on legal work during this period, due 
to changes in its accounting system. In 2000, it was reported that 10.7% of the Office's resources was spent 
on legal services; in 2001 the figure is recorded as 6.4%.
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Conclusion
The Competition Act 1998 substantially juridified the relationship between the 
Office and its regulatees in the field of competition policy. The evidence for this is not only 
to be found in the way in which the Act has been enforced since March 2000, but also in 
the Office’s interpretation of the Act which has been dominated by legal considerations. 
The following tables use the indicators set out in Chapter 1 to demonstrate the substantial 
presence of both Type I and Type II juridification:
Type I  juridification between the OFT and its regulatees post-Competition Act 1998
Frequent litigation 
✓
Litigation much more common than previously with 
frequent appeals -  in some cases even by third 
parties
Coercive, inflexible regulatory strategy 
</
Indicated by the widespread use of prosecution, and 
the absence of negotiation during a prosecution.
Reliance on formal, legal processes 
✓
OFT’s procedures now determined by legal rules 
and followed rigidly
Frequent prosecutions in response to breach of law 
✓
Far more prosecutions than previously -  more 
investigations launched in two years than in the first 
twelve years since Competition Act 1980.
High presence / involvement of lawyers Large increase in OFT lawyers, who also occupied 
important positions within the organisation
Type II juridification between the OFT and its regulatees post-Competition Act 1998
Explicit legal argument 
✓
As indicated by OFT decisions and the content of 
appeal submissions
Regulatory contact seen as setting legal precedent 
X
Less important perhaps as large EC case law already 
followed.
High presence / involvement of lawyers 
✓
Large increase in OFT lawyers, who also occupied 
important positions within the organisation
References to law and legal cases Frequent references to EC law mandated by section 
60. Legal argument crucial in determining outcome.
Adoption of overtly legal values Rigid adherence to legal procedure and due process 
norms with appeals in mind. Legal tests applied.
84 For instance, in 2001, Vincent Smith, a bilingual lawyer, was appointed Director of Policy Co-ordination in 
the OFT’s Competition Enforcement Division, and Simon Priddis was appointed Director of Mergers after
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It has also been argued that the source of this juridification can be found in the 
Competition Act itself, as opposed to decisions made by the Office or its regulatees or the 
courts or any other actors. Put simple, sections 51 and 60 have imposed a legalistic 
enforcement style on the Office and encouraged legal appeals by regulatees. The only other 
source of juridification was the Bettercare decision. The decision is likely to encourage still 
more legal appeals, thereby sustaining a process of juridification under the Act.
five years working for an American law firm in Brussels and Washington.
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Appendix
Investigations under the Competition Act 1998: 2001-2002
Jan 2001 General Insurance Standards Council No infringement
Apr 2001 Napp Pharmaceutical Holdings Ltd Infringement of Chapter H 
prohibition -  fine imposed.
Apr 2001 Swan Solutions Ltd/Avaya ECS Ltd No infringement
Apr 2001 DSG Retail Ltd/Compaq Computer Ltd/Packard Bell NEC Ltd No infringement
May 2001 BT Surf Together and BT Talk & Surf Together pricing 
packages
No infringement
June 2001 Consignia and Postal Preference Service Ltd No infringement
July 2001 Aberdeen Journals Ltd Infringement of Chapter H 
prohibition -  fme imposed
July 2001 ICL/Synstar No infringement
Oct 2001 LINK Interchange Network Ltd Individual exemption 
granted
Oct 2001 Memorandum of Understanding on the supply of oil fuels in 
an emergency
Individual exemption 
granted, subject to certain 
conditions and obligations.
Feb 2002 Market sharing by Arriva pic and FirstGroup pic Infringement of Chapter I 
prohibition -  fines imposed
Feb 2002 Film Distributors’ Association Ltd Amendments agreed so as 
to ensure compliance with 
Act.
Mar 2002 BT’s wholesale DSL products: alleged anti-competitive 
pricing
No infringement
Apr 2002 Vodafone’s distribution agreements for pre-pay mobile phone 
vouchers
No infringement
Apr 2002 The North and West Belfast Health and Social Services Trust No infringement
May 2002 John Bruce (UK) Ltd, Fleet Parts Limited and Truck and 
Trailer Components
Infringement of Chapter I 
prohibition -  fines imposed
July 2002 Alleged anti-competitive agreement between a number of 
telecommunications network operators
No infringement
Aug 2002 Harwood Park Crematorium Ltd No infringement
Sept 2002 Aberdeen Journals Ltd -  remitted case Confirmation of original 
decision
Oct 2002 Companies House No infringement
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CHAPTER 7
Conclusion
Introduction
In Chapter 1, three main questions were asked. Firstly, what is the extent of 
juridification in the UK -  how far has law begun to govern the conduct of its political and 
regulatory relationships? Secondly, what are the causes of juridification and of the absence 
of juridification? And thirdly, what would the growth of juridification mean for existing 
theories of regulatory strategies? Chapter 1 further outlined a preliminary aim of the thesis: 
to establish a methodology for studying juridification.
In this chapter, these questions are addressed, as far as is possible, in light of the 
evidence of the case studies. The chapter is divided into four sections -  one for each of 
these questions. In the first section, the evidence of the case studies as to the extent of 
juridification is set out. It is argued that, apart from a few exceptions, law has tended to 
remain in the background of regulatory relationships. At the end of this section, these 
findings are compared to more general evidence, and it is noted that they are very much 
compatible.
In the second section, the methodological questions that were specifically left open 
in Chapter 1 are revisited and considered in light of the case studies. The first area of 
consideration is the utility of the indicators of juridification: what they are capable of 
revealing, what they tend to obscure, how closely they reflect the qualitative analysis of the 
case studies. In the second part of this section, the question of whether soft law should be 
included in an analysis of juridification is reconsidered, again in view of the evidence of the 
case studies.
In the third section, the causes of juridification, and its absence, in the case studies 
are set out. It is argued that, in general, the lack of juridification can be explained through 
reference to the literature on regulatory strategies. Moreover, one of the cases in which 
juridification did occur can also be explained by reference to that literature, as can the fact
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that in this case juridification did not last -  it gave way to a persuasive regulatory strategy. 
However, in a second type of case, juridification occurred for reasons other than those 
advanced in the regulatory strategy literature. Significantly, in this type of case, 
juridification is not showing any signs of being a temporary phenomenon.
In the final section, the implications of the findings of the case studies for the 
regulatory strategy literature is considered. On the basis of the evidence of the case studies, 
it is argued that this literature may require revision in two respects in particular. The first is 
its claim that juridification is linked to the deterrence strategy, and that the absence of 
juridification is linked to the persuasive strategy. The second is the claim that the 
persuasive strategy will ultimately be predominant. Whilst both these claims remain 
generally accurate, the case studies have revealed some important exceptions.
The extent o f  juridification
In this section, we consider the question of how far regulatory relationships were 
governed by law and legal considerations in the cases of the CRE and the OFT, before 
taking a look at more general evidence relating to juridification within the UK.
The Commission for Racial Equality
The evidence brought in Chapter 3 was striking. Not only was there no trend of 
increasing juridification, but actually there was a pattern of de-juridification of the 
relationships between the Commission and its regulatees. This was highlighted by dividing 
the period 1977-2002 into four policy phases, each less juridified than the last.
The first policy phase was characterised by a strong detachment between the 
CRE’s law enforcement work and its promotional work, and a heavy reliance by the CRE 
on its power to launch formal investigations. It was argued that the detachment between 
these two areas of its activities implied juridification because enforcement powers, when 
used, were chosen precisely because of their formal legal qualities. It also helped to cause 
juridification by leading to a focus on rules over outcomes. Both these aspects were 
strongly evident in the Commission’s approach to its power of formal investigation, which
268
was characterised by a general rigidity as part of a general deterrence-based strategy. 
Regulatees, on their part, responded to this through adversarialism. A heavy reliance on 
lawyers, legal challenges (both appeals and judicial review applications), and generally 
obstructive attitudes were typical responses. Often the lack of co-operation from regulatees 
led to the Commission having to issue subpoena notices and to seek further court orders. 
Overall then, the frequent presence of lawyers, the high percentage of investigations 
leading to legal action, the use of legal phraseology in reports of investigations, the 
formality of some of the procedures used and the inflexibility of the Commission with 
respect to the issuing of non-discrimination notices all constituted strong evidence that 
relationships between the Commission and its regulatees were substantially juridified.
The problems generated by juridification -  judicial and political intervention, and 
an organisational inability to continue with this initial strategy - led the Commission into a 
major change of approach. In this second policy phase, whilst formal investigations were 
still used by both of its policy divisions, the Employment Division was beginning to use 
them in a different way, with greater use of general investigations as part of a persuasive 
regulatory strategy. Partially due to an internal restructuring, the Commission began to link 
its enforcement and promotion work more closely, and this led to a greater focus on 
achieving outcomes rather than following legalised processes. In practice, this meant that if 
education, advice and persuasion were just as capable of achieving a desired result, they 
were now preferred to the use of legal powers. Under this policy, several formal 
investigations were discontinued, with the Commission more willing to try to reach 
agreement with its regulatees rather than to impose a solution. Nonetheless, some of the 
Commission’s other policies -  especially its policies of providing responsive assistance to 
individual complainants under the Act and of prosecuting individuals who had pressurised 
or instructed others to discriminate - suggested that it still had a preference for fulfilling its 
duty of eliminating discrimination through its law enforcement powers and its duty of 
promoting racial equality through general promotional work.
Again though, the Commission was forced to change track -  this time partially 
because of budgetary constraints and a rising number of cases under the Act, and partially 
because of management reform imposed by the Home Office. In its quest to ensure that all 
of its activities were cost effective, the Commission changed from a policy of providing
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responsive assistance to individual complainants to one of strategic assistance, and it also 
discontinued its policy of looking to prosecute offenders under the Act. Both decisions 
were essentially de-juridifying, replacing contacts based on legal considerations with 
contacts based on non-legal considerations. In the case of providing assistance to individual 
applicants, the Commission’s policy of increasingly looking to settle rather than go to a full 
tribunal hearing was also evidence of de-juridification. Finally, the changing emphasis of 
the Education, Housing and Services Division, later renamed the Social Policy Division, 
and especially its greater focus on education that centred around new codes of practice, was 
further evidence of the de-juridification of regulatory relationships.
In the final policy phase, the Commission stopped using formal investigations 
altogether except as a last resort. Instead, it focused on hard-hitting and well-publicised 
media campaigns and general lobbying, as well as on the persuasion of individual 
regulatees using tribunal cases as a springboard. It did this in two ways: firstly, by looking 
for wide-ranging settlements in those cases where it agreed to provide full legal 
representation to complainants; secondly, by trying to negotiate change with companies 
subject to adverse tribunal decisions. As a result, formal legal action became extremely 
rare, and relationships between the Commission and its regulatees were usually 
characterised by negotiation and mutual co-operation.
The following tables, reproduced from Chapter 3, summarise these developments 
with specific reference to the indicators of Type I and Type II juridification.
Type I  juridification between the CRE and its regulatees: 1977-2000
1977
Frequent litigation 
✓
Many legal challenges to formal investigations. 
‘Responsive’ approach to individual complaints under 
the Act meant that litigation the norm if the requirements 
of the Act had been met.
to
1982
</
Coercive, inflexible regulatory strategy 
*
Very little flexibility throughout the formal investigation 
process. Sharp distinction between ‘enforcement’ and 
‘promotion’. Strong evidence of deterrence strategy.
(5/5) Reliance on formal, legal process Yes: provisions of Act followed rigidly; formal terms o f  
reference and non-discrimination notices.
Frequent prosecution in response to 
breach of law *
The cornerstone of the CRE’s strategy in this period.
High presence / involvement of lawyers 
✓
CRE lawyers heavily involved in conduct of 
investigations and decisions on individual complainants 
under the Act. Lawyers of investigated companies 
present in about two-thirds o f cases.
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1983
to
1987 
* X
(3/5)
Frequent litigation 
* X
Fewer formal investigations and far fewer legal 
challenges in response. Still a responsive approach to 
individual complainants, and litigation still the norm 
with other breaches of the Act.
Coercive, inflexible regulatory strategy 
* X
More flexibility shown in the conduct of formal 
investigations, greater integration of different elements 
of strategy. Still a separation between enforcement and 
promotion, however -  implying that inflexibility once 
enforcement decided upon.
Reliance on formal, legal process 
* X
Commission slightly less rigid in approach to formal 
investigations, focusing more on outcomes. However, it 
still relied on legal avenues with its other powers.
Frequent prosecution in response to 
breach of law 
✓
Still the norm with cases of persistent discrimination and 
pressure to discriminate. Legal action still the norm to 
help individual complainants under the Act. Fewer 
formal investigations launched.
High presence / involvement of lawyers 
* X
Lawyers had the same role as previously, but the far 
greater emphasis placed on achieving change through its 
promotional work meant that the work o f lawyers was 
less important to the CRE as a whole.
1988
to
1992
X
(0/5)
Frequent litigation 
X
Far less litigation than previously: only one legal 
challenge to formal investigation, reliance on settlements 
rather than litigation with s26-28 actions, litigation used 
less to aid complainants under the Act.
Coercive, inflexible regulatory strategy 
X
Far greater flexibility with integration o f enforcement 
and promotional work. Persuasion and search for 
settlements now more common than prosecution.
Reliance on formal, legal process 
X
Legal tools such as formal investigations still used; 
however, generally a greater reliance on settlements.
Frequent prosecution in response to 
breach of law x
No longer true: fundamental change of strategy with 
respect to prosecutions under the Act, so that the norm 
was to search for a settlement if possible.
High presence / involvement of lawyers 
X
Change of strategy meant that lawyers within the CRE 
were less important.
1993
to
2000
X
(0/5)
Frequent litigation 
X
Litigation avoided wherever possible: settlements seen as 
more fruitful and less expensive option.
Coercive, inflexible regulatory strategy 
X
Commission’s strategy the opposite of this: it was based 
on negotiation and flexibility to try to achieve change.
Reliance on formal, legal process 
X
Bargaining in the shadow of the law far more common. 
Formal investigations barely used.
Frequent prosecution in response to 
breach of law X
Settlements now at the centre of the CRE’s strategy, with 
wide-ranging settlements aimed to promote change.
High presence / involvement of lawyers 
X
As before.
Type II juridification between the CRE and its regulatees: 1977-2000
Explicit legal argument 
✓
Yes -  legal argument recorded faithfully in reports of 
formal investigations. Very common especially in 
indirect discrimination cases.
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1977
to
1982
</
(5/5)
Regulatory contact seen as setting legal 
precedent 
✓
Outcomes of formal investigations used by the 
Commission in industrial tribunal cases and in the course 
of formulating codes of practice. Some cross-referencing 
between investigations.
High presence / involvement of lawyers 
✓
CRE lawyers heavily involved in conduct of 
investigations and decisions on individual complainants 
under the Act. Lawyers of investigated companies 
present in about two-thirds of cases.
References to law and legal cases 
✓
Very common: reference to relevant sections of the Act 
the norm in formal investigations, frequent reference to 
legal developments in annual reports.
Adoption of overtly legal values 
✓
References to natural justice, and to the need to make a 
finding “on the balance of probabilities”. Frequent 
consultations with legal advisers.
1983
to
1987 
* X
(3/5)
Explicit legal argument 
✓
Still common, especially in indirect discrimination cases
Regulatory contact seen as setting legal 
precedent 
X
Less applicable than previously, as Commission had now 
built up a body of ‘case law’ which it then used in 
formulating codes of practice.
High presence / involvement of lawyers 
* X
Lawyers had the same role as previously, but the far 
greater emphasis placed on achieving change through its 
promotional work meant that the work of lawyers was 
less important to the CRE as a whole.
References to law and legal cases 
</
Same as previously, albeit that formal investigations 
used less.
Adoption of overtly legal values 
* X
Legal values still important; however, the new emphasis 
on achieving outcomes rather than sticking to legal 
processes indicates that achievement seen as more 
important than following the requirements of the law.
1988
to
1992
X
(1 >4/5)
Explicit legal argument 
* X
Becoming far less obvious due to the decline in number 
of formal investigations and tribunal appearances. Legal 
argument used in the course of reaching settlements.
Regulatory contact seen as setting legal 
precedent X
As in previous period
High presence / involvement of lawyers 
X
As in previous period, but even more so because of 
changes of strategy in relation to individual complaints 
and prosecutions under the Act.
References to law and legal cases 
✓
As in previous period: references still made in the course 
of legal contacts.
Adoption of overtly legal values 
X
If anything, Commission becoming keen to avoid the use 
of law wherever possible, preferring non-legal 
approaches and bargaining in the shadow of the law.
1993
to
2000
X
(1/5)
Explicit legal argument 
* X
As in previous period
Regulatory contact seen as setting legal 
precedent X
Legal precedent less important than achieving far- 
reaching change in the shadow of law.
High presence / involvement of lawyers 
X
As before.
References to law and legal cases 
* X
Less common, due to use of formal investigation as a last 
resort only. Still used in the course of negotiating 
settlements, however.
Adoption of overtly legal values 
X
As before.
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Over time therefore, relationships between the CRE and its regulatees became less 
adversarial, less formal, less governed by rule-based considerations and less influenced by 
specifically legal questions.
The Office of Fair Trading
In the case of the Office of Fair Trading, the story was slightly different. Rather 
than policy phases characterised by changing levels of juridification, there was generally a 
consistent picture of a lack of juridification between the Office of Fair Trading and its 
regulatees. This was subject though to a couple of exceptions, one major one in the field of 
competition policy, and a more minor one in the field of consumer protection.
In Chapter 4, it was shown how, in the field of consumer protection, the vast 
majority of the contact between the Office and its regulatees between 1973 and 2002 was 
informal and flexible in nature, dominated by behind-the-scenes negotiations. The 
enforcement powers of the Office were rarely used, often because a punitive approach was 
seen as unreasonable -  a feeling exacerbated by the bluntness of some of the tools 
available. In many cases, to revoke or refuse a consumer credit licence for instance, was 
effectively to put a trader out of business. This was not done lightly, and thus the level of 
intervention by the Office was low, and when it did decide to use its enforcement powers it 
did so flexibly. Where it was possible to find a solution without resorting to the formalities 
of law, it was nearly always taken.
Meanwhile, on a more general level there was further evidence of a lack ol 
juridification in the demise of the power to create criminal offences through Advisory 
Committee references and the general lack of legislation to redefine the relationships 
between the Office and its regulatees. The Part II power to create new criminal offences 
was used only four times by the Office before being abandoned. It was seen as being too 
slow and too costly, and the political process necessary for a proposal to become law was 
inflexible. At the same time, it was argued that the general lack of legislation was 
significant largely because it highlighted the more consensual and less juridified nature ol 
the alternative - codes of practice. It is notable, for instance, that few sectors were subject tc 
legislation similar to the Estate Agents Act 1979, which put the relationship between the 
OFT and estate agencies on a statutory footing and provided the Office with powers tc
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withdraw the licences of individual estate agents. Instead, relationships were based on the 
negotiation of changes to the terms or implementation of codes of practice.
There was some evidence of an increasingly adversarial approach on the part of 
regulatees targeted by the Office under Part III of the Fair Trading Act and the Consumer 
Credit Act. Whilst the Office used both these powers sparingly and in a flexible manner, 
there were some companies which responded through lawyers, and occasionally the threat 
of judicial review and appeal. In the case of its Part III powers, this did have an effect on 
the Office’s approach, making it more cautious and defensive. Nonetheless, very few legal 
challenges were actually brought, and the Office’s use of its enforcement powers as powers 
of last resort runs counter to a firm conclusion of juridification. It is worth recalling also 
Lord Borrie’s comments about the trends in credit licensing hearings, in which he argued 
that despite increasing adversarialism, this did not lead to a process of juridification as the 
Office still preferred to maintain informal contacts wherever possible. As was pointed out 
in Chapter 4, instead of an inexorable process of juridification, this evidence suggested a 
more mixed picture whereby the Office was doing its very best to avoid juridified contacts, 
and regulatees reacted diversely -  some in an adversarial manner, attempting to make use 
of technical legal arguments, others preferring to co-operate and to try to reach consensus 
without the use of law.
In the area of unfair contract terms, however, regulations implementing a 
European Directive did have the effect of leading to the juridification of relationships 
between the Office and its regulatees. This was Type II juridification -  law and legal 
considerations governing regulatory relationships outside the context of litigation or othei 
formal and legal processes. This stands out as the only clear-cut case of juridification on the 
consumer protection side.
With the exception of unfair contract terms, the vast majority of relationships 
between the Office and its regulatees in the area of consumer protection were governed b> 
non-legal considerations. In no area did the courts have much of a role, even after the 
introduction of the Stop Now Orders. The relationships between the Office and its 
regulatees in the field of consumer protection thus confirms the sense that law tends tc 
contain only a background importance in the conduct of regulatory relationships.
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Moreover, up until 1998, the evidence overwhelmingly points also to an absence 
of juridification between the Office and its regulatees in the field of competition policy. In 
the area of monopolies and mergers, original choices made as far back as 1948 in favour of 
an administrative rather than legal style of enforcement were still heavily influential. In 
many ways little had changed since then. Merger control, in particular, was characterised 
by a total lack of juridification, with the deliberate retention of as much flexibility in the 
system as possible. The temptation to introduce merger guidelines was consistently 
avoided, and the Office’s approach to merger advice was consistently dominated by non- 
legal considerations -  for instance, the likely political response to its advice in any 
particular case. Monopoly control was similarly informal and non-legal in nature, with the 
courts effectively bypassed because of the wide discretion available to the Office and other 
decision-makers under the Act. In both areas, the actual proportion of monopolies and 
mergers controlled by the Office of Fair Trading was very low.
The Competition Act 1980 also failed to lead to juridification, despite the 
expectation that it might lead to a body of case law. The way in which targets were chosen 
for investigation, the manner in which investigations were conducted, the absence of legal 
challenges, and the total absence of references to law and legal cases all indicated a lack of 
juridification.
Perhaps the most striking area of competition policy in which juridification was 
absent, however, was in the area of restrictive trade practices. The system, originally 
established in 1956, was legalistic and formalistic, based around the legal form of an 
agreement and requiring compulsory registration followed by adjudication in the 
Restrictive Practices Court. In practice, however, the Act was implemented largely through 
administrative means. Most of the Office’s work in this area centred around getting 
agreements exempted from the formalities of the Act through section 21(2) of the 
Restrictive Practices Act 1976 - the “of no significance” clause. Sometimes, there would be 
much negotiation between the Office and parties to an agreement so that appropriate 
modifications could be made that would enable a section 21(2) exemption. The result was 
that only a tiny fraction of cases were actually heard in the Restrictive Practices Court, with 
the rest dealt with informally by the Office. Only in the case of the discovery of a secret 
cartel did the Office consistently make use of the formal provisions of the Act.
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For 25 years therefore, the relationship between the Office and its regulatees in the 
field of competition policy was non-juridified. This changed, however, with the advent of 
the Competition Act 1998. The Act was important in impacting not just on the substance of 
UK competition policy, but also on the style of its enforcement, and it substantially 
juridified the relationship between the Office and its regulatees. The evidence for this was 
found not only in the way in which the Act was enforced since March 2000, and not only in 
the response of regulatees, but more basically in the Office’s interpretation of the Act 
which was dominated by legal considerations.
It was also argued that the source of this juridification was to be found in the 
Competition Act itself, as opposed to decisions made by the Office of Fair Trading or its 
regulatees or the courts or any other actors. Essentially, sections 51 and 60 imposed a 
legalistic enforcement style on the Office, and invited investigatees to respond through the 
Competition Commission Appeals Tribunal. The only exception to this general proposition 
was a decision of the Appeals Tribunal, likely to increase further the juridification between 
the Office and complainants by increasing the number of replies that counted as decisions 
under the Act, thus necessitating more publications and enabling more appeals. Except for 
this Bettercare decision, juridification was entirely the direct result of provisions of the Act.
The following tables sum up the findings in the case of the Office of Fair Trading:
Type Ijuridification between the OFT and its regulatees (consumer protection): 1973-2002
Frequent litigation 
X
No -  although litigation threatened more often in the 
1990s.
Coercive, inflexible regulatory strategy 
X
No -  the exact opposite: the Office was as 
consistently flexible and informal as possible.
Reliance on formal, legal processes 
X
No -  informal processes nearly always preferred.
Frequent prosecutions in response to breach of law 
X
Prosecutions rare, with negotiations preferred. If 
anything, fewer prosecutions relating to rogue 
traders and licensed creditors in 1990s.
High presence / involvement of lawyers 
* X
Lawyers relatively unimportant, and did not occupy 
influential roles in the organisation. However, 
regulatees beginning to make greater use o f lawyers 
in the 1990s, and greater role within the OFT in 
relation to unfair contract terms.
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Type II juridification between the OFT and its regulatees (consumer protection): 1973-2002
Explicit legal argument 
* X
Became more common during 1990s, not only in the 
context of unfair contract terms, but also in relation 
to problem traders.
Regulatory contact seen as setting legal precedent 
* X
Generally not relevant, with the important exception 
of unfair consumer contract terms.
High presence / involvement of lawyers 
* X
Lawyers relatively unimportant, and did not occupy 
influential roles in the organisation. However, 
regulatees beginning to make more use of lawyers in 
the 1990s, and greater role within the OFT in 
relation to unfair contract terms.
References to law and legal cases 
✓
Common as a basis for bargaining strategies.
Adoption of overtly legal values 
** X
Preference for more bargaining strategies in the 
shadow of law indicated by demise of Part II power 
and a willingness to reach agreement without 
resorting to prosecution. However, natural justice 
considered important in hearings under Part ID of 
the FTA and under the Consumer Credit Act.
Type I juridification between the OFT and its regulatees (competition): 1973-1998
Frequent litigation 
X
No -  extremely little litigation over this period.
Coercive, inflexible regulatory strategy 
X
No -  the exact opposite: the Office was as 
consistently flexible and informal as possible.
Reliance on formal, legal processes 
X
No -  informal processes nearly always preferred.
Frequent prosecutions in response to breach of law 
X
No, although secret cartels prosecuted more 
frequently in the 1990s.
High presence / involvement of lawyers 
X
No -  at least not on OFT side.
Type II juridification between the OFT and its regulatees (competition): 1973-1998
Explicit legal argument 
X
Generally unimportant.
Regulatory contact seen as setting legal precedent 
X
Generally not relevant. Hope expressed that this 
would happen in the implementation of the 
Competition Act 1980, but not done in practice.
High presence / involvement of lawyers 
X
No -  at least not on the OFT side.
References to law and legal cases 
X
Not used as structure of monopoly, merger and 
restrictive practices control non-legalised.
Adoption of overtly legal values 
X
No -  for instance, in relation to merger controls, 
option of introducing guidelines resisted.
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Type I juridification between the OFT and its regulatees post-Competition Act 1998
Frequent litigation 
✓
Litigation much more common than previously with 
frequent appeals -  in some cases even by third 
parties
Coercive, inflexible regulatory strategy 
«/
Indicated by the widespread use of prosecution, and 
the absence of negotiation during a prosecution.
Reliance on formal, legal processes 
«✓
OFT’s procedures now determined by legal rules 
and followed rigidly
Frequent prosecutions in response to breach of law 
✓
Far more prosecutions than previously -  more 
investigations launched in two years than in the first 
twelve years since Competition Act 1980.
High presence / involvement of lawyers 
✓
Large increase in OFT lawyers, who also occupied 
important positions within the organisation
Type II juridification between the OFT and its regulatees post-Competition Act 1998
Explicit legal argument
V
As indicated by OFT decisions and the content of 
appeal submissions
Regulatory contact seen as setting legal precedent 
X
Less important perhaps as large EC case law already 
followed.
High presence / involvement of lawyers 
✓
Large increase in OFT lawyers, who also occupied 
important positions within the organisation
References to law and legal cases 
✓
Frequent references to EC law mandated by section 
60. Legal argument crucial in determining outcome.
Adoption of overtly legal values 
✓
Rigid adherence to legal procedure and due process 
norms with appeals in mind. Legal tests applied.
The case of the Office of Fair Trading thus shows up mixed results. In general, there was a 
lack of juridification that related to the Office’s persuasive regulatory strategy. However, ir 
the area of unfair contract terms, a persuasive regulatory strategy was accompanied by a 
focus on law and legal considerations. And in the area of competition policy, a new legal 
framework completely changed the nature of relationships between the Office and its 
regulatees, to the extent that they were now characterised by substantial juridification.
General evidence relating to the extent of juridification
As this thesis only takes two case studies, and especially as it was not possible tc 
select these case studies on the basis of a current theory of juridification, it is difficult to us<
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them to make valid generalisations as to the extent of juridification generally within the 
UK. Nonetheless, it remains interesting to see how these findings compare with the more 
general evidence of juridification as it has been defined in the course of this thesis.
In Chapter 1, it was noted that there have recently been several studies claiming 
trends of juridification (defined narrowly) in the context of a number of political and 
regulatory relationships. These include the areas of utilities regulation, the central-local 
government relationship, financial services regulation, military relations and competition 
policy. However, it was also apparent that studies tended either to focus on juridification in 
a particular field, without considering any general trends, or to see juridification as a 
constant rather than as a variable. We were left then with little sense of how widespread 
this phenomenon has become.
In addressing the general question of the importance of law in politics, legal 
scholars might wish to focus on the dramatic development of public law since the 1960s, 
emphasised in many textbooks. McEldowney (2002: 7), for instance, argues that “public 
law of the UK has come of age”. Fordham (2001: 536) states that “it is axiomatic that the 
law of judicial review is shifting, as it develops and matures”, whilst Supperstone and 
Goudie (1997: vii) note that “during the last three decades administrative law in the United 
Kingdom has been transformed”. The expert commentary in these practitioners’ texts is, 
moreover, matched by that of leading judges: for instance, Lord Diplock, argued that the 
rapid development of a rational and comprehensive system of administrative law was the 
greatest achievement of the English courts in his judicial lifetime,1 and Lord Bingham MR 
wrote that “judicial review was the boom stock of the 1980s. Unaffected by recession, the 
boom has roared on into the 1990s”. There are many other examples. Some commentators 
also back up their claims with figures, such as Bradley and Ewing (2003: 631) who support 
their comment that “during the last 25 years, there has been, and continues to be, a 
remarkable growth in litigation seeking judicial review of the decisions of public
1 R v Inland Revenue Commissioners, ex parte National Federation of Self Employed [1982] AC 617, 641.
2 In the introduction to Gordon (1996).
3 For a list of similar judicial comments, see Fordham (2001: 536-7)
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authorities”, with the fact that 5298 judicial review applications made in 2002 compares to 
3739 in 1997 -  an increase of over 40% in five years.4
It is noticeable though that the few legal textbooks that actually discuss the impact 
of this increase in judicial review applications tend to be somewhat equivocal. Supperstone 
and Goudie (1997: 1.15-1.16) assert that “the growth of judicial review, though it still 
exercises what de Smith characterised as a ‘sporadic and peripheral’ influence on public 
administration, has begun to have significant impact on the consciousness of 
administrators.” Harlow and Rawlings (1997: 530) first note that “litigant-driven, judicial 
review is indeed sporadic. A minority of cases concern central government and these are 
limited to a minority of departments. Its outreach too is limited by cost and chance.” 
Further on though, it is suggested that “statistics only tell part of the stoiy. They cannot 
measure the ‘ripple* effect of one decision on, perhaps, thousands of similar cases: a 
familiar premise of the test case... [Ljitigation has radiating effects, underpinning 
negotiation ‘in the shadow of the law* in multiple venues outside the courts.” Yet later, it is 
thought that “a more realistic hypothesis is that judicial review has only a sporadic, 
peripheral and temporary impact on government policy”.5 Bradley and Ewing (2003: 638- 
9) concur with this latter view, extending it to the general status of law within governance 
as follows:
It is not possible to describe the administrative process in terms of law alone.
There are many tasks (for example, budgeting, co-ordination and planning) to 
which law is not of primary relevance. Many politicians and administrators are 
likely to view law instrumentally as a means of achieving social or economic 
policies...
By contrast with taxation, in many areas of government the nature of the legal 
framework is deliberately skeletonic, so as to allow for wide discretion on the 
part of the government concerned in promoting policies that are nowhere laid 
down in statutory rules... In principle, discretionary powers are subject to control 
by the courts. In practice, the exercise of discretion is often closely controlled 
through policy decisions taken by ministers or by departmental rules which lay 
down how officials should exercise their powers. At one time, such policies and 
rules were often protected from publication outside Whitehall, but the more open 
approach to government that now exists requires disclosure of all policies and 
rules that are relevant to decision-making in individual cases.
4 For trends injudicial review applications generally, see Bridges et al (1995) and (2000). In the latter article, 
they note that whilst applications have been rising steadily, this has not been accompanied by a similar rise in 
the number of cases actually heard, due to the increasing use of settlements as a regulatory mechanism.
5 The uncertainty here can be attributed directly to the general paucity of evidence relating to judicial review, 
especially its impact on the decisions and procedures of public bodies. See generally Richardson and Sunkin 
(1996) and for an exception, Halliday (2000).
280
Many officials are therefore concerned with administering government 
policies rather than with administering law as such...
Thus it can be seen that there is substantial disagreement between commentators.6 
The debate has a certain resonance with the discussion in Chapter 1 as to the proper 
definition of juridification. Defined widely, it is possible to see the influx of law 
everywhere. For instance, it is now common for law firms, especially the big law firm s, to 
have regulatory departments.7 There is evidence also of a general “enlargement of the legal 
world”,8 with increases in litigation,9 lawyers10 and legal rules.11 Defined more narrowly as 
law in the foreground, governing and dominating relationships, suddenly law does not 
always seem quite so important.
We turn next to the main methodological points arising from the case studies: the 
value and utility of the indicators and the empirical understanding of law that underpins the 
definition of juridification.
Methodological points arising from the case studies
It will be recalled that one of the principal aims of this thesis was to develop an 
empirical approach to juridification. In Chapter 1, a definition of juridification was 
defended and adopted, and some of the empirical issues relating to that definition were
6 Halliday’s (2000: 119) conclusion, on the basis of three case studies relating to housing allocation, is thai 
“even if the structural contexts of administrative law permitted a flourishing legal conscientiousness, th< 
limited focus of judicial review substantially reduces its potential to influence the multiple exercises o: 
discretion which die administrative process entails”, and thus that the effect of judicial review on bureaucratic 
decisions is extremely limited.
7 Source: www.legal500.com which recommends virtually all of the biggest law firms in the UK in the area o: 
regulation. Firms listed include Clifford Chance, Herbert Smith, Lovells, Allen & Overy, Freshfields 
Brukhaus Deringer, Simmons & Simmons, DLA, SJ Berwyn, Ashurst Morris Crisp, Norton Rose, Linklaters
< Baker & McKenzie and Dechert.
8 See Galanter(1992)
9 “In England and Wales, original proceedings in the High Court increased from 140,003 in 1963 to 261,761 
in 1988... There were comparable increases in civil appeals and ‘a striking growth in the numbers ant 
caseload of tribunals’” -  Galanter (1992: 8).
10 In 1960, there were 20,988 lawyers in England and Wales. By 1985, there were a total of 51,857.
11 Galanter (1992: 6) points out that the average number of pages added annually to the statute book almos 
doubled from the 1950s to the early 1980s.
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outlined. The chapter also set out some indicators of juridification. In Chapters 3 to 6, these 
indicators were used to summarise the empirical findings of the case studies. In this section, 
these indicators are considered in light of how well they were able to capture the evidence 
of the case studies. The discussion then moves on to the question, first asked in Chapter 1, 
as to whether the growth of and reliance upon soft law should be considered as evidence of 
juridification.
Indicators of juridification
In order to assess the utility of the indicators, we start by putting the results into an 
overarching form, as follows:
IN DIC ATO R
strategy 
Reliance on formal, legal 
processes______
The table confirms that there were two clear-cut cases of juridification: the CRE 
between 1977 and 1982 and the OFT in the field of competition policy since the 1998 Act. 
There were also two cases of partial juridification: the CRE between 1983 and 1988 and the 
OFT in the field of consumer protection -  although the latter is misleading in that many of 
the positive findings relate specifically to unfair consumer contract terms rather than to
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consumer protection as a whole. In all the other cases, law was effectively not governing 
regulatory relationships.
In very general terms then, these indicators can be seen to give quite an accurate 
impression of the place of law in regulatory relationships. Their utility may be limited, 
however, by the ease with which they can be applied. Whilst the data for some of these 
indicators may be obtainable without detailed qualitative study (for instance, the extent of 
litigation and the number of prosecutions), most of the remaining indicators would require 
detailed qualitative study to use. This would suggest generally that several indicators would 
need to be used, accompanied by a consideration of how they operated in practice, in order 
to establish whether or not law is dominating or governing a particular relationship.
It is possible to explore this further however, by focusing in on specific indicators. 
In order to consider the accuracy of the indicators and the way in which they inter-relate, 
consider now the same table, but this time with a horizontal rather than vertical focus:
INDICATOR
Frequent litigation
Reliance on formal, legal
______ processes______
Frequent prosecutions in 
response to breach of law
High presence / involvement of
Regulatory contact seen as 
setting legal precedent
Adoption of overtly legal values
The table is interesting, as it suggests that the Type I indicators tend to go together 
far more than the Type II indicators. In other words, there seems to be a particular 
connection between litigation and the type of regulatory strategy followed, the presence and
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involvement of lawyers and the number of prosecutions. In the case of the Commission for 
Racial Equality (1977-82), the nature of these connections was shown clearly: a coercive 
regulatory strategy led directly to a high number of formal investigations, an adversarial 
backlash and the central involvement of lawyers on both sides. It would seem that the 
converse is also true: a persuasive strategy with few prosecutions is less likely to generate 
litigation, and lawyers are less important in the contacts between the sides. This was 
generally the case, for instance, with the Office of Fair Trading and its regulation of 
consumer protection. Thus in terms of Type I juridification, the table implies that even one 
or two factors may serve as accurate indicators. It can be concluded then that indicators 
could be used relatively easily in a large-scale study of Type I juridification.
With Type II, however, the table reveals a more complex picture. References to 
law and legal cases are extremely common -  highlighting the fact that even in those 
regulatory relationships which are not being governed or dominated by law, there can still 
be an important structuring role for law. Thus even when the CRE moved away from a 
deterrence strategy, it still used law as one lever for reaching settlements. By contrast, the 
perception of regulatory contact as setting legal precedent is relatively rare. However, this 
does not mean that it is of m in o r importance: it was, for instance, the key distinguishing 
feature of the juridification of unfair consumer contract terms regulation. Finally, it should 
be said that the Type II indicators are generally more difficult to apply, relying generally on 
more subjective interpretations of evidence, and the variations within the table imply that 
there are unlikely to be shortcuts. The Type II indicators are thus unlikely to be of much use 
in the context of a large-scale study. Instead their use rests in providing a focus for 
qualitative studies.
The above table is useful for another reason though, in addition to what it says 
about the indicators themselves. This is that it serves as a way of emphasising some of the 
patterns in the case studies. For instance, it highlights the fact that juridification is not an 
either / or category: there are levels of juridification, and it is perfectly possible for law to 
play an important role in some respects but not others. In the case of the OFT and its 
contacts with “rogue traders” under Part III of the Fair Trading Act, there was a reliance on 
informal processes and a general absence of litigation, with prosecutions rare. Yet there 
was also a trend during the 1990s of regulatees making greater use of lawyers and relying
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on legal argument. Thus whilst law was not governing the regulatory contacts, it was 
occasionally brought to the foreground of these relationships. Next, whilst the table 
confirms the link between the deterrence strategy of regulation and Type I juridification, it 
indicates that Type II juridification is possible even under a persuasive strategy. This is an 
important point, to which we will return before the end of this chapter. Finally, it confirms 
that the categories of Type I and Type II juridification are indeed useful ones. The 
theoretical argument made in Chapter 1 that it is perfectly possible for juridification to exist 
without litigation or the use of formal, legal processes, has been confirmed by the case 
studies, with the most important example being the regulation of unfair consumer contract 
terms.
Soft law and juridification
Should a growing reliance upon and use of soft law be taken as evidence of 
juridification? In Chapter 1, this question was discussed and the provisional answer given 
that:
In the absence of any straightforward way of discovering the bindingness of soft 
law, it will be assumed in this thesis that this should be left open to empirical 
investigation. Thus only if it appears that soft law is treated as legally binding by 
the parties will it be assumed that this constitutes evidence of juridification. In 
general therefore, it is references to and reliance upon hard law that is seen as 
constituting the more reliable evidence.
It is submitted, on the basis of an examination of the evidence of the case studies, 
that this approach was a useful one, and that researchers should, in general, be cautious 
about assuming that the growth in soft law implies juridification. This is because tools such 
as codes of practice or guidelines are often viewed less as legal instruments governing 
regulatory relationships than as a starting point for negotiations or as informational tools.
Consider some of the specific examples of the use of soft law. In the case of the 
Commission for Racial Equality, codes of practice in the areas of employment and housing 
were used primarily as a springboard for a new promotional strategy. Whilst the codes did 
have a clearly defined legal effect, they were not binding and rather than govern the 
relationships between the Commission and its regulatees, they provided a reference point 
for negotiations. In the case of the Office of Fair Trading, codes were used as a substitute
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for legalised regulation, and indeed the preference for negotiations based on these codes 
was strong evidence of the Office’s non-juridified relationships with its regulatees.
The case of the OFT also tells us much about the insignificance of the name of an 
instrument. Merger guidelines produced during the 1970s and 1980s may have been called 
guidelines; yet they prescribed virtually nothing, merely outlining the normal 
administrative procedures employed and the types of considerations taken into account. In 
sharp contrast, the guidelines produced by the Office under the Competition Act 1998, were 
very evidently intended as binding legal documents: they set out rights and duties, relevant 
case law, and relied upon statements made in Parliament in a fascinating application of the 
Pepper v Hart rule.12
The case studies thus highlight the need to be cautious in assuming that the use of 
soft law implies juridification. When codes of practice are viewed as an acceptable form of 
self-regulation that obviates more legalised and coercive alternatives such as legislation, it 
is positively misleading to see them as evidence of juridification, and falls into the trap of 
equating juridification with simply more law. In general, the growth of such instruments 
may reflect trends other than juridification. For instance, Bradley and Ewing (2003: 639) 
argue that the increasing appearance of such instruments may be less a sign of juridification 
than of increasing transparency. According to this view, what has changed is not so much 
the amount of soft law but its visibility. On the same lines, it has also been suggested that 
the growth of soft law may simply relate to computerisation, such that what might 
previously have been conveyed in meetings can now be distributed electronically.13 In any 
case, the crucial point is that it is the way in which soft law operates in practice, how it is 
seen by the parties and whether it is treated as legally binding, that matters -  not its mere 
presence.
12 Another example that can be added to this list is the set of guidelines produced by the Office for Trading 
Standards Departments as to the proper implementation of Part HI of the Fair Trading Act. See the arguments 
in Chapter 4, emphasising how these guidelines were not intended to be legally binding.
13 This was suggested to me by Professor Carol Harlow, who pointed out that in a university setting what used 
to be agreed in departmental meetings was often now circulated in rule form through e-mail -  less a sign of 
legalisation than of a new and convenient method of communication.
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Explaining juridification and its absence in the case studies
Why, in general, did juridification fail to occur, and what do the cases 
characterised by juridification have in common?
In the case of the Commission for Racial Equality, it should be recalled that a 
coercive, deterrence-based regulatory strategy was initially predicted by the regulatory 
strategy literature — indeed, it was because of this that the case study was chosen in the first 
place. A number of factors gave rise to this prediction: the close contacts with pro­
regulation groups, the make-up of its staff, the lack of direct legal and political controls and 
the strong investigatory powers under the Race Relations Act for which the Commission’s 
predecessor -  the Race Relations Board -  had campaigned. The initial enforcement strategy 
of the Commission was thus consistent with the claims of the regulatory strategy literature, 
as set out in Chapter 2.
In practice, the Commission’s deterrence-based approach implied substantial 
juridification. Consistent with the claims of the regulatory strategy literature,14 the evidence 
confirmed the intimate connection between this strategy and a focus on legal rules and on 
processes over outcomes. The rigidity of the Commission once a formal investigation had 
been launched was highlighted by a number of cases where, had the Commission’s primary 
objective been to promote racial equality and good race relations, it might have considered 
reaching settlements and discontinuing the investigations, and yet the Commission did not 
do so. Evidence was also presented to indicate that, in the early years of its work, the 
Commission refused to accept binding undertakings in lieu of non-discrimination notices 
largely because it believed that this would be unlawful under the Race Relations Act.
Moreover, the Commission’s strategy also led to further juridification. Its 
regulatees responded through legal adversarialism, and this recourse to the courts 
encouraged the Commission to focus still further on strict legal interpretations of its powers 
in an attempt to make its decisions “court-proof’.
However, in the case of the CRE, there were counter-reactions to juridification that 
led directly to a process of de-juridification. The new process was sparked off by some
14 See Chapter 1 and the next section of this chapter for a more detailed consideration of where this claim 
appears within the literature.
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catalysts: in particular, the legal cases of Hillingdon and Prestige and the political 
judgement of the Home Affairs Select Committee, as well as the appointment of a new 
Commission Chairman. But these events did not occur by chance: they all had common 
roots in the effects of juridification. Two-thirds of all formal investigations started by the 
Commission were affected by litigation -  this extraordinary statistic caused organisational 
paralysis: a backlog of cases, low morale amongst staff, and a general lack of confidence in 
conducting further investigations. Thus the Commission’s de-juridifying decisions with 
respect to formal investigations was caused by the effects of (Type I) juridification itself.
What explains the subsequent further de-juridification of relationships between the 
CRE and its regulatees? In this case, the factor that stands out is the need to justify 
activities in terms of their cost effectiveness. This was due to two complementary factors: 
the general push from government for public management reform, and the accompanying 
budgetary cutbacks. In this context, the costs of juridification simply could not be afforded: 
formal legal contacts were expensive in comparison with the use of informal approaches, 
and litigation was a further cost that was to be avoided. On the part of regulatees, the 
possibility of avoiding formal action was a significant incentive which, in itself, encouraged 
a non-confrontational stance. Formal legal contacts were thus replaced by negotiation and 
bargaining in the shadow of the law.
To sum up: in the case of the Commission for Racial Equality, the costs of 
juridification proved too high to be sustainable, especially within a context of political 
pressures and budgetary constraints. There was also an element of learning from 
experience: informal approaches often proved more productive than heavy-handed, 
legalistic contacts.
In the case of the Office of Fair Trading, some similar themes were present: the 
costs of juridification meant that it was deliberately avoided, and there were other 
incentives to maintain informal contacts. First though it is necessary to recall the arguments 
in Chapter 2 that the regulatory strategy literature predicted an initial lack of juridification 
due to a combination of factors: the institutional history of competition policy prior to the 
Fair Trading Act 1973, the civil service staffing arrangements of the Office, the strength of 
pro-business groups relative to consumer groups, the institutional fragmentation of many 
aspects of policy, and the high level of political oversight possessed by the Secretary of
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State. All these factors were influential in the subsequent nature of regulatory relationships. 
With respect to competition policy prior to 1998, the Office continued with a style of 
regulation that was very much in keeping with pre-1973 policy. It could be -  although this 
was not demonstrated in Chapter 5 - that the predominance of civil servants working in the 
Office, and especially the number of secondments from the Department of Trade and 
Industry, was an important factor in this continuity. What was shown clearly in Chapter 5, 
however, was the central role of the Secretary of State: effectively this ruled out an 
interventionist approach on the part of the Office. In the case of merger control, the advice 
given by the Office even tended to be based partly on the anticipated decision by the DTI.
Legal design factors also limited the scope for juridification in many policy areas. 
The Part II powers to create criminal offences became useless to the Office because of the 
delays and inflexibility of the whole process. In this case, institutional fragmentation 
combined with certain weaknesses in the legal design, such as the inability of the Secretary 
of State to renegotiate the details of a proposal. The Part HI powers to prosecute rogue 
traders were also used rarely, because of the reliance on Trading Standards Departments 
and the need to prove “persistent conduct” in the courts. Gradually, the delays and risk of 
losing a case meant that the Office tried to resolve matters without using the power at all, 
except as a latent threat. In competition policy, the structure of control with references to 
the MMC introduced further limitations on the Office’s ability to choose its own style of 
enforcement. With respect to restrictive trade practices, the desire on all sides to avoid 
lengthy, expensive proceedings in the Restrictive Practices Court was the driving force 
behind negotiations between the Office and parties to agreements in lieu of juridification. 
Weaknesses in the legislation, such as the requirement for the Office to have evidence of a 
secret cartel before it could begin investigating it, further limited the possibility of a more 
interventionist regulatory policy.
Thus in the case of the Office of Fair Trading, the structure of the regulatory 
system militated against juridification. Whilst the discretion of the Director General to set 
the policy agenda was high, his coercive powers were relatively weak, and his political 
controls strong. In addition though, especially in the area of competition policy, by the time 
the Office was created, there was already a long and established tradition in terms of the 
nature of government intervention. Wilks (1999) has argued that competition policy itself
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can be considered an institution with “regulative, normative and cognitive dimensions” and 
having a “long-term, systematic and predictable effect on human behaviour”.15
It should be added that, as with the case of the CRE, resource constraints were also 
important in the case of the OFT, constraining its ability to prosecute more widely -  even 
had it wished to do so. There were several examples of this noted in Chapters 4 and 5: the 
low budget given to enforcement in the late 1980s due to the concentration on processing 
credit licensing, and the low number of investigations under the Competition Act 1980. 
Chapter 5 also saw a converse example: a decision by the Office to increase the proportion 
of its budget devoted to investigating secret cartels in the early 1990s led directly to an 
increase in prosecutions under the Restrictive Trade Practices Act 1976 and thus to an 
increase in the number of relationships between the Office and its regulatees that were 
characterised by juridification.
Finally, it is interesting to note also the interaction effects of certain causal 
variables. Legal design weaknesses may not, in themselves, have prevented the regulatory 
agencies from trying to utilise their powers extensively -  however, when combined with 
budgetary constraints, they became of crucial importance. A favourable political 
environment (in terms of support for strong regulation) tended also to lead to further 
resources, as was the case with the OFT following the Competition Act 1998, and the 
converse was also true, as the CRE found in the 1980s.
The following table sums up the main causes of the lack of juridification in the 
two case studies. It can be seen that there are some common themes: budgetary constraints, 
legal design factors, political environment factors and the apparent success of the 
persuasive approach to regulation. As the table in Chapter 2 (reproduced from Kagan 
(1994)) indicates, all of these are flagged up in the regulatory strategy literature as 
significant. More basically though, the general absence of juridification and its connection 
to the predominance of the persuasive regulatory strategy, has confirmed key predictions of 
this literature, as set out towards the end of Chapter 1.
15 Wilks (1999: 159, 339-340)
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CRE (1983-2000) Legal and political pressures, budgetary constraints, apparent superiority of 
persuasive strategy.
OFT (consumer protection) Persuasive regulatory strategy in turn influenced by a combination of staffing 
arrangements, strength of pro-business groups relative to consumer groups, 
legal design factors and budgetary constraints
OFT (competition prior to 
1998)
Persuasive regulatory strategy in turn caused by institutional history of 
competition policy, staffing arrangements, strength of pro-business groups, 
legal design, budgetary constraints, success of informal processes.
The case of the Office of Fair Trading did also, however, offer up two clear cases 
of juridification: unfair contract terms and competition policy post-1998. Unlike 
juridification in the early years of the Commission for Racial Equality, these two areas of 
regulation have, moreover, remained juridified. Strikingly, they share an immediate cause: 
both cases were the direct result of legislation that harmonised the UK position with EC 
law. In the case of competition policy, this was done to such an extent that a special clause, 
section 60, was included in the Act to ensure that EC law would be a central consideration 
for regulators and regulatees alike. In the case of unfair contract terms, the requirements of 
the EC directive led directly to overtly legal exchanges, and the incentives for the law to be 
worked out on the ground rather than in the courts hardly detracted from the need for 
consistent legal interpretations and thus a body of case law.
The regulatory fields of both unfair contract terms and competition thus had 
something in common. Juridification did not stem from the Office’s style of regulation, it 
did not stem from the attitude of regulatees, and it did not stem from decisions of the 
courts. Rather, juridification was imposed on both regulatory fields through the introduction 
of EC jurisprudence into UK law.
The causes of juridification in the case studies can be summed up by the following
table:
CRE (1977-82) Deterrence regulatory strategy (caused by institutional history, staff make-up, 
and close links with pro-regulation groups), and poor legal design.
OFT (unfair contract terms) Legal demands of transposing EC law into UK law, the structure of legal
control.
OFT (competition policy 
from 1998)
Legal demands of transposing EC law into UK law, legal design factors.
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The Office of Fair Trading and Commission for Racial Equality were only two 
case studies, and thus it is necessary to be cautious about making generalisations without 
further testing. Nonetheless, it is also noteworthy how many of the causes of juridification 
and its absence within these case studies match the causes of variations in regulatory 
strategy as they appear in that literature. To that extent, and subject to the arguments in the 
next section, the case studies serve to confirm the importance of this literature in 
understanding the phenomenon of juridification.
Implications o f the findings for the regulatory strategy literature
The regulatory strategy literature contains many findings that are relevant to a 
study of juridification. In this particular study, it successfully predicted the trends in the 
case of the Commission for Racial Equality: both the initial juridification and the 
subsequent dominance of the persuasive strategy and the lessening in importance of law in 
the relationships with its regulatees. In the case of the Office of Fair Trading, it successfully 
anticipated the general dominance of the persuasive strategy and the general lack of 
juridification that ensued. These predictions were set out in Chapter 2 of this thesis, and 
subsequently confirmed in the case studies.
However, with respect to two particular claims, the findings of this thesis suggests 
that the literature may need revision. The first of these is the connection made between 
regulatory strategy and the presence or absence of juridification. The second is the 
dominance of the persuasive regulatory strategy. In the next two sections therefore, each of 
these claims are reviewed in turn.
The claim of the connection between regulatory strategy and juridification
The regulatory strategy literature assumes that, in practice, there tends to be a 
connection between a deterrence-based coercive regulatory strategy and a general focus on 
legal rules. This is because the coercive strategy tends to be rigid in outlook. If particular 
prosecutions are intended to “send a message” not only to the particular violator concerned
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but also to other potential violators, there is little that is likely to persuade the regulator to 
drop the prosecution. The key question is whether or not the rules have been broken. This 
association is made by, amongst many others, David Vogel (1986: 21) claiming that “on 
balance, the American approach to environmental regulation is the most rigid and rule- 
oriented to be found in any industrial society; the British, the most flexible and informal”, 
and Hawkins and Thomas (1984: 13) who state that “in a deterrence system... the 
enforcement style tends to be accusatory and adversarial, leading to routine reliance on 
formal legal processes”} 6
The persuasive regulatory strategy, on the other hand, is unlikely to have such a 
reliance on rules and formal, legal processes. On the contrary: the defining characteristic of 
this approach to regulation is its focus on outcomes rather than processes. As it focuses less 
on past acts (whether the law has been broken) than on future goals (how to secure future 
compliance), it is intrinsically more flexible. Moreover, the place of law is inherently 
different under this model: it becomes facilitative, a way of structuring negotiations, a 
latent threat to be used only in the final resort. Indeed, it is even argued (Reiss 1984: 24) 
that the use of law is seen as a sign of failure in such a strategy, emphasising the inability of 
the regulator to secure compliance through other means.
Thus, as the passage quoted in Chapter 1 from Shover et al (1986: 10) made clear, 
there is a natural connection in practice between the deterrence strategy and juridification, 
and between the persuasive strategy and its absence. The deterrence strategy encompasses
17“an overriding drive towards the rationalisation of all aspects of the regulatory process”. It 
tends to imply “the reliance on formal, precise and specific rules; the literal interpretation 
of rules, the reliance on the advice of legal technicians, the quest for uniformity and the 
distrust of and an adversarial orientation towards the regulated”. The persuasive strategy, 
on the other hand, has a “dominant orientation towards obtaining compliance with the spirit 
of the law”. Under this strategy, there is a tendency towards “general, flexible guidelines, 
the discretionary interpretation of rules, (and) bargaining between agency and regulated 
industry conducted by technical experts”.
16 emphases added.
17 Note how this reflects one of the main arguments put forward by Loughlin (1996) to explain juridification -  
the trend in modem society to rationalise.
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It is assumed therefore that different regulatory strategies imply very different 
roles for law. Yet the case of the Office of Fair Trading throws up an intriguing possibility: 
that it is perfectly possible for a persuasive regulatory strategy to be accompanied by 
substantial juridification. The particular field where this has occurred is in the regulation of 
unfair consumer contract terms. Contact between the Office and its regulatees in relation to 
unfair terms has been based undeniably around a persuasive strategy, characterised by 
continuing discussions and the general absence of litigation. At the same time, however, 
contacts have been extremely legalistic and technical, focused on the interpretation of rules 
and very self-consciously intended to establish the law on the ground. That the regulatory 
strategy literature has not picked up on this combination reflects the fact that it is relatively 
new -  a direct result of the increasing clash of UK-style regulation and the need to 
incorporate the requirements of an EC Directive.
The claim of the dominance of the persuasive regulatory strategy
In Chapter 1, it was shown that one of the main claims of the regulatory strategy 
literature was the dominance of the persuasive strategy. Importantly, this was more than a 
descriptive claim: it was linked to a number of other claims, including the claim that the 
persuasive strategy is a superior strategy, and claims that there were inherent reasons why it 
was likely to be far more common than the deterrence strategy. Before showing how the 
empirical findings of this thesis might impact on this, it is worth setting out these 
arguments in a little more detail.
One of the main reasons why the persuasive strategy was assumed to prevail was a 
normative reason -  that it was simply more effective. For instance, Veljanovski (1991: 175) 
argues that “discretionary enforcement shifts the cost-effectiveness decision out of the rule- 
making phase of the regulatory process onto the enforcement official who can be expected 
to have more detailed knowledge of the compliance potential of different classes of 
offenders”. He further argues that the use of prosecutions as a threat offers the violator 
incentive for compliance. Meanwhile, Ayres and Braithwaite (1992) consider a number of 
disciplinary perspectives to argue that a ‘tit-for-tat’ or responsive regulation approach is the 
most rational. Under this approach, the bulk of regulatory contact is persuasive, with
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sanctions only used if this strategy is failing to secure compliance. Hutter’s (1997) 
‘insistent’ strategy is in a similar vein.
There are a number of other reasons advanced through the literature to arrive at 
this prediction that the persuasive strategy would dominate, some attracting greater 
empirical support than others. These include claims based on budgetary constraints — for 
instance, Clarke (2000) argues that the predominance of the persuasive strategy is 
explained at least partially by “the impossibility of using coercion extensively enough to 
achieve success given the imbalance of resources between most regulators and regulatees”. 
And in Chapter 1, the influential work of Vogel (1986) was cited -  a piece claiming that the 
differences in styles of regulation between the US and the UK are explained by different 
institutional histories and different historical relationships between government and 
business. Both of these claims have found support in this thesis, as was summarised in the 
last section.
Despite this general support however, there is one case in this thesis that fails to 
conform to the prediction of the literature that the persuasive strategy will be predominant. 
This is the case of the Office of Fair Trading and its regulation of competition since the 
Competition Act 1998, in which a persuasive strategy has given way to a strategy which is 
contains most of the features of the deterrence strategy, frequent prosecutions, a relatively 
rigid and rule-orientated approach to those prosecutions, and generally heavy reliance on 
law and legal processes. The most proximate cause of this was legal design: sections 51 and 
60 which essentially forced juridification onto the Office. More generally though, the 
emergence of juridification and the resulting deterrent strategy again stems from the 
inherent difficulties of incorporating EC law into a UK context.
The impact of EC law on the nature of UK regulation thus emerges as a significant 
finding of this thesis. In both of the recent cases in which it was discovered, juridification 
came directly from Europe. Juridification in the case of the CRE proved not to be 
sustainable. It was caused by a deterrence strategy and soon gave way to a persuasive 
strategy with far less of a reliance on law. But recent juridification in the case of the OFT 
may well be here to stay: it differs from the juridification in the CRE case as rather than 
being caused by a deterrence strategy, it has helped to give rise to it.
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Conclusion
In general, this thesis has provided support to the existing literature on regulatory 
strategies in two main ways. Firstly, it has confirmed that juridification, defined as the 
governing of regulatory relationships by law and legal considerations, does not occur as 
often as a cursory glance through the juridification literature might suggest. Instead, the 
place of law in regulatory relationships is often complex, and it varies -  sometimes 
dominating relationships, sometimes remaining in the background. Most of the time 
though, relationships are not governed or dominated by law to the extent that they should 
be described as juridified. Secondly, it has confirmed that the causes of this general absence 
of juridification are in line with previous studies of regulatory strategy. Legal design 
factors, resource constraints, political constraints, institutional history and the apparent 
success of the persuasive regulatory strategy often combine to push law to the background, 
with regulator and regulatee either preferring or being compelled to concentrate on extra- 
legal contacts.
However, this general support is qualified by two specific findings. The first of 
these is the finding that regulatory strategy is not always connected to juridification in the 
way claimed by the regulatory strategy literature. The second is the finding that the 
persuasive strategy is not always predominant, and in particular can be threatened by 
juridification imposed from the outside. The common factor in each of these findings is that 
they stem from the recent need to import EC norms into UK regulation. If the link between 
this process and juridification is confirmed through further testing, we might be seeing the 
beginning of a trend in UK regulation, with law appearing far more regularly in the 
foreground of regulatory relationships.
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outlined. The chapter also set out some indicators of juridification. In Chapters 3 to 6, these 
indicators were used to summarise the empirical findings of the case studies. In this section, 
these indicators are considered in light of how well they were able to capture the evidence 
of the case studies. The discussion then moves on to the question, first asked in Chapter 1, 
as to whether the growth of and reliance upon soft law should be considered as evidence of 
juridification.
Indicators of juridification
In order to assess the utility o f the indicators, we start by putting the results into an 
overarching form, as follows:
B
Frequent litigation * X X X X
Coercive inflexible regulatory 
strategy
* * X X X
■
X *
Reliance on formal, legal 
processes
* * X X X X x
*
Frequent prosecutions in 
response to breach of law
* * X X X
x
X
*
High presence / involvement of 
lawyers
* * X X X * X *
Explicit legal argument
.
* * * X * X * X <✓
Regulatory contact seen as 
setting legal precedent
* X X X * X X
References to law and legal 
cases
* «/ * X <✓ x */
Adoption of overtly legal 
values
* * X X X * X X *
OVERALL (out of 9) _  9__ 5V2 IVi 1 3 0 8
The table confirms that there were two clear-cut cases of juridification: the CRI 
between 1977 and 1982 and the OFT in the field o f competition policy since the 1998 Act
11 Galanter (1992: 6) points out that the average number of pages added annually to the statute book almo: 
doubled from the 1950s to the early 1980s.
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